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Executive Summary in English 
 
For several centuries, imperial and global historians have shown, the world was 
dominated by dynastic and tributary empires until bureaucratically-organized and 
market-oriented imperial formations came to dominate from the mid-1800s. 
Increasingly, scholars within the research fields of international history, international 
relations and development studies recognize that this global imperial system has 
influenced deeply the structural logics, ways of organising and practices of the United 
Nations regime, which emerged in and after the Second World War.  
However, this is far from the case within the research field on UN peacekeeping 
that is dominated by primarily contemporary oriented social science disciplines. Only 
a handful of scholars, here set as the ‘imperial segment’, see the interventions—that 
install externalising and unaccountable systems of governance in former colonies at a 
growing speed—and the international system they are part of, as imperial in nature. 
Despite their contributions, most peacekeeping scholars link the mounting problems 
of the interventions and their state-building components in the ‘mission areas’ post-
Cold War Western hegemony and the associated rise of neoliberalism.  
In the context of an expanding interventionist international regime and research 
concerned mainly with the synchronic aspects thereof, the dissertation seeks to realise 
two aims. First, it seeks to advance interdisciplinary dialogue by linking the research 
on UN peacekeeping from the social sciences with imperial historiography, in other 
words by adding a diachronic dimension. Secondly, it seeks to build a theoretical 
framework and provide a two-part analysis of the first UN intervention in Egypt and 
the Gaza Strip from 1956 to 1967 to ground a new ‘peacekeeping’ narrative.  
Taking as its point of departure scholar of international relations Philip Cunliffe’s 
concepts of ‘multinational imperialism’ and ‘imperial multilateralism’, the theoretical 
framework joins these with the systemically oriented imperial historiography on the 
one hand and the network-, space- and people-centred imperial frontier studies on the 
other. Thus both historicising the interventions and the international system and 
creating linkage between what is conventionally seen as ‘global’ geopolitics and 
‘local’ everyday life, the theoretical framework insists that the international political 
and military systems of governance the interventions embody are not unchangeable 
global structures but simultaneously local and global human practices that can be 
understood, problematized, challenged and subsequently transformed.  
Taking a predominantly systemic view on the basis of not only but especially 
imperial and international historiography, the first part of the analysis examines 
initially how the history of the UN paradigm needs to be understood in extension of 
the shift in the imperial system from only imperial competition to imperial 
competition and inter-imperial cooperation in the late 19th century. It then turns to 
show how this changing frontier system manifested in the Mediterranean and Middle 
East, the region that would host the first United Nations peacekeeping operation in 
late 1956. Lastly, the first part examines how the increasing regional competition 
engendered by the shifting British, American and Soviet imperial frontiers created a 
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situation—the joint British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt—that led to the 
making of the UN intervention. In contrast to most scholarship, the dissertation 
suggests that the intervention was not only set up as a means to avoid a (world) war 
with the Soviet Union and renewed fighting between Israel and Egypt, but also 
represented one of several Western multilateral initiatives aimed at reopening and 
stabilising the oil deliveries to the increasingly anxious Western European members 
of NATO following the closing of the Suez Canal.  
Shifting to linking geopolitics and everyday life on the basis of research literature, 
published sources and hitherto mostly unused UN records, the second part of the 
analysis shows initially how—on the one hand—the UN force was built using mainly 
NATO military infrastructure and Western or Western-trained forces which led to 
conflicts with the Egyptians ‘on the ground’ during the UN force ‘escorting’ the 
French and British forces out, and—on the other—the canal clearance was done with 
nearly only Western companies and paid for only by Western canal users. It then turns 
to examine how the UN had to deploy the force into the Gaza Strip to ensure the 
withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces for Egypt to allow the Suez Canal to 
reopen. In turn, this led to confrontations with the Gaza Strip residents, which forced 
the UN to both abandon the emerging idea of a joint UN-Egyptian administration and 
change the UN area of operations from the entire Gaza Strip and to only near the 
Armistice Demarcation Line. Again in contrast to most scholarship, the dissertation 
argues that the UN force in this way came to favour Israeli to Palestinians security. 
Finally, the second part examines the diverse relations between the UN units and the 
Palestinians of the Gaza Strip, native residents and refugees alike, and Bedouin, 
confined by both Israel and Egypt, both near the ADL and inside the Gaza Strip, 
suggesting that the UN intervention resembled the British Mandate regime and that 
its ways of engendering ‘security’ similarly often translated into ‘local’ experiences 
of ‘insecurity’.  
At a time when the West is funding the UN (and other ‘security’ organisations) to 
launch more interventions with forces mostly from former colonies and install more 
externalising and unaccountable systems of governance in other former colonies, the 
dissertation’s theoretical framework and critical re-examination of the first UN 
intervention offer a fundamentally different point of departure for understanding 
‘peacekeeping’. In doing so, it both suggests that the research field of imperial history 
offers timely, if not crucial, theoretical and methodological tools to understand, 
problematize and contest the interventions and state-building projects, and calls for 
scholars to consider both their research context and work.    
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Executive Summary in Danish 
 
Imperial- og globalhistorikere har med deres forskning vist, at dynastiske og tributære 
imperier i flere hundrede år dominerede verden indtil bureaukratisk organiserede og 
markedsorienterede imperiale formationer blev dominerende fra omkring midten af 
1800-tallet. Indenfor forskningsfelterne international historie, internationale 
relationer og udviklingsstudier har forskere i stigende grad anerkendt, at dette globale 
imperiale system kraftigt har påvirket de strukturelle logikker, organisationsformerne 
og praksisserne i de internationale organisationer der hører under FN og som opstod 
under og efter Anden Verdenskrig.  
Dette er imidlertid ikke tilfældet indenfor forskningen i FN’s fredsbevarende 
operationer, der domineres af de primært samtidsorienterede samfundsvidenskaber. 
Kun en håndfuld af forskere, her samlet og betegnet som det ”imperiale segment”, ser 
interventionerne – der med stigende hastighed opretter eksterne styreformer, der ikke 
kan drages til ansvar, i de tidligere kolonier – og det internationale system, de er en 
del af, som imperiale. På trods af disse forskeres bidrag, har deres tanker 
tilsyneladende ikke vundet bred opbakning. Dette har bevirket, at de fleste forskere, 
der arbejder med fredsbevarende operationer, udelukkende kæder de voksende 
problemer, der erkendes i forbindelse med interventionerne, og deres ”state-building” 
i ”missionsområderne”, sammen med neoliberalismens udbredelse.    
Set i lyset af et sådant ekspanderende regime af interventioner i tidligere kolonier 
samt forskningen, der overvejende behandler de synkroniske aspekter heraf, søger 
denne afhandling at opnå to mål. For det første søger den at fremme en tværfaglig 
dialog ved at forbinde den samfundsvidenskabelige forskning i FN’s interventioner 
med historieforskningen i inter-imperiale sikkerhedssamarbejde, eller med andre ord, 
at tilføje en diakronisk dimension. For det andet søger afhandlingen, at opbygge en 
teoretisk ramme og på baggrund af denne at fremsætte en analyse af den første FN-
intervention i Egypten og i Gaza-Striben fra 1956 til 1967, der kan danne grundlag 
for en ny fortælling om FNs ”fredsbevarende” operationer.  
Med udgangspunkt i forskeren Philip Cunliffes begreber om ”multinational 
imperialism” og ”imperial multilateralism”, forbinder den teoretiske ramme den 
systemisk-orienterede imperiale historieforskning med det mere netværks-, steds- og 
menneske-centrerede historieforskningen ”imperial frontier studies”. Ved således 
både at historisere interventionerne og det internationale system samt at skabe en 
forbindelse imellem, hvad der konventionelt ses som ”global” geopolitik og ”lokal” 
hverdagsliv, fastholder den teoretiske ramme, at de internationale politiske og 
militære systemer og styreformer, som interventionerne repræsenterer, ikke er 
uforanderlige globale strukturer men sideløbende lokale og globale praksisser som 
kan forstås, problematiseres, udfordres og efterfølgende ændres.   
Analysen består af to dele. Igennem et systemisk blik hovedsageligt på baggrund 
af imperial og international historieforskning undersøger den første analysedel 
hvordan FN paradigmets historie bør forstås i forlængelse af udviklingen i det 
imperiale system i slutningen af det 19. århundrede, der betød et skifte fra alene et 
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system styret af imperial konkurrence til imperial konkurrence og inter-imperialt 
samarbejde. Dernæst vises hvordan det imperiale systems ”frontiers” manifesterede 
sig i Middelhavsområdet og Mellemøsten, hvor den FNs første ’fredsbevarende’ 
operation blev igangsat i 1956. Afslutningsvist undersøges det hvordan den stigende 
regionale rivalisering mellem de britiske, amerikanske og sovjetiske imperiale 
”frontiers”, skabte en situation – i form af den fælles britiske, franske og israelske 
invasion af Egypten – der førte til iværksættelsen af FN interventionen. Modsat 
størstedelen af forskningen med fokus på interventionen forslår afhandlingen, at FN-
interventionen ikke kun fungerede som en måde hvorpå man kunne undgå en 
(verdens-) krig med Sovjetunionen og en ny krig mellem Israel og Ægypten, men også 
repræsenterede et af flere vestlige multilaterale initiativer, der havde til formål at 
genåbne og stabilisere olieleverancerne til de vesteuropæiske medlemmer af NATO, 
der blev stadigt mere urolige ift. deres olieforsyninger i kølvandet på lukningen af 
Suezkanalen.  
Analysens anden del skifter fra vægte de systemiske og geopolitiske forhold til at 
vægte udviklingen ”på jorden” og hverdagslivet på baggrund af forskningslitteratur, 
publiceret kildemateriale og indtil nu mestendels ubenyttede FN arkivalier. Det 
afdækkes, at FN-styrken især blev opbygget på baggrund af NATOs militære 
infrastruktur og med vestlige eller vestligt trænede styrker, hvilket førte til konflikter 
med en række ægyptere under den del af operationen der skulle ekskortere de franske 
og britiske styrker ud. Det vises også, at genåbningen af Suezkanalen næsten alene 
blev gennemført af vestlige virksomheder og ligeledes udelukkende blev finansieret 
af vestlige kanalbrugere. Herefter vises hvorledes FN blev nødsaget til at indsætte 
styrken i Gaza-Striben med henblik på at sikre de israelske besættelsesstyrkers 
tilbagetrækning før Egypten ville genåbne kanalen. Indsættelsen af FN-styrken i 
landsbyerne og byerne i Gazastriben medførte konfrontationer, hvilket tvang FN-
styrken ud til ”the Armistice Demarcations Line” (ADL), der adskilte Israel og Gaza-
Striben. Igen i modsætning til størstedelen af forskningen argumenteres det således, 
at FN-styrken derved kom til at fungere som et ekstra lag grænsekontrol for Israel. 
Afslutningsvis vises igennem en analyse af relationerne imellem FN-enhederne og 
palæstinenserne og beduinerne, der var ’spærret inde’ i Gaza-Striben af både Israel og 
Egypten, både nær ADL’en og i selve Gaza-Striben, hvorledes interventionen på 
mange måder mindede om det britiske mandatregime og at dets ”sikkerhedsregime” 
også ofte kunne opleves af de ”lokale” som ”usikkerhed”.  
På et tidspunkt hvor vesten betaler FN (og andre sikkerhedsorganisationer) for at 
lancere flere interventioner med styrker hovedsageligt fra tidligere kolonier for at 
oprette flere eksternaliserende regeringssystemer, der ikke kan drages til ansvar, i 
andre tidligere kolonier – tilbyder afhandlingens teoretiske ramme og kritiske 
undersøgelse af den første FN-intervention et fundamentalt anderledes udgangspunkt 
for at forstå FNs ”fredsbevarende” operationer. Ikke blot foreslås herved, at den 
imperialhistoriske forskning tilbyder rettidige, måske endog vitale, teoretiske og 
metodiske værktøjer til at forstå, problematisere og anfægte interventionerne og disses 
”state-building” komponenter. Forskerne indenfor for forskningsfeltet opfordres også 
på denne baggrund til at reflektere over deres kontekst og forskning.      
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Introduction 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“A peacekeeping force is like a family friend 
who has moved into the household stricken by 
disaster. It must conciliate, console, and 
discreetly run the household without ever 
appearing to dominate or usurp the natural 
rights of those it is helping”.1 
 
Brian Urquhart (Former British 
military officer, UN Under-
Secretary-General, and involved 
in several interventions) 
 
 
In Short…. 
 
Global and imperial historiography have shown that a large portions of humankind 
lived under dynastic and multi-ethnic empires from 1400 to 1800s and what we label 
imperialism from the mid-19th century to the middle of the 20th century. Today, 
however, our schools and universities teach us— as our politicians and representatives 
of international organisations remind us—that we live in an international system 
comprised of nation states and international organisations that want nothing more than 
to eradicate poverty, save the planet and so forth. Would it not be odd, however, if the 
nation states, as both relatively new phenomenon in global history and the children of 
colonial empires and imperialism, influenced our international system more than the 
dynamics of empires and imperialism, which for several centuries dominated the 
history of our world?  
With this dissertation, I seek to link this broader question of the links between the 
‘imperial’ and the ‘international’ to the recent lines of concrete and critical enquiry in 
research on international military interventions (known as ‘peacekeeping’ 
operations). Scholars from a range of disciplines have taken to examine these issues 
from various perspectives. As of now, however, only few scholars studying 
international interventions have clarified what they exactly mean by ‘empire’ or 
                                                          
1 B. Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, New York, 1987, 248. 
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‘imperialism’.2 The discussion has yet therefore to lead to radical new narratives that 
go beyond the scholarship itself. I consequently seek to expand the existing common 
ground to invite ‘mainstream’ scholars into the debate. To do so, the dissertation 
‘imperialises’ the traditional narratives of the 20th century by way of a composite 
theoretical framework rooted in both imperial historiography and research on 
international interventions and an analysis of the first ‘peacekeeping’ intervention on 
basis of hitherto unused and unpublished sources.  
This may seem a radical step. However, it is not. It is merely an invitation to take 
part in a long overdue contestation of the prevailing Western periodization of the 20th 
century in most research on international interventions. Periodization, American 
foreign policy historian Andrew Bacevich notes, obscures rather than clarifies.3 This 
has to do with how, historian of Asia Prasenjit Duara contends, “Periods are shaped 
by structures emerging from centres of power that tend to dominate historical life. 
Like all hegemonic formations, such structures tend to channel and restrict the 
imagination of the social, the political, and selfhood (…).”4 However, the counter-
narrative scholars tuned in on the ‘imperial’ already promote needs to be expanded 
into, rather than identity itself in opposition to, ‘mainstream’ research on international 
interventions. 
 
 
State of the Art on International Interventions 
 
To this day, students of political science and international relations still read the 
textbook narratives that have their roots in the 1940s. Typically, these place nation-
states and the United Nations at the centre of a completely ‘new’ international system 
that facilitated the end of imperialism by 1960 by promoting peace, development, 
human rights, and democracy on the one hand and decolonisation as the end of 
imperialism on the other. For example, one textbook argues that, “The demise of 
imperialism in the twentieth century was a fundamental change in world politics.”5 
Subsequently, most textbooks do not emphasise institutional continuities; try to 
historicise the emerging global hegemony of the US (and the Soviet contestation 
thereof) beyond the Cold War logic; gender and racialize the narrative of 
                                                          
2 For more on this point, see Philip Cunliffe, “Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons 
between Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today,” International 
Peacekeeping 19, no. 4 (2012): 426–42. 
3 Andrew J Bacevich, The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy since 
World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), XII. 
4 Prasenjit Duara, “The Cold War as a Historical Period: An Interpretive Essay,” Journal of 
Global History 6, no. 3 (2011): 458. 
5 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 95. 
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‘peacekeeping’; or challenge the end of the Cold War as another rupture.6 However, 
the influence of these narratives go beyond textbooks.  
Within the multi-disciplinary research field on international interventions,7 many 
scholars view the interventions through the narratives’ rupture-oriented periodization 
with imperialism (1945/1960), decolonisation (1945-1960), and the end of the Cold 
War (1989). Consequently, many critical scholars see the growing problems of 
insecurity, gendered violence, economic failure, and aid dependency associated with 
neo-liberalism rather than outcomes of the international system’s deeper dynamics. 
Despite the mounting criticism of the early post-Cold War and current interventions, 
many scholars nevertheless still do not question the Cold War interventions, assuming 
these were simple and consensus-based ‘peacekeeping’ within a pluralist and all-new 
international framework working towards decolonisation.8 Following the 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, an upward number of scholars across 
a range of disciplines have unsurprisingly re-introduced the notions ‘imperial’ and 
‘imperialism’ in the debate on the American interventions,9 the international 
interventions and the broader paradigm of governance these are part of. Countering 
Urquhart by putting the UN in the role of a ‘false friend’, the latter group of scholars 
is the one relevant here.  
Far from uniform, the group of scholars that study international interventions and 
use an imperial vocabulary span several disciplines, analyse different interventions 
with different methodologies, and display various different attitudes towards the logic 
and execution of the interventions. For analytical purposes, the scholars can be seen 
as making up two loose clusters rather than two established ‘schools’. Scholars that 
explicitly or implicitly accept the narratives of decolonisation and Cold War 
                                                          
6 See for instance Robert H Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International 
Relations: Theories and Approaches, 2013; Emilian Kavalski, Encounters with World Affairs: 
An Introduction to International Relations, 2015; Norrie MacQueen, The United Nations since 
1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War (Essex, U.K.; New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 
1999); Norrie MacQueen, Peacekeeping and The International System (Milton Park, New 
York: Routledge, 2006); Jill Steans, Lloyd Pettiford, and Thomas Diez, Introduction to 
International Relations: Perspectives and Themes (Harlow, England; New York: 
Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005). 
7 Research on international interventions now spans at least anthropology, cold war history, 
conflict studies, development studies, international history, international law, international 
relations, military history, military sociology, peace studies, security studies, strategic studies 
and war studies.  
8 See for instance Paul Higate and Marsha. Henry, Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and 
Performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia (London; New York: Zed Books, 2009); Béatrice 
Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from below: UN Missions and Local People (Bloomfield: 
Kumarian Press, 2006); Laura Zanotti, Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, 
International Security, and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011). 
9 See for instance Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s 
Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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peacekeeping, but find the post-Cold War interventions akin to different forms of 
imperialism make up the first cluster. Scholars that perceive the broader international 
system as imperial in nature and accordingly decolonisation as a mere shift and the 
interventions within that framework make up the second. I take the first cluster to 
consist of Austrian military historian Erwin Schmidl, Canadian historian turned 
international relations and human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff, American political 
scientist Kimberly Marten Zisk, British scholar of international relations David 
Chandler, and American anthropologist Robert Rubinstein. While all see the 
interventions launched after the Cold War as a new form of imperialism (Schmidl who 
focused on the Cold War interventions excluded), the attitudes towards the 
interventions differ vastly. Yet, common for this group is the hierarchical attention to 
states, institutions, policy-making, and modes of governance, rather than spaces and 
how people in everyday life negotiate the presence of the interventions.  
Writing before the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Austrian military 
historian Erwin Schmidl showed how the European interventions in the 
Mediterranean and Ottoman provinces in the 19th and 20th centuries reflected the 
waxing of the European imperial frontiers and the waning of the Ottoman Frontiers. 
While he tried to engage in the discussions of social science scholars, writing for 
social science journals addressing scholars of strategic, military and war studies as 
well as the international interventions, his important insights appear to have been 
overlooked either on account of his historicising approach being ‘too early’ or perhaps 
too nation-state-centric or his lack of connecting to the post-Cold War interventions.10  
An example of a scholar adopting the prevailing narrative, Canadian historian 
turned human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff focused on the US-led interventions in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, categorising them as manifestations of an ‘empire 
lite’ that has failed to deliver on its promises of democracy and progress.11 However, 
he saw the execution rather than the goals in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan as 
flawed. In doing so, his work reflected not only the long-standing Canadian loyalty to 
the US,12 but also a defence of the work of the pro-interventionist International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, where he worked.  
Publishing soon after the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, American political 
scientist Zisk used some of the troubled post-Cold War interventions to argue that 
current interventions should find inspiration in the imperial interventions of Great 
Britain, France and the US to narrow their focus from state-building to security.13 
                                                          
10 Erwin A. Schmidl, “The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century,” Small 
Wars & Insurgencies 10, no. 2 (1999): 4–20; Erwin A. Schmidl, “The International Operation 
in Albania, 1913–14,” International Peacekeeping 6, no. 3 (1999): 1–10. 
11 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: 
Vintage, 2003). 
12 See for instance Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, “Global Order, US Hegemony and 
Military Integration: The Canadian-American Defense Relationship,” International Political 
Sociology 2, no. 4 (2008): 305–21. 
13 Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from The Imperial Past (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004). 
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However, schooled in ‘classic’ American political science (and its traditions of 
proximity to power, state-centrism, selective approach to and use of history, and 
distance to the ‘receiving ends’ of foreign policy),14 her use of imperial historiography 
left much to be desired. Indicative hereof, a fellow American political scientist 
subsequently diplomatically noted that she was (…) generally stronger on the 
contemporary cases than the historical cases of imperialism.”15  
Writing a few years later as part of a group of scholars challenging American 
intellectual hegemony within the discipline of international relations,16 British 
Chandler saw international interventions as new colonial framework far more 
intrusive of the nineteenth century empire creating “(…) ‘phantom states’ whose 
governing institutions may have extensive external resourcing but lack social or 
political legitimacy.”17 Explicitly stating that the emergence of western hegemony at 
the end of the Cold War replaced the ‘pluralist post-war framework of the United 
Nations’ overnight, however, Chandler seems to accept the narratives of the UN and 
decolonisation unequivocally.18  
More recently, American anthropologist Robert Rubinstein have labelled the post-
Cold War interventions as ‘the return of imperial policing’ due to the outward-
oriented turn of the local systems of governance and economies, the merger of UN 
civilian and military objectives and the emergence of an intervention culture of 
violence. As Chandler, he also contrasted post-Cold War and Cold War interventions, 
seeing the latter as unproblematic expressions of a legitimate and consensus-based 
international system.19 As with Ignatieff, however, his work can also be read as a 
defence of his own pro-interventionist position permeating his applied work for the 
US Army Center for Strategic Leadership, the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, and 
the UN after the Cold War.20  
                                                          
14 Lucian M. Ashworth, “Interdisciplinarity and International Relations,” European Political 
Science 8, no. 1 (2009): 16–25; J. M. Hobson and George Lawson, “What Is History in 
International Relations?,” Millennium 37, no. 2 (2008): 415–35; George Lawson, “The Eternal 
Divide? History and International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 18, 
no. 2 (2012): 203–26; Ole Waever, “The Sociology of a Not so International Discipline: 
American and European Developments in International Relations.,” International Organization 
52, no. 4 (1998): 687–727. 
15 David M. Edelstein, “Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past.(Book Review),” 
Political Science Quarterly 120, no. 4 (2005): 680. 
16 Ashworth, “Interdisciplinarity and International Relations”; Wayne S. Cox and Kim Richard 
Nossal, “The ‘Crimson World’: The Anglo Core, the Postimperial Non-Core and the Hegemony 
of American IR,” in International Relations Scholarship around the World (London: 
Routledge, 2009), 287–307. 
17 David Chandler, Empire in Denial : The Politics of State-Building (London, Ann Arbor: 
Pluto Press, 2006), 8. 
18 Ibid., 28. 
19 Robert A. Rubinstein, Peacekeeping under Fire: Culture and Intervention (Boulder: 
Paradigm Publishers, 2008); Robert Rubinstein, “Peacekeeping and the Return of Imperial 
Policing,” International Peacekeeping 17, no. 4 (2010): 457–70. 
20 For more, see Rubinstein, Peacekeeping under Fire. The tradition of anthropology serving 
western geopolitical objectives has, if anything, been revived. Recently, American 
18 
 
18 
 
As should be clear, research in international interventions, and applied research 
especially, does not take place in powerless vacuum: disciplinary legacies, national 
historical narratives, and the international situation matter. To recap, these scholars 
(aside Schmidl who did not address contemporary interventions) had no illusions on 
the current interventions (although their attitudes differed markedly). They did lack, 
however, a deeper historical understanding of how the emerging international system 
before the Second World War and the American expansion during and after the war, 
which led to the formation of the UN, re-actualised colonial and imperial practices.  
I see the second cluster consisting of Canadian historian turned sociologist Serene 
Razack, British scholar of development studies Mark Duffield, Australian 
international relations scholar Philip Darby, British imperial historian John Kent, 
Canadian scholar of international relations Bruno Charbonneau, and last but not least 
British scholar of international relations Philip Cunliffe.  Aside Kent, who did not 
consider post-Cold War interventions, they have all—with variation—argued that 
international interventions reflect the imperial character of the international system.  
Not focused on Iraq or Afghanistan despite writing in 2004 when the debate on 
imperialism had kicked into a higher gear, Canadian historian turned sociologist 
Sherene Razack focused on the 1992 intervention in Somalia. Anchoring her analysis 
in the Canadian court case that saw Canadian soldiers on trial for racial violence and 
the fact that the trial was in Canada (rather than Somalia), she portrayed the Canadian 
participation in the Cold War interventions as a continuation of settler-colonialism in 
Canada and as serving US interests. In extension thereof, she linked the violent and 
racist settler colonial history of Canada and the Canadian military violence in Somalia 
in 1992. Subsequently, she saw the Canadian narrative of ‘peacekeeping’ as a national 
mythology masked as a history of ‘doing good’, thus contesting the strong rupture 
orientation of the aforementioned narratives seeing the post-Cold War international 
interventions constitute a ‘new imperialism’.21  
Broadening the scope, British development scholar Mark Duffield used British 
imperial history and the notion of the ‘western external frontier’ to argue that the post-
Cold War interventions more broadly constitute an integral part of a Western-
dominated international regime to contain the fleeing Third World populations 
generated by the global market economy. He placed this in contrast to how previous 
surplus underdeveloped populations were exported, e.g. the British settler colonies 
that became the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand).22  
Along the lines of Duffield but preferring the older if still much-contested notion 
of ‘imperialism’, Australian and scholar of international relations Philip Darby argued 
                                                          
anthropologists (and sociologists, geographers and other social scientists) deployed with 
American military forces in Afghanistan as part of the Human Terrain System project. Similarly 
albeit at a much smaller scale, the Danish Army has also found it useful to turn to an 
anthropological after a sociologist failed to deliver a loyal publication. 
21 Sherene. Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and 
the New Imperialism (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2004). 
22 Mark R. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of 
Peoples (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 1–31. 
19 
 
19 
 
that international interventions are cast in the colonial mould of intervention from 
above and outside and are part of upholding an inequitable global order that locks 
non-European people into a world not of their making. As one of the few scholars 
concerned with how local populations claim agency by negotiating the interventions, 
he argues that future interventions must entail locally rooted and accepted 
mechanisms.23  
Focusing on a single intervention, British imperial historian John Kent used the 
early Cold War intervention in the former Belgian colony Congo to connect Cold War 
geopolitics with the conditions of the Congolese population, their struggles and ethnic 
tension. He argued not only that the intervention was used to advance an African 
system of nation states with allegiance to “(…) the principles, if not old colonial 
practices, of Western capitalism”,24 but also that the UN was central for the US in 
promoting its vision of a broader world order, thus challenging the narratives of the 
UN and decolonisation. Framing his analysis within the Cold War historiography, 
however, Kent targeted the debates amongst Cold War and African historians rather 
than those in the multi-disciplinary field mostly interested in the recent or ongoing 
international interventions.25  
Writing a few years later with the aim of joining the dialogue on the imperial via 
a study of French interventions in their former African colonies, Canadian scholar of 
international relations Bruno Charbonneau initially argued that the interventions 
represented colonial continuities recast in a neo-imperial world dominated by the US 
and Great Britain. Using works by historians on French imperialism, his research 
stood out as building bridges.26 While still recognising imperial legacies in “(…) old 
capabilities, new organising logics and, specific practices and power relationships”,27 
Charbonneau has since stepped back, calling for scholars to bring in the historicity of 
particular imperial experiences to challenge what he argued to be a too simplistic 
duality between imperialism and internationalism on the one hand, and the local and 
international on the other.  
Finally, British scholar of international relations Philip Cunliffe also considers the 
systemic and its structural components, concentrating on the states that provide troops 
for the interventions. In 2012, Cunliffe noted that it was impossible for scholars to 
overlook how military forces are sent to pacify unruly marginal areas in the 
international system with force while installing institutions and ideals found useful by 
the dominant members of the international system.28 Subsequently, he argued that the 
                                                          
23 Philip Darby, “Rolling Back the Frontiers of Empire: Practising the Postcolonial,” 
International Peacekeeping 16, no. 5 (2009): 699–716. 
24 John Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo (London, 
New York: Routledge, 2010), 193. 
25 Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation. 
26 Bruno. Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2008). 
27 Bruno Charbonneau, “The Imperial Legacy of International Peacebuilding: The Case of 
Francophone Africa,” Review of International Studies 40, no. 3 (2014): 629. 
28 Cunliffe, “Still the Spectre at the Feast,” 427. 
20 
 
20 
 
current interventions are not only rooted in an historic tradition of imperial security, 
but also that they amount to a system of imperial multilateralism, envisioned at its 
formation to carry out tasks hitherto carried out by colonial empires.29 The supply of 
colonial forces for imperial service, especially during the two world wars and later 
counter-insurgency operations, ensured the formation of a shared transnational 
military culture of experience, doctrine, habits and training. In his view, it was not 
coincidental that the colonial territories suppling imperial military units became the 
largest troop suppliers after the Cold War. Finally, he argued that: “(…) the imperial 
functions of peacekeeping are therefore a congenital component of the United Nations 
and not merely a by-product of the overstretch resulting from the multiplication of UN 
missions after the end of the Cold War.”30  
Razack, Duffield, Darby, Charbonneau, and Cunliffe—hereon onwards the 
‘imperial segment’—confronted how the interventions from the outset generated 
hierarchical and gendered relations through their lack of accountability, asymmetries 
in political action and systems of ordering rooted in the waxing and waning of imperial 
frontiers. Aside Kent, these scholars view the overall international system as imperial 
and the interventions within that framework. They also, some more explicit than 
others, say that our analytical frameworks support status quo and therefore need to de-
centre the West and the state and concurrently re-centre the imperial, the colonial and 
the local. As in the other cluster of scholars, however, disciplinary legacies, national 
narratives, and the international situation still take centre stage. Indicative of the 
continued Western dominance of the research field, American researchers are not only 
markedly absent in the ‘imperial segment’. The strongest attempts of decolonising 
knowledge of the interventions have also so far come from scholars from other 
Western countries and not ’peacekept’ countries, even if they view the interventions 
and the international system from different platforms, move in different directions and 
agree little on the concepts and the importance of the ‘mission areas’ and their 
populations.31 To the best of my knowledge and indicative both of my own position 
within this Anglo-Saxon dominated research field and the intimate links between the 
knowledge we generate on international system and this very system, scholars 
working in or on the former colonies as well as in other languages than English have 
also yet to untether from the mainstream or counter-neoliberal narratives to fully 
engage with the challenge of historicizing the interventions systemically32 or have 
                                                          
29 Philip Cunliffe, Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South (London: Hurst, 
2013). 
30 Ibid., 220. 
31 Awareness of the settler colonial and imperial origins of the Australian, Canadian, New 
Zealand, American and South African academic worlds is gradually emerging. See for instance, 
James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 
1783-1939 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Tamson Pietsch, Empire of 
Scholars: Universities, Networks and the British Academic World, 1850-1939 (Manchester, 
New York, Vancouver: Manchester University Press, Palgrave Macmillan and UBC Press, 
2013). 
32 See for instance Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the 
Sudan Conflicts (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011); Kwesi Aning, Kwesi and 
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begun to do so in English.33 Consequently, the debate on the imperial in the 
international, in my view, face three challenges. 
 
 
The Challenges of the Field 
 
The first challenge relates to how the connections between imperialism and Western 
academia have left significant blind angles in research on ‘peacekeeping’. The second 
connects to the question of how to overcome the difficulties created by the 
multidisciplinary research field (and thus how scholars relate across disciplinary 
divides). Partly an attempt to deal with these challenges, the third revolves around 
how to go about historicize the international system, the networks of the states that 
contributed forces and the ‘mission areas’ in a way that crosses the disciplinary 
differences.  
A consequence of the entangled histories of the disciplines with colonial 
imperialism, the first challenge concerns the blind spot of research on international 
interventions, including the ‘imperial segment’: the links between the interventions 
and the historical angle that is the colonial, social and political geographies of the 
‘mission areas’ and the colonial experiences of their populations. As the American 
scholar of international relations J. Ann Tickner argued, “(…) most western 
knowledge cannot be separated from its implication in the history of imperialism.”34 
This is also true for the disciplines involved in the study of international interventions. 
Having been debated since the 1960s, the ties between anthropology and colonial 
systems probably represent the well-known connections. The discipline cannot be 
understood without its intellectual linkage to European colonial imperialism or how 
many but not all anthropologists served imperial projects and colonial states.35 As 
historians and development scholars aware of their discipline’s origins have shown, 
the field of development also has a history of origins tied to Western colonial 
                                                          
Samuel Atuobi, “Responsibility to Protect in Africa: An Analysis of the African Union’s Peace 
and Security Architecture,” Global Responsibility to Protect 1, no. 1 (2009): 90–113; Tony 
Karbo, “Peace-Building in Africa,” in Peace and Conflict in Africa (London ; New York: Zed 
Books, 2008), 113–32; Germain Ngoie Tshibambe, Grace Maina, and Erik Melander, 
“Analysing the Peace Process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo : From War to the 
Uncertain Peace,” in Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa (Capetown: University 
of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2016), 161–91; Rashed Uz Zaman and Biswas, Niloy Ranjan, 
“Bangladesh’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions and Challenges for Civil–Military 
Relations: A Case for Concordance Theory,” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 3 (2014): 324–
44. 
33 Bruno Charbonneau, “Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in 
Africa,” Modern & Contemporary France 16, no. 3 (2008): 279–95; Charbonneau, “The 
Imperial Legacy of International Peacebuilding.” 
34 J. Ann Tickner, “Retelling IR’s Foundational Stories: Some Feminist and Postcolonial 
Perspectives,” Global Change, Peace & Security 23, no. 1 (2011): 12. 
35 Helen Tilley and Robert J Gordon, Ordering Africa: Anthropology, European Imperialism 
and the Politics of Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007). 
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imperialism.36 Vernon Hewitt argued, “As a project, international development can 
be defined as a product of empire, a universal language of ‘improvement’ and 
civilisation acted out through a series of complex – and contradictory – processes and 
interactions.”37 Sociology is less known for its ties to colonial imperialism as most 
see sociology as originating in studies of industrialising urban Europe. However, 
sociology has a link to imperialism as ‘on the ground’ advisors not only in European 
colonies in Africa, but also the Russian continental and American Pacific and 
Caribbean expansions.38 History has also had a similar role. The strong favour of 
British imperial historians of the British Empire is probably the more famous, but 
historians of other European colonial powers were equally busy writing their nations’ 
paths to glory. Dismissing the US being an empire, American historians claimed that 
the US was ‘exceptional’.39 The discipline of international relations has its roots in 
European 19th century studies on politics, but coalesced into a proto-research field 
involving geographers, historians and political economists placing emphasis on 
imperialism and war in an international system only from 1880. After the Second 
World War and the rise of the US politically, militarily, economically, and 
academically in the social and natural sciences,40 focus shifted to the US, thus aligning 
the discipline with the view from Washington until the end of the Cold War. With this 
shift, history fell into the background, often to become a selective pool of evidence 
with little regard to historiographical traditions. This removed imperialism, gender 
and geography from the British pre-war and inter-war international relations 
tradition.41 Finally, colonialism was not peripheral but central to international law due 
                                                          
36 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War; Mark Duffield and Vernon M. Hewitt, 
eds., Empire, Development & Colonialism: The Past in the Present (Woodbridge, Rochester: 
James Currey, 2013); Joseph Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert Agrarian Doctrines of 
Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007). 
37 Vernon Hewitt, “Empire, International Development & the Concept of Good Government,” 
in Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present (Woodbridge, Rochester: 
James Currey, 2013), 31. 
38 George Steinmetz, ed., Sociology & Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline 
(Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2013). 
39 See for instance Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to 
the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 14–19; Remco Raben, “A New 
Dutch Imperial History?: Perambulations in a Prospective Field,” BMGN - Low Countries 
Historical Review 128, no. 1 (2013): 5–30; Athena Syriatou, “National, Imperial, Colonial and 
the Political: British Imperial Histories and Their Descendants,” Historein 12 (2013): 38–67; 
Jackson Frederick Turner and John Mack Faragher, Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: “The 
Significance of the Frontier in American History” and Other Essays (New Haven (Conn.); 
London: Yale univ. press, 1998). 
40 For the natural sciences, see especially John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar 
Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006). 
41 Ashworth, “Interdisciplinarity and International Relations”; Lucian M. Ashworth, 
“Feminism, War and the Prospects for Peace: Helena Swanwick (1864-1939) and the Lost 
Feminists of Inter-War International Relations,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 13, 
no. 1 (2011): 25–43; Lucian M. Ashworth, A History of International Thought: From the 
Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations, 2014; Wayne Cox and Kim 
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to the need of colonial empires to legitimise the governing of non-European peoples.42 
Indeed, as Tickner argued, Western knowledge production and imperialism have 
intimate relations, something that continued in Cold War research. Most of this work 
shows that the outlook of the imperial metropoles on the one hand and the colonial 
state apparatus’ quest for technologies of power and knowledge on the other continued 
to inform the different disciplines’ ways of looking and understanding beyond 
decolonisation.  
To be sure, ‘white’ male American, and to a lesser extent British and Canadian, 
researchers of the state- and Western-centric disciplines of international relations, 
international law and political science undeniably held research on the interventions 
in an iron grip during the Cold War. They promoted them in publications on legal, 
financial and logistical issues as well as foreign policy decision-making processes in 
the leading Anglo-American journals, New York, Washington and London-based 
think tanks reports and American university publications, thus fuelling the narratives 
on the UN and decolonisation in the mainstream.43 Although a few American and 
British scholars of area studies and international relations were able to escape the 
militarisation of their research fields and offered critical work,44 they did not reflect 
on the colonial era, just as their work soon drowned in ‘technical’ articles by other 
scholars and pro-intervention publications by (‘white’, male) UN officials.45 
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Additionally, the broader militarisation of the American social sciences through the 
formation of 40 research centres run by the US military and Defence Department and 
the military contract work of civilian universities pushed closer the social sciences to 
the interests of power.46 It is indicative that the few sociologists who tried to look 
beyond ‘the state’ in works intended as responses to the militarisation of the social 
sciences also failed to escape the paradigm of the interventions despite introducing 
field work and arguing that local populations were relevant.47 Moreover, the few third 
world PhD fellows that studied UN interventions in American universities (mainly 
close to power in Washington and New York) appear not to have published on UN 
interventions after defending their dissertations, leaving the field to westerners, 
mostly also male.48 Due to the origin of the Western and state-centric top-down ways 
of looking and knowing of Cold War scholarship in the connections between the 
disciplines and imperialism, these prisms effectively rendered the local population 
and geographies of each ‘mission area’ unimportant and with them their colonial 
histories invisible.  
This effect, so deeply engrained in the involved disciplines, is to some extent 
visible amongst even the scholars in the ‘imperial segment’. While Razack was 
attentive to the meaning of Canadian Settler colonial history in the violence of the 
Canadian soldiers in Somalia, she focused almost only on the soldiers, leaving the 
different Somali she let us encounter only as victims. As Duffield analysed an 
adapting system, the few individuals that made it into his analysis were largely from 
the Western political elite. Darby spoke of indigenous agency in relation to the 
interventions as something necessary to integrate into the fabric of future 
interventions, not in relation to past interventions. Throughout his work, Kent focused 
only on Congolese politicians as individuals although he recognised Congolese 
agency and means to negotiate the outcome of the intervention with force via the 
countrywide riots as the UN was leaving and the US taking over via mercenaries. 
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Despite his call to challenge to the local-international binary Charbonneau has rarely 
focused on other ‘local’ actors than politicians, mobs and demonstrators. Seeking to 
move beyond states, Cunliffe’s analyses of some ‘mission areas’ made it clear that 
international relations still has difficulties analysing non-state relations such as 
socially and spatially integrated interactions between people.  
The second challenge links to the multidisciplinary character of the research field 
and the histories of the different disciplines. As argued by scholars of planning and 
development Arild Buanes and Svein Jentoft, disciplines are not only organised in 
departments, but also ordered epistemologically through internal ‘languages’ of 
methodologies, concepts and theories, and normatively regulated by norms and values 
of what is proper scholarship and what is not.49 This has made informed dialogue on 
the imperial and the international, let alone broadening it to include others, difficult. 
That scholars from a number of disciplines got involved when the debate on empire 
and imperialism picked up in the 2000s may also have allowed too many scholars, as 
Cunliffe argued in 2012, to get away with equalling interventions to imperialism 
without qualifying these claims. While it is necessary to qualify such claims, even 
when the connections seemed obvious, it has been harder for most. As Cunliffe notes, 
“(…) imperialism remains under-theorized and under-utilised in the study of 
peacekeeping (…).50 While Cunliffe is right here, there has been little to connect to 
not only because few scholars in the field have qualified their critiques of international 
interventions as imperialism empirically and theoretically, but also because most 
researchers remain oblivious or disinterested in the deeply entangled imperial 
histories of their own disciplines. While exploring different aspects of the 
interventions, Kent, Duffield, Charbonneu, Razack, Darby and Cunliffe in many ways 
qualified their ideas (and asked others to do so also), for the most part connected to 
each other’s work (when possible) and to various extents sought to pull the overall 
research field towards common ground, especially by way of publishing in the main 
research journals. Their efforts and the deeper entanglements of the connections 
between Western scholarship and colonial imperialism notwithstanding, however, the 
lack of what the historians and sociologists Anne Markowich and Terry Shinn called 
‘disciplinary elasticity’51 has not aided the interdisciplinary dialogue on the links 
between imperial and international. The second challenge is thus to not only to 
continue to seek common ground in a field that is still governed by disciplinary 
boundaries, methodological traditions, conceptual languages and limitations while 
elucidating the issue of the imperial, but also to continue to engage the 
interdisciplinary mainstream.  
Subsequently, the third challenge revolves around the historicization of the 
international system, the networks of states that contributed and still contributes forces 
and the ‘mission areas’ on the one hand and doing so in a way that bridges the 
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disciplinary differences of the multidisciplinary research field on the other. A sensible 
point of departure, I argue, would therefore be the gap between imperial and colonial 
historiography and the blind angle of both the ‘imperial segment’ and ‘mainstream’ 
critical research towards the colonial, social and political geographies of the ‘mission 
areas’ and the colonial experiences of their populations. As philosopher of history 
Frank Ankersmit notes, “(…) big problems have long histories; and as long as we 
remain in the dark about these histories we shall be unable to deal with them.”52 
Hence, this challenge entails both moving past how much research has indirectly 
served the status quo by not re-centring the ‘mission areas’ as a means to understand 
better the links between imperial and international. Accordingly, the webs between 
the countries sponsoring the interventions, the countries supplying the troops, vehicles 
and supplies, the UN bureaucracy providing the experts and the ’mission areas’ 
themselves central to understanding the international system in the same way the 
imperial webs were key to the different forms of imperialism. Thus, it becomes 
necessary to pay attention to see the ‘mission areas’ as webbed socio-spatial 
palimpsests in which colonial, imperial and international regimes of governance 
overlapped and re-actualised imperial practices and conflicts, often to the detriment 
of most of the ‘mission area’ populations. 
Connecting these challenges, the ‘imperial segment’ requires a counter-narrative 
that both connects colonial and imperial historiography with the ‘imperial segment’ 
as a way to emphasise the links to the imperial and the international and both the 
importance of people in the ‘mission areas’ on the one hand and works towards 
broadening the interdisciplinary dialogue on the other. 
 
 
The Aims and the Main Research Questions  
 
Consequently, my first aim is to join and advance the interdisciplinary dialogue on 
the imperial and the international as a historian with an awareness of both the imperial 
historiographies and the research done by scholars in the ‘imperial segment’. The 
International Centre for Trans-disciplinary Research that see transdisciplinarity as that 
“(…) which is at once between the disciplines, across the different disciplines, and 
beyond all discipline (…)” and has as its goal “(…) the understanding of the present 
world, of which one of the imperatives is the unity of knowledge.”53 If going by their 
understanding, transdisciplinarity may thus be a long-term goal, and interdisciplinary 
dialogue the short- and intermediate term means to move towards it. As ought to be 
clear, this involves asserting that research does not take place in a vacuum. If anything, 
scholarly inquiries are inherently political. Positions are not choices but inevitable. It 
is thus before anything else a question of thoroughness. With this goal of 
interdisciplinarity is also therefore also the hope to promote self-reflection amongst 
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scholars as disciplinary legacies, prisms of nation, age and gender, and possible 
military experiences are factors on our work and how in extension thereof how we 
dare re-envision the international.  
My second aim is twofold. First, I intend to take a step towards a broader 
framework, a way of looking and understanding rooted in the marriage of imperial 
and colonial historiography and Philip Cunliffe’s notion of ‘imperial multilateralism’ 
that can work towards unpacking the imperial dynamics of the international 
interventions and elucidate how the interventions re-actualise colonial practices and 
ideas. Second, I aim to provide an analysis that via the framework both elucidates the 
shift from dynastic empires over modern imperialism to a broader Western networked 
form of imperialism—imperial multilateralism—and shows how people in the 
‘mission areas’ relate to and resist the form of governance sought implemented via 
the apparatuses of the international interventions, civilian and military alike. Paying 
greater attention to both the networked character of the interventions and the ‘minor 
histories’ of the ‘mission areas’ can be a way to not only unpack the imperial dynamics 
of the international system and expound how the interventions re-actualise colonial 
practices and ideas, but also a way to keep the dialogue on common ground, if not 
expand it. Focusing on the networks of the interventions is a way to explicate the 
dynamics of the shifting forms of governance as the colonial empires gave way to a 
Western dominated networked means of retaining influence by partially 
internationalising the regimes of governance of the new formally decolonised 
members of the international community. Moreover, granting equal importance to the 
histories of everyday life in the mission area that many scholars probably consider 
minor histories given the continued role of Western- and state-centric perspectives are 
all but unimportant. ‘Minor’ histories, anthropologist and imperial historian Ann 
Laura Stoler has suggested, “(…) should not be mistaken for trivial ones. Nor are they 
iconic, mere microcosms of events played out elsewhere on a larger central stage.”54 
Rather, they mark “(…) a differential political temper and a critical space. It attends 
to structures of feeling and force that in “major” history might be otherwise 
displaced.”55  
Aiming to link between the imperial and the international on the one hand and the 
systemic and the practices of everyday life on the other, I thus want to understand  
 
- How the post-1945 regime of international organisations under the umbrella 
of the United Nations emerged from inter-imperial cooperation and the 
systemic significance thereof; 
 
- And in this context, what forms of civilian and military regimes of regulation 
and governance the interventions of the United Nations, intentionally and 
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unintentionally, transferred to and engendered ‘on the ground’ in the 
‘mission areas’; 
 
- And accordingly within this context, how different population groups ‘on the 
ground’ in the ‘mission areas’ related to and/or resisted the forms of civilian 
and military regimes of regulation and governance the interventions of the 
United Nations, intentionally and unintentionally, transferred to and 
engendered in the ‘mission areas’. 
 
To attempt to provide some satisfactory answers to these questions and tackle the 
challenges laid out, I choose to focus on the first intervention designated 
‘peacekeeping’: the clearing of the Suez Canal in 1956 and 1957, and the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that operated in Egypt in 1956 and the Egyptian-
controlled Gaza Strip from 1957 to 1967. Before taking to generating research 
questions to this joint intervention and explaining why this is the better choice 
compared to other interventions, however, I must pave the way by attending to my 
theoretical framework. The following two chapters are dedicated to discussing these. 
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Chapter 1: Theorising Imperialism and 
International Interventions  
 
My theoretical framework is rooted in a merger of the various imperial 
historiographies and an operationalisation of the scholar of international relations 
Philip Cunliffe’s concept of ‘imperial multilateralism’ from his main work on 
international interventions. For obvious reasons, the broader imperial historiography 
is indispensable in discussing imperialism. I use Cunliffe’s work and primary concept 
because—as will be clear in the following section—he provides a strong point of 
departure that is still open to debate and modification. Cunliffe does not base his work 
on a structured theoretical framework (as is otherwise common in his field of 
international relations). Rather, he uses what he calls a “moving prism (…) to catch 
light from as many angles as possible”.56 This involves both critically engaging the 
wider mainstream and mainstream critical interventions scholarship and incorporating 
British and French imperial and colonial military historiography albeit not in a 
chronological structure. It is therefore not fair to distil his thoughts into a theoretical 
framework. It is, nevertheless, necessary to ‘freeze’ his arguments in order to first 
anchor and thus strengthen, rather than juxtapose, them in the theoretical discussions 
of the historiography he seeks to utilise against the mainstream interventions 
literature, and then operationalise it as the base of my analytical framework via 
imperial frontier studies.  
 
 
Empires and the Modalities of Imperialism: Anchoring Cunliffe’s 
‘Imperial Multilateralism’ in Imperial Historiography  
 
Cunliffe’s fundamental idea is that “As such, UN peacekeeping can be assimilated 
into a long history of imperial security in which metropolitan centres of power have 
sought to reduce the costs of policing empire by devolving these responsibilities to the 
periphery itself.”57 Thus, he notes, UN forces are the heirs to colonial armies, NGOs 
the heirs to missionaries, Special UN Representatives the heirs to Viceroys and 
civilian UN Staff the heirs to colonial administrators. While Cunliffe thus ventures 
well out of the confines of most international relations schools of thought by seeing 
imperialism as integral to the international system, he does not define or discuss what 
he sees the concepts of empire and imperialism to entail, something Bruno 
Charbonneau rightly criticises him for in his review.58 Reading backwards from the 
way in which Cunliffe sees ‘the essence of empire’ as distilled into the post-war UN 
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system as “(…) a hierarchic and paternalistic regime for maintaining order across a 
diverse set of peoples, while recreating political dependency as part of a global 
civilising mission”,59 it is clear that he sees empires as hierarchical, paternalistic and 
ruling over diverse sets of peoples. However, he leaves too much unsaid. Concepts 
find use in particular contexts. 
As the conceptual historians Helge Jordheim and Iver B. Neumann have pointed 
out, the discussions of ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ (and other forms) are today 
global.60 Recognising this, many of the foremost imperial and global historians, as 
well as some anthropologists and political scientists, have adopted global and 
systemic perspectives on empires, in direct opposition to the heretofore-dominant 
teleological Western-centric and (nation) state-centric historiographies.61 Taking a 
broad view, Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, two prominent imperial historians 
who see empires as “(…) large political units, expansionist or with a memory of power 
extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they 
incorporate new people”,62 link the empires in a global framework. They argue that 
the formation and expansion of empires from 1400 until the late 1700s both shaped 
and were shaped by what was essentially the making of a global system. According 
to Burbank and Cooper, the dominant empires of Eurasia, the Chinese, Russian, 
Mughal and Ottoman empires mainly relied on similar ‘repertoires of power’ in the 
form of strongly hierarchal dynastic and patrimonial forms of rule, the co-optation of 
conquered peoples and lands by various connective measures such as tribute, 
marriages, and the acceptance of difference in customs, religion and social 
organisation. In contrast, the Habsburg, Portuguese, Dutch, British and French 
empires over the 16th and 17th centuries relied on less hierarchical merchant elite and 
aristocratic networks, trade and—later—plantation and mining slavery to both expand 
and sustain themselves as empires. While their expansion led to settlements along the 
African and Indian coastlines, in what became Latin and North America and the 
Indonesian archipelago the European empires were unable go beyond the fringes of 
the larger Eurasian and interior African empires and kingdoms for centuries 
technologies, local arbitrators and non-hostile terrains facilitated entry. Altogether, 
most scholars are united in the view that most early-modern empires were hierarchical 
power structures revolving around centres dominating their geographically adjacent 
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peripheries, if the Habsburg, Dutch and British Empires were also ‘hybrids’ indicative 
of the following centuries. 63  
As multiple scholars have noted, this balance of power between the larger Eurasian 
and smaller European empires began changing from the early to mid-19th century. 
Cunliffe does not address this change directly; he only does so implicitly and very 
briefly, speaking of a long transition from empires to multilateral imperialism.64 Here, 
however, we enter the heart of the discussion on the global imperial system changing 
from being dominated by dynastic and tributary empires ruling geographically 
adjacent territories towards being led predominantly by non-dynastic empires with 
growing bureaucratic state apparatuses and geographically non-adjacent territories 
over the 19th century. A commonly accepted periodization distinguishes between the 
dynastic empires with adjacent territories from the corporatist empires engaging in 
imperialism from the middle of the 19th century. For decades, historians (and others), 
however, were unable to agree whether or not to use the concept of imperialism and 
what it meant. While some heavyweights active before (formal) decolonisation had 
taken place argued that imperialism was no word for scholars as it both was imprecise 
and led to violent and emotional responses,65 others later argued in favour of accepting 
the debate as an irritating ‘fact of life from which historical analysis must begin.”66 
Fernando Coronil, anthropologist of the Americas, noted, “(…) imperialism is out in 
the streets as an indispensable political term”, and that the question has become “(…) 
not so much whether to use this term or not but how to recast it to make it useful.”67 
Most scholars now accept a distinction between ‘early modern empires’ and ‘modern 
empires’ and the use of the concept of ‘imperialism’, understood “(…) as the “process 
by which they are established, extended, or maintained”,68 in relation to ‘modern 
empires’. Again, Cunliffe’s ‘moving prism’ makes it rather difficult to elucidate what 
his view of imperialism entails as ‘it’ is spread over two separate chapters. 
Imperialism in one place appears as a state-led (rather than dynastic-led one assumes) 
expansion.69 In another, he also sees it as a hierarchical and paternalistic form of 
governance with colonial armies to incorporate indigenous authorities and reduce 
costs.70 However, he also argues, “Historically, empire has been the solution to the 
gap between liberal ideas and a non-liberal reality—imperialism being the means for 
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realising liberal ideas where they do not exist”,71 thus implying that the Japanese, 
Italian and German imperial projects cannot be classified as imperialism. Indicatively, 
Cunliffe refers mainly to British and French imperialism before 1945 and American 
empire after 1945, apparently overlooking the broader debate amongst historians on 
the global dynamics of the different modalities of imperialism. For example, John 
Darwin, a global and imperial historian, plays down the liberal dimension of 
imperialism as he casts it as a continuum with wide variation in its objects and 
methods revolving around “(…) the attempt to impose one state’s pre-dominance over 
other societies by assimilating them to its political, cultural and economic system.”72 
Darwin thus emphasises the connections between imperialism and colonial rule rather 
than imperialism and liberalism and imperialism and capitalism. The work of 
Cunliffe, reflecting his choice to exclude the political economy of the contemporary 
interventions while recognising its importance, also disregards the links between 
imperialism and capitalism.73 This narrow focus is odd as he elsewhere links 
imperialism with colonies, making economic spheres of influence, establishing 
privileged trading zones that could exclude rivals and the taxation of local 
populations.74 In contrast, Coronil ties imperial expansion and capitalism as twin 
forces, arguing “Just as imperialism makes evident the political dimension of 
capitalism, capitalism makes visible the economic dimension of imperialism, 
revealing ‘states’ and ‘markets’ as dual faces of a unitary process.”75 Burbank and 
Cooper link the collective rise of the European empires to both the bureaucratisation 
of the imperial repertoires of power and the emerging nexus of imperial expansion, 
capitalism, and industrialisation. As for the former, the desire to keep control with 
their colonial territories and the increasingly fierce milieu of inter-imperial 
competition to expand, Burbank and Cooper argue, led all empires to modernize their 
repertoires of power. The European empires were the first to make simultaneously 
‘national’ and ‘imperial’ institutions such as census and tax collection systems, health 
systems, gendarmes and imperial armies. Seeing the potential, the expanding 
continental Russian and American empires, the ‘unified’ Italian and German empires 
and the hard-pressed Ottoman and Japanese empires followed suit. This, Burbank and 
Cooper posit, led to a wide range of imperial authorities and sovereignties, many of 
which were increasingly sought grounded in the racialised idea of the superiority of 
‘‘white’ civilisation’ (despite the orientation of the empires of the US, Germany, Italy 
and Russia towards the idea of a nation state).76 As for the emergent nexus of 
imperialism, capitalism, and industrialisation, Burbank and Cooper see it as a globally 
contingent process that both shaped and were shaped by the expansions via the 
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militarisation of the commercial circuits.77 Focused on the world rather than only 
empires, the global historians Michael Geyer and Charles Bright also saw the mid-
19th century as the opening of the modern era with the globally transformative 
processes of the expansion in the industrial forms of production and destruction, 
migration and new (imperial) regimes of order and state building projects.78 
As for the subsequent phase of the global rule of imperialism, the scholarly debate 
has largely revolved around the question of whether it is best understood as the coming 
apart of modern empires and imperialism, or, better, as a phase of transformation 
towards new decentralised forms of empire and cooperative forms of imperialism. In 
line with recent scholarship that favours seeing imperialism through the prism of 
cooperation, decentralisation and internationalisation in different ways, and Cunliffe 
who speaks of ‘multinational imperialism’, I opt for the latter view. While Cunliffe 
does note the emergence of ‘multinational imperialism’, which he argues amounts to 
a step towards imperial multilateralism from around 1900, he sticks to the narrow 
view once again. He mentions only the inter-imperial force, the so-called ‘Eight-
Nation Alliance’, deployed against the Chinese anti-foreign rebellion in 1900, the 
creation of Albania in 1912-13 at the edge of the Ottoman Empire by the European 
empires and their deployed military forces, and the policing operations and mandates 
of the League of Nations.79 Again, his idea would have been had he rooted his work 
more broadly in historiographical works on the higher degree of inter-imperial 
cooperation, the increasingly bloc-fixed forms of imperialism, and the emergence of 
webs of semi-autonomous inter-imperial institutions in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. For example, imperial historian Valeska Huber contended, “(…) 
colonialism and internationalism were not contradictory projects but rather 
intricately intertwined”80 in her work on how the Suez Canal became part of turning 
the Mediterranean into a European imperial space by both supporting imperial 
military logistics and serving as a space for disease surveillance.81 Antony Anghie, a 
legal scholar, similarly sees international law, its principles and doctrines—such as 
the concepts of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘belligerent occupation’—and the international 
institutions promoting it as formed by (and forming) the legal practices of the different 
colonial projects, their gradual universalisation and late 19th century ‘internal’ 
European practices regarding colonial occupation.82 Also working on the imperial 
legal and security systems, imperial historian Daniel Brückenhaus likewise points to 
the roots of early 20th century police cooperation in metropolitan Europe in inter-
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imperial needs to monitor anti-colonialists.83 Imperial historian Ulrike Lindner has 
also shown how inter-imperial knowledge exchange was increasingly formalised.84 
International historians Naomi Nagata and Tomoko Akami have likewise argued that 
the paradigms of the League of Nations on diseases both evolved out of imperial 
concerns and inter-imperial cooperation, and became sites for Japan to claim equality 
with the ‘‘white’’ imperial powers.85 Daniel Gorman, historian of the British Empire, 
notes similar inter-imperial ‘‘white’’ concerns and ‘pro-’white’’ dynamics in the 
humanitarian responses to not only, but especially, the trafficking of women and 
children in the 1920s.86 In relation to the launch of the League of Nations, the 
international historian Mark Mazower operates with an ‘imperial internationalism’ 
that took for granted not only the durability of empire and the idea of ‘‘white’’ 
superiority, but also that international organisations should serve as vehicles for both. 
In light of the global preponderance of British imperialism from the middle of the 19th 
century to the First World War, he also contends that the League can be seen as a 
liberal imperial bloc in contrast to the collapsed Russian Empire that the Bolsheviks 
recast as the Soviet Union.87 As for these bloc-oriented forms of imperialism, Prasenjit 
Duara, historian of Asia, sees initially Japan in the 1930s and subsequently the US 
and the Soviet Union after 1945 engaged in ‘imperialism of nation states’. Duara saw 
this form of imperialism as having “(…) a strategic conception of the periphery as 
part of an organic formation designed to attain global supremacy for the imperial 
powers”,88 even if that meant promoting anti-colonial ideologies, making major 
economic investments and turning subordinate territories into (nominally) sovereign 
nation states.89 Interestingly, Duara’s ‘imperialism of nation states’ appears to roughly 
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correspond to both Fernando Coronil’s mode of ‘national imperialism’, which he sees 
as ‘(…) the informal dominion of a nation-state over independent nations”,90 and his 
mode of ‘global imperialism’, which he defines as “(…) the informal dominion by a 
network of capital and states over an increasingly integrated worldwide system.”91 
Additionally, historian of modern American history Paul Kramer sees the US as a 
‘colonial nation-building project’ also embracing and practising ‘international empire, 
producing “(…) asymmetries in the scale of political action, regimes of spatial 
ordering, and modes of exceptionalizing difference enable and produce relations of 
hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction and exploitation.”92 As for the bloc 
the UN represented, Mazower argues that the charter agreed upon in 1945 came to 
form—as it evolved out of both the ideas and practices of British imperialism and 
American war planning—“(…) in this respect, a more effective and ideologically 
more liberal, version of the 1940 Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and 
Japan.”93 With regard to the links between the development and demographic 
paradigms of the British Empire and those of the UN, Gorman speaks of an 
internationalisation of British imperialism,94 while imperial historian Joseph Morgan 
Hodge sees the UN as a form of internationalisation of the late imperial British 
agricultural and science doctrines.95 International historian Michael Connelly 
similarly see the demographics programmes under the auspices of the UN as the heirs 
to British settler colonial programmes and “(…) another chapter in the unfinished 
history of imperialism.”96 Similarly, political scientist Véronique Dimier contends that 
the aid system of the European Economic Community and later the European Union 
in many ways were shaped primarily by French colonial officials and on account of 
their experiences.97  
The heir to his pre-1945 ‘multinational imperialism’, Cunliffe sees ‘imperial 
multilateralism’ as emerging in three phases, beginning with the period from 1945 to 
1989 that includes the formation of the UN and decolonisation.98 For him, the UN 
both reflected the American imperial expansion after 1945 and served as a means to 
reduce the disorder brought about by the dissolution of the European colonial 
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empires.99 Rather than seeing decolonisation as a systemic rupture, Cunliffe notes that 
it corresponded “(…) with the growth of international institutions to discipline and 
regulate the behaviour of newly independent states in place of old imperial 
strictures.”100 Additionally, Cunliffe argues that this period also saw how the 
experience of imperial warfare overseas had “(…) laid down a transnational military 
infrastructure of experience, doctrine, habit, organisation, training and manpower 
that was inherited by the United Nations via its newly independent member states and 
thereby re-directed to the purposes of post-colonial peacekeeping.”101 As colonies 
became states, the military dependence and engagement in international interventions 
of many former British and French colonies during the Cold War sustained the ‘new’ 
imperial security system.102 Providing cover for the withdrawal of the British, Dutch 
and Belgians from their colonies, the Cold War interventions thus saw the 
participation of units from the armies of many former British and French colonies and 
small states and middle powers such as the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Canada 
and Australia.103 In contrast, the US, Great Britain, France as well as Spain and Italy 
dominated the interventions of Cunliffe’s second phase from 1990 to 2000 due to the 
political space the collapse of the Soviet Union gave the West to concentrate legal, 
military and political power in the UN system.104 Accordingly, the third phase from 
2000 saw a massive increase in the use of units from former colonial armies,105 
marking thus neither “(…) a cosmopolitan break with previous patterns of military 
deployment”106 nor the emergence of a single, unitary empire,107 but a transformation 
of the interventions to “reduce the costs of policing empire by devolving these 
responsibilities to the periphery itself.”108  
A brief recap of the discussion is necessary at this point. In contrast to the early 
modern dynastic and tributary empires, several scholars see modern European, 
American and Japanese imperialism both furthering and furthered by capitalism and 
other exploitative socio-economic practices and racialised colonial regimes of order 
based on direct intervention. Due to the end of incorporable territory, an increasingly 
aggressive ‘multinational imperialism’ took on the Chinese and Ottoman empires, 
both previously out of reach for the smaller European early modern empires, at the 
beginning of the 20th century. It is now common amongst scholars to see the League 
of Nations as the institutionalisation of this still racialised inter-imperial system with 
the British Empire and direct colonial rule and ‘internationally’ sanctioned territorial 
rule at the centre. To use Cunliffe’s concepts, several scholars also see the system of 
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‘multinational imperialism’ become a system of ‘imperial multilateralism’ not with 
the British Empire and direct colonial rule at the centre, but the US, the British Empire 
and the Soviet Union and indirect rule via the UN and new national elites of 
postcolonial states with complex loyalties.  
When thus embedded in and qualified by the broader historiography, Cunliffe’s 
concept of initially ‘multinational imperialism’ and later ‘imperial multilateralism’ 
concept become even more compelling, analytically potent and the antithesis of the 
purely “ideological construct” Hughes sees it as,109 despite focusing on the works on 
the military history of the British, French and American imperial modalities.  
 
 
Systems, Networks, Agency and Places: Anchoring Cunliffe’s 
‘Imperial Multilateralism’ in Imperial Frontier Studies 
 
To begin with, I want to emphasize the need of adopting a both-and approach to the 
global imperial system and its manifestation ‘locally’ (rather than either-or). This will 
enable capturing, theoretically and conceptually, not only the system’s transformative 
dynamics, its forms, and technologies of power, but also the human agency making 
up the system and how it is negotiated ‘locally’. With this approach, rooted in 
Cunliffe’s concept of ‘imperial multilateralism’, I will show, it becomes possible to 
elucidate the shifting character and thus turn to the time dimension as a means to 
explain systemic change. Promoting a micro-spatial approach to global history more 
broadly, global historian of punishment Christian De Vito argues that planetary, 
macro or structural approaches for the most part create a false local-global divide. 
Instead, he calls for approaches that see local and global as connected, parts of one 
another and as simultaneous concrete spatialised processes involving individuals in 
various numbers and settings around the world (but do not focus exclusively on 
individuals).110 Linking directly to imperialism, cultural and political geographer John 
Morrissey similarly argues “(…) it would be a mistake to either consider the local as 
always ‘on the periphery’ or overlook imperialism’s perennial concerns with 
localized techniques of occupation and economic production.”111 Similarly, global 
anthropologist Eric Wolf has argued, global processes link to peoples’ lives ‘locally’ 
and vice versa. He therefore argues it necessary to delineate the significant elements 
working in these processes, their systemic combinations and negotiated 
transformative characters. In other words, we need to consider the ‘local’ histories of 
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incorporation into the global processes—such as the rise of Cunliffe’s system of 
‘imperial multilateralism’.112  
There should be no doubt that Cunliffe is taking to task the lack of attentiveness 
to imperialism within both the discipline of international relations and the other social 
sciences in the research field on international interventions. In brief, he focuses on the 
changes in the countries that contributes military forces for the interventions. In doing 
so, however, he is also grappling with the parallel line of thought amongst imperial 
historians that he relies on when it comes to local agency and the importance of not 
only who contributes troops but also where they go.  
The tradition of imperial historians in short reads as follows. For more than a 
century, imperial historians have discussed the transformative character of 
imperialism in the Middle East, Europe, East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and 
South East Asia, and the relationships between their different parts and other empires. 
Although occasionally still the case, imperial historians traditionally analysed the 
empires through studies of the military strategies of the government and metropolitan 
elites, the big picture in relation to economic dynamics and trade patterns of histories 
of expansion (and decline). For many years, this privileged the top-down and outward 
views from what were perceived to be the ‘centres’, binary views of home and empire, 
and grand narratives of empires bringing civilisation and modernity to the colonies. 
In turn, these perspectives engendered the colonies—and the people living in them—
mostly insignificant in themselves but often also invisible, despite being perhaps the 
most important locations in a systemic sense. Prior to the Second World War (and in 
some cases beyond), most imperial historians were also apologetic to the particular 
projects of imperialism they linked to due to a sense of shared (national) imperial 
identity rooted in ideas of race and religion.113 While Cunliffe is both clearly attentive 
to and critical of the evolution of the broader system of imperial multilateralism, he 
appears to offer little theorisation on the ‘mission areas’ in themselves and their 
relation to the emerging system, nor on the associated importance of local agency and 
the social categories of race, gender, class, age and so on. Rather than reflecting his 
analytical choices, this mirrors the broader weaknesses of the fields of international 
relations and imperial military history due to their epistemological and ontological 
links to their subjects and subsequent state-centric character. I therefore turn to anchor 
his system of ‘imperial multilateralism’ further in the imperial frontier studies, a 
particular segment of research linking the imperial and colonial fields of study.  
This link, or spill over if you will, between the imperial and colonial fields evolved 
out of the socio-political changes that happened with decolonisation and the 
immigration ‘waves’ from former colonies to the former metropole. With people from 
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the former colonies migrating, scholars such as colonial historians, anthropologists 
and geographers began paying attention to the colonised and colonisers, albeit initially 
as static categories. However, with the combined and growing influence of social and 
cultural history, the French post-structuralist Michel Foucault and the postcolonial 
scholar Edward Said, they changed their focus with time. Gradually, attention was 
granted to the ways in which the colonial regimes of governance and local populations 
negotiated power materially, institutionally, spatially and discursively, how they 
mutually shaped each other and formed interconnected hybrid identities through the 
ambivalent intimacy of everyday life or the ways in which the colonial violence 
affected indigenous communities. Accordingly, colonial historians (and others) thus 
broke down gradually the traditional divide between imperial and colonial 
historiography by placing the metropoles and colonies on the one hand, and the 
coloniser and colonised on the other, in the same (intra-imperial and inter-imperial) 
analytical field(s). Recently, these scholarly currents have crystallised into what has 
become known has ‘critical imperial studies’ and ‘new imperial history’, or rather 
‘new imperial histories’.114 Scholars relating to this current, or at least inspired by it, 
have conducted studies on how imperialism and, for example, diseases, family and 
motherhood, gender, sexualities, race and bodies in both colonial and broader imperial 
spaces were connected. Their work has shown that the imperialism of modern empires 
was not only spatially configured, but also as intimate as the personal was political 
and, therefore, negotiated by some and downright violently resisted by other ‘locals’ 
in the colonies.115 Within this body of research, imperial frontier studies stands out. 
By emphasising not only systems, networks, but also agency and places, it is able to 
capture the transformative dynamics, forms, technologies of power making up the 
changing global imperial system and how it is negotiated through human relations.  
The analytical use of the ‘frontier’, however, originates not in imperial studies, but 
in the field of American history in the 19th century.  While the American historian 
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Frederick Jackson Turner was most probably not the first scholar to use the notion of 
a ‘frontier’,116 he made the analytic use of the concept popular from 1893 onwards. 
Writing not long after the US had extended its imperial reach to the Pacific, he saw 
the frontier operated as an incorporative ‘edge of civilisation’ that given its character 
and advancement of individualism initially by ‘white’ settlers and later by federal 
institutions of the United States, promoted American democracy, economic equality 
and ultimately political equality. Ignoring the genocide against indigenous 
populations the expansion entailed, Turner saw the ‘white’ settlers and American state 
institutions as culturally superior and thus as bringing ‘civilisation’ to the lands of 
‘primitive’ indigenous peoples.117 Subsequently, many historians of the United States 
detached this racialising aspect of Turner’s frontier concept and emphasised instead 
(especially from the 1990s) how the frontier was a fluid physical space of contact and 
conflict, which also, when seen from the indigenous perspective, brought destruction 
and havoc.118 Historians studying Eurasian and South American ancient, medieval and 
early modern empires have since also adopted the concept in this capacity, as a fluid 
space on political-geographical periphery in relation to the centres of the agrDe arian 
empires.119  
More importantly here, however, scholars studying modern European empires and 
imperialism also turned to the ’frontier’, emphasising also its systemic dimension to 
its territorial dimension. This broadened the understanding of the ‘frontier’ from 
strictly a political-geographic space between geographically adjacent territories or 
several patches of such territories making up a larger frontier-belt as promoted by 
Turner, historians of the United States before the 1870s and historians of ancient, 
medieval and early modern empires. No longer limited to the study of large land-based 
and dynastic empires, the analytical value of the ‘frontier’ increased for historians of 
modern empires and imperialism. Historians and others therefore turned to the 
concept to analyse, for example, how metropolitan imperial imaginaries mobilised 
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support for the imperial projects from public rather than state initiatives; how imperial 
warfare depended on the populations of the colonies for soldiers; how colonial 
governmentalities were resisted and modified; and how shifting imperial frontiers 
affected the global power relations between the empires. In other words, historians 
and others of modern empires and imperialism have taken up the use of and 
appropriated the concept of the ‘frontier’ to show not only how ‘the periphery’ was 
central to the ‘centre’. They have also shown how imperial formations are best 
understood as fluctuating two-way processes that shape and are shaped by both the 
imperial institutions, the agency of the people and places incorporated into the empires 
and the networks connecting the metropoles and the colonies.120 In extension thereof, 
the aforementioned scholar of development Mark Duffield has also used the frontier 
concept in relation to  the building of a fluid and relational ’external sovereign 
frontier’ via imperialism that the new international institutions helped to maintain 
upon decolonisation in form of de facto condition of state inequality via technologies 
of security such as development and international interventions.121 It is thus fair to say 
that scholars have proven the worth of the frontier in relation to De Vito and Wolf’s 
similar calls to link global systemic processes to peoples’ lives ‘locally’ and 
Morrissey’s warning to consider local peripheral or ignore the strong imperial 
attention to the development of local technologies of governance.  
While Hessel Duncan Hall, League of Nations official, Commonwealth historian 
and geographer, did not appreciate frontiers as two-way systemic processes, it is 
necessary to use also his notion of the ‘frontier zone’ as the particular site of 
incorporation. Already in 1948, he used the ‘frontier’ to conceptualise what he called 
‘earth’s political crust’ and ‘frontier zones’ as the multi-sited institutions in which this 
manifested. In other words, he used the concept of the ‘frontier zone’ to show how the 
emerging international organisations were intimately intertwined with European and 
American imperialism in ways not too dissimilar to Duara’s ‘imperialism of nation 
states’, Fernando Coronil’s modes of ‘national imperialism’ and ‘global imperialism’, 
                                                          
120 Hanne Cottyn, “Renegotiating Communal Autonomy. Communal Land Rights and Liberal 
Land Reform on the Bolivian Altiplano. Carangas, 1860-1930” (University of Ghent, 2014); 
Daniel Goh, “Postcolonial Disorientations: Colonial Ethnography and the Vectors of the 
Philippine Nation in the Imperial Frontier,” Postcolonial Studies 11, no. 3 (2008): 259–76; 
Andrew Tait Jarboe and Richard Standish Fogarty, eds., Empires in World War I: Shifting 
Frontiers and Imperial Dynamics in a Global Conflict (London; New York: I.B. Tauris; 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); James D Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th 
Century (London: Macdonald Futura, 1981); Spencer Mawby, “Britain’s Last Imperial 
Frontier: The Aden Protectorates, 1952–59,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
29, no. 2 (2001): 75–100; Patricia O’Brien, “Remaking Australia’s Colonial Culture?: White 
Australia and Its Papuan Frontier 1901–1940,” Australian Historical Studies 40, no. 1 (2009): 
96–112; W. Michael Ryan, “The Influence of the Imperial Frontier on British Doctrines of 
Mechanized Warfare,” Albion 15, no. 2 (1983): 123–42; Antonio C. Tavares, “The Japanese 
Colonial State and the Dissolution of the Late Imperial Frontier Economy in Taiwan, 1886-
1909,” The Journal of Asian Studies 64, no. 2 (2005): 361–85. 
121 Mark Duffield, “Development, Territories, and People: Consolidating the External 
Sovereign Frontier.,” Alternatives 32, no. 2 (2007): 225–46. 
42 
 
42 
 
Cunliffe’s ‘multinational imperialism’ and Mazower’s ‘imperial internationalism’ 
manifested themselves in particular political-geographical modalities. Examples on 
this list of ‘frontier zones’ counted Suez Canal regime, demilitarised islands under 
peace agreements, the mandates in the colonial territories of the collapsed German 
and Ottoman empires and international regimes in Danzig and Tangier of the League 
of Nations, the UN trusteeships and Germany and Korea after 1945.  
Altogether, the concepts of the ‘frontier’ and the ‘frontier zone’ are well suited to 
operationalise Cunliffe’s ‘imperial multilateralism’. They offer a systemic, but 
spatialised and networked approach to the interventions that historicises the systems, 
networks, agency and places that shaped and were shaped by the interventions. In the 
following section, I therefore offer my theoretical framework based on the marriage 
of the two concepts.  
 
 
Spatializing and Networking the ‘Mission Areas’ of International 
Interventions as ‘Frontier Zones of Imperial Multilateralism’ 
 
Following the previous sections of this chapter, the expansion of the system of 
imperial multilateralism was not merely a geographical expansion of the existing 
global imperial system revolving around American and European imperialism. The 
expansion in itself also changed the overall system ‘centrally’ as well as ‘locally’. In 
this sense, it makes sense to speak of understanding the building of imperial 
multilateralism as frontier building with both diachronic and synchronic dimensions. 
The diachronic dimensions involve more than the formation and practices of the UN 
as an institutional paradigm in 1945. Part thereof were also the palimpsest foundations 
of the UN contained in the gendered and racialised ideas and practices of the 
principally inter-imperial military alliance from 1942;  the increasingly region- and 
bloc-oriented modalities of American, British, Soviet and French imperialism of the 
1930s and 1940s; the inter-war ‘imperial internationalism’ that took empire for 
granted and internationalism as a means to sustain it; and, finally, the pre-First World 
War ‘multinational imperialism’.  
Within the framing of the frontier of imperial multilateralism, the systemic 
expansion happened not via colonies, as did the modern empires, but via especially 
the ‘mission areas’ the international interventions’, or ‘frontier zones of imperial 
multilateralism’. These zones were political-geographical palimpsests of actively and 
passively occasionally conflicting or cooperative colonial, post-colonial and 
international gendered and racialised regimes of governance in which actors negotiate 
both the international presence and the imposition of regimes of social and spatial 
ordering. Here, actors encompass national and international decision makers, UN 
military and civilian staff, ‘local’ decision-makers, and various ‘local’ communities, 
their population groups and individual members thereof. In extension of the various 
forms of incorporation as spheres of influence, protectorates, colonies or 
commonwealths into the modern empires, the territories incorporated into the UN 
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system as frontier zones by way of interventions attained different degrees of 
sovereignty and forms of governance.122 Consequently, the frontier of imperial 
multilateralism can be seen as being both a gendered and racialised multi-sited 
political assemblage and simultaneously but by no means linear and uncontested 
expansive processes of broadening and deepening.123  
As for the systemic expansion in breadth, it follows that this overall process relied 
on several factors. Firstly, the growing number of troop contributors amongst the 
group of small Western states or pro-western former Western colonies ensured the 
means to expand. Secondly, the establishment of new frontier zones in the ‘Third 
World’ provided a growing number of sites for expansion. Thirdly, the making of an 
analytically relevant but much-ignored gendered and racialised multi-sited web of 
imperial multilateralism via 1) Western military infrastructure such as airfields, naval 
and military bases, 2) supply systems by water and air, and 3) the Western dominated 
UN bureaucracy steeped in the ways of Western knowledge systems and conventions 
(i.e. cartography and ‘development’ ideology) ensured the ability of the system to 
reproduce itself.  
Equally part of continuing what was essentially the—if negotiated—
internationalisation of Western and western colonial governmentality and military 
infrastructure, the expansion in depth hinged on the continuation of these processes 
of tying all systemic actors and sites closer together. The use of Western (male) 
experts in top positions in the UN in New York and each ‘mission area’ ensured their 
and the broader Western systemic influence. Providing military units repeatedly also 
guaranteed political and institutional ‘alignment’ amongst former colonies or small 
Western states. Additionally, the longer each intervention was active by way of 
renewed mandates, the deeper the integration of each frontier zone in the overall 
system and the reach of its ways of operation and dynamics. That is not, however, to 
say that the processes of expansion by establishing new interventions, further 
integrating existing mission areas, and reproducing the overall system were not sought 
negotiated both in the bodies of the UN and ‘on the ground’ in the ‘mission areas’.  
At the political arenas of the UN in New York, the members partly or wholly 
opposed to or in favour of the interventions acted within both the formal and informal 
spaces for political manoeuvring to further their own interests or counter their 
opponents. However, states are both institutions and processes of territorialised 
systems of power. At the UN, the analytically relevant actors are hence not only 
‘states’ as such, but also the involved clusters of predominantly male national and 
international decision makers, government representatives and diplomats and equally 
predominantly male UN officials, many of whom were former colonial employees, 
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and the relations in between the states and organisations they represented. The 
dynamics of the negotiations at the General Assembly, the Security Council and the 
corridors can thus be understood as influenced by the probable dominant group of 
representatives’ common experiences from colonial or international deployments and 
self-identification in relation to race, gender and class on the one hand, and the 
geopolitical alignment of the different member states, the geopolitical importance of 
the mission area to these, and their formal/informal authority in the international 
hierarchy on the other. The views of governments and organisations were 
subsequently not always uniform, but could (and did) vary from adamant resistance 
to establishing missions or covering operational expenses to ‘barking but no biting’ 
and quietly supporting the interventions, perhaps with troops, as a means to get 
influence ‘on the inside’. Although the Soviet Union under Stalin had been a founding 
partner of the UN and the number of representatives of former colonies that were 
becoming legally independent states was increasing year by year, they put forward 
their different forms of opposition at the UN initially in the context of Western 
dominance of the organs of the organisation. However, the shifts in the balance of 
power allowed the representatives of the opponents of the interventions, as Cunliffe 
notes, to ‘storm the citadel’ from the late 1960s.124 While not a linear process, the 
‘siege’ lasted until the Soviet system weakening and collapse and the Western bloc 
became able to gain further control with the UN system and subsequently outsource 
further the maintenance of system stability.125  
The frontier zones of imperial multilateralism were and are not top-down projects 
in the same way the colonial regimes were not what geographer Doreen Massey calls 
‘power-geometries’126 with strict linear top-down dynamics due to the relations 
between the different colonial regimes of governance and different ‘local’ actors that 
drew upon a wide spectre from violent resistance to cooperation.127 As the gendered 
and racialised colonial regimes, they were and are part of everyday life, sometimes 
very intimately so. In line with De Vito, Wolf and Morrisey, it is therefore not 
sufficient to analyse only the relations between national and community decision 
makers and the UN headquarters in the mission areas as important as these relations 
are. Even if spatial theorists argue “(…) space is fundamental in any exercise of 
power”,128 and how spaces, therefore, can be “(…) delineated for various purposes: 
to produce grids of classification, order and discipline; but equally to foster particular 
kinds of environmental qualities (…)”,129 it is necessary to study the everyday 
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negotiations of the interventions with members of the ‘local’ communities and 
population groups. The cluster of analytically relevant actors thus expands from 
mainly national and international decision makers and UN officials at the UN to 
include also deployed UN military and civilian staff, ‘local’ decision-makers, and not 
the least various ‘local’ communities, their population groups and individual members 
thereof. As for the former, the positions and perspectives of the ‘international’ 
different actors ‘on the ground’ in what they see as ‘mission areas’ were and are 
different than those involved mostly or only at the arenas of the UN in New York or 
the institutions in the web of imperial multilateralism around the world. The deployed 
UN staff, whether civilian or military, may be additionally influenced by for example 
their orders, organisational culture, experience from previous colonial or 
deployments, understanding of the ‘mission areas’’ geopolitical and cultural histories, 
relations to other civilian organisations/military units, and previous encounters with 
‘locals’ and the dynamics of the site of encounter within the ‘mission area’. As for the 
latter, ‘local’ decision-makers and members of ‘local’ communities and population 
groups were likely shaped by experiences in the colonial era, the degree of external 
orientation and militarisation of their post-colonial society and communities, self-
identification in relation to ethnicity/race, gender, class and age, previous encounters 
with international personnel and the dynamics of the site of encounters. Given how 
the various actors ‘on the ground’ had shifting agendas that sometimes overlapped 
and other times conflicted, the pluralised spatial reflections by sociologist Brooke 
Neely and scholar of race Michelle Samura are useful here. They argue, “Space is 1) 
contested, 2) fluid and historical, 3) relational and interactional, and 4) infused with 
difference and inequality.”130 This means not only that “(…) meanings and uses of 
space change over time”131 and “(…) social actors create, disrupt and re-create 
spatial meanings through interaction with one another”,132 but also that “(…) political 
struggles over space play out through structures of difference and inequality that 
define and organize spaces according to dominant interests (…)”.133 While one use 
of space can thus reinforce regime power, another can be used to resist the very same 
power. Contested spaces, Neely and Samura note, are therefore gendered and 
racialised “(…) geographic locations where conflicts in the form of opposition, 
confrontation, subversion, and/or resistance engage actors whose social positions are 
defied by differential control of resources and access to power.”134 Additionally, 
geographer and spatial theorist Doreen Massey notes, “From the symbolic meaning of 
spaces/places and the clearly gendered messages which they transmit, to 
straightforward exclusion by violence, spaces and places are not only gendered 
themselves gendered but, in their being so, they both reflect and affect the ways in 
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which gender is constructed and understood.”135 The gendered and racialised 
everyday negotiations of the interventions in fields, roads, checkpoints, villages, 
urban neighbourhoods and so on were and are all thus simultaneously both part of the 
geography and materiality of the ‘mission areas’ and the homes and communities in 
which people sought to make the best of their lives.  
Altogether, the building of the frontier and each frontier zone thus shifted the 
centre of gravity forth and back between the various states involved, the UN bodies 
in New York and the frontier zones that were simultaneously ‘mission areas’ and 
‘home’. In other words, the processes of systemic expansion were if unequal, 
gendered and racialised encounters nonetheless negotiated and thus reversible multi-
sited and multi-dimensional processes. To sum up, the frontier zones were, in all their 
diversities, as integral to and reflective of the frontier of imperial multilateralism as 
the spectre of imperial possessions such as settler colonies, crown colonies, plantation 
colonies, protectorate and dependent territories, and spheres of influence were to the 
different empires and imperial projects.  
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I offer my methodological reflections. In the first section, I explain 
why the first United Nations interventions is the best suited of all to answer the 
broader questions I outlined in the introduction. I use the second section, a 
historiography, to place the scholars and their works on the first UN intervention in 
their political and disciplinary contexts, linking thus to the discussion of the research 
field in the introduction. Calling for attention to the links between research, scholars, 
the international organisations and the interventions, I would be remiss not to offer 
any on reflections my own context. I do so in the third section, connecting to 
scholarship on reflective research practices and auto-ethnography within both 
International Relations, imperial history and ‘peacekeeping’ research. In the fourth 
section, I introduce the unpublished and published records and materials I use in the 
chapters 4 through 9 and situate the material within a theoretical understanding 
informed by critical archive theory. Finally, I provide both my intervention-specific 
questions that I ask as the point of departure for an interdisciplinary and historicising 
counter-narrative and an outline of the structure of the thesis, linking specific research 
questions to specific chapters. 
 
 
Why (only) UNSCO and UNEF?  
 
Why choose the intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip from 1956 to 1967—or 
rather the United Nations Suez Clearance Organization in the Suez Canal from 1956 
to 1957 and the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt and the Gaza Strip until 
1967—over other interventions, or several others for the site(s) in which to build my 
analytical political history?  
As for the early international interventions of the UN, several others stand out in 
their own rights. I could have chosen the broader mandated intervention in Congo 
from 1960 to 1964, which the aforementioned Cold War historian John Kent, whom 
I linked to the ‘imperial segment’, has argued was used to advance an African system 
of nation states with allegiance to “(…) the principles, if not old colonial practices, of 
Western capitalism”.136 In his scathing works, the American political scientist David 
Gibbs has also argued that the UN intervention was an extension of US foreign 
policy.137 Another option could be the intervention in West Papua from 1963 to 1964, 
which historian John Saltford has similarly argued was akin to “(…) ’big power’ Cold 
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War politics in which the rights of the Papuans counted for nothing,”138 in relation to 
the agreement between the United Nations, Indonesia and the Netherlands on the 
Papuans’ right to self-determination upon decolonisation in 1962. Additionally, I 
could also have considered the intervention on Cyprus, which was initially to have 
been a NATO force but became a UN force deployed in 1964, inviting to Cyprus an 
influx of NGOs, INGOs and international agencies promoting not entirely problem-
free Western forms of development.139 An interesting case study linked to the later 
part of Cunliffe’s first phase of imperial multilateralism could also have been the 
intervention launched by the Organization of African Unity in Chad from 1981 to 
1982, which political scientist Terry M. Mays argues “(…) served as a foreign policy 
tool for Nigeria, France, the United States, and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain”.140 
In Cunliffe’s later phases, the interventions in Somalia from 1992 that both Razack 
and Cunliffe reviewed scathingly as imperial in character,141 and in Cambodia that 
French political scientist Beatrice Pouligny has shown was little popular with the local 
communities and that led to aid dependency according to Cambodian-American 
political scientist Sophal Ear142 are also interesting as potential case studies. More 
recently, the interventions in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia, which sociologist Paul Higate 
and developmental scholar Marsha Henry argue produced insecurity for the 
populations in the ‘mission areas’ in the context of a global neo-liberal security scape, 
provide other interventions to scrutinise in relation to the main research question.143 
So again, why the first UN intervention instead of the following interventions? 
When considering the body of research on international interventions several 
decades has produced, there is no doubt that the interventions following the end of the 
Cold War have received the most scholarly attention. This is perhaps not surprising 
given that both the pace of initiating new interventions along with the scope of their 
mandates have only increased following the end of the Cold War and it is now possible 
to speak of a multi-disciplinary research field rather than scholars from various 
disciplines merely taking an interest for intra-disciplinary purposes. The little interest 
in the Cold War epoch also characterises ‘the imperial segment’ that predominantly 
focused on the post-Cold War interventions. Only Kent, who focused on the 
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intervention in Congo from 1960 to 1964, and Cunliffe, who offers a section on the 
end of empire and birth of imperial multilateralism, have taken an interest. As 
mentioned before, however, Kent did not link his work to the research on international 
interventions, but only the research field of Cold War history. Cunliffe on the other 
hand specifically argues, “The imperial character of peacekeeping is visible even in 
the much reduced peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era”144 as they were often 
used to either cover the retreat of the American allied European colonial empires or 
prevent a violent aftermath following imperial divide-and-conquer practices. If we 
also recall the broader views of the Cold War interventions of, for instance, David 
Chandler and Robert Rubinstein, who both saw them as relatively trouble-free and 
rooted in a consensus-based international community,145 it becomes even more 
interesting to focus on the Cold War interventions.  
Then why focus ‘only’ on the intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip and not 
also the Cold War interventions in Congo, West Papua and Cyprus, since these were 
clearly problematic and have not yet been properly contextualized? Indeed the 
intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip does not appear to stand out as extreme with 
regard to dimensions such as the geopolitical bearings of the interventions, the degree 
of racism, and everyday low-level violence towards members of the communities of 
the ‘mission areas’. Future research may suggest that the interventions in Congo and 
West Papua were perhaps clearer examples thereof.  
However, the joint interventions in Egypt and the Gaza Strip from 1956 to 1967 is 
pivotal as the expansion of the frontier of imperial multilateralism hinged on them, as 
the use and deployment of UN forces in the Korean War under US command had only 
materialized due to the Soviet boycott of the Security Council. In much research, the 
intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip therefore stands as the ‘first real’ and the best 
example of a ‘classic’ peacekeeping operation as since articulated by politicians, 
scholars and veterans. The UNEF and its smaller sibling in the form of UNSCO are 
thus not merely any (‘joint’) case study of a frontier zone of imperial multilateralism 
from the Cold War. They are, as I will show in the following section of this chapter 
and in chapter 5, the first stitches in the myth of ‘peacekeeping’ and the success of 
UNEF, which is woven into military culture and organisation, officer academies, high 
school and university textbooks, university and think-tank research, policy 
recommendations, policymaking, public narratives, and frontier building in other 
‘mission areas’. Showing how ‘peacekeeping’ is anything but, and consequently is 
not only the most effective way to attempt to pull the threads of the still very dominant 
narrative of ‘peacekeeping’ with what that unravelling could potentially bring, but 
also the intervention in which to anchor the counter-narrative of the interventions 
expanding the frontier of imperial multilateralism.  
Additional factors weigh in as well. In most research, the oil and shipping 
dimensions of the intervention are severely under-studied, intentionally or not. Often, 
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scholars do not mention them at all. If acknowledged, as I will show in the following 
section, they mention only briefly the United Nations Clearance Organization, without 
offering any further comments. The process started at the beginning of the 20th 
century, but Western Europe only made the full transition to an oil-based economy 
after the Second World War, with strong American nudging by way of the Marshall 
aid.146 The UN’s concerns about disturbances in the Suez Canal regime in the years 
following the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the American and European 
concerns with keeping the oil flowing through the canal—to keep growth rates high 
enough to check the attraction of Communism to Western European working class 
voters—were therefore all but insignificant. While of lesser geopolitical significance, 
the shipping dimension was also important. 
Finally, the intervention also appears, as far as I have been able to ascertain, to be 
the Cold War intervention that has seen interest from the broadest range of disciplines. 
Not only foreign policy historians, military historians, legal scholars and scholars of 
international relations have taken an interest. Sociologists, peace scholars and 
anthropologists have also published on the intervention. This would suggest that it is 
the perhaps most suitable Cold War intervention to use as a point of departure for 
further interdisciplinary dialogue.  
 
 
Research On UNEF and UNCSO: The Building, institutionalisation 
and Internationalisation of the Myth of Imperial Multilateralism 
 
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu suggested that scholars of the social sciences 
often take over ‘problems’ as they are defined by state apparatuses and 
governments.147 As will be clear, his argument appears valid for most of the research 
in English on the intervention’s two components. While I am unsure of how much 
research exists beyond that in English,148 I focus here on works in English not only 
because I (aside from being able to read them) feel confident they make up the largest 
cluster. I also centre them as they—reflecting global power relations—unveil much 
about the links between American foreign policy and social sciences, the influence of 
American imperialism on the social sciences in the West via the dissemination of the 
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transnational narrative of ‘peacekeeping’ that includes UNEF’s success, and, once 
UNEF ended in 1967, the institutionalisation and internationalisation thereof.  
Before moving to the research from UNEF’s operational period, it is necessary to 
note that, as anthropologist David Nugent argues, the funding of social science 
research fields (such as area studies and international politics), journals and 
internationally oriented think-tank’s by American trusts established in late 19th and 
early 20th centuries by the wealthiest American businessmen was all but coincidental. 
Rather, as Nugent argues, the financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
Ford Foundation, and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, the John Simon 
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and others to universities was fundamental in 
building a post-war global geography of knowledge aimed at securing capitalist 
development and political stability around the world.149 For example, the formation 
of the journal, International Organization, was one of the vehicles the Rockefeller 
Foundation funded. In 1954, the Rockefeller Foundation convened a conference. 
Several former, serving and future political heavyweights and private actors took part 
and requested that the predominantly political scientists from the well-connected 
American East coast universities such as Columbia, MIT, and Tufts show ‘what they 
could do for them’.150 While many scholars were former UN diplomats and military 
officers, the growing presence of the military in American social science both as an 
employer of researchers and sponsor of policy-oriented university research pulled, as 
Cold War historian Joy Rohde has shown, many scholars closer to the interests of 
power.151 As I will show, the American and Canadian academic landscapes were 
rather similar and would come to influence the emerging research on UNEF.  
Within six months of the operation, Maxwell Cohen, Canadian former soldier 
turned legal scholar and later UN representative for Canada, published the first article 
in a Canadian journal in the spring of 1957. Seeing the European empires and the 
Commonwealth as the basis of world order, his framing revolved around the use of 
troops from ‘independent’ nations, Canadian resolve, and praise of the UN Secretary-
General.152 Another Canadian, Graham Spry, historian turned oil executive with 
Middle Eastern tasks, had an article published in the Rockefeller Foundation-
sponsored journal of the British think tank, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
in which he praised Canada, expressed concern with the internal Western rift, and 
other worries of several ‘‘white’’ Commonwealth states.153 At Columbia University, 
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American political scientist Leland M. Goodrich and his Ph.D. student Gabrielle 
Rosner, enrolled in a research programme backed by the Rockefeller Foundation,154 
wrote another ‘loyalist’ article in International Organization. Goodrich was not only 
the editor of the journal, but also a member the international secretariat at the San 
Francisco conference, co-drafter of the UN Charter and a recipient of Rockefeller 
Foundation funds for work on American UN policy in 1951. As insiders, they praised 
the UN Secretary-General and Canada, professed hope for the intervention to last, and 
backed the making of a permanent UN force.155 In an article in ‘his’ journal, the editor 
of Foreign Affairs (that has roots in the Journal of Race Development) Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong, both admired the intervention and supported expanding the UN’s 
organisational and military abilities.156 Also publishing in the journal of which he was 
chief editor, American historian Matthew A. Fitzsimons applauded the US 
government for co-opting the UN.157 Framing UNEF as in compliance with 
international law in an American law journal, legal scholar Dudley H. Chapman he 
recommended that it be granted greater discretion with respect to its authority and 
deployment and the Secretariat be expanded for future interventions.158 Prominent 
Western scholars, who published in ‘their own’ journals and were involved in frontier 
building by academic legitimization within the fields of international law, political 
science and international relations, establishing the UN or securing Western access to 
Middle Eastern oil, thus not only dominated research from the outset. They were also 
instrumental in founding a pro-interventionist scholarly discourse rooted in western 
imperial knowledge conventions.  
For a while, Western scholars shifted focus away from the Middle East as the 
hostility of both the Soviet Bloc and the governments of several newly independent 
third world states towards the growing costs and number of UN interventions 
intensified. However, in 1963, the Rockefeller Foundation convened scholars and UN 
officials at MIT to take stock of the ongoing interventions, provide ‘lessons learned’, 
and emphasise the need for permanent standby forces. The participants included for 
example Lincoln P. Bloomfield, former officer of the US Navy and the Office of 
Strategic Services turned political scientist and counsel for the State Department and 
Henry V. Dicks, officer for US military intelligence and psychological warfare expert 
in the Second World War turned psychiatrist. The journal edited by Goodrich instantly 
published their papers. In one article, the British political scientist touring American 
East-coast universities Herbert Nicholas commended UNEF for providing both 
contingents from countries detached from local and great power conflicts and making 
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its temporary character the solution to the Middle East problem.159 In another, Edward 
E. Bowman, a strategic and corporate management scholar at MIT and consultant with 
the arms manufacturer Honeywell, and James E. Fanning, one of Bowman’s graduate 
students, summarised the logistical ‘lessons learned’ on basis of UNEF and the 
intervention in Congo. Adopting a pro-interventionist position, they argued that the 
UN needed to work on coordination, planning, air transport capabilities, and 
supplies.160 Aside praising the clearance of the Suez Canal and the intervention in 
which he had been part, Brian Urquhart, former British officer and diplomat turned 
special advisor to the UN Secretary General from 1953 to 1961, advised using ad hoc 
forces to acclimatise governments to the idea of a permanent force.161 Combined, 
these publications were outwardly moderate manifestations of the Western ideas for 
how to use the UN. The same year, Rosner also had her dissertation published as the 
second book in a Columbia book series that the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored 
and Goodrich edited along with William T. R. Fox, a fellow Columbia scholar. Fox 
was as embedded in the power matrix as Goodrich, having been in the international 
secretariat in San Francisco, co-founder of the journal in which Goodrich and Rosner 
and the 1963 conference papers were published, anchor-person in the 1954 
Rockefeller conference, consultant for the State Department, and finally lecturer for 
the US military. Moreover, Andrew Cordier served both as an interviewee for Rosner 
and in an ‘advisory capacity’ for the book series. Cordier was no small fish in neither 
the US nor the UN. He served as national security advisor in 1944 and a US delegate 
at San Francisco in 1945 before becoming Undersecretary-General in charge of the 
General Assembly and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in several 
interventions until forced to resign (to Columbia University) due to the Soviet 
criticism of his partial actions in the Congo intervention.162 Expectedly, she was kind 
towards the UN and UNEF and ended by supporting a permanent force.163 The first 
internationalisation of the narrative took place within the ‘white’ Commonwealth the 
same year when two Australian scholars of international relations, Arthur Lee Burns 
who had spent time at Princeton and spent time with Fox amongst others and Nina 
Heathcote, also took to promoting the narrative of success in their book in a Princeton 
book series on world politics.164 As the Congo intervention divided the UN on 
‘peacekeeping’, the American MIT political scientist Norman J. Padelford offered a 
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theoretical model of the negotiation of support and his reflections on how to, on basis 
of UNEF, move on from the financial and political ‘stalemate’. His position was not 
surprising as a member of the US delegation at the Dumbarton conference in 1944, 
co-author of the UN charter and a board member of the journal, International 
Organization, in which he published.165 Fellow American political scientist Jacob C. 
Hurewitz took it even further, arguing that the involvement of the UN and the US in 
the Middle East after 1945, including the UNEF intervention, was ‘dis-imperialism’. 
Considering Hurewitz’ ‘pedigree’, this is not surprising. He was deeply embedded in 
the American power matrix, having served in the OSS’ Middle East Section in the 
Second World War, then the State Department and finally as counsel to several 
administrations before turning to academia. Predictably, the Rockefeller Foundation, 
the Council of Foreign Relations, the Ford Foundation, and the Rand Corporation all 
funded his work on the Middle East.166 Peter V. Bishop, a Canadian political scientist 
and recipient of Ford Foundation funds, engaged in the debate in Canada. He both 
depicted international law and ‘peacekeeping’ as a global public good and praised 
Canada’s role in UNEF, ‘peacekeeping’, and the financial dilemma.167 In 1966, a 
Scandinavian journal published a different kind of article. Part of promoting the 
emerging field of peace studies, the Norwegian sociologist from the Norway-based 
Peace Research Institute Ingrid Eide was perhaps the second scholar (after Armstrong) 
to visit the ‘mission area’ and the first to argue that the ‘locals’ were important to an 
intervention.168 Few, however, took notice.  
When UNEF was terminated in 1967, the ‘old’ generation of American and 
Canadian scholars either retired or lost interest in UNEF due to its end, the continued 
deployment on Cyprus, and the launch of a second intervention in the Sinai Peninsula 
in 1973. However, most researchers were still predominantly ‘white’ and pro-
interventionist American and Canadian males rooted in state-centric disciplines that 
saw the world as a system of nation states, providing mostly ‘technical’ perspectives. 
Topics as the Palestinians and the links between UNEF, imperialism and oil had no 
traction. An example of this group, aforementioned Canadian legal scholar Cohen 
published his disappointment as he saw in the end of UNEF at the request of Egypt a 
sign that peacekeeping had lost momentum and the more encompassing peacemaking 
interventions as taken off the agenda.169 After having been a Rockefeller Fellow at 
Columbia in 1968, the British international relations scholar Alan James also praised 
UNEF for diffusing the ‘Suez Crisis’, maintaining the truce and keeping quiet the 
border in a book for the British Institute of Strategic Studies (a British think tank) in 
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1969.170 Moreover, only few non-Western and female scholars had gained access to 
the debate. An example of this group and in part the upward influence of the emerging 
Third World at the ‘citadel’, the Ugandan international relations scholar Yashpal 
Tandon was one of the very few not to argue the intervention a success but rather that 
it had relaxed the pressure for a political solution. Nevertheless, he had the advantage 
of hindsight and his point was first made by UN Secretary-General U Thant. His 
interest in ‘peacekeeping’, hereunder UNEF, also began only after having met 
Goodrich and others during a fellowship at Columbia.171 In the following years, UN-
associated scholars institutionalised and Indian and Scandinavian scholars further 
internationalised the narratives of ‘peacekeeping’ and UNEF’ success. In 1972, for 
example, the James Boyd, who had served as US Air Force attaché in Egypt from 
1956 to 1959 and subsequently Chief-of-Staff at the UN Military Staff Committee, 
applauded UNEF’s success.172 In 1974, Indar Jit Rikhye, Bjørn Egge and Michael 
Harbottle, three army officers from Norway, India and Great Britain turned UN 
military officials in Egypt and the Gaza strip, Congo, and Cyprus and insiders par 
excellence, saw UNEF as successful and its ending as unfair.173 Indicatively, their 
book was born out of a conference at the New York-based International Peace 
Academy created after the launch of a new UN force in 1973 and the call for a 
permanent UN force at the General Assembly by US Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger.174 After a ten-year pause reflecting the drop in the political interest in 
‘peacekeeping’, Canadian political scientist and director of peacekeeping programs of 
the International Peace Academy Henry Wiseman again took to promoting both 
UNEF and interventions generally with other UN-scholars and officials.175 
Predictably, Rikhye also began promoting UNEF’s success again.176 Altogether, these 
most often ‘white’ men using ‘temporally flat’ (nation) state-centric epistemologies 
successfully institutionalised the narrative between 1967 and 1989. Additionally, a 
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new generation of UNEF-oriented scholars in troop-contributing countries such as 
India and the Scandinavian countries and historically interested international relations 
scholars further internationalised the narrative. An example of the former, Indian 
international relations scholar Nand Lal, who did his doctoral research at the 
Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1973, praised India’s non-aligned foreign policy, its 
engagements with the UN, and the Indian involvement in setting up, staffing and 
running UNEF an article in both an Indian journal and his re-written dissertation, also 
published in India.177 That his view reads similar to earlier Canadian scholars was no 
coincidence. For decades after independence, Indian international relations thinking, 
argues scholar of international relations Navnita Behera, suffered from intellectual 
dependency on Western traditions. The dominance of foreign policy thought by the 
Ministry of External Affairs, again informed by Nehru’s idea of India’s need to ‘join 
the existing system and modernity’, she contends, only exacerbated the centring of 
the West by Indian scholars.178 Another example was Swedish-based Abdel-Latif M. 
Zaidan whose international law dissertation on UNEF opened with a pro-
interventionist quote by the (Swedish) Secretary-General who initiated UNEF and 
ended with a chapter on how to form a permanent force.179 Finally, Evan Luard, 
British diplomat turned politician and scholar, wrote a chapter on the ‘Suez Crisis’, as 
the invasion of Egypt is known as in Great Britain (and the US), and the UNEF in his 
broader UN history. Having left the British diplomatic service over the invasion of 
Egypt in 1956,180 he was naturally very fond of both the UN operation and the UN.181 
A new group of historically oriented scholars of international relations and 
historians began to review UN ‘peacekeeping’, the ‘Suez Crisis’ and UNEF after the 
call for a New World Order with the UN-sanctioned but US-led intervention against 
Iraq in 1990 and Somalia in 1992 as well as the release of American, Canadian, 
British, Israeli and UN archival records. An example of the first group of primarily 
American think tanks experts at and military officers turned scholars in the 1990s, 
Israeli and US-educated Middle Eastern scholar Mona Ghali repeated the narrative of 
UNEF’s success. Tellingly, her work appeared in an anthology on ‘lessons learned’ 
by the Henry L. Stimson Center, a think tank formed in 1990 not in New York where 
the UN was located, but Washington (as several others) as an indication of the ongoing 
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tectonic shift in the international realm.182 In contrast, the initially Israeli and British 
diplomatic and Cold War historians were mostly empirically concerned with the ‘Suez 
Crisis’, the Israeli-UN relationship, and the British view on a permanent force in light 
of UNEF.183 Their interests in ‘high’ politics came to inform the main current in 
historical and ‘IR’ scholarship interested, if peripherally, in UNEF. Viewing through 
the (nation)state-centric lenses and released government records, scholars continued 
to focus on the onset of the ‘Suez Crisis’, the role of the Secretary-General, and the 
different countries’ involvement, reactions, and policy changes only until early 1957 
as well as the financing of UNEF. Although this scholarship unveiled, to some extent, 
the Canadian-American collusion with the Secretary-General in creating UNEF and 
the Eisenhower administration’s wish for the UN to deflect the Soviet criticism and 
get oil flowing again, records and perspectives remained limited to the views of and 
relations between Tel Aviv, London, Paris, New York, Washington and Ottawa. Only 
Prithvi Muidiam, an Indian historian, provided a non-Western view on the ‘Suez 
Crisis’ in his work on India and the Middle East.184  
By the mid-2000s, however, the horizon began to broaden. Using European 
records and literature in addition to works and records in English, diplomatic historian 
Ralph Dietl showed that the governments in at least Bonn, Rome and Brussels 
informally supported the French-British attack on Egypt, reflecting broader West 
European frustrations with the increasingly bi-polar world order.185 It is indicative that 
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it took Sohail Hashmi, an US-educated and based Pakistani scholar of international 
relations to draw attention to the economic interests of Pakistan in re-opening the Suez 
Canal and subsequent involvement.186 Yet, the internationalised story of 
‘peacekeeping’ still dominates. An example thereof, Canadian diplomatic historian 
Michael Carroll provided a Western- and nation-state-centric analysis, despite the 
recent achievements on the importance of the Commonwealth in both the ‘Suez 
Crisis’ and the formation and running of UNEF as well as empire in relation to 
Canadian foreign and UN policy187. Despite using most of the Cold War literature 
discussed here, Carroll failed to see it in context. Finally, his ‘on the ground’ chapter 
considers only the standpoint(s) of Canadian soldiers.188 Writing from a university in 
the illegal settlement of Ariel in the West Bank, Israeli- and US-educated historian 
turned political scientist and national security consultant for Israel Alexander Bligh 
expresses a historical interpretation from the Israeli far right. Ignoring several decades 
of UNEF research and using uncritically only British and Canadian (and therefore 
naturally anti-Egyptian) cabinet and embassy records from 1956 and 1957(!), he 
remarkably argues both that the UN and UNEF were anti-Israeli and pro-Egyptian 
from 1956 to 1967(!) and that Egypt’s sovereignty and political space for 
manoeuvring threatened Israel.189 However, a handful of political scientists, 
anthropologists, and scholars of international relations offer wider frameworks, 
illuminating the weakness of the methodological nationalism of diplomatic historians. 
That said, their mostly non-records-based frameworks are not problem free either. 
While British scholar of international relations Norrie MacQueen examined 
‘peacekeeping’ as a self-interested response of the international system to conflicts, 
he stuck to the established storyline on UNEF.190 Looking at ‘peacekeeping’ from a 
tool for a pluralist international organisation, the American anthropologist Robert 
Rubinstein argued UNEF as against big power interests and a “(…) model 
peacekeeping operation, maintaining peace and order in a buffer zone in the Sinai 
and Gaza Strip between Israel and Egypt.”191 Despite using a good number of records 
from UNEF to focus on the everyday interactions between the Gaza Strip residents 
and UNEF soldiers, the ‘temporally flat’ perspective of Alana Feldman, another 
(American) anthropologist, reproduced the underlying narrative of UNEF.192 Arguing 
that the interventions in the Middle East from 1948 onwards should be seen as a useful 
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international regime to discipline the states in the region, American army officer 
Kenneth R. Dombroski turned political scientist at a university in Washington also 
supported the narrative of UNEF’s success, using pro-interventionist Cold War 
literature and overlooking the advances in historical scholarship.193 Taking a more 
critical view of the UN against the backdrop of the American rise to global power in 
1945, UK-educated Brazilian political scientist and scholar of international relations 
Richard Kareem Al-Qaq sees ‘peacekeeping’ as social ordering on the global 
periphery. Relying on Luard, several works by British and American historians, the 
memoirs of several key figures and published UN documents, Al-Qaq, however, 
focuses only on Egypt and, as others, bypass the importance of oil and imperialism 
more broadly. Nevertheless, he convincingly argues UNEF is a “(…) novel political 
formula for policing Southern states that that [sic, MOJ] had fallen foul of the 
international political economy, which did not necessarily rely on gunboat diplomacy 
or impinge, at least formally, on the sovereignty of these new states.”194 Finally, 
Cunliffe goes beyond both an American post-war global order and American empire. 
He argues UNEF the onset of imperial multilateralism, the post-1945 heir to what he 
has called multinational imperialism, although he under-emphasises the importance 
of the Gaza Strip in relation to understanding the character of the intervention due to 
a reliance on Al-Qaq, Macqueen as well as Israeli diplomatic and military historian 
(turned diplomat) Michael Oren.195  
To recap, especially American and Canadian scholarship from 1957 to 1967 
served to legitimise the expansion of the frontier of imperial multilateralism via a 
narrative of ‘peacekeeping’ that scholars associated with either the UN, the troop 
contributing countries or the ‘‘white’’ Commonwealth then institutionalised and 
further internationalised. Especially in the last decade, however, historians and 
historically interested scholars of international relations have turned to archival 
records and thereby begun to unravel gradually the Cold War narrative of 
‘peacekeeping’, and UNEF as part thereof. On basis of Western records, researchers 
have pointed towards but not illuminated in detail the collusion between Washington, 
Ottawa and New York to prevent Moscow from interfering, to repair the damaged 
internal Western relations, and to re-open the flow of oil to Western Europe. 
Additionally, scholars have begun to move beyond the nation state frameworks and 
connect peacekeeping, UNEF included, to changes in the global imperial system. 
Finally, scholars have also, using UN records and interviews, begun a turn to viewing 
the intervention ‘on the ground’. Nevertheless, the interwoven narratives of UNEF as 
successful, and ‘peacekeeping’ as a global good, have not so far been deconstructed. 
Moreover, scholars have yet to examine in more detail the role of the Middle East in 
relation to the emergence of the frontier of imperial multilateralism; the informal 
empire of both Great Britain and the US in the Middle East until 1956; the oil and 
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trade dimension; the connections between the US, UN and troop contributing 
countries such as Brazil, Yugoslavia, the Scandinavian countries, and India; the local 
realities when it comes to experiencing a shift from British imperialism to the UN; 
and the negotiations of agency, race, gender, class and so on in the ‘mission areas’. 
Thus, much remains to be done.  
 
 
My Working Questions and the Dissertation Structure 
 
To link together my aims and main research questions, theoretical framework and 
state of the art on UNEF and UNSCO, I to ask a series of six working questions. Given 
the need to both situate UNEF in the larger global imperial system and see it from the 
‘inside’ via the everyday negotiation of its regime between the soldiers of the different 
contingents and the Palestinians, Bedouin, Egyptians and Israelis ‘on the ground’, a 
two-part structure seems suitable to answer my research questions.  
The first set of three questions, then, focus on ‘the making of the frontier of 
imperial multilateralism’, while the second revolves around ‘the negotiation of life 
and authority in the frontier zone of imperial multilateralism’: 
 
- How did the creation of the United Nations as a predominantly inter-
imperial military alliance in 1942 (and its conversion to a broader security 
organisation in 1945) link to the late 19th century shift from agrarian 
tributary empires towards increasingly bureaucratic, industrialised and 
trade-oriented imperial state-systems and colonial state powers as the 
systemically dominant actors on the one hand, and from centring imperial 
competition to also emphasize inter-imperial cooperation in on the other? 
 
- How did both the mounting reach and capacities of the imperial state-
systems and colonial state powers at the expense of the agrarian tributary 
empires and the coincidence of imperial competition and inter-imperial 
cooperation manifest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the region 
in which the first UN intervention took place? 
 
- How did these deeper systemic changes in the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East eventually accrue to create a situation that not only led to the Suez 
Crisis, but also in turn made a United Nations intervention in the form of 
both the United Nations Emergency Force and United Nations Suez 
Clearance Operation a viable (or the only) option in late 1956? 
   
- How did amassing the UN intervention force, forcing out the British, French 
and Israeli forces from Egypt and reopening the Suez Canal in late 1956 
relate to the global and the regional manifestations of the earlier shift 
towards parallel imperial competition and inter-imperial cooperation both 
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systemically and ‘on the ground’ in the form of military cultures, 
rationalities and mental geographies?  
 
- How did the UN deployment from Egypt into the Gaza Strip ‘mission area’ 
in early March 1957 relate to the global and the regional manifestations of 
the earlier shift towards imperial competition and inter-imperial 
cooperation both systemically and ‘on the ground’ in the form of military 
cultures, rationalities and mental geographies?  
 
- In this context, how, and with what outcomes, did the different actors of the 
Gaza Strip ‘mission area’—Palestinians, Bedouin and Egyptians—engage 
the different contingents of the UN force, and thus negotiate the broader UN 
regime in the Gaza Strip, in its operational period from 1957 to 1967? 
 
In this way, each working question provides the basis for a chapter that sets the scene 
for the subsequent chapter. In this way, the six chapters each historicise the global-
regional context and the various dimensions of the intervention, thus providing my 
contribution to the counter-narrative of the United Nations interventions when 
combined.  
In the first part, thus, I focus on the building of the global system of imperial 
multilateralism, then to the regional place of the Mediterranean and Middle East 
within the global system and, finally, the place of the Gaza Strip within the regional 
system and the making of the system in the Gaza Strip. Picking up the discussion from 
the theoretical chapter, I concretely examine in chapter three how the global imperial 
system shifted from ‘national’ imperial systems towards inter-imperial cooperation, 
or from ‘imperial frontiers’ to the emerging ‘frontier of multinational imperialism’ 
and ‘the frontier of imperial multilateralism’, in the period from the late 19th century 
to the 1950s. In the following chapter, I initially interrogate how these changes 
manifested in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, or how the frontiers of 
‘multinational imperialism’ and ‘imperial multilateralism’ incorporated the region, 
ending with the joint British, French and Israeli invasion in late 1956. In extension of 
the invasion and the threat it came to represent, chapter five examines how UNEF and 
the clearing of the Suez Canal subsequently became one of several American-
supported and largely controlled means to sustain both the regional status quo and the 
overall frontier system.  
In the second part, I shift focus from the global imperial system and imperial 
multilateralism to the frontier zone by examining the formation of the UN regime(s) 
and their practice ‘on the ground’. In other words, I turn to what I term the expansion 
in both breadth and depth of the frontier by focusing on networks, technologies of 
power and human agency in the frontier zone, which over late 1956 mirrored the UN 
deployment from the Suez Canal area and canal towns in Egypt eastwards over the 
Sinai Peninsula to the Gaza Strip. As the canal clearance finished in spring 1957, it 
contracted to the Gaza Strip and a few logistical sites in Egypt. As suggested in the 
theoretical chapter, the systemic expansion of the frontier in breadth entails the 
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making of frontier zones and the linking of chiefly Western military infrastructure, 
supply systems and knowledge systems. Accordingly, chapter six initially ‘dots the 
map’ and ‘connects the dots’ to elucidate how UNEF was built on chiefly Western 
military infrastructure and supply and knowledge systems before it examines 
UNSCO’s clearing of the Suez Canal, and finally the redeployment of UNEF to the 
Gaza Strip. Focusing on the expansion of the frontier in depth in extension thereof, 
the following three chapters shift attention to the practices of UNEF’s regime and how 
its authority was negotiated ‘on the ground’ in the interactions with local actors. With 
the formation of Israel as the main political change in and near the Gaza Strip from 
1948 to 1956, chapter seven scrutinizes, firstly, the relations between UNEF and the 
Israeli border regime and, secondly, the Israelis living in settlements near the Gaza 
Strip against the backdrop of the British relations with the Jewish settlements in the 
Mandate period. Subsequently, chapter eight turns to the Gaza Strip and the relations 
between the UN force and the existing UN aid and development regime, the local 
Egyptian military, and, not least, the different Palestinian and Bedouin populations 
against the backdrop of the British regime in Mandate period.  
 
 
On Records and Research 
 
In this section, I will link the structure with the research literature and the archival 
material I use to build my analysis. However, I will merely do so in an overall way 
here: the broader topics of discussion and trends in the main bulk of the research 
literature has already been dealt with in some detail in the theoretical chapter and the 
specifics of the records, or the necessary ‘nitty-gritty’ of the craft of the historian, will 
be dealt with in the different chapters. Altogether, however, it can be said that the 
structure—which moves from an examination of the development of the overall 
system and how it manifested in the region of the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
to an interrogation of the everyday negotiatedness of the systemic incorporation of 
Egypt and the Gaza Strip as a frontier zone—entails a gradual movement from 
grounding the analysis in mostly research towards grounding the analysis in archival 
material growing number of both published and unpublished records and unpacking 
these with contextualising research literature.  
Examining the shift ‘imperial frontiers’ to the emerging ‘frontier of multinational 
imperialism’ and ‘the frontier of imperial multilateralism’ from the late 19th century 
to the 1950s in the first chapter, this chapter is built first and foremost on research 
showing changes in the global imperial system by focusing on respectively the early 
modern empires, the various ‘national’ imperial systems, the emerging paradigm of 
inter-imperial cooperation within the spheres of logistics, health, or security and how 
these systems of governance were put in place and negotiated. Mostly, I have already 
introduced these scholars: imperial and international historians as for example Laura 
Briggs, John Darwin, Daniel Gorman, Greg Grandin, Joseph Morgan Hodge, Valeska 
Huber Gabriel Kolko, Paul Kramer, Peter Lowe, Mark Mazower, Naomi Nagata, 
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Susan Pedersen, Dan Plesch and on the one hand and scholars from other research 
fields and disciplines such as military history, US history (whose practitioners do not 
place their work within imperial historiography), Korean history, Cold War history, 
sociology, and defence studies as for example Thomas Borstelmann, Catherine Lutz, 
Julian Go, Ruth Oldenziel, Eric Ouellet, Nicole Sackley, Erwin Schmidl, J. Adam 
Tooze, and Odd Arne Westad on the other. By and large, these works come from 
separate research fields, but commonly revolve around geopolitical decision-making, 
strategic landscapes, institutional change, regimes of governance and state-centric 
networks and how these tied together (although several of these works appear not to 
have been put in contact before). 
Interrogating how these global changes manifested in the systems of governance 
in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, or how the frontiers of ‘multinational 
imperialism’ and ‘imperial multilateralism’ sought to incorporate the region, chapter 
four similarly builds on research literature. Aside building on several scholars also 
used in the first chapter, I have also linked historians of the Ottoman Empire such as 
for example, E. Attila Ayteykin, Karen Barkey, Chales Issawi, Nadir Özbek, Eugene 
Rogan and Mehmet Soytürk and Mandate historians such as Jacob Norris and Peter 
Sluglett, with energy historians such as Anand Toprani, Steven G. Galpern, and David 
S. Painter with historians of post-Ottoman and Cold War Southern Europe and the 
Middle East such as for example Reem Abou-El-Fadl, Mordechai Bar-On, Peter Beck, 
David Cohen, Mohrez N. El-Husseini, Guy Laron, Zach Levey, Amikam Nachmani, 
Mogens Pelt, Tore Tingvold Petersen, Elieh Podeh, Süleyman Seydi, Michael T. 
Thornhill, B. Yeşilbursa. As with the research used to build the first chapter, the works 
of these primarily historians dealt with the (Ottoman) system of governance, the 
emerging paradigm of inter-imperial European cooperation and how these regimes 
were negotiated. 
Common for the research used in these two first chapters, is, fortunately, trends of 
diversification among scholars with regard to origin, but overall commitment to 
complexity, layers and scales and multiple perspectives, and (accordingly) an 
intensifying use of an ever-growing base of archival materials not just from a growing 
range of state archives beyond those located in London and Washington, but also from 
a growing number of regional and local corporate and private archives, newspapers, 
memoirs and in some cases also interviews. If there is still space for further 
pluralisation, the utilised research has, in other words, generally come a long way with 
regards to with regard not only to who writes, but also what they write about, and on 
which basis they do.    
In extension of the shift from the ‘global’ to the ‘regional’, chapter five the global 
and regional in the ‘local’ in that it examines the beginning of the systemic 
incorporation of Egypt. Concretely, it studies how UNEF and the clearing of the Suez 
Canal subsequently became one of several American-supported and largely controlled 
means to sustain both the regional and the overall status quo. While research on Egypt, 
the US, France, Great Britain, Soviet Union and Israel remains important here, I 
increasingly include both published and unpublished recrods in this chapter. 
Specifically, I have used the volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States (a 
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selection of American foreign policy-related documents made available online) on the 
Suez Crisis and the Middle East, published UN documents, communication between 
various European shipping organisations held in the Business Archive of Denmark in 
Aarhus, and the Archive of the UN in New York: documents on the dredging 
companies contracted by the UN to clear the Suez Canal produced by the UN Office 
of Special Political Affairs and the Field Operations Service, and finally the minutes 
of the meetings of the UNEF Advisory Committee. While arguably important to 
UNEF and UNSCO, my main interest has not been the invasion of Egypt and Israeli 
occupation of the Gaza Strip, but rather what followed and the subsequent decade. I 
have not, therefore, looked for archival materials in London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Cairo, 
Moscow, and Washington. As for the records on the commercial shipping dimension 
obtained in Denmark, the archive of the Suez Company, located in Roubaix in France, 
is not insignificant. However, the Danish archive had much both broad and valuable 
material, which was also readily accessible since it was not under any confidentiality 
regime, needed no further translation (as it was mostly in English) and yet remained 
unexploited.  
In the sixth chapter (and thus the first chapter of the second part of the analysis), I 
shift to an everyday perspective and frontier-zone related research and sources. The 
chapter initially ‘dots the map’ and ‘connects the dots’ to elucidate how UNEF was 
built on chiefly Western military infrastructure and supply and knowledge systems 
before it lastly examines UNSCO’s clearing of the Suez Canal. Consequently, I use 
again unpublished UN documents on the UNSCO and UN Field Service documents 
on the logistics of UNEF and the volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States 
Series pertaining to both the Suez Crisis and the Middle East on the one hand, and add 
the memoirs of not only Mohamed Heikal, the advisor to the Egyptian President, and 
E. L. M. Burns, the first UN Force Commander, but also several Danish soldiers on 
the other. Finally, I turn to already mentioned Cold War Middle East scholarship and 
others more specifically concerned with the Suez Crisis, Israel, Egypt, and the states 
contributing troops for the UN force, such as for example R. Thomas Bobal, Silvia 
Borzutsky and David Berger, Bruno Charbonneau, Eric Crove, Ralph Dietl, Mikael 
Nilsson Hilde Henriksen Waage, to contextualise the records. 
The seventh chapter studies the redeployment of UNEF to the Gaza Strip, the 
failure to internationalise the control of the Gaza Strip, the relocation of the 
operational area of the UN force and a large part of its contingents to the ADL, and 
the relations between UNEF and the Israeli border regime the Israelis living in 
settlements near the Gaza Strip against the backdrop of the British relations with the 
Jewish settlements in the Mandate period. Consequently, I use documents from 
FRUS, unpublished cables and reports of the UN-employed military observers of the 
Egyptian-Israeli Military Armistice Commission (EIMAC) that were already in the 
Gaza Strip when the ‘Suez Crisis’ broke out as part of the larger the military observer 
organisation UNTSO, published memoirs of UN soldiers and already mentioned 
research on Israel, Egypt, the British Mandate for contextualisation. Here, I have 
chosen not to try to find supplementary material from the governments and militaries 
of neither Egypt nor Israel the Egyptian, although their views are of importance, as I 
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estimate the time I would have had to spend finding these, applying for access, 
learning enough Arabic and Hebrew to read these and other relevant records, and 
visiting the archives would have surpassed both the value of what could be found and 
the time allocated to my project. Finally, the material I was able to put together for 
this also nevertheless also allows for a new, and perhaps controversial, reading of the 
processes examined.  
 The last of the six-chapter analysis, chapter eight, in tune with my theoretical 
framework, links up with Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, both London-based 
scholars of international relations, who argue that we need to move past the orthodox 
‘Westphalian’ model of the international system and the polities therein as it remains 
caught in ‘the territorial trap’ of the state and thus populated by only diplomats, 
soldiers and capitalists. Questioning if this framework was ever viable, they suggest 
that we ‘thicken’ (and deepen) the framework to make the international include also 
“(…) social and cultural flows as well as political-military and economic interactions 
in a context of hierarchy.”196 The shift in attention to the relations between the UN 
force and the existing UN aid and development regime, the local Egyptian military, 
and, not least, the different Palestinian and Bedouin population groups requires a 
different set of records than those used hitherto. Therefore, I have here utilised 
documents on the Armistice Demarcation Line regime such as observation and 
incident reports from both the EIMAC observers and various departments of UNEF 
itself, traffic incident reports, labour records and so on. For context, I linked to 
research on the British Mandate in Palestine, the militarisation of the Israeli foreign 
policy, border space and public sphere, the Palestinian nationalist movement and the 
UN aid regime in the Gaza Strip. Here, I have again chosen not to supplement out 
material from neither the governments and militaries of Egypt and Israel nor the 
Egyptian governor-general in the Gaza Strip in UNEF’s operational period for the 
same reasons as chapter seven. I also decided not to pursue any examination of any 
UNEF-generated or related records in the archives of the Canadian, Brazilian, 
Indonesian, Norwegian, Swedish, Indian, Finnish and Colombian ministries of 
defence, armies and deployed units My ‘cost-benefit’ reflections are again very 
similar. Such an effort, which would be aimed at the unattainable ‘complete history 
of’ rather than a dislocation and deconstruction of the existing narrative by way of an 
alternative, would have to be the efforts of a multi-lingual and multi-national research 
team. 
Altogether, I, thus, seeks to engage broad body of research and a large material of 
a certain breadth and depth to convincingly support my aims and arguments.  
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Chapter 3: From ‘National’ Empires to 
‘imperial multilateralism’: The Roots of 
the United Nations 
 
Focusing on bringing together recent European and American imperial historiography 
and thus broaden the discussion from the theoretical chapter, I here present the 
argument that the period from the last decades of the 19th century to the end of the 
First World War saw a rather significant change in the global imperial system.  
From consisting of mainly (the last) remnants of the dynastic and tributary form 
of (early modern) empire and modern increasingly industrialising, bureaucratic and 
market oriented imperial systems, the system also came to be characterised by new 
forms of various inter-imperial forms of cooperation and informal empire often 
involving several empires in the Mediterranean and the Pacific domains of the 
Ottoman and Chinese empires. The different processes in this paradigmic shift 
gradually became even clearer in the former Ottoman, Russian and German lands 
following their collapses in the First World War, in increasingly American-dominated 
South America in the 1930s, and in the United Nations military alliance from 1942 
and organisation from 1945 onwards.   
 
 
‘Multinational imperialism’, 1900-1918: An Ad Hoc Expansion 
 
The gradual paradigmatic shift towards various inter-imperial forms of cooperation 
and informal empire, I argue, involved the three simultaneous and increasingly 
interwoven processes of 1) the emergence of Cunliffe’s ‘multinational imperialism’, 
2) the American ascendency as an aspiring international empire, and not least 3) the 
coupled British ‘decentralisation’ and turn to the US.  
As for the first process, historians have shown how inter-imperial cooperation 
already existed in the later decades of the 19th century. Collaboration was mostly a 
practice within the sphere of logistics and mobilities in form of agreements and 
autonomous institutions dealing with post and telegraph services and river trade 
between European powers. The Suez Canal, in contrast, required the cooperation of 
both most European imperial powers and the Ottoman Empire as co-signatories.197 
Scholars have shown that Health was another increasingly important issue. While the 
health conferences saw mostly European representatives, both Japanese and Ottomans 
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participated.198 Gradually, the universalisation of the colonial legal practices of the 
European empires led to the formulation of international law.199 At a more informal 
level, the imperial powers also exchanged knowledge on plantation economies. For 
example, American colonial officials travelled to both Dutch Java and East Indies and 
the British Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States to study plantation 
economies.200 The use of bureaucratic technologies and knowledge to advance 
imperial interests—be that trade, the regulation of the mobilities of imperial subjects, 
ideas and goods—and claims of superiority for ‘white’ civilisation grew common.  
By late 19th century, however, military historian Schmidl shows how the inter-
imperial cooperation extended beyond these spheres and the European part of the 
Eurasian continent into the sphere of imperial expansion in both the Mediterranean 
and the Pacific.201 Following the sociologist Eric Ouellet, the Boxer Rebellion, a 
Chinese revolt in 1900 against the growing foreign influence, is instructive. Although 
the instant reaction of the imposing empires related to how their privileges of 
economic concessions, religious influence and extra-territoriality were challenged by 
the ‘Boxers’, they each had their own agendas. The American government wanted to 
keep its ‘open-door’ policy. The French wanted more influence close to French 
Indochina. Imperial latecomers, Germany and Italy wanted Chinese colonial territory. 
The regional powers, Russia and Japan, coveted Manchuria. The British sought to 
protect their economic concessions. Commanding the strongest forces, the British sent 
almost as many naval vessels as the other combined and along with the French and 
Germans most troops. At its peak, the inter-imperial force consisted of about 100.000 
soldiers. Reflecting both past and future practices, the inter-imperial intervention both 
killed an estimated 30-100.000 Chinese and formed hybrid practices of ‘single-
empire’ governance involving foreign military governors at districts levels and the 
larger cities and basic Chinese institutions locally. However, inter-imperial 
cooperation faded quickly once the military campaign ended in 1901. No common 
institutions were set up aside a single international city administration. Instead, 
cooperation had been organised ‘on the ground’ (even if the forces of Germany and 
France as well as Russia and Japan had to be separated) and helped by a common 
concept of operations in form of a colonialist approach of a ‘punitive’ action against 
‘semi-primitive’ people. Soon after the campaign, Russia also seized Manchuria the 
following year, resulting in the war between Russia and Japan in 1904.202  
On the issue of the US rise to join the ranks of the empires with global reach, the 
US government deployment of forces to China in 1900 reflected not only a growing 
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interest in the wider Pacific, but also, as scholars of American imperial history have 
shown, a longer history of imperial expansion. Historian of American imperialism 
Paul Kramer’s view of American imperialism entail a shift from empire-building 
nation to ‘international’ empire over the 19th to the 20th century. Sociologist of 
American imperialism Julian Go see the US expansion in three waves after declaring 
its independence as a British settler colony. From 1810-1825, the governments sought 
to oust rival European powers from the North American continent, secure territory 
and achieve regional dominance through 16 interventions, wars and annexations in 
the North American continent, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Latin America. From 1825 
to 1840, Go argues, the focus of the American political and economic elites turned to 
stabilisation. From 1840, emphasis shifted towards hemispheric dominance. Lasting 
until 1870, this wave of expansion included not only 24 interventions, wars and 
annexations in the North American continent, Mexico (that lost half of its territory to 
the US), the Caribbean, and Latin America, but also another 22 interventions, wars 
and annexations in the Asia-Pacific region. By the turn of the century, the US had 
increased its original territory by four times. However, some new territories remained 
military governorships for decades203 to remove native resistance, prevent settler 
rebellions, and secure conditions for further settlement and commercial development. 
This meant that people in the territories remained imperial subjects rather than 
(imperial) citizens until the federal government granted statehood.204 With the 
expansion, Greg Grandin, historian of US-Latin American relations, notes, followed 
trade. Initially with Cuba, then other Caribbean and Latin American countries and 
finally China and India. Once trade ties were established, the largest American 
corporations and richest investors also trailed to invest massively in banking, 
infrastructure, and mining, oil, agricultural, and fruit industries. Subsequently, the US 
government not only allowed two private tycoons to invade Latin American and 
Caribbean countries to establish their own fiefdoms, it also sent warships into Latin 
American ports almost 6.000 times between 1869 and 1897. By 1898, the expansion 
of American governments and corporations resulted in war with the Spanish Empire, 
already fragile from the loss of most of Latin America in the 1820s. The war led to 
the independence of Cuba, the subjugation of Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines 
by American imperial forces, and another war with the peoples of the Philippines who 
did not want one colonial rule replaced by another.205 Moreover, as scholars of gender 
and race have shown, the differentiation on basis of ideas of race was integral to 
American expansion and the efforts to sustain it. ‘Whites’ were the only frontier 
subjects sure to become citizens. Not only were people from the Midway, Samoa, 
Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal Zone and the Virgin Islands 
(all acquired between 1867 and 1917) never granted a say in their relations with the 
US. Many were also exposed to racist and gendered violence within the spheres of 
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colonial ‘health’, ‘education’, and ‘policing’.206 For example, as Grandin argues, 
“Troops understood their time in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Philippines 
as an extension of their experience with political violence at home. Many of them had 
either firsthand experience in the wars against Native Americans or hailed from parts 
of the United States where Jim Crow held sway.”207 Taking the arguent further, Go 
notes, “America’s continental colonialism was more imperial and authoritarian than 
Britain’s settler empire in theory, and it was even more so in practice.”208  
With the First World War, a war among globally aspiring empires, the US 
government was granted a free hand. It expanded the navy, its presence on the 
profitable Japan-Brazil trade routes and into the hitherto British-dominated Caribbean 
(that had already seen the landing of Marines in Cuba in 1902 and Nicaragua in 1912). 
Without much scrutiny from other imperial powers, the US landed marines in Haiti in 
1915 and the Dominican Republic in 1916.209 Thus, Kramer’s view of US imperialism 
as (…) a dimension of power in which asymmetries in the scale of political action, 
regimes of spatial ordering, and modes of exceptionalising difference enable and 
produce relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction, and 
exploitation”210 sums up well the American ascendency as an aspiring international 
empire between 1810 and 1918.  
With regard to the British, the expansion of the American Empire was not only a 
concern for Spain as historians of British and American imperialism have shown. In 
the years following the American takeover of the Philippines, several members of both 
the British political and economic elites also grew irritated the Americanisation of the 
colonial administration and economy of the Philippines, which they—despite Spanish 
colonial rule—had dominated.211 At the same time, the apprehensions of British 
politicians, military strategists and officials were to a much higher extent a reflection 
of the mounting pressures of a global imperial system in which the British Empire 
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was omnipresent. Indeed, British and American inter-imperial intellectual and elite 
social contacts led to the formation of a sense of shared ‘whiteness’ and ‘anti-Slavic’ 
mission in the ‘Anglo-American Pacific’. Consequently, several members of the 
British imperial elite hailed the American expansion into the Pacific with the takeover 
of the Philippines and territories in the Caribbean as a great ‘white’ achievement.212 
However, imperial historians Mark Mazower and Duncan Hessel Hall have shown 
how the growing pressures led to an increased British pressure on the governments in 
the settler colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa to take part 
in the ‘defence of the realm’ such as the 1899 war against the Boers.213 Although 
Germany was perceived to be the main threat to the realm (especially during the Boer 
war), the British remained somewhat uneasy with the US. To be sure, it helped that 
the British and American imperial governments had improved formal and informal 
relations upon settling a border dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, and 
US traders had provided 100.000 horses, 80.000 and US banks provided massive loans 
covering about 20% of the Boer war costs. Nevertheless, the widespread public 
Anglophobia caused by the ‘white’-on-’white’ war as well as Irish, Dutch and German 
immigration was one factor pulling the other direction. The American Pacific policy 
of an informal commercial empire that included the ‘open door’ approach in China 
(and Latin America) and formal colonialism in the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam and 
Samoa was another.214  
However, the British were also preoccupied by the imperial activities of the 
French, the Russians and the Germans in China and Japan. While the aforementioned 
intervention in China in 1900 brought the British and Americans closer, the British 
never suspended their concerns. Imperial historians have shown how the British, 
fearful of additional expansion plans of the Russian Empire that had already put 
pressure on the Ottoman Empire since the 1850s and conquered Manchuria following 
the joint intervention (if only to lose it to Japan in 1905), entered an uneasy, but 
strategically necessary naval alliance with Japan in 1902. While they gained a 
favourable regional military balance, the British anxieties regarding the tense ties 
between the US and Japan following the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05 lingered on. 
Both rapidly rising militarist powers in the Pacific, their tension was at that point 
rooted in the American takeover of Hawaii and the Philippines, the construction of a 
coaling station in Japan, the racialised anti-Japanese (and anti-Chinese) immigration 
scheme and colliding designs on the Pacific Ocean. Additionally, strategists of the 
British naval establishment had concerns about the American build-up of naval 
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capabilities that they were unable to match due to existing commitments. 
Consequently, the Dominions were requested to partake more actively in financing 
imperial security. Simultaneously with the alliance with Japan being renewed, the 
‘white’ settler colonies were therefore asked to both pay more towards the imperial 
navy and not be overly against the immigration schemes favoured by Tokyo. This, to 
put it mildly, challenged the intra-imperial and especially colonial sense(s) of 
‘Britishness’/British ‘whiteness’ and thus the colonial racist anti-migration schemes 
aimed at preventing ‘Asiatic’ immigration such as the ‘white Australia’ policy. While 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance remained active, the racial and intra-imperial tension did 
not fade, despite several imperial defence conferences.215 Altogether, the onset of the 
‘decentralisation’ of the British Empire and turn to the US was therefore not only 
linked to changes in the global imperial system such as the end of territory not 
occupied by other empires, the rise of Germany, the US and Japan, and inter-imperial 
alliances linking both ends of Eurasia, but also its own global presence. When the 
First World War broke out, the British were therefore forced to be somewhat humble 
when it became necessary to both ask its settler colonies for hundreds of thousands of 
troops and the US for massive war loans.216   
To recap, merging European and American imperial historiography reveals that 
that the global imperial system from the close of the 19th century to the end of the First 
World War shifted from being dominated by the dynastic form of empire and modern 
imperialism with colonies to also promote informal empire(s), imperial alliances and 
new inter-imperial forms of cooperation. 
 
 
‘Multinational Imperialism’, 1918-1941: Towards ‘Imperial 
Multilateralism’  
 
In continuation of the previous section and with support from both imperial and 
international historiographies, this part expounds further the argument that the 
changes in the global imperial system towards new forms of imperial cooperation and 
governance became more visible following the end of the First World War.  
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As for the inter-imperial cooperation (Cunliffe’s ‘multinational imperialism’), the 
end of the First World War, which is now widely recognised as a war for empire,217 
saw the formation of the League of Nations and several sub-agencies. While 
international historian Mark Mazower notes that the League of Nations “(…) whose 
members included Abyssinia, Siam, Iran and Turkey was already something with a 
very different global reach to the old European Conference”,218 he also makes well 
clear that the League did not question imperialism as such, nor its permanence more 
broadly or the idea of ‘white’ superiority. As he notes, several of the architects of the 
League, most forcefully personified in the South African general Jan Smuts who was 
key in the racialisation of South Africa, had grown up to respect, defend and expand 
modern imperialism (and thus seen the Boer War as fratricide). That the new 
international organisations were thus to serve as vehicles for imperialism using the 
very same ‘civilizational hierarchies’ of imperialism is to him therefore little 
surprising.219  
Indeed, both the League and its sub-agencies accordingly took up issues colonial 
administrations were already to some extent focused on. For example, the sphere of 
health continued to be important. The international historians Naomi Nagata and 
Tomoko Akami have argued that the League organisations concerned with diseases, 
which evolved out of imperial concerns and inter-imperial cooperation, continued to 
reflect predominantly ‘white’ imperial concerns. However, for that reason Japan used 
the health and disease conferences to claim equality with the ‘white’ imperial 
powers.220 Also of importance for the growing imperial attention to health—before 
the Depression set in and put stability via (some level of) welfare on the colonial 
agendas—was the growing importance of public opinion, and, not least, the 
involvement of women’s organisations as part thereof. The women’s organisations, 
argues imperial and international historian Susan Pedersen, put on the international 
agenda equal political rights, health and education services, and trafficking. However, 
this, she notes, reconciled social progress and imperialism rather than oppose 
internationalism and imperialism.221 Similarly, historian of the British Empire Daniel 
Gorman contends that the initiatives and policy recommendations concerning 
trafficking were similarly directed mainly by ‘‘white’’ concerns and ‘pro-’white’’ 
dynamics.222 Speaking of ‘old wine for new bottles’ and ‘a half-way house between 
imperialism and internationalism’, these dynamics, Gorman argues, were even clearer 
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in the mandates system for the territories of the former Ottoman and German empires 
set up by the League. While formulated by Smuts and then adopted and promoted 
further by the US President Woodrow Wilson, the mandate system reflected 
fundamentally the state of affairs at the end of the war. Australia came to govern New 
Guinea and Nauru, both of which Australian forces had occupied early in the war. 
New Zealand was put in charge of German Samoa its forces had occupied in the war. 
South Africa was to govern South-West Africa. Great Britain proper, France and 
Belgium divided the German colonies in Africa, which they had also occupied, and 
Great Britain and France also those of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. Only the small 
and peripheral nations of the collapsed German empire were, as ‘whites’, given 
national self-determination as so strongly promoted by US President Wilson.223 
Pedersen continues, “In general, mandated powers governed their mandated 
territories along the same lines, and with the same personnel, that they governed their 
colonies; mandatory oversight affected their rule only indirectly and in no consistent 
way.”224 As Mazower reminds us, “Not surprisingly, what one historian calls ‘the 
Wilsonian Moment’ was greeted with demonstrations and protests from north Africa 
to China, even Japanese diplomats felt rebuffed.”225 From the perspective of the 
populations in the mandates, it also appeared as similar systems of governance as its 
predecessors. Pedersen contends, ”Indeed one of the striking things about the 
mandates system is that, for all its rhetoric of training in civilization, in many 
territories it was politically a step back.”226 Not only were most of the mandate 
populations exposed to patronising racial attitudes, several of them could also see 
similar dynamics of economic imperialism to those of the previous colonial power.227 
This resulted in more than 3.000 petitions to the League’s Permanent Mandates 
Commission. Composed of predominantly high officials or former colonial governors 
thus uncritical of empire, the commission registered only around 1500 and made 
reports on only 325 petitions, or around 10% of the total amount they received.228 
Predictably, ‘disturbances’ broke out in South-West Africa, Syria and Palestine.229 
Beyond the sphere of neo-colonial governance, the League also dabbled in imperial 
geopolitics with various results. For example, the Soviet Union, which had initially 
been against the League seeing it as a continuation of imperialism, slowly warmed 
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towards the organisation once Stalin took over leadership.230 In contrast, the League 
wound up unable to deal with Japanese and Italian imperial expansions into China and 
Abyssinia in the 1930s. The more important of the two, Japan had for more than a 
decade respected and supported the emerging inter-imperial regime, not least because 
it had received a mandate in the Pacific. However, the lack of recognising its rule in 
Manchukuo, the continued denial of equal status with the larger ‘white’ empires and 
the British lack of interest in renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922 (despite 
continuing a strategy of extended credits, trade concessions, market guarantees and 
loans to bring to power moderates) led to the militarisation and nationalisation of 
Japan. After ‘losing’ Japan, the League subsequently also failed to manage the fallout 
of the Versailles Treaty in Europe, which pushed many frustrated Germans towards 
Nazism231 (despite a similar British strategy of empowering moderates through trade 
etc.) and the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan, and thus prevent the 
outbreak of the Second World War, another global war for empire.232 
Another reason of the League’s failure as an inter-imperial security system was 
the American absence. The US, which had assisted the British in the Boer War, helped 
both British the British and French in the First World War by joining their inter-
imperial alliance and contributed troops233 and arms, even if too late and too little. As 
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American loans had kept the British and French empires afloat, however, US 
President Wilson was the dominant politician at the peace negotiations. There, he got 
what he wanted: bilateral relations with allied debtors after the war and a return to 
free-market economics.234 As its focus was to the south, however, the US never joined 
the League. Still, as British historian of 20th history Adam Tooze notes, “In its pomp 
Victorian Britain had never commanded the kind of leverage over Prussia, or 
Napoleon III’s France, or Alexander III’s Russia, that Washington was 
accumulating.”235 At the same time, as Grandin argues, a growing number of Latin 
American populations gradually began to challenge the American grip on Latin 
America. Most importantly, the large-scale and aggressive American intrusions in 
Mexican politics, economy and society that cost half of its original territory Mexico’s 
at independence, high levels of profit repatriation and labour repression resulted in a 
decade-long revolution from 1910 and thereby the nationalisation of the oil industry 
and the destruction of several US-owned mines and plantations. Most American 
corporations and investors wanted to ‘intervene and clean up as usual’. Yet, Mexico 
was not a small Caribbean island state. Latin American nationalism, the US learned 
(and would learn again), was to be reckoned with.236 However, the attention required 
by the Mexican revolution was soon forgotten as the First World War granted the US 
hegemony in the Americas, the Caribbean and a large part of the western Pacific as 
the new dominant exporter, banker and investor. American investments in Latin 
American went from $754.1 million in 1915 to $2,819.2 million in 1924.237 After 
several interventions, the US in 1927 came to face a seemingly endless struggle in 
Nicaragua due to their opponent’s guerrilla tactics and will to fight. By 1928, the 
severe and rather open criticism ventilated at the Pan-American conference (and 
growing critical press coverage all over the continent) added to the hatred that had 
resulted in the Mexican Revolution and began to influence more broadly than hitherto 
American politicians, diplomats and political pundits. The Depression only made a 
shift further necessary as American companies came to find the increasingly 
protectionist European markets harder to access. While the Hoover administration had 
initiated the ‘Good Neigbor’ policy (as opposed to previous ‘Big stick’ policies) and 
withdrawn from the Dominican Republic in 1924 and Nicaragua in 1925, the 
Roosevelt administration took the shift further. Following the withdrawal of troops 
from several countries, the US began to promote better relations via political, 
economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in form of military and political treaties, 
trade agreements, multilateral bodies of consultation and arbitration and cultural 
exchange. As Grandin argues, “In short, the 1930s and 1940s marked a turn in the 
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fortune of the American Empire, when diverse expressions of what political scientists 
call “soft power” began to congeal in a coherent system of extraterritorial 
administration (…)”238 Having more or less created an American parallel to the 
League, Washington had diversified its strategy. Intervention, war and occupation 
were to a large extent replaced by regional multilateralism, bilateralism ‘under the 
radar’ in form of political pressure as in Mexico and the support of pro-American 
regimes as in Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba.239 
Nonetheless, Roosevelt was still a man of geopolitics. In line with his emphasis of an 
offensive naval strategy combined with air power by way of island bases, Roosevelt 
already in 1933 asked the companies of the emerging American military industry to 
line up innovative weapon systems, one of which was a long-range bomber. Out of 
tune with the Congress, however, it failed. In 1938, Roosevelt’s request of Congress 
of 20.000 warplanes for a military build-up also failed.240 However, Roosevelt 
successfully initiated in secrecy a broad programme under the advisory body of the 
Council on Foreign Relations to make proposals to the State Department on how to 
safeguard US interests and enhance the ability to influence the post-war world via 
multilateralism following the joint Anglo-Polish declaration of war against Germany. 
Commanding a smaller standing military force than each European colonial empires 
fighting in Europe and facing opposition in Congress, however, Roosevelt and his 
expansionist factions in the State Department and various military institutions faced 
an uphill struggle. When the hard-pressed British requested military aid, however, 
Congress moved a step closer to war.241  
In a similar way in which the US was forced to turn to informal imperialism, Great 
Britain grew less able to reign supreme in its own realm, having moved from ‘a 
Brotherhood of Nations’ to the Commonwealth in 1911 and a new Supreme 
Command in 1917 that granted the ‘white’ Dominions greater influence throughout 
the war. As influence, autonomy and constitutions seized the intra-imperial agenda, 
Great Britain saw Governor-Generals be exchanged with High Commissioners, 
Ireland achieve independence and its ‘children’ within the British Commonwealth 
claim power for themselves.242 The pressure from the Dominions also influenced 
imperial strategy overall. The alliance with the Japanese was not renewed mainly due 
to strategic reconsiderations that placed Japan in the role of a potential regionally 
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dominant opponent243 (as Japanese and British goals in China increasingly collided) 
and the US that of a friend and to lesser extent American pressure rooted in the 
animosity towards Japan.244 However, pressure from Canada and South Africa that 
were both very sensitive to American concerns and against the alliance with Japan as 
well as Australia and New Zealand that increasingly looked to the US, helped the 
decision.245 As the global presence of the US grew stronger after the First World War, 
the British Empire came to rely further on American economic military and economic 
support. Both the British and French thus sought to align themselves with the US when 
necessary and lure the US closer when possible. In the matter of the Irish quest for 
independence, for example, the British were able to secure the support of both Wilson 
and the subsequent Harding administration that both declared their support for the 
Irish in principle, but that it was an internal British question.246 On their part, the 
French sought to stave of the repayment of war loans as long as possible.247 The 
British were also able to prevent the potential re-orientation towards Washington, and 
thus effective loss, of Canada after Ottawa was granted permission to open its own 
embassy in Washington following the new conception of Dominion status.248 
Likewise and indicative of the importance of oil to the global imperial system, the 
British, French and American governments and oil companies split the oil concessions 
of the Middle East into three portions with American companies gaining dominance 
in the newly founded kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1927.249 To keep the Americans 
close, the British (and the French) also sought an increased contact between the more 
internationalist-minded of the British, French and American imperial elites over the 
1920s.250 Military cooperation also became a part of the increasingly friendly 
relationship as when, partly an echo of the intervention in 1900, the Chinese 
nationalists saw a joint Anglo-American attack in 1927. By that time, the British and 
the French recognised the US and its hegemony as a ‘phenomenon with no parallel’: 
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“The Advantages to Britain of cooperating with the US were vast, whereas 
confrontation was unthinkable.”251 In the following years, therefore, several imperial 
naval conferences also ensured Anglo-American naval parity (rather than American 
primacy)252 When the British Empire thus entered the war, London thus again turned 
to both its Dominions, colonies and Washington. As in the First World War, however, 
American aid in 1941 did not come cheap. With the deal, the British got 50 aging 
ships at the cost of 99-year base rights to British bases in both the Caribbean and the 
Atlantic, thus enabling Roosevelt’s idea of a network of island bases.253  
Linking scholarship thus shows that the period from 1918 to 1941 saw the 
formation of the League, an American imitation thereof, and intensifying inter-
imperial political, economic and military ties between the American, British and 
French Empires on the one hand and the German, Italian and Japanese on the other. 
While multi-imperial, many of these projects, organisations and alliances 
simultaneously reproduced and reactualised previous colonial and imperial power 
relations and categories of race and gender ‘locally’ and internationally. With the 
outbreak of the Second World War (whether marked as 1937, 1939 or 1940), these 
different processes came together, spawning the UN military alliance. 
 
 
The First Act: The United Nations Military Alliance, 1942-1945 
 
In agreement with Cunliffe, I have argued that the United Nations builds on a tradition 
of inter-imperial military alliances, cooperation and governance. In this section, I also 
argue— again on basis of imperial and international historiography as well as scholars 
from other disciplines—that the UN also reflected the immediate situation of the 
Second World War, more concretely the American wartime planning and the 
Roosevelt administration’s thoughts on using multilateralism as a vehicle for informal 
empire with global reach.   
   As Europe, Africa, and Asia became engulfed in war, the Roosevelt administration 
requested and received funding for a call-to arms that involved the building of a dozen 
aircraft carriers that could serve as a network of mobile bases and airfields in support 
of or as replacement of island bases. Missing the American aircraft carriers at the 
American navy and air force base on Hawaii in late 1941, Japan enabled the US to 
enter the war earlier and as more than a supporter as in the Boer War and the First 
World War. As a means to defeat Germany while containing Japan, the Roosevelt 
administration announced the multilateral ideas of the Council of Foreign Relations 
to its British ally. As demonstrated by international historian Dan Plesch, US 
President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill put aside 
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existing ideas on a strictly military alliance with a supreme military council and 
conceived the idea of the United Nations as a military alliance when they met in the 
Washington a few weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.254 Looking at the 
signatories of the Declaration of the United Nations from Washington in 1942 and the 
place they signed it, the inter-imperial character of the military alliance is clear. The 
UN alliance consisted of the various parts of the British Empire, the United States and 
most of the central and southern American countries under the informal empire of the 
US, the Chinese republican heir to the Qing Empire, the Belgian and Dutch colonial 
empires and finally Yugoslavia and Norway. Indeed, the US sought to make the most 
of the alliance while aiding its allies, sometimes at a high cost. 
Soon after the establishment of the alliance in early 1942, the State Department—
the US executive in other words—took over the making of the proposals on how to 
shape the post-war world order from the strongly influential but merely advisory 
Council of Foreign Relations. By then, the secret project had provided 670 reports, 
held 361 meetings, and involved more than 100 high-ranking US officials, indicating 
it was no small undertaking.255 Subsequently, the various factions in the US 
administration and military institutions began to link their different ambitions and 
ideas on the post-war functions of the UN. Increasingly they all came to see it as a 
vehicle to expand American influence globally. In line with the regional ‘Open Door 
Policy’ from the late 1890s, State Department officials increasingly argued against 
following the European model of colonial imperialism and suggested instead a single 
world economy with American global economic preponderance. This was partly to be 
achieved by loosening the grip of the colonial and mandate powers—mostly members 
of the UN military alliance and thus US imperial allies—through what became the 
UN trusteeship system, which would be oriented towards building sufficient 
capabilities and institutions for national self-governance. While the Department of 
Defence wanted permanent bases, Roosevelt agreed with the State Department, seeing 
a globally nation state based international system tied together by a single market 
economy as pivotal for American global primacy.256 Thus, none of the different 
factions, noted historian of US foreign policy Gabriel Kolko, worked towards a 
neutral, unaligned system of equal states. Moreover, Kolko argued, the US 
increasingly tied the questions of American post-war bases to the formation of the 
world organisation.257  
Consequently, the US took part in the war efforts and sought to use the alliance in 
ways that primarily suited its own interests. While the US deployed a significant 
number of forces to the UN theatres of war in the Atlantic, Europe and the 
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Mediterranean compared to its pre-war levels of mobilisation, its combat efforts 
mainly concentrated on the Pacific, the area of primary interest to the Roosevelt 
administration. The US did not bear, however, the burden of the Pacific battles that 
cost a significant amount of losses, especially amongst the Japanese and Chinese. In 
fact, the US also came out of war having lost the smallest amount of lives of the 
members of the UN alliance, far behind for example the smaller members of Poland 
and Yugoslavia. The number of dead from the British Empire and its colonies 
amounted to 650.000. Having seen a Japanese occupation, approximately 1.310.000 
Chinese lost their lives. Having seen most combat during the war, around 18 million 
Soviets died. In contrast, ‘only’ 298.000 Americans lost their lives during the war.258  
Besides a means to coordinate the war efforts in the different theatres (which the 
US also dominated), the UN alliance also comprised of a military-economic network. 
Not surprisingly, the dynamics of the exchanges that saw millions of tonnes of food 
and military equipment, hundreds of thousands of military trucks for logistics and 
combat, thousands of military aircraft, tanks and trains and raw materials shipped 
between the allies were also dominated by the US and its Lend-Lease agreement. 
While the US initially spent 7% of its GNP to provide supplies to primarily the war 
efforts of the British and Soviet imperial powers, it was less of a charity than the 
British Prime Minister and his ministers remarked to the British public. Washington 
forced London to surrender the rights and royalties on nuclear technology and other 
technologies such as radar, antibiotics, and jet aircraft.259 The war and these 
agreements effectively turned the US into the world’s workshop. By 1942, the British 
and Soviet empires were both out-produced by the US. The following year, US 
factories produced double that of the factories in Germany and Japan combined and 
roughly a third more than Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Canada. While the 
goods and food were produced according to British and Soviet needs, the US also 
gained additional influence on strategic planning with particular goods such as tanks 
for Egypt, where American companies had major investments, when the British stood 
to lose the Suez Canal and thus their ability to protect their Middle Eastern oil 
production in 1941. However, the advantages for the US went beyond bypassing 
rights and royalties of British technologies and gaining influence on strategic 
planning. It also got access to the colonial markets of several of the European colonial 
powers, the markets of the informal European colonies in the Middle East and 
Ethiopia, to which it offered trade, loans and arms for base rights and an Italian-built 
military radio station for intelligence purposes. The picture was more complicated in 
the Middle East. Trade went through the Middle East Supply Centre, an Anglo-
American military organisation populated by numerous colonial officials that 
centralised Middle Eastern trade control and economic mobilisation much to the 
irritation of local elites who saw it as commercial imperialism as local industries lost 
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out to Commonwealth competitors and American companies frustrated with the 
military import-export regime. Nonetheless, the US became the largest consumer of 
colonial goods during the war. Its economic ties with Latin America also grew 
stronger: Nearly 60% of Latin American imports in 1941 came from the US, which 
until 1945 only became more involved in the trade of the continent’s strategic 
materials and connected the Latin American industries and militaries.260 As for bases, 
the US had fewer colonial bases than Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Japan when it joined the war. As the war came to encompass 
the entire globe, however, the alliance put the number of US bases beyond the wildest 
dreams of Roosevelt and his military strategists and planners. By 1945, the gradual 
US build-up in several Pacific colonies conquered from the Japanese, in French 
colonies in North Africa and the Pacific, and in Portuguese and Danish colonies in the 
Atlantic left it with more than 30.000 military installations in 100 countries.261  
Moreover, the American presence in British imperial politics reached new heights. 
British officials grew irritated with US personnel that they felt was causing tension 
within various imperial locations on purpose. In some cases, US representatives were 
indeed seeking to do so intentionally, although these attempts were often rebutted 
locally, as it happened in Australia. By 1944, however, the British government began 
to fear for its security system if Canada and South Africa isolated themselves and New 
Zealand and Australia turned to US. The untying of the Commonwealth would take 
decades, but the war made the US the big elephant in the room. However, the British 
had both ignored calls for power sharing and failed in the eyes of the Dominions, also 
known as the ‘white’ Commonwealth, to treat them with the respect they felt was due 
given their troop contributions. The Japanese attack on Australia in 1942 only 
increased tension, as it became clear that London could not keep its promises on 
security. Additionally, their UN membership only added to the Dominions’ growing 
awareness of their strategic differences and their international recognition and 
networks.262 Another aspect was the widespread racism rooted in wider ideas of racial 
                                                          
260 Go, Patterns of Empire, 138; Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Explaining the Rise to Global 
Power: U.S. Policy toward Asia and Africa since 1941,” in America in the World: The 
Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941, ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael 
J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 236–59; Donna Mehos and Suzanne 
Moon, “The Uses of Portability: Circulating Expers in the Technopolitics of the Cold War and 
Decolonization,” in Entangled Geographies, ed. Gabrielle Hecht (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
2011), 43–74; Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN, 59–73; David Rock, “War and Postwar 
Intersections:  Latin America and the United States,” in Latin America in the 1940s: War and 
Postwar Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 15–40; Rosemary 
Thorpe, “The Latin American Economies in the 1940s,” in Latin America in the 1940s: War 
and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 41–58; Martin W. 
Wilmington, The Middle East Supply Centre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1971). 
261 Catherine Lutz, The Bases of Empire the Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts 
(London: Pluto Press, 2009); Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrisons, 2000. 
262 Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War (London: 
Continuum, 2008). 
85 
 
85 
 
superiority and ‘‘whiteness’. Entangled in the war, the narrative of ‘white’ superiority 
informed, often in conflicting ways due to the large number of colonial and African 
American troops, perceptions on who was fighting and for what.263 With the entry of 
the US, the links between US expansion, violence and racism embedded in the state 
apparatus and legislation exacerbated the manifestations of racism in the different 
theatres.264 Indeed, the Japanese attack on the US in 1941 was seen as a manifestation 
of the growing Japanese influence and threat to global ‘‘white’’ superiority. As put by 
historian of US foreign policy Thomas Borstelmann, it threatened not only the 
“political order of the western Pacific, but also the social order of the United States 
and the European colonies”.265 Subsequently, many ‘white’ soldiers from the US, 
Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand racialised the war (as did African-
American and colonial soldiers), enabling a broader male-dominated bond of the 
‘white race’ and not only British imperial history and culture. Race was not the only 
social marker at work. In several war zones and areas for ‘rest and recreation’, 
opposing views on gender and race intersected in fights on ‘coloured’ soldiers’ 
relationships with ‘white’ women, the role(s) of women in colonial societies etc.266  
As the UN increasingly looked as the winning alliance and inter-imperial market 
access thus to trump the trade systems of European colonial imperialism, US Treasury 
Department officials connected with the post-war the State Department planners to 
shift from strategic thinking to policy-making. In late 1944, their ideas emerged fully 
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at the Bretton Woods Conference with the creation of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, which were 
to regulate post-war financial flows and direct capital into the lesser developed areas 
of the world, including European colonies. The British economic and military 
dependency on the US267 forced London to accept this link between economy and 
military matters at the Dumbarton Oaks conference in Washington. The Soviet Union 
also accepted.268 The San Francisco conference followed in 1945.269 Here, the US had 
to accommodate the Soviet Union and British Empire to get their final support.270 
However, the different factions more or less got what they sought: a veto-imbued 
Security Council, a weak General Assembly, a weak Secretariat, several Japanese 
League of Nations Mandates as ‘Strategic Trusteeships’,271 bases ranging from 
Western Europe and the Atlantic to the Pacific,272 and a vehicle of global American 
imperial frontier building by opening “the world to ordering political-economic 
expansion.”273 Fearing a future as uninviting as the past, a West African journalist 
contended, “New life has been infused into predatory imperialism.”274 While failing 
to mention the American influence in the emerging international institutions, the 
imperial historian John Darwin nonetheless saw the influence of the US in both ends 
of Eurasia as unprecedented and called the new American ‘system’ “(…) imperial in 
all but name.”275  
As the US stood ready to remake the world in its image in 1945, the Soviet military 
presence in Europe made it a power to be reckoned with. While the American and 
Soviet governments had cooperated extensively during the war, all had hinged on the 
shared goal of defeating the members of the Tripartite Pact. Indeed, the tension that 
were to grow into hostility and the mutual readjustment of enemy images and 
strategies were rooted in the joint Euro-American intervention in the Russian 
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Revolution in favour of the Tsar’s regime.276 As the war ended, the Soviet Union and 
its leader, the General Secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, had 
grown increasingly frustrated with the UN. Soviet negotiators had failed to get both 
UN memberships for each of the Soviet republics to minimise the gap between the 
Soviet and the Western blocs, to get influence on the American ‘Strategic 
Trusteeships’, and to have the Secretariat divided to install a Soviet official in a top 
post. Consequently, Stalin sought to empower the Security Council, where the Soviet 
Union could counter the Western influence with its veto, and to counter what he saw 
as American abuse of the UN.  
Against the backdrop of the previous three sections of this chapter, it would appear 
entirely reasonable to understand the UN military alliance as a new imperial system 
built on previous racialised and gendered modalities of imperialism and, not least, a 
direct tool for the US to expand its imperial frontiers. The following section will make 
this additionally clearer.  
 
 
The Second Act: The UN, 1945-1956  
 
If the UN military alliance had not provided the US with opportunities to expand its 
frontier beyond its paradigm of 19th century colonial imperialism and its informal 
empire in Latin America, the post-war version of the UN military alliance certainly 
would.  
However, the UN allies fell out with each other soon after the war and the 
transformation of the alliance into a post-war regime cluster of UN organisations. In 
the changing worldviews of Washington and London, the Soviet Union increasingly 
appeared as a potential adversary with more than just defensive plans.277 This 
understanding also spilled over into the UN. However, many of the immediate post-
war geopolitical incidents handled by the UN testified to the Western domination of 
the UN despite the attempt of the Soviet Union to gain a foothold as the British 
international historian Evan Luard showed. Despite Soviet criticism of the British 
military presence in Greece and Indonesia, its own military presence in the 
Azerbaijani region of Iran ended by way of the UN in summer 1946. The UN 
commission tasked with investigating the external meddling in the Greek civil war 
also led to a public setback for the Eastern bloc when the interference of Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria and Albania was made public. Soon after, the US took over the support of 
both Greece and Turkey from the British after the latter had declared its resources 
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inadequate.278 Subsequently, Greece began to receive Marshall Aid on top of and 
beyond the already flowing support from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration that was operating in Europe and Asia on basis of American, British 
and Canadian funding and often relying on colonial officials coming in from colonial 
positions in Asia and Africa.279 Occupied by British, American and Yugoslavian 
forces, the city of Trieste was divided by Italy and Yugoslavia, notably after the latter 
had broken with the Soviet Union. In South East Asia, problems arose with the British 
troops in Indonesia and the Dutch attempt to re-take the colony after the Japanese 
Empire had occupied it during the war. Initially most Western countries rallied to their 
support. However, the Dutch military operations against the independence movement 
made it a hard sell over time. When Washington shifted position, a Dutch-Indonesian 
republic was established via the UN in 1949, appearing to settle the matter in a pro-
Dutch way until the nationalists declared an independent republic. Initially enjoying 
the support of the Soviet Union, the first UN Secretary-General of the UN Trygve Lie 
also gradually leaned more and more towards the Western bloc, also purging his 
Secretariat for Americans marked by the FBI as potential leftists.280 As Luard noted 
for the first decade of the UN, “(…) the West used its majority bestowed on it to ensure 
that the organisation acted in ways favourable to its own political interests and 
contrary to the principle of great-power consensus (…)”. Accordingly, it seemed that 
the Soviet Union was about to leave the UN in 1947—the same year the US according 
to historian of the US Gene A. Sessions multilateralised the Monroe Doctrine via the 
mutual defence agreement known as the Rio Treaty—281when it established the 
Cominform for Eastern Europe.282 As noted by Mazower, the dividing line between 
the US and the international organisation was hard to see.283 
However, Washington and other Western governments grew worried with the 
combination of what was seen as slow beginnings of the Marshall plan, the failure of 
the American plans for global economic expansion to come to full fruition, the 
apparent success of Soviet rapid industrialisation, the expansion of the Cold War 
beyond Europe, and the ‘loss of China’. These developments had not been on the 
horizon in 1945.284 In 1949, therefore, the Truman administration announced a new 
global initiative that brought together the efforts in Europe under the Marshall Plan 
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and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the projects in 
Latin America under the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and private American 
companies. Turning to indirect governance, as argued by historian of US development 
policy Stephen Macekura, the programme architects “(…) envisioned a clear 
relationship between national economic development, international economic 
integration, and the promotion of liberal political institutions, a relationship that 
would, in turn, comport with the strategic interests of the United States.”285 From 
1953, Eisenhower’s administration increased government spending in the programme 
and intensified its cooperation with the World Bank, the United Nations Technical 
Assistance Program, and the Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development, having realised the US private sector alone was an insufficient 
approach. Moreover, Eisenhower connected the programme with military aid under 
the Mutual Security Programme, the hitherto largest reconfiguration of the 
programme in a strategic direction. Seeing the programme as a means to combat 
Communism, Washington also began to ‘urge’ its European allies, especially the 
colonial empires, to expand Third World aid via international or multi-lateral 
organisations,286 organisations in which the US had influence.287 The British, French, 
Dutch and Italian governments were not the only European governments to do so from 
the late 1950s. As masters of colonial empires, however, they stood to gain more from 
looking after their own interests such as maintaining the Sterling Area, develop 
colonial resources, lead the colonies’ entries into the global market economy, and gain 
goodwill with the US. Western bilateral and multilateral organisation increased their 
aid upon decolonisation, perceiving the stakes to be higher as the Soviet Union also 
engaged itself with the world more actively either through proxies as had been the 
case in South East Asia or directly as Africa and Latin America following 
Khrushchev’s ascendance to power,.288 While the presence of Soviet agents was new 
to many former colonial societies in Africa, South East Asia, the Middle East, the 
Caribbean and Latin America from the late 1950s, the experts that came from the 
international and European multi-lateral and national institutions and agencies were 
often not. Not unlike the situation in mandates in the former German and Ottoman 
Empires, European colonial officials dominated the international staff. Many simply 
stayed after decolonisation. Moreover, many former colonial officials and scientists 
also found work for the European bilateral and multilateral institutions and agencies 
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not to mention the UN organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization 
and the World Bank Development Service.289 Staff in new ministries and villagers in 
the rural districts, whom according to historian of US development policy Nicole 
Sackley “(…) became both subjects and objects of expert and state campaigns to 
develop and secure the ‘The World”290 and could therefore experience former colonial 
officials return with similar if not the same colonial models and strategies they used 
before departing. Sackley argues, “Through expert knowledge and state power, the 
reconstructed village (or the model village built from the ground up) promised to 
secure and legitimate empires, Cold War alliances, and new nation-states.”291 In 
extension thereof, as international historian Amy Sayward and geographer Tony Weis 
contend, the re-actualisation of the Western colonial agricultural models through the 
international organisations combined with the Western need for outlets for subsidised 
surplus food production not only expanded the colonial monoculture cash crop regime 
over the 1950s and 1960s. It also led to dramatic rises in Third World food imports.292 
Also within the realm of development, the health and demographic programmes and 
strategies of the United Nations Division of Population, UNESCO, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, the World Bank, and a range of American and British 
NGOs led to sterilization of the “unfit” or ethnic cleansing in extreme cases.  As the 
historian of international health and demographic policy Matthew Connelly argued, 
“(…) the link between population control and imperialism is not merely conceptual, 
but historical. The ambition to control the population of the world emerged directly 
from the travails of territorial empires.”293 Summing up, scholar of development 
Mark Duffield and political scientist Vernon Hewitt maintained, “While specific 
changes to the international system and the capacities of international organisations 
since World War II may have reconfigured some of these techniques, they remain 
embedded in the same assumptions and work towards the very same outcomes.”294 
Connected directly to how the US had turned the Pacific into its imperial lake as 
Friedman phrases it,295 the imperial dynamics of the UN were perhaps the most visible 
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in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 than in any other aspect of what Luard called 
the decade of Western supremacy. Korea was effectively divided not long after the 
arrival of the Soviet and American forces in 1945. Using the UN umbrella as a cover 
for engaging in informal empire, the US Accordingly began industrialising the largely 
agricultural south as it had done in Europe. Under the supervision of Western experts 
and the protection of US armed forces, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction 
Agency administered this modernisation project. As both the largest donor in the UN 
program and bilateral donor, the US reigned supreme in South Korean affairs until the 
formal declaration of independence in 1948 (as in Japan until 1951). Subsequently, 
Washington pressured the UN into employing large numbers of administrators whom 
had previously worked for the Japanese colonial regime as in Western Germany where 
Nazis administrators were able to re-enlist, not least in the security services. South 
Korea thus inherited not only the legacies of an authoritarian Japanese colonial state, 
but also those of a security force controlled by foreigners and a forced industrialisation 
run by Japanese-educated elites.296 The mounting tension between the two regimes 
eventually led to a war, initiated with the Communist regime invasion of the South. 
The US managed to form a UN military operation due the Soviet boycott of the UN 
Security Council in anger with Taiwan representing China in the Security Council. 
While cautious, the ‘white’ Commonwealth states and Great Britain rallied to support 
the Truman administration militarily within days of the war.297 The US, NATO states, 
‘white’ Commonwealth states, US client states (such as the former US colony of the 
Philippines298 and US occupied Japan) and finally Latin American countries, thus 
provided close to 300.000 troops for the United Nations Command (UNC). Supported 
by Western dominance in the UN General Assembly, the pro-western UN Secretary-
General Trygve Lie in New York, as well as the US Army headquarters in Japan, the 
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American and Western use of the UN was painstakingly clear for all to see.299 Not 
surprisingly, the Korean peninsula in extension thereof witnessed an influx of 
technologies and practices with roots in Western and Japanese colonial security 
operations as well as inter-imperial warfare experiences during the Second World 
War. For instance, aerial surveillance rapidly developed as a colonial security 
technology in the Middle East; in Korea, scholarship shows, it gained new 
prominence. UNC aircrafts soon began bombing civilian targets, and used incendiary 
bombs on North Korean cities and villages (in some cases in the South also) – just 
like UN declaration partners had used incendiary bombs on Japanese and German 
cities in the Second World War. Most North Korean cities were flattened.300 The UNC 
also established relief organisations, and a joint council with South Korea. However, 
civilian Koreans soon learned that UN forces showed as little regard for their lives as 
had the Japanese colonial forces. As historian of the Korean War Steven Lee argues, 
the “emphasis of civil assistance was not to stop soldiers from firing on or towards 
civilians, but to prevent civilians from hindering military offensives and other 
activities, an important distinction which reflected the acceptance of violence towards 
civilians underlying UNC relief programs.”301 UN brutality, however, was possibly 
also linked to racism as much as military objectives and military cultures. ‘White’ 
Australian and Canadian soldiers were known as racists already before the war - in 
the context of the long reign of the ‘white Australia’ policy and the racialised views 
of the eastern Pacific.302 UNC pilots from Apartheid South Africa also had reputations 
as eager fighters of ‘gooks’ and Communists.303 Reflecting over a century of ‘white’ 
American racist violence in the US, the Caribbean and the Philippines, ‘white’ 
American soldiers often sported Confederate Flags as a sign of resistance to the 
integration of ‘white’ and ‘black’ units.304 , the US had a long tradition of presidents 
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seeing the world in racial terms with ‘‘whites’ as the superior race, and ‘Negros’, 
‘Hispanics’ and ‘Asians’ as weaker ‘races’. This also went for their officials as the 
“elite ‘white’ men who ran the State and Defense Departments and the intelligence 
agencies were comfortable with the world they had grown up and succeeded in, a 
world marked by European power, Third World weakness, and nearly ubiquitous 
racial segregation.”305 Accordingly, racism and extremist ideologies may well have 
led to violence against Koreans fleeing the war in search of safety. Such interactions 
between militarised spaces, racialized bodies, and insecurity—against the backdrop 
of western and Japanese colonialism and imperialism—also influenced gender 
relations. Over 180.000 women in prostitution ’catered’ for western soldiers during 
the Korean War; a number exceeding those under the earlier Japanese and American 
regimes. Although most women were involved in prostitution due to the poverty 
caused by the war, many were also forced by the South Korean regime to keep the 
western forces content and prevent them from raping other women. The racialised 
arrangement not only forbade South Korean soldiers to enter UN ‘comfort stations’, 
the UN force’s military hygiene regime predominantly enforced regulation upon the 
women rather than the soldiers in order to reduce the risk of disease. This regime was 
similar to the previous Japanese regime of military hygiene, the regime associated 
with the fifty US military bases established in South Korea over the 1940s, and British 
and American imperial regulations elsewhere.306 During the war, several American 
and British formal proposals and informal enquiries by UN Secretary General Lie 
suggested to make the Korean operation permanent – either in the form of a UN and 
European legion of volunteers or as a permanent UN military force. Not only did these 
initiatives and the concept of a standing UN force fail (or were dismissed by the Soviet 
Union), the war had also left Great Britain distanced on the matters of Asia and 
frustrated with the increasing American orientation of the Dominions.307 
To recap, I have by way of imperial, international and Cold War scholarship shown 
that Washington beyond doubt intentionally used the UN regime web of organisations 
to serve its imperial interests around the globe, to draw in closer the British and the 
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‘white’ commonwealth, and counter the Soviet Union around the. As part thereof, 
both intentionally and unintentionally, the UN regime web also sustained, if in altered 
and occasionally contradicting forms, elements of the European and American 
imperial power relations, ideas and practices that enabled and produced regimes of 
spatial ordering, relations of hierarchy, of asymmetries in the scale of political action, 
and modes of exceptionalising difference.  
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Chapter 4: Building The Frontier of 
Imperial Multilateralism in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, 
1880-1955 
 
Above, I focused on the emergence of American imperialism within what became the 
United States, its regional spheres of formal and informal empire and its increasing 
influence on the British and French empires, as well as the emerging regime of the 
web of international institutions, many of which were of American design.  
To set the stage for the international intervention in 1956, I change the focus to the 
region of the eastern Mediterranean as it gained global importance over the 19th and 
20th centuries. Linking imperial and international historiographies with my theoretical 
framework, I recast the orthodox nation state-based histories of the Mediterranean in 
a broader imperialised perspective. Put differently, I argue that the Mediterranean 
began to shift from a mainly Ottoman intra-imperial space to, from the late 19th 
century, a space of initially European and later primarily British and French 
multinational imperialism and then a space of imperial multilateralism in which the 
US and USSR would make their influence felt after 1945.  
That is not to say that Washington, however initially disputed their allies 
expanding spaces of formal and informal empire in the region. While sticking to the 
regional partnerships with London and Paris, Washington nonetheless began to 
engage the growing number of post-Mandate governments after the outbreak of the 
Korean War as the British influence began to decline and its attempt to create a 
regional military framework weakened its own influence. The new emerging political 
forces of the region in the form of both governments and citizens not only both shaped 
and were shaped the dynamics of the relationship between London and Washington, 
but also their views on what appeared possible, wise or the opposite. Nevertheless, I 
will argue that the Anglo-American interdependence and promotion of imperial 
multilateralism in the Mediterranean and the Middle East both maintained and 
furthered several of the imperial traits related to the British regional informal 
(mandate) and formal imperialism and, increasingly, the expanding American 
informal imperialism. The ordering of space, the generation of hierarchies and 
asymmetric political action as well as exceptionalising difference in many ways 
merely changed form rather than disappeared.  
 
 
96 
 
96 
 
The Mediterranean and in Middle East in the 19th and early 20th 
Centuries: The Piecemeal Expansion of the Frontier of European 
Multinational Imperialism 
 
For several centuries, the Ottoman Sultans managed to expand their influence in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East to become the dominant empire with their heartlands 
in the eastern Balkans and Anatolia and peripheral domains in the northern Balkans, 
the southern shores of the Mediterranean and far beyond its eastern shores into the 
land of the old Mesopotamian river empires. With the expansion, Ottoman historian 
Karen Barkey argues, the Ottoman Empire grew into the ‘typical’ dynastically ruled 
and religiously and ethnically diverse empire with a patchwork pattern of relations 
with its peripheral regions via various networks and forms of ties to local elites with 
the imperial state ruling supreme, if reliant on on provincial compliance, in military 
and economic matters.308 Eventually, however, the growing military assertiveness of 
both the Habsburg and Russian empires with standing imperial armies at the western 
and northern peripheries, Barkey argues, forced the sultans to begin to centralise their 
tax and military systems, emulating the European and Russian empires in the last 
decades of the 18th century. Failing to do so successfully while also losing wars, 
however, led several European empires to shield the Ottoman regime from a harsh 
Russian peace settlement in 1792, the first manifestation of European inter-imperial 
cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean. In its attempt to improve its imperial 
‘repertoires of power’ with a standing army and a centralised tax system, however, 
the regime estranged its provincial elites. Consequently, the Sultan saw a march of 
several provincial notables and their armies to Istanbul demanding an economic and 
political empowerment of a broader social base in 1808.309 Although the regime 
managed to partially reform the tax system and build a standing army, even if smaller 
than the Russian imperial army, European inter-imperial cooperation, imperial and 
military historians show, became a growing challenge, both militarily and 
economically. Having already acquired Gibraltar in 1713, the British Empire 
continued to acquire passage routes and islands such as Malta in 1802, the Ionian 
Islands in 1815, and Aden in 1839 whereas the French went for land and took Ottoman 
Algeria in 1830.310 With the European support for the Greek independence, the Sultan 
also felt the growing influence of European multinational imperialism closer to 
Istanbul in 1827. Additionally, Austrian, British and French forces also engaged in 
localised ad hoc inter-imperial cooperation in the predominantly Christian Ottoman 
province we today know as Lebanon in 1840 (and 1860).311 Moreover, the European 
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empires also forced the sultan to agree to trade and customs agreements with the 
British in 1838 and later the French empire and others, which caused Ottoman 
imports, deficits, debts and borrowing to explode. Following several wars with the 
Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire was forced to eventually declare a moratorium 
on its foreign debts in 1875 and in 1881 cede control of its finances to a debt 
administration that was formally Ottoman, but de facto under joint British, French and 
German control.312 The inter-imperial project of the Suez Canal, which opened in 
1869, also led to increased British interest in Egypt, as it reduced significantly the 
distance to the majority of British imperial territories along the shores of the Indian 
Ocean, in the Malacca Straits and in Oceania. Obtaining a large number of shares in 
the Canal Company, and thus joining the French, the British Empire grew more 
invested and in 1888 pushed through a convention on canal neutrality protected 
obviously by the British Empire.313 Finally, many British, French and increasingly 
German experts and companies—invited by the sultan to take part in the 
modernisation of the communications (ports, railways, telegraphs) and financial 
infrastructure (banks and insurance firms)—began to seize ownership of these and 
export capital generated in the Ottoman Empire. This combination, I therefore 
suggest, marked the informal institutionalisation of European multinational 
imperialism in the Mediterranean from the late 19th century. 
While the following decades allowed this process of frontier building to shift into 
the open and the European empires to cater for their own interests, the Ottoman 
Empire grew less able to do so. Moreover, from 1878 to 1899 the Ottomans lost 
Cyprus in 1878, Egypt (and thereby also Sudan) to the British. The Ottomans lost 
Tunisia in 1881 and East Morocco in 1912 to the French. After the internal 
colonisation of Italy, the Italian Risorgimento also acquired areas in what is today 
Eritrea in 1886 (after failing to take Tunisia) and Ottoman Libya in 1911.314 When 
recently independent Greece sent troops to support an anti-Ottoman revolt on Crete 
in 1896, the frontier of multinational imperialism was formally institutionalised. 
Realising that the Ottoman Empire was threatened and thus potentially the broader 
imperial order, the British, French, Italian, Habsburg, German and Russian empires 
organised a joint naval blockade and inter-imperial force of 20.000 troops to be 
stationed in Crete. European consuls, military attaches and officers from the 
multinational imperial force subsequently reorganised the Cretan administration, the 
police, and the judiciary. Crete gained wide autonomy under inter-imperial 
supervision, but remained part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1908, however, the Austro-
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Hungarian Empire annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in, reducing further the Ottoman 
European territory. Soon after, the European imperial powers, in another example of 
institutionalised European multinational imperialism, created the Muslim state of 
Albania in another inter-imperial intervention in the Balkan War in 1913 to prevent 
the post-Ottoman, pro-Russian and expanding Serbia from getting ocean access and 
thereby strengthen the Russian Empire in the Mediterranean.315  
Within the Ottoman Empire, historians have shown that the populations also felt 
the effects of the European multinational imperialism and the Ottoman Empire’s 
attempts to counter it. Following the influx of more than two million Muslim refugees 
after wars with Russia (that changed the balance between Muslims and Christians in 
many provinces), the global crisis from the late 1870s (that reduced Ottoman 
commercial agricultural exports), and the de facto deindustrialisation of the 
countryside, a growing number of people were left without means to fend for 
themselves. While locally rooted religious care systems cared for sick, old and 
disabled people, and urban poor, conversely, came under an increasing pressure, 
suddenly becoming ‘idle’ and potential criminals requiring surveillance. Having 
already disabled the constitution in 1876, the Ottoman state criminalised the 
increasingly insecure lower urban classes of homeless people, unemployed and 
striking workers under pressure from a budding Ottoman bourgeoisie able to navigate 
the frontier building of European multinational imperialism. ‘Idleness’ and 
unemployment came to be seen as a disregard for society and work a duty. After 
having been integral to attempts of colonising the imperial countryside, pacify peasant 
revolts and improve tax collection, the Ottoman gendarmerie also became involved in 
dealing with both the growing levels of unemployment and the number of strikes as 
working conditions grew worse. By 1900, the gendarmerie saw the protection of the 
community of commerce as its most important task. Additionally, the regime also 
used Muslim refugees from the wars with Russia in forced internal colonisation 
programmes to populate and develop commercial agriculture in thinly populated lands 
in the Syrian provinces and Anatolia after the 1878 war (thus shifting their ethnic-
religious balances). Although the constitution from 1876 was reinstalled after a coup 
in 1908, temporary laws on strikes, vagrancy and suspected criminals were passed. 
Subsequently, mass-arrests, deportations and class-based spatial segregation became 
the norm in the bigger cities. Not surprisingly, discontent in the provinces grew 
significantly. Feminist writings, tax-revolts, peasant uprisings, growing political 
opposition to the regime and the ever-growing foreign influence, and mutinies in the 
army and navy defined several Ottoman provinces in the early twentieth century.316  
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The Ottoman Empire thus weakened considerably between 1810 and 1918 due to 
a combination of 57 years of war that not only cost territory and tax revenue but also 
burdened the regime with growing military costs, an externally driven process of 
deindustrialisation and the European inter-imperial collaborative expansions. 
Nevertheless, notes Ottoman historian Eugene Rogan, it did not dissolve early in the 
First World War, a war fought for empire mainly by the German, Habsburg and 
Ottoman Empires on one side and the British, French, Russian and American empires 
on the other. It took four years of campaigns, the mobilization of the Ottoman Arab 
populations by way of several different promises of a post-Ottoman independent Arab 
world and the use of millions of British ‘white’ settler colonial and both British and 
French ‘coloured’ and ‘black’ colonial forces before the Ottoman Empire eventually 
succumbed.317  
 
 
The Failure to Institutionalise European Multinational Imperialism 
in the Mediterranean, 1918-1942 
 
Unintentionally buoyed by the then collapsed Russian Empire, the British and French 
empires continued building a frontier of multinational imperialism in the 
Mediterranean region with the demise of the Ottoman Empire without the also 
collapsed Habsburgs and defeated Italians. It came initially in the form of the 
occupation of several Ottoman provinces as the regime of the Allied Occupied Enemy 
Territory Administration and later as carved-out Mandates under the new League of 
Nations, marking a new degree of institutionalised multinational imperialism. 
Moreover, the British increased their part of the Suez Canal Company shares to nearly 
80% and installed a permanent British military force to relieve the war-time 
deployment of British, Australian, Indian and Egyptian troops. Imperial historians 
have shown that this was less than London, Moscow and Paris arranged for with a 
plan to divide the region and a British war-time campaign to revive, or rather take 
over, what they called a ‘declined landscape of oppressed Arab, Armenian and Jewish 
nations’ as a ‘new’ British ‘Middle East’ within the American president Wilson’s plan 
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for a nation state-based capitalist system.318 After the American president fell sick, 
Washington became less combative and grew willing to let London “(…) exercise 
substantial political control in the Middle East provided that this control would act 
as an umbrella under which American interests could prosper and be protected.”319 
The American involvement in the rapidly expanding oil business in Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia (beginning in the 1920s) needs to be seen in light of this inter-imperial 
relationship.320 Despite not joining the League of Nations, the US took over Armenia 
as a mandate, thus joining, in effect if informally, the new regime in the Mediterranean 
and the ‘new’ ‘Middle East’. Regardless of their plans and that the Russian Empire 
turned on itself in a revolution, the British and French mandate regimes would 
continue to face the same problems as the late Ottoman regime. Rather than dealing 
with the broad and massive socio-economic problems rooted in the increasing regional 
reliance on cash and monocrops321, the rising living costs and urbanisation, the British 
and French mandates expanded their wartime military regimes into frontier zones of 
multinational imperialism.  
Throughout the 1920s, riots broke out in several Mandates. Accordingly, the 
emerging quasi-colonial security states responded by honing their technologies of 
power in the form of map-making, aerial and demographic surveillance, ID cards, the 
differentiated regulation of mobilities, medical standards, and education. The mandate 
regimes also built networks of linked police stations, military bases, naval facilities 
and airfields, as well as recruited local forces.322 As noted by Darwin, none of these 
states was “(…) to be governed on a shoestring and garrisoned with a corporal’s 
guard of local levies.”323 Altogether, the legal, fiscal, military, medical and social 
regulation of the mandates and the European colonies both failed to consider ethnic 
and religious groups and internationalised popular racialised imperial imaginaries. 
Expressions of cultural imperialism, the racialised frontiers, which often cast 
Europeans as rational, civilised and masculine and the subject of the ‘Near East’ and 
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‘Orient’, the Arab or/and Muslim as mostly emotional, primitive and feminine, 
expanded beyond the internationalised medical surveillance of mobilities of ‘oriental’ 
passengers passing through the Suez Canal. European and American tourists as well 
as Jewish settlers thus came to be ‘good’ circulation, while nomads, militant 
nationalists and criminals came to be ‘bad’ circulation, having mobilities that needed 
restriction. Similarly, the attempts to handle Mediterranean trafficking was mainly 
concerned with ‘white’ slavery.324 Predictably, governing the mandates and the 
broader region only got increasingly harder for the British and French.  
By the mid-1930s, as historians have showed, the onset of the global economic 
crisis and the regional integration process therein made it necessary to devolve power 
to local notables, to increase the troop numbers, and to broaden the powers of 
enforcement. The Saudi royal regime installed by the British came to enjoy increasing 
freedom as it grew central to stability in the Gulf already by 1931. In the late 1930s, 
however, the Saudi kingdom grew aggressive to British dismay. Egyptian nationalist 
pressure and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 meant that the British had to 
grant Egypt formal sovereignty and withdraw their reduced forces to several newly 
built bases along the Suez Canal in 1936. In Iraq, formal independence in 1930 left 
the British with both a military presence and growing ethnic and religious tension. 
Transjordan was quiet due to subsidies to the new regime and the de facto British 
military force.325 The same year, Palestinians clashed with security forces. The threat 
of martial law calmed matters initially, but the lack of British willingness to provide 
balanced policies and curb Jewish immigration that was dramatically altering both the 
Palestinian socio-economic fabric and access to land, soon led to peasant guerrilla 
warfare. The British responded by not only censoring the press, issuing collective 
fines, demolishing houses and installing travel restrictions, but also by putting the 
police under military jurisdiction, arresting people without warrants, and bringing in 
more forces. As the revolt escalated, the British resorted to beatings, humiliations, 
indiscriminate killings and death penalties, eventually ending the rebellion in 1939 by 
the brutality of more than 20.000 soldiers.326 The French struggled with similar 
problems in both its mandates of Syria and Lebanon and its North African colonies of 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. The security regimes faced urban dissent, student 
rallies and violent resistance due to economic trouble, nationalist or Islamic 
mobilisation, biased political reforms, broken French promises of political reform and 
not least the Palestinian revolt. Although security forces ended these, their increasing 
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repression and growing influence on policy formation and urban policing only 
intensified the conflicts, eventually leading to martial law.327  
However, pressure on this frontier of British and French multinational imperialism 
also mounted from other imperial powers and alliances through the 
disenfranchisement of the League of Nations and the ‘peace’ after the First World 
War. For a century before 1914, imperial historian John Darwin argues, London had 
seen Berlin as a counterweight to Moscow in the Middle East given the region was 
peripheral to Germany’s immediate interests. While Germany had opened a railway 
line from Istanbul to the Persian Gulf to open up the Ottoman economy and provide 
an alternative to the French-British controlled Suez Canal at the end of the 19th 
century, the British understanding only changed in the First World War when the 
Russian Empire was part of defeating the German Empire along with the British. 
Moreover, the collapse of Russia brought, as Darwin put it, “(…) flood-tide of German 
influence swirling round the Black Sea and towards North Persia.”328 However, 
Mandate regime led Arabs to see Germany as a “(…) fellow victim of the post-World 
War I settlement, and perhaps the only major European without imperial ambitions 
in the Middle East.”329 Nationalism and anti-Semitism also gained traction, as it was 
never realised that Nazi ideology placed Arabs at the bottom of its racial hierarchy 
and that Germany would not support Arab independence.330 Over the 1930s, the 
British and French both saw German influence increase in Turkey and feared it would 
do so in Transjordan and Saudi Arabia. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia, however, 
challenged the regime of the League of Nations, as Abyssinia was a member. 
Accordingly, as imperial historians have shown, London and Paris resorted to various 
measures. First, they used the League to impose sanctions on Italy, even if ineffectual 
given they left oil out. Second, they co-opted Istanbul by recalling the Italian post-
World War I occupation of Anatolia, the meddling in Albania in the 1920s, and the 
offensive maritime military preparations on the one hand, and handing over 
Alexandretta, a part of French Syrian mandate, on the other. Thirdly, the British 
turning to tested methods, also began supporting rebels in Italian East Africa, 
consisting of Abyssinia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Finally, the British also 
sought to restrain Italy, Germany and Japan that by then had gotten together in first 
an Anti-Communist Pact between the German and Japanese empires and later in a 
formal military alliance through secret negotiations with Italy and an incorporative 
trade policy aimed at strengthening conservatives in Germany and Japan who 
preferred economic growth to imperial war.331  
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These attempts failed. Berlin, in the meantime, had allied with both Tokyo and 
Rome, forming a competing inter-imperial alliance with Berlin recognising Tokyo’s 
imperial project as a parallel to what Mazower has called a Nazi-version of the 
Monroe doctrine bound by territory, history and blood.332 Initially fought in northern 
Europe, the theatres of war soon expanded beyond Europe, the Mediterranean and 
Middle East included. However, not only the Italian interests and failures in Greece, 
North Africa and British Somaliland drove the Axis interest in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East. The realisation of the German leadership that a larger supply of oil 
and ability to process and distribute would be needed to rid Germany’s dependence 
on Anglo-American oil companies after the war was also a major driving factor. As 
shown by military and energy historian Anand Toprani, contemporary experts of the 
international oil industry warned “(…) that the confiscation of the British and French 
oil interests in Rumania and the Far and Near East and the acquisition ad Norwegian 
tanker fleet was the least [of] what could be expected.”333 Indeed, the French Vichy 
regime began to aid Germany and Italy in seizing control of Iraq’s oil fields and the 
pipelines to the Mediterranean. Moreover, the recently founded German oil giant, 
Kontinentale Öl, was preparing to send engineers to Iraq if the German Afrikakorps 
broke through the British defences in North Africa. Finally, Germany was readying 
subsidiaries to purchase, lease or construct tankers, oil loading and offloading 
facilities and pipelines in the Mediterranean as well as the Black Sea.334 Consequently, 
the involvement of the Soviet Union and the US grew necessary, much in the same 
way that the British and French empires had needed Russia and the US in the First 
World War, thus reconfiguring the frontier of multinational imperialism and its 
regional manifestation. In late 1941, the Japanese attack on the main American naval 
complex in the Pacific led the US to join the alliance dominated by the British and 
Soviet empires and what remained of the French under the leadership of Franklin 
Roosevelt. By early 1942, as shown in the previous chapter, the inter-imperial military 
alliance of the United Nations had been formed. As it would turn out, the members of 
the UN were just as interested in the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean facilities and 
systems of oil production, refinery and distribution as Germany.  
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The Ad Hoc Building of the Frontier of Imperial Multilateralism in 
the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1942-1950 
 
As were to become clear to the British and French imperial governments, however, 
the United Nations was not merely a military alliance. As historians of the American 
and British Middle East war-efforts and post-war foreign policies have shown, the 
formation of the UN connected the frontier of American informal empire in Latin 
America, and its basis in the idea of strong promotion of a capitalist web of dependent 
nation states revolving around the US and multilateral organisations, with what was 
left of the British-French frontier of multinational imperialism and its practices of 
direct interventions and neo-colonial regimes, a legacy predating the First World War. 
In the Middle East, this showed in several ways. First, the British lost the military 
command of the Middle East theatre of war once American forces were deployed to 
Northern Africa in late 1942: the only theatre that British generals had commanded 
from the moment the US joined the war. Friction soon went beyond military 
command, the prestige and strategic influence associated with commanding a theatre. 
As the war had cut off regional trade with Europe aside Britain by 1942, the US began 
to take part in supplying the British and imperial forces via the aforementioned lend-
lease agreement and the Middle East Supply Centre. As was soon clear to American 
and British officials involved, the essentially militarised trade network increased 
living costs for people all over the Middle East as it curtailed the already reduced 
civilian trade many had come to depend on due to the shift from subsistence farming 
to commercial crops, and industrialisation. Neither the British nor the Americans were 
particularly concerned with this dimension. Rather, the British grew frustrated as they 
began to fear for their post-war markets and the strength of the Sterling Area, a tariff-
based neo-mercantilist Commonwealth protection scheme that although it dated back 
to first attempts in 1932 had only been fully realised during the war. On their part, 
American export companies were furious that the British were hiding behind military 
logistics to keep them out, since massive profits could be made. Although Washington 
wanted to enforce the long-standing ‘open door’ policy and push London towards 
granting its mandates and colonies in the Middle East independence as the majority 
of these were part of the Dollar arrangement, it accepted the trade drawbacks as a 
wartime arrangement. Predictably, additional mistrust developed over oil, which had 
been a point of contention since the 1930s. The US desired an arrangement that would 
secure equal American access, something the British were not keen on given their 
ability to acquire oil in Sterling rather than Dollars and thereby avoid worsening the 
trade balance. Heated discussions followed through 1944 and most of 1945 until the 
issue faded for the time being as the oil companies made their own provisions. The 
French also felt the effect of coming to rely on the US as the French government, or 
what was left of it in the French African colonies, was forced to grant its mandates of 
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Syria and Lebanon independence in 1944 to let them formally join the UN military 
alliance after being recognised by both Washington and Moscow.335 
Once the war ended, Anglo-American regional inter-imperial cooperation 
continued, as did the occasional tensions. Whereas London still favoured direct 
control, Washington preferred indirect influence and regional multilateralism after 
gaining successes with this model in Latin America. Multinational imperialism thus 
began to shift towards imperial multilateralism in the Middle East and Mediterranean 
as it did around the world. Washington’s insistence that London grant Trans-Jordan 
independence and end the occupation of Iraq that had been formally independent since 
1930, resulted in Jordanian independence in 1946 and the British withdrawal from 
Iraq to retain only air force bases in Iraq from 1947. The region’s oil was another 
cause of disagreement. To London, buying oil in Sterling rather than Dollars was 
essential to preserve the advantages of the Sterling area and protect its already 
weakened balance of payments. Additionally, the British oil refinery in Abadan in 
Iran was the world’s largest and the main oil supply of the British Empire just as the 
Suez Canal had returned in its role as the imperial ‘jugular vein’. By 1946, nearly 
200.000 British troops remained in both in what had become the largest military 
complex in the world with 10 separate airfields and 34 individual base areas along the 
Suez Canal and Egyptian cities. 336 As energy historian Stephen Galpern eloquently 
puts it, “One need not guess how the British felt about this encroachment in their 
sphere of influence.”337 To Washington, however, it was not merely a question of 
American oil companies getting sales to the Sterling area or an attempt to weaken the 
machinery of the British Empire. Rather, its access to Middle Eastern oil, and thus 
also in the Sterling area, was an integral means in a broader plan of getting Western 
Europe into an oil-based growth economic paradigm that was believed able to 
dissuade Western European citizens from potentially becoming attracted by 
Communism.338 Having surveyed the past two decades’ literature on Anglo-American 
relations in the Middle East, Galpern argues that they, despite minor conflicts on the 
shared goals and how to achieve these, were able collaborate both strategically and 
economically to defend their regional interests as they and their former Soviet ally 
had grown more than suspicious of each other.339  
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London was therefore finally not too worried seeing Washington increase its 
influence in the region by keeping war-time air base rights in Libya and Morocco,340 
promoting a growing number of American companies to get involved in the trade of 
oil, cars, hotel construction, kitchen equipment, cameras, sewing machines, rubber 
products and so on via headquarters in Egypt,341 and expanding the technical 
assistance programmes of the UN organisations within most sectors of the Middle 
Eastern states.342 If anything, the British imperial government came to rely 
increasingly on its ally. One example of this was in Iran, where both the Soviet Union 
and Great Britain in 1942 deployed troops to prevent Iran from falling under German 
control and made an agreement with the Iranian government to withdraw no later than 
six months after the end of the war. Looking to expand its frontier as in Eastern Europe 
and secure access to oil, however, Stalin allowed for the establishment of a left-
leaning administration in Azerbaijan, the part of Iran occupied by Soviet forces, just 
as the Red Army prevented the Iranian army from entering the region in 1945. 
Moscow suggested that Azerbaijani autonomy and oil agreement could resolve the 
matter in the subsequent bilateral negotiations. Unable to do much alone, London had 
Washington put pressure and consider relocating naval forces to the region. Against 
that backdrop, the Iranians accepted to enter an agreement concerning the acceptance 
of the leftist Tudeh party and oil negotiations. Once the Red Army left in the spring 
of 1946, however, Tehran crushed the Azerbaijani administration and abandoned its 
promises of oil negotiations, much to the satisfaction of both Washington and London 
who hoped to keep the Soviet Union out of the oil-rich region.343 Another example 
was the Soviet pressure on the Turkish government. In line with the Tsarist imperial 
ambitions of expanding into the Mediterranean, Stalin initially attempted to refute the 
existing legal framework that granted Turkey control of the access to the 
Mediterranean in 1945. As part thereof, he sought to reach an agreement of a joint 
defence system agreement with Turkey (which had been neutral in the war), which 
would allow for the building of at least one base in the region. Although the Turkish 
government declined, both top officials in the State Department and Truman himself 
began fearing that Turkey could fall to the Soviet Union. Similarly, the British were 
only just able to handle the Greek civil war, initiated in 1946, when Stalin, in 
accordance with their agreement on zones of influence, reigned in the new 
Yugoslavian, Bulgarian and Albanian post-war Communist regimes that all with 
varying agendas supported the Greek communist faction against the British-trained 
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and -backed national army and right-wing faction.344 Feeling increasingly unable to 
resist the Soviet pressure and facing a financial crisis due to a dollar shortage, London 
informed Washington of its inability to support the Turkish and Greek governments 
in February 1947.345 Recent Cold War scholarship has showed the different ways the 
British disengagement mobilised the Truman administration. As mentioned above, the 
US first abandoned its support for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Agency, as it offered aid to Albania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, China and 
Greece, of which only the latter two did not belong to the Soviet bloc. To replace it, 
Washington initiated a US programme, the Marshall Plan. Athens and Ankara were 
not surprisingly amongst the first to receive funding and aid via the new scheme in 
1948.346 The US also began supporting the Greek right in the civil war with finances, 
equipment and the assistance of special forces. The scholar of the Mediterranean 
Amikam Nachmani argued the “(…) US involvement, political, economic and military 
etc., was literally overwhelming”347 and that “(…) the role played by the United 
Nations and its bodies was, if not an integral part of the Truman Doctrine, at least a 
complimentary form of Western intervention.”348 The Greek right predictably won the 
civil war, although the political system ensured a centre coalition government. 
Additionally, the recently formed CIA opened a station in Athens for its Balkan 
operations and to serve as a model for the new Greek intelligence service.349  
On a broader scale, Truman’s global anti-Communist development programme 
from 1949 also resulted in the opening of programme offices in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, Pakistan and Israel over 1950 and 1951.350 Additionally, 
as naval and military historians have shown, the US also supplemented the British 
military measures by increasing its own military presence. The first step was to 
maintain existing base rights in Libya and Morocco. The second was to acquire access 
to more facilities, which from 1947 to 1949 also put Aden, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, 
Trans-Jordan, and Oman on the wish list.351 The third step for Washington was to 
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boost—initially temporarily—its Mediterranean fleet, originally a small task force of 
only 3 ships from its post-war force, in 1946, and to expand the fleet to one aircraft 
carrier, 16 ships, and 15 support vessels and make it permanent two years later. 
Another clear sign of Washington assigning importance to the region was the 
institutionalisation of annual Middle East meetings with the British and the Canadians 
from October 1947. Indicative of the balance of power, the first joint American, 
British and Canadian meeting took place at the Pentagon, but left the British in 
command of the Middle East. While the US committed fighting units, the strength of 
the British forces and numerous bases in Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan and on Cyprus were 
decisive. However, as historian of British imperial history in the Middle East, Michael 
Cohen notes, the Atlee government had contemplated, if shortly, using the new United 
Nations to take over British Middle Eastern imperial interests, given its focus on 
balancing social reform and budget problems. As a way to share the burden, the British 
ideas on military arrangements for the Middle East thus involved American bombers 
operating from air bases in Egypt and Palestine, not the bases in Morocco and Libya 
further to the west to which the US had access. This combination would allow the 
goals of both being able to resist a Soviet first strike to retain control of the Middle 
East and to keep the Soviet Union from its oil production in Romania, the Caucasus 
and Baku, as the air bases in Britain only put 25% of the Anglo-American bombing 
targets in the Soviet Union within range. The Egyptian bases, in contrast, placed 94% 
of the bombing targets within range.352 In 1948, however, the British departure from 
Palestine to the UN forced the British to focus only on Egyptian bases. This grew 
increasingly problematic because of the much hated British influence and large 
military presence. Indeed, the growing Egyptian nationalism forced the royal regime 
to take the British military presence before the UN, thereby forcing the British to 
withdraw to the Suez Canal bases, to pass legislation to increase the number of 
Egyptians in the Suez Canal Company management and staff, to demand ten days’ 
notice from any state wishing to use the canal for warships, and finally to install a 
regime of inspecting and searching vessels from the ports of Suez and Port Said to 
prevent Israeli ships from passing through. The British sought to co-opt the French, 
the Americans and the UN Security Council to counter these measures, but failed.353 
London and Washington also soon disagreed over costs and the deeper issue of what 
the Americans saw as British unwillingness to open the region further and the British 
saw the Americans as overly meddlesome. Additionally, Washington had a period of 
internal disagreement on how proceed. By October 1949, the Pentagon wanted to 
withdraw altogether whereas the State Department, in touch with American 
companies (most notably the oil companies that controlled most of the oil production 
in Saudi Arabia, a quarter of the Iraqi production and shared the Kuwaiti production 
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with the British-Iranian Oil Company) wanted to stay. However, the outbreak of the 
Korean War, which began not long after the Chinese Communists took over power, 
brought together the hitherto occasionally estranged staffs of the Pentagon and the 
State Department, thereby expanding and further militarising the frontiers of imperial 
multilateralism, including its manifestation in the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East.354  
 
 
A Troubled Expansion: The Frontier of Imperial Multilateralism in 
the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1950-1955 
 
Less concerned with the Korean War, London sought to retain its influence for 
primarily economic and strategic reasons while Washington took the Korean War as 
an ill-willed attempt of its former ally in Moscow to expand its influence and idea of 
an opposing world order globally. As historians have shown, the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations responded in kind.355 In the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, scholars have shown, this translated into a growing American interest in 
a regional military arrangement aimed at Moscow, due to concerns about the ability 
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of the existing British arrangement to protect American oil projects, and thus its hold 
on Western Europe.356 A month into expanding the frontier in East Asia with troops 
in Korea Washington, London, Paris and Istanbul invited the Egyptian monarchy to 
join talks on the arrangement, thus intentionally and openly seeking to take further 
both the ad hoc Anglo-American inter-imperial cooperation and what had hitherto 
been institutionalised in the still Western dominated UN regime. Already under 
nationalist pressure, the monarchy both rejected and brought up the 1936 Egyptian-
British base right treaty and the issue of de facto sovereignty. The British wanted the 
US, Egypt and Israel involved, but failed to engage the latter two. The Egyptian king 
wanted no part before the British had withdrawn their forces that were already four 
times the number allowed for in the 1936 treaty and sought to stress the British by 
restricting their canal access, effectively closing their refineries in Haifa, Israel. 
Hurting from the Iranian nationalisation of its oil production in 1951, London doubled 
its military presence to 83.000 soldiers. In doing so, London forced about a coup and 
a military regime that not only rejected any British defence scheme but also initiated 
a guerrilla campaign in the canal area until 1954.357 In line with the American 
experiences in Latin America, a CIA committee led by President Eisenhower 
explicitly formulated a principle of indirect imperial control in a strategy for the 
Middle East in 1951: “Our principle should be to encourage the emergence of 
competent leaders, relatively well-disposed towards the West, through programs 
designed for this purpose, including, where possible, a conscious, though perhaps 
covert, effort to cultivate and aid such potential leaders, even when they are not in 
power.”358 Preferring therefore the older imperial ‘repertoire of power’ of indirect 
control to direct intervention and recognising Egypt as less central than hitherto, 
Washington refused to join London’s proposal for secret collusion against Cairo with 
Paris, complicating both Anglo-American relations and the defence project 
throughout 1952.359 Moreover, engaged in both Korea and Western Europe, the US 
wanted the British to lead in the region as hitherto the case. While London favoured 
a project rooted in the Arab Middle East, Washington, as I will show, grew weary of 
Egypt throughout 1953 and therefore wanted to involve Turkey due to its strategic 
location, its strong anti-Communist tradition360 and its massive debt to the US from 
                                                          
356 For more on this dimension of the relationship between the US and Western Europe, see 
David S. Painter, “The Marshall Plan and Oil,” Cold War History 9, no. 2 (2009): 159–75. 
357 Michael T. Thornhill, “Eden, Churchill and the Battle of the Canal Zone, 1951-1954,” in 
Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives and Its Aftermath (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 35–
51. 
358 Quoted from Scott Lucas and Morey, “The Hidden ‘alliance’: The CIA and MI6 before and 
after Suez,” Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (2000): 97. The British Foreign 
Secretary, Anthony Eden, would come to the same conclusion in February 1953. However, the 
British never managed to harness rather than struggle against the emerging nationalist 
movements. Tore Tingvold Petersen, “Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The 
Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952-1957.,” The International History Review 14, no. 1 
(1992): 71–91. 
359 Morewood, “Prelude to the Suez Crisis.” 
360 In 1921, the new Turkish state eliminated the entire Communist leadership.  
111 
 
111 
 
the Marshall Aid, and Iran to counter the potential military advantages of location and 
oil of Iran of a Soviet invasion. Turkey was interested, but preferred NATO as it 
expected it had larger funds and it would not come to depend on the British any more 
than necessary due to strong anti-British sentiment. However, it did not help that the 
US consulted unilaterally Turkey and Iran, both already receiving US military aid, 
and Pakistan, which was potentially interested in a scheme without the British.361 
However, with British consent, a Turco-Pakistani cooperation agreement was 
carefully announced to avoid Pakistani nationalist sentiment and Soviet ire in 1954. 
The agreement reached with Egypt on using the Suez Canal base complex in the event 
of war soon after changed little: the US wanted a northern tier project, leaving the 
British irritated with what they saw as a lack of solidarity in managing Egypt. 
Although the British hoped to keep Iraq out, and the Arab prime ministers had met in 
Cairo on Egypt’s initiative to dissuade Iraq from turning so strongly towards the 
Western bloc, Iraq joined Turkey and Pakistan in what became known as the Baghdad 
Pact in early 1954 after having received US military aid.362 Despite British concerns 
and Egypt’s insistence on a neutral Pan-Arabic scheme, the British joined the pact 
soon after, also renewing its bilateral agreement with Iraq. However, Washington 
grew concerned that London was turning the pact into an instrument of British rather 
than Western policy, and therefore, to (re)gain control, joined the military deputies 
committee, but not the pact itself (later renamed the Central Treaty Organization) in 
1955.363 
At the same time, relations between London and Paris and Washington also 
soured. The continued failure to make progress with the regional military arrangement 
was one factor. Cold War and Middle East historians have shown that other factors 
included the expansion of Germany and NATO into the Mediterranean, the British 
frustrations with American meddling in Iran, the growing British dependence on the 
US in relation to Egypt, and a conflict over strategically important territory on the 
border between Saudi Arabia and three British-dominated Gulf States. Having ‘taken 
over’ Greece and Turkey in the late 1940s, Washington not only forced the moderate 
Greek government to resign in favour of a right-wing government, it also—to British 
frustrations—demanded that West Germany, as the potentially strongest European 
power, share the burden in the Mediterranean by providing industrial credits to Greece 
and Turkey as well as economic aid to Israel. Also to British and French irritation, the 
US accommodated the Greek and Turkish wishes to join NATO and saw the formation 
of right wing ‘stay behind’ networks as in Western Europe, due to strategic 
considerations and goodwill from the contribution to the Korean War. This not only 
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reflected Eisenhower and his broader foreign policy apparatus’ sense of the British 
becoming a burden (Secretary of State Dulles phrased it as ‘millstones around our 
neck’) in early 1953, but also left the British and French frustrated as they remembered 
the earlier loss of regional influence to the Germans.364 Moreover, the inclusion of 
Greece and Turkey into NATO added a naval dimension to NATO. While American 
vessels in the Mediterranean that had been increased to somewhere between 40 and 
70 were included, it also reduced British, French and Italian strategic autonomy in the 
Mediterranean as it came to encompass a large part of the assigned British, French 
and Italian naval assets in the spirit of ‘burden sharing’.365 This, however, harmonised 
little with how the US, despite the protests of the populations in several cases against 
imperialism and militarisation, also acquired new or further access to facilities, base 
rights or bases in Greece, Spain, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, and Algeria.366 
Concerning Iran, Anglo-American dealings grew increasingly difficult due to their 
different views on the rise of Iranian nationalism. The White House favoured a fairer 
deal in the negotiations about the main issue of oil than did Whitehall. The immediate 
outcome was that the moderate Mossadeq government nationalised the oil industry 
after a series of talks, which had also involved US negotiators who had applied 
pressure on the British as well as granted Iran a platform from which to negotiate 
following an agreement that would share 50% of the profits with Saudi Arabia. 
Subsequently both failing at the UN and the International Court of Justice and unable 
to launch a large scale military operation due to the loss of the Indian army and the 
deployment of a large number of British troops in Malaya and Korea, London could 
only boycott Iranian oil and buy American oil from Saudi Arabia. Seeing how 
Whitehall both struggled to cope with rising military budgets and an economic crisis 
due to the lack of previously cheap oil on the one hand and Mossadeq’s turn to the 
previously illegal leftist Tudeh party on the other, the White House therefore had the 
CIA—with the support of MI6—execute a coup against Mossadeq. To British 
frustrations, the deal with the new Iranian regime subsequently granted American oil 
companies 40% ownership of the new Iranian oil consortium.367 Until (and despite) 
the joint intervention in Iran with the White House under the Truman administration 
that had retained some British access to Iranian oil, Whitehall, and especially the 
secret ‘Suez Group’ of MP’s, intelligence officials and cabinet members that began to 
emerge after the Iranian crisis, felt abandoned by their wartime allies regarding the 
Egyptian guerrilla operations against the British forces in the canal and thus the safety 
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of the British oil supply and, ultimately, stability. Since 1945, the overall shipping 
volume passing the Suez Canal had tripled with two thirds being European oil, and, 
as the British boycott of Iranian oil meant that British oil had shifted to oil from the 
Persian Gulf emirates and Saudi Arabia, made Metropolitan Great Britain the largest 
importer of oil.368 By the second half of 1953, however, Eisenhower had lost patience 
with the new Egyptian military regime under the nationalist Abdel Gamel Nasser 
regarding its potential as the foundations for an American Middle East policy in part 
due to racialised imaginations of Arabs being irrational, mercurial, and emotional. Not 
long after the coup in Iran, Washington (and Langley) thus turned away from the 
Egyptian regime and recognised the need to stabilise further the British oil supply to 
upholster its main ally and prevent the Soviet Union from gaining influence. Initially 
manifested in propaganda against Cairo within Egypt, pressure on the Egyptian cotton 
trade, and support of Canada and France to discretely supply Israel with fighter jets, 
this soon ensured a common interest between the US and the British in removing the 
Egyptian regime despite differences in how to do so. While this suited British strategic 
interests, the British soon came to feel the same sense of both losing influence and 
military capacity and a growing dependence on the US in Egypt as they had in Iran.369 
Further to the east, Anglo-American relations grew even more antagonistic. Having 
lost their influence in Saudi Arabia to the US, London reacted angrily to the incursion 
of Saudi troops into the Buraimi Oasis, an oasis on the southeast tip of the Arabian 
Peninsula controlling both potential oil reserves and the strategic access to the British-
dominated emirates of Abu Dhabi, Muscat and Oman, in August 1952. London and 
Washington convened talks as the former wanted to regain control and the latter to 
safeguard lucrative oil deals and important airbases in Saudi Arabia. However, 
disagreement lasted until 1957, reflecting an emerging rupture between the two 
wartime allies and founders of the UN.370 As the American National Security Council 
concluded in 1954, “Efforts to prevent the loss of the Near East will require increasing 
responsibility, initiative, and leadership by the United States in the area.”371 
As shown by naval and Cold War historians, the third problem for Anglo-
American frontier building was the growing assertiveness of the Soviet Union. After 
the Second World War, the Kremlin supported Jewish immigration to Palestine to 
pressure the British. Subsequently, Stalin saw to it that substantial amounts of rifles, 
machines, fighter planes and tanks were delivered to Israel during the 1948 war and 
Israel recognised de jure to force the British out of Palestine and thereby loose, most 
importantly, the port of Haifa and the numerous airfields. However, with the Soviet 
Jewry’s growing fascination with Israel and Israel’s zigzagging in relation to the 
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Korean War, the Kremlin broke its diplomatic ties with Israel.372 The following few 
years of absence in both the Middle East and the broader Mediterranean region, it 
must be noted, had less to do with Anglo-American successes in building regional 
alliances than with strategic decisions in Kremlin foreign policy-making. After failing 
to get a foothold, Stalin had initiated a long-term plan to build a blue water navy to 
counter the Anglo-American naval supremacy with the ordering of new battleships, 
cruisers, aircraft carriers and submarines. Until these vessels were ready, however, the 
Soviet navy was to operate with strategically defensive but tactically offensive vessels 
that could operate under the protection of land-based air power. The second phase 
therefore required naval and air facilities. After the break with Yugoslavia and Israel 
and NATOs expansion into Greece and Turkey, neutralist Egypt increasingly 
appeared promising.373 Rooted in Stalin’s pursuit of resources and technology, Soviet 
relations with Eastern Europe and, partially, China had been brutal and often close to 
pillaging, a practice named ‘imperial scavenging’ by historian of the Soviet Union 
Austin Jersild. After Stalin’s death, Khrushchev and the other Politbureau members 
grew increasingly aware that the Soviet approaches beyond the Communist bloc, had 
to be far more modest if not supportive of local regimes, as it had no Red Army 
presence or offensive blue water navy units.374 This shift, as the historian of Soviet-
Egyptian relations Mohrez Hussini, historian of Soviet naval strategy Milan Vego, 
and historian of US foreign policy David W. Lesch have convincingly shown, 
reflected not only the second phase of navy building. It also coincided with the 
formation of the Baghdad Pact. With the pact, Moscow was able to capitalise on the 
growing Arab irritation with the Anglo-American expansion. First, the new leadership 
under Nikita Khrushchev struck a trading deal involving Egyptian cotton for wheat. 
By 1953, Cairo was considered able and willing to ‘provide’ once relations with the 
West had degraded and ties with Moscow improved. Shortly after the visit of Dulles, 
the American Secretary of State, in mid-1953, which estranged Cairo and 
Washington, Moscow got another deal.375 Additionally, the Baghdad Pact enabled 
Khrushchev to capitalise on the situation in Syria. Here, a pro-Western military coup 
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had seen growing anti-government and anti-American riots so strong that the new 
regime had been forced to leave Truman’s global ‘development’ programme along 
with Egypt to move towards each other.376 Despite political differences, a growing 
number of Syrians, not least military officers, were tired of Western intrusion. This 
was manifested in the 1954 counter-coup against the pro-western military 
dictatorship, thereby ending any Western hopes of Syrian participation in the pact. 
Adding fuel to the fire, a right-wing group rumoured to have CIA ties killed the main 
leader of the 1954 countercoup, removing Syria completely from the West.377 
With both Washington and Moscow expanding as London, not to mention Paris, 
faced several colonial confrontations, many of the newly independent states began to 
seek more space for autonomy and strategic manoeuvring by either engaging in a 
balancing act between Moscow and Washington, or moving towards either. The new 
Egyptian regime, for example, realised its 1953 cotton-for-oil-and-war-materials-deal 
added a military dimension to Soviet-Egyptian relations. Cairo therefore sought to 
strike a balance by accepting the military presence of Great Britain at the Suez base 
complex in case of war, engaging in dialogue with the CIA and seeking finances and 
arms from the US, Great Britain, Belgium and Sweden. This strategy, however, 
proved to no avail. Mistakenly feeling betrayed, Whitehall refused to deliver the tanks 
paid for by Egypt before the military coup in 1952, just as Washington declined a 
request the same month as Iraq joined Turkey and Pakistan in the pact, adding insult 
to injury.378 When Iraq joined Turkey and Pakistan in 1954, the new Syrian 
government also next announced its support for the Egyptian attempt to 
counterbalance Western influence via Pan-Arabism. Together, and not long before the 
Yugoslavian leader made a trip to India and Burma later in 1954 to find an alternative, 
Egypt and Syria announced a new Arab defence framework under Egyptian 
command, which both Saudi Arabia and Yemen later applauded. In line with the 1950 
French-British-American agreement not to sell weapons in the Middle East, the US 
refused to sell arms to Egypt. With US knowledge, however, both the British and 
French struck deals with Israel on British tanks and French fighter jets, not only in 
violation of their agreement, but also leaving Cairo behind in an arms race on Israeli 
initiative.379 Eisenhower would offer only to finance Egypt’s modernisation: 
important to the new regime but only if it would be able to defend itself, whether it be 
with or against its former imperial overlord. In late 1955, Egypt eventually bought the 
vessels and arms it had sought from the West from the Soviet Bloc. It did so in a deal 
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that also facilitated a Soviet cultural centre in Cairo and talks of more cotton and rice 
for industrial products and potentially finances for the electrification of the country 
by way of the Aswan dam. The deal, however, was arranged only seven months after 
an Israeli attack on Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip, after the US had refused to sell 
arms to obtain parity and threatened to (illegally) blockade all Egyptian ports, and 
after Nasser’s personal notice to the American ambassador and insurances from the 
Egyptian ambassador to the US that the Soviet Union would gain no political 
influence.380 By then, US officials also managed to estrange the government in 
Belgrade from the West, which it—since its involvement in the Greek Civil War—
had been forced to turn to for economic and military aid and Italy for trade due to the 
split with the Soviet bloc. The US only succeeded in pushing the Communist ‘outcast’ 
towards a new path of non-alignment in which both India and Egypt also grew 
interested.381 Aside the Greek, Iranian and Turkish frontier zones ensured by Anglo-
American cooperation and interventions, Israel, the Jewish settler colonial state 
carved out of the frontier zone of European multinational imperialism of Palestine, 
sought better relations with the Western bloc by way of France. While France had 
donated weapons in 1948 (along with the US that had also sought to gain some sway 
in Israel via economic aid during the Soviet flirt),382 it had since kept Israel at a 
distance. Paris had done so to balance its needs in the Mediterranean for a stable oil 
supply, protected lines of communications to Indochina, colonial stability in Northern 
Africa, and vast profits from selling arms to Syria (until the anti-western coup). From 
1952, France also began to do several deals on arms, artillery pieces, tanks, and 
transport, fighter and bomber planes with Israel, some of which, as mentioned, had 
US support. Additionally, France found attractive Israeli intelligence on Egypt’s 
involvement in Algeria where it was embroiled in colonial warfare, albeit Israeli 
intelligence staff exaggerated the Egyptian support of the Algerian rebels. To Tel 
Aviv, the deals with Paris were the best it could get when Washington and London 
were holding back.383 More importantly, as Israeli historian Guy Laron shows, the 
Israeli armed forces were being re-organised following its higher echelon’s push for 
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an offensive strategy to fight wars beyond Israeli territory and in accordance with 
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s craving for a war to conquer the West Bank from 
Jordan. A middle class revolt, however, took funds from the military border regime. 
To keep expulsed Palestinians from returning to their homes and villages, the Prime 
Minister instead used violent raids on the border forces of the surrounding states to 
force these to control the Palestinians and passed legislation that made ‘infiltration’ a 
political crime. Although Ben-Gurion resigned in 1953, his successor failed to gain 
enough support to alter the new military strategy. Riding/promoting a wave of popular 
militarism driven by fear, Ben-Gurion returned to the post of Prime Minister again in 
1955 and a Chief of Staff, his protégé, looking for a war with Egypt by way of the 
Gaza Strip.384 
In summary, the 1950s initiated a new phase of external scheming, this time not 
only by the British and French Empires, but also by the heir to the Russian Empire, 
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite system and the Western Bloc under 
Anglo-American leadership. In this process, the new states of the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East sought to navigate a number of pressures: which model of 
modernisation to choose and which arms to procure to deal with ‘post-colonial’ 
conflicts caused by British and French multinational imperialism as well as Ottoman 
imperialism. Combined, the mounting external pressures, the growing regional 
popular and strategic frustrations in the context of nationalism, and the regional 
stocking up of military hardware was building up to a substantial crisis on a regional 
scale. With Egypt not surprisingly at the centre, the following year would reveal both 
how this was to unfold and how Washington, with Moscow’s unwitting help, once 
again, enrolled the UN to serve as a vehicle for its geopolitical interests. 
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Chapter 5: Incorporating Egypt and The 
Gaza Strip in the Frontier of Imperial 
Multilateralism via The ‘Suez Crisis’ and 
The UN Intervention(s) 
 
The crisis would be a result out of how Anglo-American frontier building in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East grew more complex after the Korean War. Firstly, 
the creation of a regional defence regime proved hard. Secondly, Anglo-American 
relations soured with Washington’s increasing influence and military presence. 
Thirdly, the Soviet Union, which also sought a strategic foothold in the region, partly 
managed to use the waning British influence. Finally, both Washington and London 
misread Arab nationalism and the increasingly assertive post-mandate Arab regimes, 
which the British and French had fostered, resulting in among other the nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal in 1956.  
However, the Western bloc’s attempt to build a new ‘international’ canal regime, 
the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt (and the Gaza Strip) and American 
‘economic diplomacy’, as Diane Kunz calls it,385 also need to be seen in relation to 
the Soviet invasion of Hungary in late 1956. Both crises can be seen as serious rifts in 
the frontier systems the US and the Soviet Union built after 1945. While the Polish 
army was enough for the Polish riots in mid-1956, Moscow, pressed by a regime 
unable to contain popular ire, took to a unilateral military intervention in Hungary. 
This reflected that the turn from an imperial model with native yet heavily supervised 
regimes that Hungarian historian Lazlo Borhi calls ‘empire by coercion’386 to a co-
produced model with the Warsaw Pact as a first step was still premature. In contrast, 
Washington was able to combine, if painstakingly, its growing global political and 
economic clout and the making of a UN military force and UN clearing operation to 
hold together, if not expand, its frontier system, and thus appear less aggressive than 
Moscow.  
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Overstating the Cold War Binary in Frontier-building: The 
American and British withdrawal of Finances for the Aswan Dam 
and the Egyptian Response, 1953-1956   
 
The regional confrontation would come to unfold in Egypt, which was at the centre 
of the build-up of opposing agendas, the militarisation of the region and the 
involvement of all the imperial powers and the paternalist polices of the Eisenhower 
administration, the trigger for the subsequent escalation of tension into war. As in 
other Middle Eastern states, and shown above, the Egyptian military government was 
seeking to navigate between external and domestic pressures on the path to 
modernisation. Over the period 1954 to 1956, the Egyptian president came to see 
domestic political repression and the building of a massive dam to modernise its 
electric supply as the largest step in modernising the country as a way to balance these 
pressures.387  
After speaking to Eugene Black, the President of the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) in 1953, Eisenhower decided to 
use Egypt’s push to via the Aswan Dam, which was to provide 50% of the total 
Egyptian power production, as the carrot to rein in the Egyptian military regime. Cairo 
joined the game, and sent representatives from its High Dam Authority to London to 
hire British consulting engineers in September 1955, perhaps to show an interest in 
the Western Bloc as it purchased weapons from the Soviet Bloc the same month.388 
By November 1955, Washington had brought London and the World Bank in on the 
arrangement to finance the dam, but the British government was nervous that the 
Soviet Union, whose presence was increasingly felt in the Mediterranean, would offer 
finances. Due to Egyptian scheming, the deal would also bring the British an 
enormous contract with a consortium with German and French partners. Less 
concerned with the contract and intending to find out whether or not Cairo was 
revising the budget upwards, Washington held back to check the numbers until 
February 1956, when a deal of 200 million US Dollars was signed.389 Additionally, 
Eisenhower initiated Operation Alpha, a plan to guide Egypt and Israel to a peace 
agreement. However, this failed, mainly due to the Israeli want for a war at a time 
when Egypt had yet to integrate the Soviet arms from 1955.390  
However, a little group of high-ranking officials accordingly devised Operation 
Omega, viewing Egyptian attempts to increase its space of manoeuvring through a 
racial lens and deciding they were expressions of irrational emotionalism. This 
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scheme was meant to if not rein in at least shrink the Egyptian government’s options 
by plotting to overthrow the Syrian government, to damage the Egyptian cotton 
industry, and if oil routes were threatened in response potentially occupy not only 
pipeline installations in Syria but also the Suez Canal. As the document read, 
“Measures, even drastic, would have to be seriously contemplated.”391 Additionally, 
American officials concerned with oil in both the State Department and the 
Department of the Interior met with one another and NATO petroleum experts several 
times to consider the impacts of a potential closing of the canal to Western ships 
carrying oil.392 In effect, as the former aide to the Egyptian military government 
Mohamed Heikal noted, the Omega plan was to isolate Egypt from the rest of the Arab 
world to increase American influence.393 Allen Dulles, the Secretary of State also 
wanted to pull the funding of the dam. In June 1956, Black told the Eisenhower 
administration that Nasser “gave every indication of preferring to make an agreement 
with the West (…)”,394 but also warned the administration against withdrawing from 
the dam project as it not only “would have a tremendous impact”395 but also that “(…) 
all hell will break loose.” 396 Nevertheless, Dulles kept pushing for a withdrawal 
against the recommendation of several officials. Recovering for several weeks after 
surgery, Eisenhower did not reject Dulles’ plans even if Black sought to do so.397 From 
December 1955, Dulles also expanded an existing strategy of pressuring Egypt from 
the south with exuberant British support. The presence of the Egyptian government 
was considered a nuisance not only in Sudan after the agreement with the British, but 
also in Ethiopia following the 1953 UN backed annexation of Eritrea, where the US 
since the Second World War had maintained and gradually expanded a 
communication station to gather signals intelligence in the Middle East. 
Consequently, they called for Egypt to expand its ‘Unity of Nile Valley’ scheme to 
include also joint water sharing and development plans for several states in east Africa 
and the great lakes region.398  
Predictably, as most historians taking an interest in the ‘Suez Crisis’ have shown, 
regional tension increased further. Washington, Dulles in particular, grew frustrated 
with what the Americans saw as an increasingly threatening presence of its Muscovite 
imperial rival in the region. Factions in London were angry but could do little about 
neither the withdrawal from the bases along the Suez Canal nor the US. In Paris, 
frustrations linked to the US, but even more so with the Egyptian support of Algerian 
nationalists and the disruption of French shipping in the canal partly in relation 
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thereto. Tel Aviv was frustrated as its attempts to start a war with Egypt kept getting 
sidelined while Cairo grew frustrated with being refused arms by the West while Israel 
got deals and therefore engaged in the loading and unloading of French shipping in 
the ports of the Suez Canal.399 Finally, the Egyptian president left for Yugoslavia to 
speak to both Tito and Nehru, the Prime Ministers of Yugoslavia and India and allies 
in the struggle to build a space beyond either imperial bloc, on how to move forward. 
400 It was at this moment, when the three most important leaders from the Third World 
involved in contesting the increasingly rigid and dangerous international atmosphere, 
Washington and London decided to cancel the funding for the dam.401 Dulles gave the 
decision to Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian ambassador, on the 19th of July as the 
Egyptian president was returning home and after six months of silence from the US 
on the funding since the 200 million Dollar agreement. Informed before he was 
granted permission to speak, Hussein responded to Dulles’ paternalism the only way 
he could, by letting him know that Egypt would then be forced to consult with the 
Soviet Union, which Dulles found a problematic message but delivered with dignity. 
The same evening the British also withdrew their offer to co-fund the Egyptian Aswan 
Dam project. Although the Egyptian president consulted with the American 
ambassador, Henry Byroade, who had grown fond of Nasser as both were military 
men, he offered no immediate reaction due to a religious two-day-long holiday in 
Egypt in which no newspapers were published.402  
A week later, the Nasser made his intentions of the Egyptian nationalisation of the 
Suez Canal public in a speech to a large crowd in Alexandria.403 As he had calculated 
that the risk of war with the British as 90% in the first days to fade by late October 
with world opinion in Egypt’s favour, he had decided that Dulles’ political decision 
needed a political response.404 The ire of the Egyptian president was understandable 
after having not only been told off after an agreement had been made, but also told 
off in a paternalist fashion. However, putting aside the Western racial lens, the 
nationalisation could also been seen an attempt to increase the Egyptian share of the 
canal profits to avoid getting in bed with the Soviet Union, the—to most—only option 
left open by Washington. Indeed, in 1956, when Egypt received the highest rate of the 
profits, only 800.000 out of 39 million Pounds were passed on from the Suez Canal 
Company.405 Considering that most high-ranking Egyptian officials had not 
considered nationalisation an option (most if not all were surprised, some terrified 
when they realised it had taken place) and with the cost of building the dam assessed 
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to 400 million pounds this seems logical. Moreover, although missed by most 
historians, the historians Silvia Borzutzky and David Berger have pointed out that the 
Egyptian president also discussed dam finances with Eugene Black, the president of 
World Bank, rather than the visiting Soviet foreign minister, Dmitry Shepilov when 
both were in Cairo only four days after Dulles withdrew the American financial 
support.406 This also seems plausible given the ever-closer consultation with the 
Yugoslavian and Indian leadership. In any case, a handful of Egyptian military units 
with high ranking officers who had been instructed under the threat of death to ensure 
the continued function of the canal during his speech. The nationalisation of the canal 
thus took place to the loud and wild excitement that could be heard in all larger 
Egyptian cities and towns.407  
Nasser’s move also realised the fears of not only the American Association for the 
United Nations that dated back to the British-Egyptian low-intensity war for the canal 
between 1951 and 1954. The United Nations Association of America’s Commission 
to Study the Organization of Peace, which was populated by several American 
political scientists and scholars of international relations with years of service to the 
US State Department on international matters such as the formation of the UN and 
strong ties to east-coast universities, Columbia especially, and corporate research 
institutions, also grew worried. The commission thus re-sent a statement from 
November 1951 to both Dulles and Hammarskjold. In this, it was argued for the 
establishment of an International Straits Commission and a network of international 
bases based on that of the US to ensure the access of all nations to international 
waterways such as the Suez Canal on basis of the Uniting for Peace resolution used 
by the US in the Korean War, and argued.408 However, the nationalisation had already 
caused concern in the UN Office of Special Political Affairs. This concern was 
probably not a coincidence, as the American Under-Secretary-General Ralph Bunche, 
a former US Office of Strategic Services analyst, State Department official and major 
figure in the development of the UN trusteeship organisation, led this office. His office 
subsequently produced a minor series of four—by historians hitherto un- or under-
consulted—draft memoranda that reveal the importance Western high-ranking UN 
officials assigned to the Suez Canal. On basis of the report of the Collective Measures 
Committee that was born out of passing of the United for Peace resolution and 
possibly also the statement from the American Association for the United Nations, 
UN top officials, most probably from the core of high-echelon Westerners, wrote an 
internal memorandum reflecting on how to obtain facilities for a UN force in the Suez 
Canal area.409 Within a few days, however, a rewritten version of the memorandum 
                                                          
406 Borzutzky and Berger, “Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don’t.” 
407 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes, 137–41. 
408 ‘Statement on Waterways and Strategic Bases by Commission to Study the Organization of 
Peace’ November 1951, Correspondence and Clippings 2/3, Nationalization, Suez Canal, 
Office of Special Political Affairs, S-0164-0001-0002, UNA 
409 ‘Memorandum on Strengthening Collective Security Arrangements in the Middle East’ 10 
December 1951, Suez Canal Area 10 Dec 1951 – 15 April 1957, Office of Special Political 
Affairs, S-1066-0001-0007, UNA  
124 
 
124 
 
shifted focus from only the issue of facilities to also the establishment of either a UN 
legion ‘for the defence of the Suez Canal Area’, an ‘Executive Military Authority’ 
drawing troops from a pool provided by ‘individual states’. Although it was deleted, 
the draft suggested that the troops were to be supplied by states with a ‘primary 
interest’ in the utilisation of the Suez Canal, thus an internally designed vehicle of 
imperial multilateralism within the UN.410 Dated the 13th of December but with the 
same name, the third draft stated: “(…) it seems desirable for the United Nations to 
consider what methods might be appropriate to maintain peace in the Canal Zone and 
secure the free passage of ships though the Suez Canal. It is evident that armed forces 
will be necessary to accomplish these purposes.”411 The last but also unrealised draft 
of the memorandum uplifted the functioning of the frontier of imperial multilateralism 
to “the basic principle of freedom of passage to peaceful international traffic through 
the Suez Canal” and “the recognition of special interests of States whose vital lines of 
communication are dependent on free passage of shipping through the Suez Canal”,412 
which it was suggested a ‘UN Security Authority’ along with the states with ‘primary’ 
interests should uphold.  
Having been of great importance in the world wars and subsequently, the Suez 
Canal had become linked to the British military presence, the oil supply of Western 
Europe and the Commonwealth trade. As argued above, the trigger, reflecting the 
growing American influence, was Washington’s withdrawal of its offer to fund the 
Aswan dam, the centrepiece in the Egyptian military regime’s modernisation project. 
While Arab nationalism and anti-British sentiments informed the Egyptian regime, it 
also resembled its predecessor, the British dominated monarchy, in its centralised 
form, which enabled the Egyptian government to respond without consulting its 
broader political apparatus.  
 
 
Washington Versus London/Paris/Tel Aviv: The Near Implosion of 
the Frontier of Imperial Multilateralism in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, 1956 
 
With the Egyptian nationalisation, the Western frontier of imperial multilateralism 
would soon come under pressure due to the very different perceptions of how it should 
be handled. Although a French ship was allowed to pass through the canal without 
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paying up front, which was the norm under the Suez Canal Company, as a signal of 
the continued functioning of the canal, the first British reaction was to wage financial 
warfare against Egypt, freezing 60% of the Egyptian Pound reserves, and then put all 
Mediterranean forces on alert. This led Eisenhower, who had now returned, to inform 
Eden, the British prime minister in a stern tone that he found it unwise even to think 
about using force even if the oil situation could become critical. Soon, Eisenhower 
both received word from Eden that the metropolitan part of the British Empire had oil 
for only six weeks and most of Western Europe less and that France was also readying 
for war from the US embassy in Paris.413 Aware of their want for war and the rift that 
was emerging and learning that the nationalisation was the result of the withdrawal of 
American finances, Eisenhower sought to broaden the base of states addressing the 
Suez issue. 
Even if Eisenhower and his officials by way of the CIA knew that London and 
Paris were hesitant about an attack without Washington’s approval, his 
administration, however, to some extent failed to realise but certainly overrode the 
growing aspirations of several European (not to mention several Middle Eastern and 
Eastern European) governments for strategic autonomy.414 Not only had the Marshall 
Aid, while offering financial support, tied the Western European economies into an 
US dominated economic sphere, it had also turned Western Europe into addicts of 
oil.415 Additionally, several of the western European governments and politicians had 
grown weary of what they saw as American divide-and-conquer politics in Europe. 
The US had not only nuclearized Great Britain (with Canadian help)416 and used ‘the 
special relationship’ to separate it from Europe. Washington had also pressed Western 
Germany into NATO (after the American push for the European Defence Community 
had failed as Cold War historian Michael Creswell has shown),417 forcing about in the 
process an Soviet military bloc on the doorstep of Western Europe, to, as Cold War 
historian Ralph Dietl argues, “(…) assure US control over the Western European 
subsystem and superpower control over a future all-European structure emerging out 
of the Western European subsystem.”418 Subsequently, France abandoned the idea of 
the ‘Atlantic community’, which Canada and Great Britain had also supported. 
Instead, Paris turned to the vision of Eurafrique’, intending to re-centre the 
Mediterranean, co-opt West-Germany and reel Great Britain back in.419 Furthermore, 
this divisive effect also marked the Western sectors of nuclear technology and energy, 
even if, as the historian of technology and science John Krige argues, “The force field 
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of empire that emanated from Washington was co-produced”.420 Another factor in 
promoting Western European dissent—and in relation to ‘Eurafrique’ as well as the 
upkeep of empire—was European shipping. Indeed, a projection by the Suez Canal 
User Association (formed during the crisis) of the figures from 1955 to 1956, had a 
handful of Western imperial and colonial powers and NATO members pay 78% of 
the canal dues (of which the British paying 40%, and then the French 11%, the 
Americans 11%, the Italians 6%, the Norwegians 5%, and the Dutch 5%).421  
It was therefore foreseeable that the August 1st emergency meeting that was 
initiated to prevent a silent approval of the nationalisation by the International 
Chamber of Shipping, the globally dominant and western-led corporative shipping 
interest organisation, was only the beginning of a broader European/Western 
response. The representatives from the British Empire, the ‘white’ Commonwealth 
and India, Belgium, the Scandinavian countries, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
the US agreed that they should meet with American oil representatives to discuss a 
users’ association and in relation thereto make a small working committee with 
representatives from Great Britain, the Scandinavian states, Italy, France, the 
Netherlands and India. Although the more moderate Danish, Indian and Greek agents 
abstained from voting, the chamber also passed a resolution stating that—since the 
canal was international and not the domestic affair of one country—using it to finance 
national projects was unacceptable.422 The chamber also lent its support to the Suez 
Canal Company for which its director thanked the chamber as the company ‘felt’—
after having run a canal that cost thousands of Egyptian lives to marginal benefit of 
Egyptians—“(…) so unjustly robbed”.423  
Seeking to uphold overall control, Dulles also met with Eden and stated that 
Washington would not back military intervention, as it was necessary to use other 
means to regain control of the oil and communications supply lines. Although he, in 
line with the wishes of the International Chamber of Shipping, called a conference in 
London to rein in the American allies, he failed to reduce London and Paris’ 
frustrations,424 which went deeper than imperial lines of communications, shipping 
and weary relations with the US. Facing not only the Suez group and a media 
landscape in favour of intervention despite a regime of censorship but also a growing 
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financial crisis and pressure on the Pound, the Eden government called up reservists 
on the 2nd of August, thereby increasing the risk of war.425 Mollet’s government was 
equally enraged. Having lost its mandates earlier and struggling with the violent 
collapses of the discriminative racially ordered social-political colonial states in 
Indochina and Algeria and rising tension in Morocco and Tunisia, Paris wanted to 
keep not only empire and status. The French government also wanted to reduce its 
dependence on the US and NATO (that had paid for communication services in north-
west Africa), even if it was to make a standby-agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund by mid-October.426 Indeed, Tito’s cordial visit to Paris in July had left 
him with the impression that the French were (also) sick of the global duality and, 
mistakenly, interested in non-alignment, which he told Nasser.427 Not only was the 
defence ministry and industry selling large numbers of fighter jets, tanks and arms to 
Israel, the Israeli-French intelligence and political ties also grew closer, especially 
after the nationalisation, thus putting Paris and Cairo ever more at odds.428 In the 
Jewish settler colony, Ben-Gurion had re-seized power. Increasingly armed with 
French, British and West-German weapon systems and a wish for war with Egypt 
(before the integration of the Soviet arms was complete) and Egypt all but interested 
in a war, he, other hardliners, and the military built up a public expectance of war.429 
Moreover, Israel’s relationship with the UN deteriorated. The General-Secretary had 
already driven though the Gaza Strip in 1955 to draw attention to the border tension 
just as the Security Council had called on Tel Aviv to respect the armistice rather than 
raid Egypt and Jordan (to instigate war and force these to restrict the Palestinians from 
returning).430  
Fearing that the conference might fail, Eisenhower ordered the State and Defense 
departments to make contingency plans for supplying Western Europe with oil at a 
solely canal-oriented meeting of the US National Security Council on the 9th of 
August. Accordingly, the US Maritime Institute notified the International Chamber of 
Shipping that American companies owned and controlled many of the vessels 
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operating under foreign flags.431 When the British transferred 5.000 troops to Cyprus 
two days later, Eisenhower, in recognition that the canal was still open and 
functioning, decided that his administration would not support its allies should they 
resort to force, confidentially accepting thereby the nationalisation by Egypt.432 
Although both Eisenhower and Dulles expected failure at the conference, they sought 
to set up an international organisation to run the canal over two conferences in 
London.433 In doing so, they proposed a civilian organisation very similar to those 
proposed (internally) by staff in the UN Office for Special Political Affairs and the 
American Association for the United Nations (USAA=. Perhaps not surprisingly, as 
the USAA had sent the aforementioned statement to both Dulles and the US Mission 
to the UN (and the UN Secretary-General) the day after Nasser had nationalised the 
Suez Canal (and to all its chapters across the US two weeks later in a pro-
British/French and anti-Nasser letter).434 At the same time as pursuing the users’ 
organisation, the Eisenhower administration also considered a boycott of the Suez 
Canal with other canal user governments to strike at Nasser by taking oil tankers 
around Africa instead.435 
Wanting to use force but uncertain how, London and Paris saw both options as 
insufficient to legitimise this. Whitehall also, once more, sought support from the 
(white) Commonwealth despite their gradual turn towards the US over the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. To bring the parties closer, Australia led a mission with 
representatives from states belonging more in the American camp than anywhere else: 
Ethiopia, Iran, and Sweden (and the US). However, Australia was no neutral arbiter. 
Canberra had not only found that “The continued commercial and defence importance 
of the Suez Canal in our communication with the Mediterranean and Europe cannot 
be doubted, and the liberty and security if the Canal remain an important Australian 
interest”436 over the 1950s. By 1956, 60% of Australia’s imports and exports went 
through the canal just as the Middle East provided 65% of its crude and partly refined 
petroleum and 40% of its total petroleum imports.437 Predictably, therefore, the 
Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies failed. For its part, Pretoria had long seen 
Cairo as communism’s potential gateway to eastern Africa, and therefore seen the 
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British act unwise and estrange a natural ally and not least the host of the base complex 
along the Suez Canal. Additionally, the South Africans could relate to the Egyptian 
argument that domestic affairs were domestic and not British affairs. Along with the 
Canadians, who had gotten close with the US politically, economically and militarily, 
the South Africans, therefore, preferred a conference to settle the differences.438 
Disappointed, the British sought to enlist the Scandinavians, also shipping nations 
dependent on oil passing through the canal. The Norwegian shipowners wanted 
western control while Norway’s foreign minister, Halvard Lange wanted an 
international control but no military force. Unaware of British and French intentions, 
Lange saw Great Britain and France as moderate and willing to compromise. While 
the Americans and the British recognised Lange as a hardliner given Norway was the 
second largest canal user by 1956, they saw Danish and Swedish diplomats as weak 
and putting the new organisation at risk. Accordingly, they sought to pressure Lange 
to influence the other Scandinavian governments to take firmer stand.439 Additionally, 
London was frustrated with Washington taking middle and not supportive 
positions.440 With the British economy effectively left, as Galpern notes, in the hands 
of the Egyptian president, London (and Paris) encouraged all the non-Egyptian staff 
to quit to prevent Egypt from running the canal efficiently (although the Egyptian 
pilots managed to bring through more ships than had the British and French pilots).441 
In response, Egypt on the 10th of September stated that although it had not infringed 
the rights of any government Great Britain had immediately met it with hostile 
economic measures and threats of war, just as the US, Great Britain and France had 
demanded the appointment of an international organisation. Furthermore, it also 
criticised their invitation of 21 other governments without consulting and inviting 
Egypt. It therefore praised the Sri Lankan, Indonesian and Soviet governments calling 
for negotiations to include Egypt. The note ended with a plea for negotiations that 
would lead to an outcome protecting Egyptian sovereignty.442 
The Egyptian government was not alone in disputing both the intentions and the 
legality of a user association in relation to the conferences. Perhaps more interestingly, 
several of the larger British shipping owners informed Whitehall that they foresaw 
great difficulties in international scheme. Moreover, the Nordic shipping owners also 
made clear that although they would support the resolution at the conference they 
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would let their governments know there would be problems.443 In the sphere of 
international law, Max Sørensen, a renowned Danish expert on international law, sent 
the Danish Foreign Ministry a highly critical memo that was passed to the Danish 
Shipowners Association (and probably beyond). He argued that the plan of letting a 
user association take over the coordination, the pilot service and the exercise of ‘other’ 
rights appeared incompatible with Egypt’s sovereignty over the canal and the adjacent 
area without Egyptian consent. Sørensen also argued that the plan of having only this 
organisation collect transfer fees from its members would challenge Egyptian 
sovereignty. He ended by noting that Egypt would be legally free to refuse the 
organisation to operate in Egypt, to stop ships using other pilots than those approved 
or supplied by Egypt and finally be in her full rights to prevent ships that refused to 
pay to use the canal.444 Not invited to the conference, the UN representatives of 
Lebanon and Syria, which both had experienced European and especially French 
meddling, sent a joint letter to the UN Security Council, which was also released to 
the international press. Using information from the French and British press, their 
letter expressed both concern with the French military build-up on Cyprus under the 
pretension that these forces (of more than 30.000 soldiers, troop transport ships, 
warships and jets) were only to potentially rescue French citizens. Finally, they 
wished for the Security Council to intervene as the build-up, not wrongly, constituted 
a “(…) definite threat to the maintenance of international peace and security in the 
region”,445 and that a potential armed intervention would constitute “(…) a violation 
of the principles of the United Nations Charter and of International Law”.446 
Additionally, the continued and effortless operation of the canal was noticed in the 
West. However, the Danish Foreign Ministry, to take one example that was most 
probably typical, assumed Egypt had brought in experienced Soviet pilots, thus 
racialising the Egyptians via a discourse of low expectations even if the Danish 
shipping companies were saying everything was as normal.447 
However, Great Britain and France would ignore not only these criticisms, but 
also the growing domestic opposition, especially in London, and their most important 
ally and sponsor over late September and the first half of October. London and Paris 
thus disregarded (what they may have known about) the Eisenhower administration’s 
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attempt to use the World Bank as an intermediary to Nasser at the suggestion of the 
former president of the World Bank John McCloy,448 Dulles’ repeated warning against 
using force again, 449 and, finally, that American oil companies had increased their 
production in the US and Venezuela following Eisenhower’s request to the Foreign 
Petroleum Supply Committee (so that it by mid-September passed the oil going 
through the Suez Canal in volume).450  If anything, the cooperation through the 
recently formed corporatist Middle East Emergency Committee and Oil Emergency 
London Advisory Committee, another vehicle of the frontier of imperial 
multilateralism, as argued by the Indian scholar of international relations M. S. 
Venkataramani, “(…) was a major factor in emboldening Eden and Mollet to go on 
the war path.”451 After secret deliberation in France (as the Israeli attacks on Jordan, 
the British ally, had nearly forced London to war with Tel Aviv),452 a three-phase plan 
was consequently agreed upon during October. First, British planners made Egypt 
their target and Israel their ally. Second, Israel was to attack Egypt and the Gaza Strip. 
Third, this would to allow London and Paris to make an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel 
on ending combat and withdrawing from the canal, insert bombers to demolish 
Egyptian defences, and then, when Nasser would expectedly fell, deploy a joint 
expedition force to ‘protect’ the canal.  
The plan was set in motion with the Israeli attack against the Gaza Strip and the 
Sinai Peninsula on October 29th. During the Israeli operations, Eisenhower, in the dark 
of the invasion, informed Nasser that the Western powers would not get involved. 
However, British reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Sinai, Suez and Port Said to 
gather intelligence for the invasion and London and Paris issued their ultimatum the 
following day despite Egyptian pilots still taking ships through the canal.453 
Embodying the near implosion of the frontier of imperial multilateralism and its oil 
supply, British planes bombed airfields in Cairo that London itself had paid for while 
thousands of Americans evacuated to Alexandria on the 31st of October and the British 
Prime Minister engaged in what historian Keith Kyle has called ‘mounting anti-
Americanism.454 Altogether, the British and French mustered 230 warships, freighters 
and aircraft carriers, 20.000 vehicles and landing craft, 100.000 troops and supplies.455 
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Repairing the frontier of Imperial Multilateralism - I: The Sixth 
Fleet and Economic Diplomacy  
 
Although perspectives are changing, as can be seen in the references in these sections, 
many of the conventional British and American histories of the ‘Suez Crisis’ still hold 
strong influences in historiography in the form of nationally-focused post-war 
histories on ‘the end of empire’ and the Eisenhower doctrine.456 I argue here, 
conversely, that it is necessary to understand the Eisenhower administration’s 
navigation of the ‘Suez Crisis’, which was in part its own and Eden’s government 
making, not as two national histories, but as a single history of the frontier of imperial 
multilateralism, which saw American involvement from the First World War. 
In Washington, Eisenhower and his officials were not aware that a plot had been 
hatched. The reaction to the Israeli attack on Egypt and the Gaza Strip in October 29th 
therefore reflected an initially narrow, if sharp, reaction. Having both sought to 
negotiate a solution to the nationalisation of the canal and been left dissatisfied with 
the Israeli in relation to the Alpha Plan, Eisenhower had moved further away from his 
predecessor’s affinity for Israel. When his staff informed him both that army units in 
Europe and the US had been placed on alert and the Sixth Fleet repositioned and of 
the risk of all-out war, Eisenhower therefore screamed at Dulles “Foster, you tell ‘em, 
God-damm-it, that we are going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the United 
Nations, we’re going to do everything we can to stop this thing.”457 Eisenhower grew 
furious as the British and French forces started to bomb Egypt after the Egyptian 
president’s rejection of the false ultimatum. It did not help that Nasser, which 
Eisenhower (via the racialised lens most American officials viewed Arabs through)458 
not unlike Eden and Mollet considered a ‘villain’,459 asked Eisenhower to commit the 
US militarily to Egypt, something which he had indeed offered earlier. While 
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Eisenhower wanted to prevent Eden and Mollet from invading Egypt—unless they 
could topple Nasser first in which case they would American support—he would not 
attack them as Nasser was in effect asking.460 As Truman had used the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution to make the UN a coercive instrument in Korea, Eisenhower also 
decided to use the UN, having already considered it to restrain Israel while also seeing 
an intensifying Soviet propaganda campaign (to shift attention from Hungary to Egypt 
and the Gaza Strip), and learning from the embassy in Cairo that Nasser did not want 
Moscow involved.461 Thus, Washington had its UN representatives consult with the 
UN Secretary-General (who had previously showed himself to be a man willing to go 
against the Soviet Union when he as a Swedish minister had signed a treaty with the 
US on exporting strategic and thus prohibited commodities to the Soviet Bloc)462 and 
his staff and Yugoslavian, Indian, Latin American and Soviet diplomats. As 
Yugoslavia stood to gain from brokering a deal as relations with Moscow were turning 
sour and the Soviet Union was trying to control its own frontier system, the US gained 
a bit of breathing space by having both the Soviet Union withdraw its criticism of the 
British and French and the General Assembly to take over the matter via the Uniting 
for Peace Resolution from 1950.463 Although the British had not been keen on the 
resolution when Truman pushed it through the UN due to fears of it being used against 
their empire and that it would anger the Soviet Union, they had supported it due to the 
backing of the ‘white’ Commonwealth and the wish to avoid a rift with the US.464 To 
the White House’s benefit, the governments of the ‘white’ Commonwealth states were 
partially irritated, as they had not been consulted. While the Prime Minister of 
Australia Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of New Zealand Sidney Holland (who 
had a naval vessel with the British Mediterranean forces from an earlier posting), and 
the extremist Prime Minister of the Central African Federation Roy Welensky were 
supportive, their political landscapes or foreign policy apparatuses were not. This left 
the British isolated within both the Commonwealth and NATO. Finally, London stood 
weaker in the Mediterranean and Middle East not only with the members of the 
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Baghdad Pact, but also Libya, in which it had base rights. Subsequently, London‘s 
hope of using airfields, bases and ports in Libya as staging grounds was shut down 
with the Libyan denunciation of the Israeli attack, and the British ambassador in Libya 
warned London that violence would break out if it were realised that the British planes 
in Libya were covering the fleet bombarding Egypt.465 
On the 2nd of November, however, London undid the work of Washington. The 
US, and thereby the fabric of its frontier in Europe, was again put under pressure by 
the attacks on Egyptian airfields by British and French aircraft from Malta, Cyprus 
and several aircraft carriers. Aware by way of the CIA’s prior overflights of Egypt 
and Syria with U-2 reconnaissance planes (which the CIA had passed to the British) 
that Kremlin did not immediately have naval and air force assets in place, the 
Eisenhower administration expected a Soviet-led UN blockade against the invading 
nations as the most likely counter-move. Moreover, as Egypt began blocking the 
canal, which had been functioning past the first joint attacks on Egypt, with cement-
laden ships, the oil supply to Western Europe going via the Suez Canal was cut off. 
Adding pressure, pro-Egyptian units in the Syrian army incapacitated three pumping 
stations on the Iraqi pipeline going through Syria to Tripoli in Lebanon, nearly leading 
the pro-Western Iraqi regime to attack Syria to protect its oil outlets.466 Finally, the 
Egyptian population and Nasser’s opponents did not rise to a regime change as the 
British hoped for. Rather, the national guards were armed just as university and 
secondary school students signed up for national service.467 
Consequently, the US took several measures. Both a short term and strategic aim 
was to on the one hand help and on the other pressure its allies to back into the fold 
and move towards re-establishing the oil supply regime via re-opening the canal (as 
the Egyptian regime had not collapsed). Moreover, it was a strategic goal to keep out 
the Soviet Union. The Joint Middle East Planning Committee and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff feared it would not only intensify its anti-Western propaganda against both 
NATO and the Baghdad Pact, transfer large numbers of Soviet forces onto the Soviet 
Bloc periphery, and potentially provide ‘volunteers’. The Soviet Union was also 
feared to seek to turn to indirect means of leverage such as to encourage oil pipeline 
sabotage, offer material support to Egypt, seek Israel expulsed from the UN, and 
finally, seek to be appointed by the UN to restore order in the Middle East.468 The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff were therefore tasked with both intimidating the British and 
French and protecting them from potential both small and large-scale Soviet attacks. 
Subsequently, the Sixth Fleet moved closer than previously and placed some vessels 
between those of the British and French and let US planes overfly these, in effect 
beginning to cast a web of NATO protection over the forces of its British and French 
allies despite their status as the aggressive belligerents.469 Until the British and French 
                                                          
465 Kyle, Suez, 392–401. 
466 Ibid., 380–81; Turner, Suez, 1956: The First Oil War, 327–35. 
467 Kyle, Suez, 416–17. 
468 “Document 489 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–
December 31, 1956, Volume XVI - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” n.d., 489. 
469 Kyle, Suez, 412. 
135 
 
135 
 
forces were landed in Egypt, more vessels would be added over the first days of 
November to enhance the reception of this message with multiple addressees.470  
Moreover, Washington also resorted to economic diplomacy although it initially 
refused to talk of financial aid and oil replacements until a ceasefire and troop 
withdrawal had been agreed upon (even if preparations had been made). As Galpern 
notes, “The administration pursued this policy not only to penalize Britain for what it 
viewed as country’s disloyalty and irresponsible action, but also to protect US 
interests in the Middle East, which it feared would be damaged by any open 
association with Britain and France.471 This hit the British harder than the French as 
the latter had drawn on its gold and credit allotments from the International Monetary 
Fund before the invasion, and the Eisenhower administration initially refused the 
British access to funds via the IMF or the Export-Import Bank of the United States 
and American oil companies got permission to sell oil for Sterling. Soon, therefore, 
the British faced a veritable run on their reserves, which led them to plummet below 
what was considered necessary for the Sterling area to function and thus a great fear 
in Whitehall that the Sterling crisis would not only lead to the break-up of the Sterling 
area but also the Commonwealth.472 As the White House and Whitehall conferred, the 
issue of funds from the IMF came up again. Wishing to withdraw 75% of its allowance 
(more than 4 times the hitherto largest withdrawal), London nevertheless feared that 
the American, Egyptian and Latin American directors of the executive board of the 
IMF would be able to oppose its withdrawal rights if the Chinese, Indian and Japanese 
directors could not be convinced to vote with the European, Australian and Canadian 
directors.473 Indeed, the British request was approved only after the acceptance of the 
ceasefire and troop withdrawal and the American treasury overcame its concern that 
there would be a run against the IMF as there had been against the Sterling. Once that 
had happened, however, as Boughton argues, “All that remained was for the Executive 
Board to ratify the arrangements that been agreed bilaterally between the two great 
powers.”474 It is telling both that the IMF became an international irregular lender 
when it was needed to support the American goal of maintaining its frontier system 
and that the loan had been agreed upon bilaterally for the board later to accept. As a 
last way to ease the financial pains of its ally, the Eisenhower administration waived 
a loan on 143 million Dollars due to fall on December 31st. 475 
In addition to the military and financial measures, the White House reactivated the 
Middle East Emergency Committee to supply its NATO allies with extra American 
and Venezuelan oil until the canal reopened.476 However, it was careful not to do this 
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too fast so as not to outwardly appear to be helping the British and French imperial 
powers.477 At the same time, the Soviet Union slowly began what American political 
scientist Arthur Jay Klinghoffer has called an ‘oil offensive’, which made the re-
opening of the canal and American-directed supplements key. The Soviet Union was 
at the time increasing its export of southbound oil (even if most oil was northbound), 
selling oil to China and transporting to its far eastern regions, as overland transport 
was too expensive.478 By Mid-November, several Western European governments had 
approached Washington to enquire as to when the oil-scheme would provide oil as 
their resources were dwindling to approximately two weeks of crude supply and 
purchasing oil in Dollar would threaten their Dollar holdings.479 The need for oil, 
however, went far beyond rationing, oil and Dollar economics. The Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs recognised and informed the Secretary of State, “If we show 
ourselves unresponsive to their needs, it is questionable whether we could count 
indefinitely upon their unreserved cooperation with respect to Western defense and 
NATO.”480 Thus, at stake was no less than the frontier of imperial multilateralism. 
Washington consequently reactivated the MEEC and also closed the Oil Emergency 
London Advisory Committee. However, to keep up appearances before not only the 
Arabs, which “(…) are moved by emotion and not by the judgement of 
businessmen”,481 and the governments of the non-aligned states, Washington also had 
the Council of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation establish the 
broader Petroleum Industry Emergency Group within the OEEC. Next, Eisenhower 
also wrote a personal message to the Saudi King, King Saud, to thank him for his 
understanding and continued efforts in keeping the oil running (so as not to make 
matters worse than retaining oil from the British and French empires aside their 
Muslim colonies).482 As the memorandum of a phone conversation between the 
Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, and the President had Humphrey note, 
“(…) we have got to keep working with the Arabs. We are on their side until these 
fellows get out.”483 Not surprisingly, the State Department instructed its personnel in 
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Middle Eastern countries producing oil for Western Europe (and the US) that 
“Maximum effort should be made to play up their self interest and to demonstrate that 
the US is continuing to do everything possible to minimize financial impact upon 
them”,484 although American officials would continue to focus on ensuring that the 
US kept the Saudi Monarchy’s “(…) interests uppermost in mind.”485 Despite 
problems due to the hostility against its allies, the US managed well. Until the oil 
supply problems caused by ‘Suez Crisis’ had been resolved, this, if ad hoc, US-
dominated oil supply scheme thus managed to provide as much as 80% of the Western 
European oil needs and strengthen the interdependency within the overall frontier.486 
As in the First World War, the US was able to either support or damage its British 
and French imperial counterparts, especially as it had turned to multilateralism as a 
20th century version of the mostly collapsed older forms of empire three decades 
before the British and French began to move in that direction. Aside the IMF and the 
multinational oil-scheme, the Eisenhower administration also turned to the UN in a 
way that will make it clear that the United Nations Emergency Force and the United 
Nations Suez Clearance Organization also need to appear in a different role than the 
first authentic ‘peacekeeping’ operation as it is labelled within the research field on 
‘peacekeeping’.487 
 
 
Repairing the Frontier of Imperial Multilateralism - II: The UN  
 
In extension of the Eisenhower administration’s use of its military means, the 
Petroleum Industry Emergency Group within the OEEC, and the IMF, I argue that the 
UNEF and UNSCO ought also to be understood as part of the efforts to sustain the 
frontier of imperial multilateralism within the global imperial system. Neither UNEF 
nor UNSCO interventions were well-defined plans set in motion, but ad hoc 
navigation from the outset. Nevertheless, they reflected the continuation of building 
the frontier of imperial multilateralism in the Mediterranean and the Middle East in 
much the same way the inter-imperial interventions in Crete and Albania and the 
Western-led and dominated intervention in Korea were expressions of the frontier of 
imperial multilateralism. 
At the UN, the Eisenhower administration initially took to writing a UN 
Resolution for the General Assembly to pass to avoid action against its allies, and 
subsequently the involvement of UN institutions to allow the British and French (as 
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well as Israeli) forces to withdraw and, finally, to re-open the Suez Canal. As for the 
resolution, Eisenhower had Dulles write up a resolution for the evening meeting in 
the General Assembly (of November 2nd) with the “mildest things we could do”,488 
calling for the withdrawal of all military forces and the re-opening of the canal. 
Indicatively, only the invaders, Australia and New Zealand voted against the 
American resolution after several hours of General Assembly discussions into the 
night.  
Concerning the formation of a UN force, the US picked up the idea the Canadians 
launched November 2nd. The suggestion of a UN force came from Lester Pearson, the 
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs who had previously been in charge of running 
the affairs of the Commonwealth and the League of Nations (and who may have been 
privy to internal memo’s of Bunche’s Department of Special Political Affairs). 
Already during the expansion of the frontier of imperial multilateralism in Asia in the 
Korean War, Pearson argued that Canada had to respect American “leadership…in 
the conflict against Communist imperialism.”489 He also argued there could “be times 
when [Canada] should abandon [its] position if it is more important to maintain unity 
in the face of the common foe”.490 On basis of his racialised Anglo-Saxonism and his 
broader take on geopolitics, he wanted to strengthen further Canadian relations to 
what Canadian historian John Price calls its southern ‘imperial ally’ beyond what had 
taken place militarily and politically after 1945.491 Pearson’s idea, however, was not 
new. As noted by his contemporary, the Canadian political scientist Graham Sprye, 
he had been a staunch supporter for a UN police force in the Middle East, which he 
had promoted tirelessly from 1955 in London, Washington, Paris, Tel Aviv and 
Cairo.492 Pearson and Hammarskjold had initially discussed a UN force that would 
include the British and French forces, recalls Urquhart, but the moment had passed.493 
After the General Assembly passed Dulles’ resolution, Pearson took the opportunity 
to suggest his much-wanted UN force in the international forum. Dulles seized the 
moment in the General Assembly to request formally that the Canadians work out a 
UN force proposal. Closing the day in New York, the Canadian ambassador explained 
to Dulles that the St. Laurent government and Pearson especially wanted American 
and Canadian troops to lift the British Empire out of its predicament and bring it closer 
to the US again.494 The next day, however, Washington once again saw its frontier 
system challenged. First, the British and French started bombing. Second and in 
response to the bombing, three pipelines in Syria were blown up. Third, Eden sought 
to turn the UN force of the Canadian-American suggestion into the ‘police action’ he 
had initiated with Mollet to blur the lines between what the British and French were 
doing and what the UN was potentially setting out to do, despite the risk that the US 
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would be compelled to use the Sixth Fleet against them on behalf of the UN.495 Facing 
an Indian resolution that suggested a force from Czechoslovakia and an Asian country 
with US air transport,496 the American representative at the UN phoned the Secretary-
General, the Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjold, to gain support for its own 
resolution proposal that was in the making.497 By the evening, on November 3rd, 
Washington had Hammarskjold’s support for a new Canadian resolution proposal and 
was busy gathering support amongst its allies as well as align the Indian resolution 
proposal with the Canadian.498 American diplomats spent the following day 
coordinating troop contributions and logistics with Hammarskjold, disregarding that 
the Mollet government had informed the Eisenhower administration that they felt that 
Eisenhower had taken them completely of the canal issue, made them as guilty as 
Egypt and not least put them under more pressure than the Soviet Union over 
Hungary.499 Ignoring the French, the Eisenhower administration and Hammarskjold 
agreed on the US providing the airlift for the emerging UN force. Hammarskjold also 
informed the American officials that the foreign ministers of Canada, India, Norway 
and Colombia, which aside India were all in the orbit of the US, were willing to 
provide troops. Finally, he added that he was going to talk to more NATO members, 
Latin American states and states such as Iran and Ethiopia, which were also all parties 
to the frontier of imperial multilateralism.500 Expectedly, the White House not only 
discussed the composition of the UN force with the Secretary-General in private as it 
had settled the IMF arrangement for the British. It also spent the day drumming up 
support from its frontier zones in the form of the members of the regional 
organisations of the Mediterranean, the Middle East and South East Asia for the vote. 
From the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines 
voted in favour.501 The representatives of the French and British empires abstained as 
did those of Australia and New Zealand, even if the latter two assigned great 
importance to their military alliances with the US. Pretoria’s representatives not only 
abstained, South Africa also left the activities of the UN altogether at the end of the 
month.502 Saudi Arabia and all members of the Baghdad Pact aside Turkey voted in 
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favour of the UN force.503 Turkey abstained, but instead took to limiting the effects of 
the invasion on the Baghdad Pact of which it was itself a member. The American 
Ambassador to Iraq saw the Menderes government as having a calm bearing, even if 
the British were temporarily excluded from the pact meetings.504 In West Germany, 
however, the British acceptance of the ceasefire caused distress due to the sympathies 
with the invasion. Moreover, Konrad Adenauer, the West-German Chancellor, spent 
time with Mollet in Paris during the peak of the crisis, the 5th and 6th of November, 
when the British and French forces were landed in Egypt, showing his sympathy rather 
than abstaining as Portugal since neither German state could not vote at the UN (until 
1973). Until the NATO Council meeting in mid-December, France and West 
Germany subsequently sought to move ahead with a ‘Little Europe’ linked to the West 
European Union, having lost Great Britain to the Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship’. However, as international historian Ralph Dietl argues, the NATO 
Council left no doubt: Europe as a ‘third force’ was dead.505 However, the European 
NATO members of Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Spain, many of which were either amongst the largest canal users or with their own 
Mediterranean designs, all voted in favour (on November 4th), as did many of the 
European countries outside NATO: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Sweden.506 Having gained the votes of all 19 Latin American states and most of the 
non-aligned states, 507 Washington also ensured that the Soviet criticism that the UN 
force was illegal never gained track. Indeed, the Soviet representatives, and thus also 
the rest of the East Bloc (aside Yugoslavia), were forced to abstain.508 Moscow’s other 
strategy of threatening the invading states and requesting Washington to join an attack 
on the invading states should they not respect the UN resolutions also failed.509 
Washington not only responded with a little veiled threat on behalf of the UN that 
stated opposition would be met with use of force, including that of the US, and noted 
that Soviet Union had failed to support the UN force. Washington also began to build 
up contingency forces in Saudi Arabia, ordered its air force to plan for the potential 
airlifts of the different UN contingents and place all heavy troop carrier wings on 12-
hour alert, put the Sixth Fleet on ‘increased readiness’ and had the Atlantic and Pacific 
fleets reinforced. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the number of aircraft on 
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the 5-minute ‘advanced state of alert’ doubled and training halted.510 Having secured 
the UN as a means amongst several to stabilise the Western, but American dominated 
frontier system of imperial multilateralism, Eisenhower called Eden to tell him to, 
unconditionally, accept the UN arrangements to the extent Eden began to write down 
what to tell the British parliament.511 Washington, however, still made its anxiety on 
Soviet ‘volunteers’ clear to Hammarskjold and that it would be best if “(…) there be 
no vacuum between time of departure of British-French forces and arrival of UN 
forces (…).”512 While he was content with the creation of a UN force, Eisenhower 
complained to Dulles that it was happening too slowly and that if he were (directly) 
in charge troops would be flown in when they were ready for deployment, even if it 
would be in groups as small as fifty. This would also have made it clear that, as the 
White House wanted, the force was not an occupation force.513  
As for the re-opening of the Suez Canal in light of the unsustainability of the 
temporary OEEC oil-replacement arrangement, the Eisenhower administration also 
from November 7th began coordinating privately with Hammarskjold, who—if there 
were any doubts about his allegiances—requested the US diplomats to convey his 
deepest appreciation to Eisenhower. They agreed that the British and French offer of 
technicians for clearing the canal to retain some influence and something to bring 
home were to be rejected and that the Secretary-General speak to the Danish and 
Dutch NATO members instead.514 The same evening, Hammarskjold invited the 
American representatives and an intelligence representative from the State 
Department to a meeting that also included his Executive Assistant, the American 
Andrew Cordier, and his Undersecretary, the American Ralph Bunche.515 The latter 
two were significant. In 1944, Cordier was shifted from his post as international 
security advisor in the State Department to set up the UN, which then hired him, 
possibly with some nudging, first as Undersecretary of the then Western-dominated 
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General Assembly, then as Special Representative in the Korean War, and, finally, as 
Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General. By 1956, he was thus in one of the most 
privileged positions in the UN. Cordier’s meddling in Congo a few years later is well 
known,516 but little work appears to have investigated whether or not he had two 
masters until his role in the UN intervention shaped from ‘Suez Crisis’. In any case, 
before the evening meeting with Hammarskjold, Cordier had already passed on 
information to the American ambassador at the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, and would 
later receive information from the US, most likely as a way to seek to get 
Hammarskjold’s attention or support.517 For his part, Bunche was no small fish either. 
Educated in political science with fieldwork in British and Dutch colonies and ties to 
the Carnegie Foundation, Bunche was first hired by the CIA’s predecessor, the Office 
of Strategic Services, where he executed psychological warfare within the context of 
colonial affairs in Africa and the Middle East.518 Then, the State Department recruited 
him to work on the so-called ‘Dependent Areas’ until he was seconded to the 
American UN delegation. There, he, not surprisingly, took part in making the UN 
trusteeship system to then become part of the UN where he eventually, after being 
involved in the establishment of Israel, ended up Undersecretary, thus also a 
privileged position. While Cordier and Bunche appear to have been in the background 
at the meeting, it is not unimportant that they were present when the Eisenhower 
administration officials briefed the Secretary-General on its priorities, including the 
Suez Canal, by the State Department intelligence representative. It was made clear 
that the US saw it as urgent to commence operations to clear the canal and have the 
clearance done under ‘optimum effort’.519 Indeed, the following day, Eisenhower 
wrote a memorandum in which he noted the “Rapid restoration of pipe line and Canal 
operation”520 first and that this work would require US personnel and perhaps 
Germans and Italians. However, Hammarskjold requested that nothing be done while 
he was in the Middle East, which Eisenhower found useful and hence demanded 
respected.521 Expectedly, however, Eden had his Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, 
use Hammarskjold’s trip to suggest to the American UN Ambassador that British 
experts were the most suited for the clearance job and a fleet was already convening 
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to go to work, under UN auspices or not.522 However,  in the General Assembly on 
the 20th of November, Hammarskjold noted that he had spoken with the Egyptian 
President, who (thus) also saw the clearing of the canal best undertaken with the 
utmost speed and efficiency and requested the General Assembly to authorise him to 
enter “(…) the financial commitments that are unavoidable, although he is not now 
in a position to indicate the size of those initial commitments”523, as suggested by the 
Advisory Committee established on November 7th. Although Eisenhower did not get 
his all-American staff, Hammarskjold did not disappoint. To run the operation, he got 
the World Bank’s senior engineering consultant Raymond A. Wheeler, who, as 
Bunche and Cordier, had also been intimately involved in the American international 
expansion. Wheeler had served three tours as an engineer—prior to the First World 
War, in the late 1920’s and prior to the American entrance into the Second World 
War—at the Panama Canal, the ‘American Suez Canal of Latin America’, which 
Panama Canal historians have argued allowed the US not only to transfer soldiers, but 
also oil to the extent that “(…) the lion’s share of the benefits originated from the 
transportation of petroleum products from California to the East Coast.”524 Wheeler 
advanced to the position of Assistant Chief of Staff in the War Department, where he 
stayed until he ‘retired’ to the World Bank, from where Hammarskjold enlisted him. 
Hammarskjold also hired the aforementioned John McCloy. Having worked his way 
up to lead the World Bank to then ‘retire’ to the position of Chairman of the Executive 
Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank (and then been involved in the Suez Crisis all 
along), McCloy knew the inner workings of capitalism as well as Wheeler knew it 
from the perspective of the imperial ‘arteries’. Hammarskjold could not have found 
anyone more suited in the eyes of Eisenhower. As his UN anchor, UN, Hammarskjold 
chose Colonel Alfred Katzin, a former South African imperial subject, industrialist 
and military officer who had fought as part of the UN military alliance for the British 
during the Second World War and later served as Special-Representative of the 
Secretary-General in Korea.525 The British foreign minister was also ‘most pleased’ 
when informed by the American UN ambassador. Within the UN, Hammarskjold kept 
Cordier and Bunche close and informally brought in the American General Lucius 
Clay, a former army colleague of Eisenhower and his successor as the overall military 
governor of occupied Germany, most probably to reflect quietly on the likely 
internationalisation of the Gaza Strip.526 The following week, Hammarskjold also 
informed the US that McCloy would draw up contracts for the clearance and, more 
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importantly, that Egyptian consent was not required as the UN had taken over 
responsibility to clear the canal.527  
With the British and French vessels’ ‘undercover’ clearance work in November as 
the opening phase of what was to be named the United Nations Suez Clearance 
Organization and the takeover of responsibility to re-establish Western oil flows, 
Hammarskjold, strongly helped by the Eisenhower administration, placed the UN 
even more solidly within the frontier of imperial multilateralism than had the 
formation of the UN force.   
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Summary of Part 1: The Making of 
‘Imperial Multilateralism’ and its 
Frontier in The Mediterranean and the 
Middle East 
 
Altogether, it can be said that the ‘Suez Crisis’ was the result of a transformative 
process of diverging ideas and colliding political projects on the part of governments 
and to a lesser extent the populations of Europe, Egypt and the US in much the same 
way the Hungarian revolution was the outcome of an transformative process of 
diverging ideas and colliding political projects on the part of governments and to a 
lesser extent the populations Hungary, the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union.528 That 
is not to say that the situations were identical and therefore fashioned identical 
strategies. The Soviet Politbureau and the British and French governments favoured 
direct intervention due to what they perceived to be the stakes (even if their military 
forces at various levels had doubts as to what was going on and what the actual aims 
were). In contrast, the Eisenhower administration sought order on basis of initially 
multilateral and later international negotiations in recognition of its and its allies 
dependency of both Middle Eastern oil and the Suez Canal, even if most officials, 
including Eisenhower himself, were as frustrated with the Egyptian government as 
the British and French.  
The approach of the Eisenhower administration reflected not only how the US had 
developed growing strategic and economic interests in Mediterranean and Middle 
East from 1945 to the extent the region had become, in the words of scholar of 
American foreign policy and culture Melani McAlister, a moral geography to the 
broader American public that oscillated between distance and othering and 
appropriation and co-optation.529 The way in which Eisenhower’s administration 
sought to draft, if in an aggressive manner, the UN, the European, Latin American, 
Asian and Arab governments, especially those in the latter group who governed oil-
producing countries, to co-produce order also reflected how the global imperial 
system at a deeper level and the role of the US therein had shifted. Over the 19th and 
20th centuries, several ‘national’ imperial frontiers had merged into both a global 
European and a regional American frontier in the interwar years and then into to two 
globally opposing frontiers of imperial multilateralism during and after the Second 
World War. This had manifested itself in a shift from mainly direct intra-imperial 
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military intervention towards mainly intra-imperial policing, intra-imperial autonomy 
and inter-imperial cooperation. Not that the imperial powers did not struggle amongst 
themselves; the two world wars and the Korean War are more than ample evidence of 
this as well as a continuation of the racialisation of imperialism. That the latter two 
wars of which the UN fought had the US come out as the dominant power was only 
the manifestation of the expansion of the US through this new frontier system.  
Due to Washington’s turn to multilateral and economic diplomacy, promotion of 
economic interdependence and, if needed, military campaigns in the inter-war years, 
the American rise to global dominance through and after the Second World War and 
the making of imperial multilateralism in the form of the UN military alliance (and 
the Middle East Supply Center), thus connected well with the earlier shift in the 
Mediterranean to multinational imperialism in the form of disease regulation (i.e. the 
annual sanitation conferences), communication (i.e. the Suez Canal), interventions 
(i.e. Crete in 1900 and in Albania 1913) over the formally institutionalised mandates 
of the League. In other words, the US became part of and globalised the frontier 
system in which the Soviet Union and its predecessor in the form of the Russian 
Empire had already been involved. What changed was not only the American 
presence, but also the region’s global importance to the building of imperial frontiers 
due to oil, oil logistics and the Suez Canal, which in itself was important for troop 
transports for the colonies of Washington’s allies. While less explicit than in the 
regulations and broader matrixes of the European colonial systems in Africa and Asia, 
the emerging system was also deeply saturated with racialised images of the Arabian 
and Muslim ‘other’ as a consequence of the adaption of the European orientalist 
discourses, something that was clear in both the making of the ‘Suez Crisis’ and the 
crisis itself.  
With the ‘Suez Crisis’, therefore, it was not only the immediate workings of the 
overall frontier system at risk, it was the future of American global influence. The 
Eisenhower administration not surprisingly used all disposable means to gain the 
upper hand. The UN was therefore appropriated to get a benevolent force into the 
canal area, which the US had previously found so important it would itself occupy it, 
and to clear the canal, which Egypt had closed it down with sunken vessels loaded 
with cement. The UN interventions thus reflected the continued change from 
emphasis on territorial control to multilateralism and the support of proxy regimes in 
the global imperial system, some ways thus a deeper (re)turn to the dynamics of the 
Ottoman, Russian and Chinese empires updated with oil, hangar carriers with jet 
planes, and, not least, nuclear technology. That the Eisenhower administration could 
not act unilaterally but had to seek to co-opt both the members of the UN and the UN 
itself to restore what the British, French and Israeli government had undone by way 
of their ‘old-fashioned’ invasion also showed that the process of maintaining and 
integrating frontier zones had changed. The change reflected the growing number of 
actors and their gradually narrower space for strategic navigation within the global 
imperial system not in a zero-sum sense, but rather that their increasing economic, 
military and financial interdependence, faster and more readily available means of 
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communications, post-colonial nationalisms and more destructive weapons both 
raised the stakes and put far more emphasis on formal consultative procedure.  
As for its allies, Washington had little problem leaving them suspended in their 
mess of their own making until they came crawling. Two days after getting on the safe 
side with the UN troops landing in Egypt from November 15th, Eisenhower even 
spoke to two British generals that had informed him that they perceived “(…) an 
increasing lack of confidence in the British Prime Minister”,530 which Nichols argues 
“(…) perilously close to meddling in British politics”.531 Once the Party Leader of the 
Conservatives in the House of Commons, R. B. Butler, and the exchequer, Harold 
Macmillan, effectively also took over from Eden, however, the Eisenhower 
administration did meddle by aiding economically via the IMF and by debt 
cancellation. Had Washington not done so, the British Empire may well have 
imploded on economic grounds. Not surprisingly, Macmillan approached Dulles at 
the NATO Council in December to distance himself from Eden and make up with the 
Eisenhower administration. In the same vein, Eisenhower decided against joining the 
Baghdad Pact, which had both become linked to the British and failed to gain the 
appreciation of both King Said and Nasser.532 That is not to say that the Americans 
wanted the British out of the region altogether. Their bases and ports in Cyprus, port 
in Yemen, and firm grip on the Gulf States were both useful and desired.533 As the 
State Department noted, “It is impossible, for political reasons, for the US to assume 
all former UK commitments.”534  
As for Egypt, Nasser survived, contrary to both Anglo-French and American 
desires. He was, however, forced to accept the UN force, which he despite its 
composition he presented to the Egyptians as a victory, and the demands on letting 
the UN take charge of re-opening the canal, relying initially and secretly on the British 
and French vessels already present and subsequently vessels from other NATO 
countries. Not being rid of Nasser, the Eisenhower administration decided to use that 
he saw the involvement of the UN as beneficial, or at least presented it so, to get on 
his better side. The day after the UN force had been agreed upon at the UN, the US 
consequently offered Egypt—that was on its way to come a frontier zone despite its 
relations with the Soviet Union and later negotiations on Soviet access to ports—a 75 
million Dollar loan to finance the Aswan Dam as well as a willingness to allow US 
private capital to take part.535 Eisenhower also paid attention to other regional actors 
so as not to put all eggs in the same basket. As the negotiations on the canal and the 
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UN force were nearing an end, the State Department sent out a circular telegram to an 
unlisted number of diplomatic missions and consular offices stating that “No 
opportunity should be lost in playing up US peace role”,536 and that “It should be 
made clear that our concern is not only for Western Europe but also for Afro-Asian 
countries which are directly affected by resent situation.” 537 Specifically, this meant 
that “In oil producing countries of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran special emphasis might 
be placed upon their obvious interest in moving the greatest quantity of Near Eastern 
oil and thus avoiding insofar as possible institution of any new supply patterns which 
would have not only short term but long term effect upon their oil income. 538 Indeed, 
it was advised, “Maximum effort should be made to play up their self interest and to 
demonstrate that the US is continuing to do everything possible to minimize financial 
impact upon them.”539 Eisenhower also approved a new plan for Ethiopia, which 
previously had been used against Egypt. Providing a new level of military assistance 
to the Ethiopian regime under the Emperor Haile Selassie, Washington not only 
outmanoeuvred Egypt and retained its rights to Kagnew, its intelligence and 
communications base in Ethiopia, but also secured extended base rights.540 Finally, as 
historians Takeyh, Yaqub and Kunz argue, the Eisenhower administration launched 
what has since been known as the Eisenhower doctrine as a means to counter any 
future Soviet or nationalist contestation of the Western frontier of imperial 
multilateralism in the Mediterranean.541  
Viewing the ‘Suez Crisis’ in this perspective changes what the UN interventions 
in Egypt and subsequently the Gaza Strip symbolised and therefore symbolise today 
altogether. It is thus clear, that they must be understood, as is the case in the research 
field on interventions, not as ‘peacekeeping’. Rather, they must be seen, I argue, as ad 
hoc and temporary expansions of the Western frontier of imperial multilateralism as 
it evolved via the Middle East Supply Center, the first failed  Middle East Defence 
Organization that was to have included Egypt and Palestine, the establishment of 
NATO’s southern flanks and its multiplane land and sea-based commands, and the 
MEDO’s replacement in the form of the Baghdad pact, which was nearly undone by 
the invasion had it not been for the domestic sacrifices of the Pakistani and Iraqi 
governments in particular. Their support of the Western overall control with the 
globally strategically important area and its resources and Western wish to keep the 
Soviet Union out were not unlike when the European powers in the Ottoman era 
sought to keep the Russian Empire rather than the Soviet Union from gaining access 
to the region. That the UNEF and UNSCO have not yet been understood in this way, 
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it must be added, is caused by several factors. First, there were no American troops 
‘on the ground’ as in the case of Korea. Second, the subsequent clever use of the press 
by the UN, which was part of creating the myth of ´peacekeeping´ (as will be shown 
later), must also be taken into account. Thirdly, that the Egyptian President managed 
to not only save face outwardly but also gain massive regional popularity by ‘standing 
up’ the European imperial powers and establishing the Egyptian-run Suez Canal 
Authority, was discursively influential. Finally, it must be remembered that the 
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip had experienced massacres at the hands of Israeli forces 
during the occupation prior to the arrival of the UN force just as they would experience 
an Israeli occupation from 1967 lasting decades, thereby leaving only horrible 
memories to compare with. Moreover, the UN force and the clearance of the canal 
must also be seen in relation to the American role in the Central-American region, 
where it dominated, and had for long, the Panama Canal, which along with the broader 
Panama Canal Zone, if anything, as Cold War historian Thomas Borstelmann notes, 
was “Perhaps the most revealing demonstration of U.S racial policies and 
practices.”542 Although, the racialisation of the Arab and ‘Muslim’ other would be 
subtler in both Egypt and the Gaza Strip, the ‘white’ UN soldiers, as will be clear, 
tapped into the already well-established tropes of cultural imperialism associated with 
both the frontier of European multinational imperialism, the frontier of imperial 
multilateralism and not least those of Hollywood. 
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Chapter 6: Forming UNEF and UNSCO 
in Egypt, 1956 
 
In 1945, the military webs of the war-time UN that had linked civilian and military 
institutions with theatres of war were dismantled in favour of a continuation of the 
path emphasising decolonisation, multilateral (inter-imperial) cooperation and control 
via externalised administrations. Especially the US and the Soviet Union, the post-
war power-houses, promoted this process. In the following, I will argue that the UN 
force and the clearance of the Suez Canal re-actualised the military webs of the war-
time UN alliance and the UN in the Korean War firstly in the form of a network of 
bases and infrastructure and secondly in the transfer of the military cultures of parts 
of NATO and the Commonwealth. It is necessary to note here, however, that the 
operation was not only put together “(…) mostly by improvisation (…)”543 as recalled 
by the British former soldier Brian Urquhart who served as one of the UN Secretary-
General’s main advisors. The ‘white’ Commonwealth members of Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa were also deliberately kept out (in contrast to Korea), just 
as the intervention recognised third world interests and concerns as legitimate, and 
generally used co-optation rather than direct force.  
In extension of the overall approach revolving around the anchoring of Cunliffe’s 
‘imperial multilateralism’ in imperial historiography, I therefore instead seek to place 
emphasis on the role of Western and Commonwealth military infrastructure and 
supply and knowledge systems in the formation, building of, logistics of, supply of, 
and staff of the UN force, the clearance of the canal and deployment into Egypt and 
the Gaza Strip. The way in which I seek to do so, entails not only an attentive 
relationship with the existing research and public UN documents with the aim of going 
beyond the standardised accounts that dominate the research, old as new. This also 
entails a re-reading of the recollections of the first Force Commander Eedson Burns 
from 1962 and the distant memoirs of the British advisor Urquhart and Urquhart’s 
biography of Ralph Bunche (which was to some extent also about Urquhart’s 
experiences and views), paying attention to atmospheres, placement of roles and 
responsibilities amongst the members of the highest UN echelon, and their views with 
regard to certain states, politicians, diplomats and so on. However, going beyond the 
standardised accounts also requires that I consult further material from the US, more 
specifically the already-utilised document series made available by the US State, the 
‘Foreign Relations of the United States’ series Department. Even if it is difficult to 
know what materials have not been made available, the more than 600 documents of 
this series on the ‘Suez Crisis’ from embassies, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and the White House offers insights into the Eisenhower administration’s 
thinking and policy-making dynamics, as well as the degree of American involvement 
in the formation, logistics and supplies of the UN force and coordination with the 
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higher UN echelon. For all but ‘technical’ details on supplies, equipment, travel routes 
and maps, I also turn to the records of the UN Field Service and its General Division 
(and its American leadership) that was also involved in establishing communications 
for the UN force immediate and in furnishing the force in the medium to long run. 
Regarding sources that allows for an analysis of the canal clearance, I have again 
included material from the Danish Shipowners’ Association and Suez Canal User 
Association, both which I have accessed by way of the Danish Shipowners’ 
Association, as the first two General-Secretaries of the Suez Canal User Association 
were Danish diplomats that were in relative frequent consultation with the Danish 
Shipowners Association and the Danish Foreign Ministry. As for the UNSCO 
clearance operations, I draw upon UN reports and other records from both UNSCO 
and the UN Field Service sent to the UN Headquarters and the Office of Special 
Political Affairs in New York. While not included here, both the personal records of 
Raymond Wheeler who was seconded by the World Bank and records of the World 
Bank pertaining to the clearance of the canal may have been useful in adding 
supplementary details. To supplement Burns’ recollections from 1962 and existing 
research on the deployment of the UN force from Port Said to Sharm-el-Sheikh and 
into the Gaza Strip, I finally turn to a handful of published excerpts of diaries and 
letters by Danish UN soldiers, which to my knowledge are amongst the only ones 
published pertaining to the late 1956–early 1957 deployment phase.  
 
 
Building UNEF in Naples: ‘Dotting the Map’ and ‘Connecting the 
Dots’ of the Web of Imperial Multilateralism  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the General Assembly decided upon the formation 
of an organisation to oversee the clearance of the canal and a UN force—for which 
Canada, India, Norway and Colombia had offered troops— in the night between the 
4th and 5th of November. However, the subsequent process of both forming the force 
and bringing it to Egypt was not without political tension, even if complications would 
not arise between Hammarskjold and Eisenhower who already saw eye to eye on most 
matters and would do so on the composition, logistics and function of the force. Before 
the vote in the evening on the 4th, Hammarskjold had let the American representatives 
at the UN know that he intended to acquire Egypt’s consent as to the composition and 
its presence so as to avoid any claims of occupation. At the same time, he also wanted 
to keep out the veto-wielding members of the Security Council, to keep out forces not 
only from Great Britain and France, but also the Soviet Union. In agreement with this 
approach, Eisenhower not only told Eden that neither of the veto-wielding members 
of the Security Council could take part by both phone and message the following 
day.544 He would also tell his Chiefs of Staff that he wanted Colombia in the force and 
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get logistical planning going, which led to two meetings between defence officials on 
bringing Canadian forces from bases in Germany, Norwegian forces from Norway 
and 3 more battalions to the naval facility on the Greek island of Crete and from there 
to vessels of the 6th fleet and the Egyptian canal zone.545  
The first complication came when the British and French began landing troops, 
despite the agreement to form a UN force and a UN clearance organisation and the 
Egyptian ambassador meeting with State Department officials in Washington about 
requesting American help.546 Consequently, Eisenhower wrote a personal letter to the 
Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, most probably with the aim of appealing to 
the Egyptian President’s interest in admitting a UN force by way of Indian 
participation. He also had his senior officials led by Undersecretary of State Herbert 
Hoover Jr. assure that the US military would provide the UN with an officer for liaison 
purposes so the US military would not deal with national delegations and governments 
directly.547 The Czechoslovakian and Romanian offers to provide troops were the 
second difficulty facing the Secretary-General and the US following the invasion. In 
line with Eisenhower’s wish, this was left for Hammarskjold and his officials to deal 
with. Although the Czechoslovakian offer was made public in a press release,548 it 
appears that the American Under-Secretary-General Bunche, who Hammarskjold had 
given the order “Now, corporal, go and get me a force”,549 as recalled by Urquhart, 
singlehandedly decided against their offers, most probably seeing them as proxies for 
the Soviet Union. Additionally, Egypt would also prove uncertain and hesitant of the 
UN force. After the Secretary-General and Lodge, the Permanent Representative of 
the US to the UN, had exchanged views on the ideal way to bring the force to Egypt, 
Hammarskjold informed the Egyptian ambassador to the UN that he considered a UN 
force of Indian, Colombian and Scandinavian troops ideal, although he withheld the 
details on using the American air force, the sixth fleet and NATO infrastructure on 
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Crete and near Rome.550 Probably expecting American influence at the UN behind the 
curtain, the Egyptian President had his advisor, Mohamed Heikal, speak to the 
American Ambassador in Cairo to pass on to Eisenhower that he chose ‘the course of 
full cooperation with the US’ and that there was no need to worry about Soviet moves 
in Egypt as his first response.551 Concerned that the UN might install an international 
control at Port Said in tune with British and French designs (since the first contingent 
to be promoted was from another NATO member with strong ties to the British), 
Nasser had his Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, speak to Eedson Burns, the 
Canadian General and future UN force commander, who was passing through Cairo 
on his way from his post as the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization to New York on Hammarskjold’s orders the following day. As Burns 
recalled in his memoirs, Fawzi first rejected Canadian participation and then returned 
to speak to Nasser. The following day, Fawzi asked for more information: which 
functions was the force to have; how its area of operation near the Armistice 
Demarcation Line would be decided upon; how long the force would remain after the 
Anglo-French force had been withdrawn; and finally how long the force was expected 
to remain in Port Said. Dismissing the UN force commanders’ assurances, Nasser 
wanted the Secretary-General to clarify these issues just as his resistance to Canadian 
troops was adamant.552 Moreover, Burns received enquiries from the Advisory 
Committee for the UN force and clearance organisation that Hammarskjold had set 
up on November 7th, with several but not all of the expected countries contributing 
troops in the form of Canada, Norway, Colombia, and India, and also Brazil, Ceylon 
and Pakistan (despite Egypt’s rejection of the latter due to their hostile relations with 
Egypt (and India) partly on the grounds of being a member of the (in Cairo and New 
Delhi much-hated) Baghdad Pact).553 
Despite these complications, the US Air Force began bringing the first Danish, 
Norwegian, Colombian, and Indian forces to Italy, tellingly with post-Second World 
Warplanes of the US Strategic Air Service known as ‘Globemasters’, from November 
10th.554 In other words, the build-up of the supposedly least controversial force was 
not only initiated before Egypt had formally accepted the composition of the force, it 
also took the form of one NATO member (the US) flying the UN contingents of two 
other NATO members (Norway and Denmark) to the territory of a fourth NATO 
member (Italy), indicative of the logistical web that would come to build and support 
the frontier zone. As Burns recalled, “(…) it was very urgent at that time, Mr. 
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Hammarskjold and his advisers believed, to get some United Nations into Egypt at 
once. It was felt that it would be a race between the UNEF’s getting established on 
the ground and ‘volunteers’ from Russia, Communist China, and other similarly 
oriented countries arriving in Egypt to assist the Egyptian forces to expel the 
invaders.”555 Offering thus an insight into the highest echelon of the UN, consisting 
not only of the Secretary-General but also the Americans Bunche and Cordier who 
grew increasingly concerned with the frequent Soviet visits to the Egyptian 
government, the force commander continued, “It was thought quite possible that such 
volunteers might be sent, and that the Middle East might develop into another Korea, 
with the forces of the West, nominally under the aegis of the United Nations, ranged 
against the forces of the Communist countries and deployed in Egypt and possible 
other Arab countries.”556 His civilian UN colleague, Brian Urquhart, recalls a similar 
anti-Soviet fear.557 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Hammarskjold contacted the 
Egyptian government directly to secure the acceptance of the force as a first step. He 
not only rebutted the Egyptian President’s refusal to permit Danish and Norwegian 
troops, saying that the governments of Finland and Sweden, whose contingents Nasser 
had accepted because they were not in military pacts with the British and French, 
would not contribute without their fellow Scandinavians, and that this might mean the 
end of the UN force. He also told the Egyptian President that he would come to Cairo 
to discuss the Egyptian government’s question about its right to withdraw its consent 
to the UN presence and the entry of the troops of ‘certain’ countries,558 meaning 
Canada that already had a troop agreement predating the formation of the force.559 
As noted, the US Air Force began flying the first units to Naples. The Danish and 
Norwegian contingents were flown directly, while the Indian forces were flown in 
probably with a stopover in Turkey as the Turkish government had already granted 
the US access or Saudi Arabia where the US operated an air force base.560 Relying on 
the global reach of the American Air Force, the first Colombian units was flown from 
Bogota via Puerto Rico, an American colonial territory, to the Azores, an Atlantic 
island group under Portuguese control that the US had rights to use under a bilateral 
agreement (that also linked American usage to NATO), to Naples on November 
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10th,561 (even if Portugal would only formally grant the UN (and its Canadian aircraft) 
permission to use the Lagens airport in the Azores on November 30th).562  
When Burns came to Cairo on November 11th on the day after the airlifts to Naples 
were started, the Egyptian government thus accepted troops from Finland, 
Yugoslavia, Sweden, India, Colombia, Denmark, and Norway. The Egyptian 
President, recalled his advisor, had insisted on contingents from the non-aligned states 
India and Yugoslavia.563 Although no troops had yet landed (as Eisenhower 
impatiently noted the following day) and Canadian forces remained unwelcome,564 
the efforts of both the Eisenhower administration in rallying support and the 
Secretary-General and his advisors were largely paying off in terms of the force 
composition: the Soviet Union got neither proxies nor allies into the UN force. Despite 
receiving Soviet fighter jets and massive loans and having several large commercial 
and cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, the only Communist 
state contributing troops, was not only moving in a direction of non-alignment, the 
brutal soviet crushing of the Hungarian revolution also soured Belgrade’s relations 
with Moscow over November, leaving them in bitter confrontation.565 While the West 
was courting Finland discretely through trade, it was not a member of NATO, just as 
it was not a Soviet proxy despite treaties with the Soviet Union.566 Although seen as 
taking Soviet propaganda at face value by the Eisenhower administration and also in 
the non-aligned camp with Egypt (and Yugoslavia),567 India was not, as the Indian 
Prime Minister had informed the Egyptian President and political ally after Nasser’s 
nationalisation of the canal in July (only a week after they had met in Yugoslavia), 
“(…) a disinterested party. She is a principal user of this waterway, and her economic 
life and development is not unaffected by the dispute, not to speak of worse 
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developments, in regard to it.”568 Indeed, due to its embedded position in the 
Commonwealth economic web, approximately 60% of the Indian trade went through 
the canal.569 Besides the Soviet Union thus not having any proxies, formal allies or 
strong friends on the force, several of the remaining members were either Western-
leaning or members of NATO. For example, Sweden was neutral, but Western-
oriented, receiving American arms and nuclear technology and adapting NATO 
standards.570 It happened on a discrete basis, however, as the American ambassadors 
in the Nordic countries had agreed that the “(…) Swedish military strength is 
important and favourable factor in area (…)”571 and that it was therefore necessary 
to support rather than embarrass the Swedish alliance-free policy. On its part, the 
Colombian government and military, whose offer Hammarskjold, or rather Bunche, 
had accepted prior to Egyptian approval (with Eisenhower’s endorsements), was 
under strong American regional influence not only due to the Panama Canal (which 
had been carved out of Colombia), but also via the Rio Treaty of 1947, which had 
previously both ensured that Colombia had deployed a force trained by American 
officers to Korea under direct US command within the UN forces and that American 
arms and equipment had become the standard in the Colombian military by way of 
standardisation agreements on training, logistics, administration and doctrine.572 
Another member of the UN force also adopting arms, weapons systems, aircraft and 
naval vessels from the US (and to a lesser extent Canada), Denmark had initially been 
rejected by the Egyptian President for the UN force on the grounds of being a member 
of NATO. Having previously adopted British arms and equipment, sent officers and 
soldiers to Great Britain for training, and not least shared both military information 
and confidential intelligence with the British after the Second World War,573 it was 
well in the process of also turning to the US. Accepting the link to the global American 
military infrastructure of airbases stretching from Korea and Japan to the US and 
Canada to Western Europe Denmark had also allowed Washington to expand its 
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Greenlandic facilities from the Second World War to operate long-range bombers,574 
which moreover saw increased activity during the ‘Suez Crisis’.575 Finally, the other 
Scandinavian NATO member Nasser sought to reject but was forced to accept was 
Norway that had also become central to American strategic planning for Northern 
Europe, both as US diplomats judged that both Iceland and Denmark would to take 
Norwegian advice on strategic matters and because the Soviet Union had built a naval 
complex on the Kola Peninsula. Over the 1950s, Oslo thus accepted Washington’s 
help to build both a military industry (as elsewhere in Western Europe in the early 
1950s),576 and a complex of air force bases and submarine facilities in the north of 
Norway.577 As argued by the Norwegian historian Mats Berdal, Norway (as Denmark) 
came to provide the US with political support, access, and capabilities enabling the 
US to project military power more effectively at an operational level while the US in 
return gradually replaced Great Britain in providing Norway’s security platform.578 
Altogether, the UN force might thus be considered both a highly improvised rescue 
operation, and, amongst UN top officials and the Eisenhower administration, a 
manoeuvre to keep Soviet influence in the Middle East to a minimum, and, thus, 
within my analytical framework, came to serve a Western frontier of imperial 
multilateralism. 
 
 
Bringing UNEF to Abu Sueir: The First Step in Building the 
Frontier Zone 
 
Before leaving New York for Cairo to see the Egyptian President, the Secretary-
General met with the Advisory Committee in his conference room. At the meeting, he 
made clear that speed was of the essence. Along the lines of Eisenhower, he called for 
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‘boots on the ground’ first and then to build up the force. He also argued that the force, 
if its presence was conditional to the Egyptian government’s consent, was to stay until 
its task were complete subject to the assessment of the General Assembly. Sceptical 
of the phrasing of both Hammarskjold and the Canadian Foreign Minister, Pearson 
(who had supported the Secretary-General straight away), Lall, the Indian 
representative first noted that this force was not a permanent UN force, and then that 
he found it difficult to see “(…) how the United Nations would wish to impose 
conditions on a country which has been aggressed against—which has been the victim 
of aggression. That would be a very difficult principle for the United Nations to take 
up.”579 Supporting Hammarskjold, both Pearson and Prettas-Valle, the Brazilian 
representative, argued that the UN was in fact rescuing Egypt from a difficult position. 
Seeking to accommodate Lall, the representative from Ceylon, Gunewardene, agreed 
that it was only an ad hoc force. However, dead set on both getting a force and getting 
Canadian troops into it, Pearson also argued, “(…) we cannot make it too easy for 
Egypt to withdraw, with our help, and then say she intend to change her policy.”580 
Although it appeared that especially Lall had more to discuss, Hammarskjold tellingly 
had Bunche end the meeting with an overview of the build-up in Naples and the 
preparations in Egypt.  
When the Hammarskjold landed in Cairo on November 14th and the UN staff in 
New York were scrambling to learn to organise a military force as Urquhart was the 
only UN official with military experience (aside two American liaison officers), the 
Egyptian host had not agreed upon all aspects of the UN force. Nevertheless, aircraft 
from the American and Italian air forces as well as the Swiss commercial airline 
Swissair began flying UN units to the Egyptian air base Abu Sueir, a former British 
air base and the air base closest to both the canal and Port Said.581 To Hammarskjold 
(and his American officials as well as the Eisenhower administration), speed was of 
the essence: ‘details’ such as a status-of-forces-agreement concerning the legal 
matters could be settled consequently (and was so only in February 1957).582 Haste 
(and the American influence) also meant that the US Navy in Italy provided the UN 
troops with helmets that were painted light blue for anti-sniping purposes.583 
According to a Danish officer, it also meant that many of soldiers of the different UN 
contingents arrived confused and thus viewed everything through a prism of 
uncertainty.584 Additionally, several members of the UN contingents arrived with 
predisposed ideas of who were allies and who weren’t. Many of the Danish young and 
                                                          
579 “Verbatim Minutes of meeting of the Advisory Committee of UNEF” 14 November 1956, 
Advisory Committee Verbatim Records, Microfilm of Andrew Cordier Papers, United Nations 
Commissions, Committees, Conference Files, S-0848-0001-0001, UNA 
580 “Verbatim Minutes of meeting of the Advisory Committee of UNEF” 14 November 1956, 
Advisory Committee Verbatim Records, Microfilm of Andrew Cordier Papers, United Nations 
Commissions, Committees, Conference Files, S-0848-0001-0001, UNA 
581 Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, 134–35. 
582 Zeidan, The United Nations emergency force, 164. 
583 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, 269. 
584 Niels Kjeldsen, Fredens soldater (Copenhagen: Hjemmevaernsfonden, 1958), 9. 
162 
 
162 
 
often rural conscripted soldiers,585 for instance, were exposed to lectures from senior 
officers or academics that appear to have had an orientalist under-current when laying 
out the situation in the supposedly inherently violent and dangerous Middle East 
region or in the case of one of the three infantry companies an obviously racist lecture 
from a British former colonial military officer on “(…) Egyptian characteristics and 
how to engage the local population” such as walking on the footpath while forcing 
the Egyptians into the gutter.586 Upon arriving in Egypt, recalls a Danish soldier, the 
young and inexperienced Danish soldiers disembarked the American aircraft nervous, 
with loaded weapons (with a bullet in the chamber and thus ready to shoot) and their 
fingers on the triggers, weary of all Egyptians with arms.587 The (fellow ‘white’ and) 
older Canadian soldiers that had arrived and many of whom had served in the Second 
World War thus calmed the young and nervous Danes.588 To the Danish officer, many 
Norwegian and Swedish (who appear also to have been young conscripts), displayed 
similar feelings. Drilling, physical exercise and both national and shared Scandinavian 
religious services, however, were used to let them regain their postures.589  
Also in Egypt, Hammarskjold—who was still just as nervous about Soviet 
‘volunteers’ as the Eisenhower administration according to the UNEF Commander 
and the UN official Urquhart590—requested the American representatives in New 
York to keep the administration from pressing ahead in the General Assembly before 
his return. In return and well aware of what was still at stake, the Eisenhower 
administration requested that the Secretary-General observe and ‘promptly’ report if 
he saw any acts of non-compliance with the resolution. During Hammarskjold’s visit 
to the Egyptian President from November 16th to 19th, the State Department also 
ordered the Ambassador in Cairo to pass on to the Secretary-General concerns about 
Soviet volunteers if the ceasefire broke, and if so that it might be useful and within 
his rights to station UN representatives in seaports and airports to ascertain whether 
resolutions were being respected and complied with.591 The US ambassador was less 
than encouraged despite the Egyptian President’s assurances that he had only 
requested help from the US and had no intention for Egypt to become a second Korea 
or the reason for a third world war and Hammarskjold’s progress on including the 
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Canadian contingent before he returned to New York.592 The discussion on Canada 
had not only revolved around its membership of NATO (as with Denmark and 
Norway), but also its relationship to Great Britain. As in the case of Copenhagen and 
Oslo, however, Ottawa had also begun to re-orient its foreign policy towards the US 
both as part of NATO and as a neighbour of the US via trade and oil (to the extent the 
British government became vocal on the matter) and strategic relations.593 Within the 
sphere of the latter, Canada and the US had grown closer with joint officer’s training 
(between 1946 and 1950),594 the joint war efforts in Korea with Canada providing one 
of the largest contributions,595 and not least the joint radar warning and control line 
system, to which the Canadian Minister to the US George Glazebrook noted in spring 
1956, “(…) the existence of a border between the two countries will have to be 
progressively discarded”.596 In any case, Hammarskjold used the threat of walking 
out and cancelling the force three times in a seven-hour negotiation with the Egyptian 
President. Eventually, Hammarskjold managed to convince Nasser that Canadian 
units should be included.597 This, noted contemporary political scientist Sprye, made 
the UN intervention “(…) very largely a Commonwealth operation”,598 as Bunche and 
Hammarskjold had India and Canada provide the backbone of the force, contributing 
close to half of the force and most of the support units. At the same time, the 
Eisenhower administration officials were trying to convince the British Foreign 
Secretary and UN Ambassador and the French Foreign Minister and Ambassador in 
Washington both that oil would be provided,599 and that the UN force, even if small, 
was adequate in allowing them to pull their forces out of Port Said with what Harold 
Macmillan, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, called “(…) a fig leaf to cover 
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our nakedness (…)”.600 In the meantime, the UN force began to receive both British 
material and national and American equipment flown into the former British airbase 
of Abu Sueir by Italian military aircraft (that were provided by the US) and to come 
to terms with the, for many, hot climate and the other contingents.601 
When Hammarskjold returned to New York on November 18th, he immediately 
consulted Lodge, the American Permanent Representative at the UN. The Secretary-
General, it turned out, was as sceptic as the American Ambassador to Egypt. However, 
his concerns no longer revolved around the Soviet involvement in Egypt of which he 
seen none (and had confirmed by Nasser), but rather the Anglo-French resistance to 
pull out of Port Said unconditionally. Rioting would, if it materialised, then provide 
Great Britain and France with further cause for intervention in which case the Soviet 
Union may intervene in Syria and Jordan. Mirroring Eisenhower and once again 
placing himself firmly as a fellow steward of the Western frontier of imperial 
multilateralism, the Secretary-General argued it necessary to bring in the UN force 
and get the clearance operations started immediately.602 On the same day, the 
Secretary-General also convened the Advisory Committee to inform them of the 
Egyptian acceptance of the force and stress that it was necessary to bring in the UN 
force and get the clearance operations started immediately. While the Indian 
representative expressed surprise with Egypt’s largely unreserved acceptance, 
Pearson also stressed the situation’s urgency, supporting again Hammarskjold (to 
whom he had promoted a UN canal force for several years).603 Much to 
Hammarskjold’s irritation the following day, the 20th of November, Lall kept raising 
issues just as Khan, the Pakistani representative, repeated his government’s offer of 
an infantry battalion,604 reflecting an interest in using both the Baghdad Pact and the 
UN to get things moving as the canal closure was increasing price levels and thus 
pressure on the Pakistani government.605 Returning to the Secretary-General’s agenda, 
Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, raised concerns with the Egyptian forces 
guarding the UN force in Abu Sueir. Concluding the discussion (once again), 
Hammarskjold not only dismissed these concerns, but also argued that Egypt was not 
agreeing but (merely) consenting, again de facto placing the UN authority above 
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Egyptian sovereignty.606 On the same day, Eisenhower made it clear to the US 
officials that were speaking to the British that his pre-condition for help was their 
withdrawal and to those talking to ‘the Arabs’ that they should let them know that 
pressure was being applied, but also that going against the UN would turn the world 
against Egypt just as the Suez Canal should not just be opened but done so with 
confidence in future operation.607  
As it were, the patching-up of the Western frontier of imperial multilateralism was 
well under-way. With the UN forces arriving in Egypt, the situation had passed the 
point where both the Soviet Union and Egypt could make further use of the ‘Suez 
Crisis’, having been gradually if only just outmanoeuvred. 
 
 
Bringing UNEF to Port Said: Expanding the Frontier Zone on the 
Back of NATO 
 
With the UN commander’s redeployment of the UN force from Abu Sueir towards 
Port Said beginning on November 21st (as the US Air Force flew in most of the 
remaining contingents), the frontier zone once again expanded. Perhaps less indicative 
of the number of units available and a personal choice than the global colour line’s 
deeper path dependency in the international system with its roots in the global imperial 
system, the Canadian commander deployed first ‘white’ (NATO) Norwegian and 
Danish units and eventually Swedish and Columbian forces and ‘brown’ Indians units 
as the last, even if the popularity with the locals not to mention the combat merits of 
the Indian forces would have made the Indians the more sensible choice.608 In the 
same vein, the recollections of one of the Danish officers of the passage in trains on 
the old British railway along the Suez Canal also makes very clear the function of the 
international system in relation to the ‘Suez Crisis’: “The journey north along the Suez 
Canal also imprinted each and every one the importance of the canal. One tanker 
after the other were ‘frozen’ in the middle of the desert stretch, towering over the 
yellow surface as the signs of the disunity of the civilised world.”609 The overall 
situation appears also to have spilled over into the understanding of the soldiers. 
Despite being received with open joy by several of the Egyptian military units they 
passed, several of the Danish (and probably also Norwegian) troops felt a sense of 
pleasure when seeing destroyed Soviet-supplied material in light of their overall 
identification with the West, once again confirming how the imperial confrontation of 
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the Cold War was very present. Similarly, the young Danes could not help but identify 
with the British invading force, cheerfully engaging in small talk and in awe of the 
older, professional and frequently tattooed British soldiers when taking over their dug-
in positions in Ismailia (a canal town).610 While this most likely tied in with the Danish 
armed forces’ turn to the British (rather than Germany) military after the Second 
World War,611 Burns’ ‘marriage’ of the Danish and Norwegian infantry companies 
into a single (‘white’) battalion just before entering Ismailia may also have reinforced 
the idea of a ‘Western whiteness’ that merged the Scandinavian soldiers’ political-
racialised imaginaries of a Nordic ‘whiteness’ with those of the older Commonwealth 
and new trans-Atlantic (NATO) parallels.  
After taking over Ismailia from the British, Burns would also continue to use the 
new DANOR battalion as his primary force for what he deemed most important or to 
crack open a task before passing it on to another battalion, thus reinforcing these ideas. 
Indeed, even the new battalion’s rank and file soldiers began to take notice of and 
speak about of how they had Burns’ favourites.612 When Burns had the force move 
into Port Said, he thus not only had the ‘white’ Nordic UN soldiers seize several 
smaller military camps and a school for headquarters, he also let the British and 
Danish forces once again link up on very friendly terms under Egyptian overview. 
Whether linked to fears of incidents with British units or not (which Burns himself 
did not reflect on), he only put the (professional) Indian troops to use as relief for the 
‘white’ Scandinavian that had only months before been conscripts.613 In partially 
taking over Port Said from the British (and eventually French) forces and continuing 
to build up the force with an emphasis on the primacy of ‘white’ forces and the 
supportive role of the Indian forces, the situation resembled how the town, according 
to Valeska Huber, had been established by imperial, commercial and international 
actors that had pushed through an ‘international colonisation’ following the formation 
of the Suez Canal and the subsequent transformation of the Mediterranean from an 
imperial lake to an imperial lane.614 In other words, the UN began the ad hoc and 
temporary ‘international re-colonisation’ of Port Said in a way that in several ways 
reminded of both the ‘traditional’ British imperial expansion and the frontier-building 
of multinational imperialism. 
At the same time, however, the Anglo-French forces in Port Said did not withdraw. 
Back in New York, Hammarskjold began consulting the American UN diplomats on 
the Anglo-French withdrawal schedule which the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn 
Lloyd, had informed to the Secretary-General about earlier in the day. That the British 
would only begin to withdraw after a four-week period that would allow the clearance 
to begin and the UNEF to be established and thus withdraw under a diplomatic cover, 
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impressed neither Hammarskjold nor the American diplomats. Although the 
Secretary-General had initially taken London’s bait of anti-Communist rhetoric and 
expressed a strong dislike of Nasser (which it was recognised only the US could 
promote in the Middle East),615 he had grown less concerned with a potential influx 
of Soviet ‘volunteers’. Focused mainly on the canal, his attention turned to managing 
Nasser, which Hammarskjold admitted to Lloyd that there was no one he liked to deal 
less with. Aware of the situation, however, he argued that “(…) we must play Arabs 
down, but play them down by fair means.”616 Acknowledging that Egypt would not 
negotiate the clearance of the canal as long as London and Paris were using their 
military presence to pressure Cairo, Hammarskjold suggested three dates for having 
built up UNEF to a certain strength, in order to have the British and French withdraw 
their forces and begin the clearance of the canal, to the American UN representative. 
As the list of installations the UN force was expected to protect in both Port Said and 
its twin (canal-)town of Port Fouad kept growing, Burns therefore received the 
message from New York to keep building the force as fast as possible.617  
Aside the use of Danish and Norwegian ‘white’ NATO bodies before ‘brown’ 
Colombian and Indian bodies first in both Ismailia and Port Said (despite Nasser’s 
earlier resistance to NATO troops from Canada), Burns appears not to have thought 
twice about letting the British vessels continue their clearance work, despite Nasser’s 
refusal to permit such work and his agreement with the UN Secretary-General.618 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, “(…) the attitude of the commanders and staff of the Allied 
forces [sic] was entirely cooperative,”619 as Burns put it. The UN commander not only 
had jovial relations with the commanders of the occupying power on several 
occasions. He also consulted with the Canadian ambassador to Egypt in Cairo on the 
nature of the Canadian contingent on his own initiative, thus adding a reconnaissance 
squadron apparently before receiving clearance from either the Secretary-General or 
Bunche, who had hitherto had the main responsibility for the force.620 Additionally, 
the Commander of the Danish UN contingency requested the Governor of Port Said 
Egyptian to bring extra police into Port Said, but only allowed them in once the UN 
military observers had vetted the 350 police officers to ensure they were not 
Palestinian militants, fedayeen, and had only their normal weapons621 thus initiating 
another transgression of Egyptian sovereignty in the series of infringements the UN 
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force would be responsible for. It was only by the 25th of November the Yugoslavian 
contingent would arrive on Yugoslavian ships and thus add another friend of Egypt 
aside India to the force that was discretely but strongly tied to NATO.622  
In the last days of November, the visible involvement of NATO assets expanded 
beyond the use of American and Italian NATO military infrastructure and the force 
commander’s logistical coordination with NATO’s Commander-in-Chief of the 
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. While the UN built its own communication 
system first via the UN radio transmitters of the UN field Service in Geneva and 
UNTSO in Jerusalem and then in Naples and Abu Sueir and Port Said (and later the 
Gaza Strip),623 the UN force relied completely on the US and the British for equipment 
and the supplies. For example, the British invasion force not only sold the UN force 
vehicles to supply both the entire Indian infantry battalion and the Norwegian medical 
company, which Burns admits “(…) the force would have been in great difficulties 
without (…).”624 The British invasion force sold the UN force petrol, oil, lubricants, 
medical supplies, and rations.625 Moreover, two weeks after buying several hundred 
British vehicles, the UN Secretary-General had his staff approach the British UN 
diplomats for spare parts.626 After meeting the Executive Vice-President of the 
American-Saudi oil company Aramco, the American Director of the UN Field 
Operations Service, David B. Vaughan, also got both supplies and refined oil from a 
trapped ARAMCO ship moving Saudi refined oil to Rotterdam.627 Reminiscent of the 
Korean War,628, the US also provided the Colombian contingent with transport, arms 
and equipment to US standards, and did so at Bunche’s direct request to the Director 
of the American Mission at the UN.629 Washington would also provide more vehicles 
in December.630 On the overall matter of  supplies and logistics, Burns himself noted, 
“It is axiomatic that a military force can function only if it is supplied with food, and 
the fuel and lubricants for the mechanical transport on which it depends for all its 
movements, plus munitions to replace those used up in operations (…)”.631 With this 
in mind, it is safe to say that UNEF would not have been available as a tool to protect 
the West and its oil supplies had it not been for the support of the US and NATO. 
 The dependence of UNEF on the West, and again particularly the US, also 
extended to its staff, as was the case even at the highest levels of the UN Headquarters 
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in New York, where several of the General-Secretary’s advisors such as 
aforementioned Bunche and Cordier as well as the Director of General Services, 
David B. Vaughan, and the Chief of the Field Operations Service, George Lansky in 
1956 and later Carey Seward, were Americans. As noted, UNSCO was also staffed 
with Americans in central positions: McCloy and Wheeler being the most prominent 
and then others such as D. G. Sullivan, who served as Chief Administrative Officer. 
‘On the ground’, several of the UN military observers of the Egyptian-Israeli Military 
Armistice Commission that had in place since 1948 were also American. In late 
November 1956, for example, the UN Secretary-General let it be known to the head 
of UNTSO and UNEF, Burns, who then let pas it downwards within UNTSO to a US 
Marine Corps Colonial working as a UN military observer in the Gaza Strip, Byron 
Leary, that the Secretary-General was not keen to replace him once his rotation were 
to end or even grant him leave for Christmas. His symbolic presence as a UN official 
was cited, but, as will be clear in the last section of this chapter, Leary was also handy 
in relation to his capacity as an American military officer to coordinate with the US 
Sixth Fleet.632 Beyond the observers, the UN force itself also employed many 
westerners, several of whom, if not most, were Americans with previous military 
experience. Some had arrived with Burns in November. Others would arrive 
gradually. Most key staff were, as he called it, ‘imported’ UN staff.633 The Chief 
Administrative Officers were American (until 1967!).634 The first Legal Advisor, 
Public Relations Officer, and Welfare Officer were all Canadian.635 Altogether, the 
UN force’s outlook and sense of self was defined by, if unintentionally, the views and 
geopolitical imaginaries and the place of the Middle East therein of these key figures. 
Also partly steeped in Western ways, or more specifically those of the British Mandate 
Regime, were many of the Greek and Egyptian “(…) locally recruited personnel, who 
had been working for British military and commercial organizations, and were 
unemployed.”636 Expectedly, aside a few secretaries, most of these UN staffers were 
also all males.  
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London, Paris, Tel Aviv and More ‘Dots in the Web’: Expanding 
the UN Force 
 
Despite the ongoing relatively problem free and non-violent ‘international re-
colonisation’ of the Suez Canal towns by the UN force (which at least the British had 
influence on), the governments of Great Britain and France were not budging; they 
wanted a forced settlement on the canal to their liking. The Israeli government also 
wanted several requirements fulfilled before withdrawing its forces from both Egypt 
and the Gaza Strip. Accordingly, they kept working American fears of Soviet 
‘penetration’ of the Middle East, of Nasser’s double-scheming and the size of the UN 
force as a problem for it being ‘effective’ at the UN, in Washington, in Tel Aviv, in 
Paris and in London in the period from mid-November to early December.637 To some 
extent, the lobbying consequently gradually intensified existing concerns. Soviet 
volunteers were often spoken if, even if the Undersecretary of State, Hoover argued 
that Moscow merely used the rumours of Soviet ‘volunteers’ to label itself the 
champion of Arab causes during a White House meeting in mid-November. However, 
the meeting also brought forward concerns on the Gaza Strip as it was learned the 
Israeli army was ‘having difficulties’ in ‘holding down’ the Palestinians. A concerned 
Hoover spoke of a “(…) another immediate problem shaping up in the Gaza Strip.”638 
Joining him, Radford, the Chief of Staff, argued that the UN force was too small to 
maintain order just as it was noted that the Ambassador to Lebanon suggested that 
Israel should be allowed to stay in the Gaza Strip until the UN force was ready.639 At 
a parallel meeting of the US delegation to the UN General Assembly in New York, 
the American Permanent UN Representative told the rather militant delegation 
members in favour of helping the US allies more openly, that the US approach was 
“(…) to have the UN Force ease itself in, get itself established and build up its 
strength”.640 A few days later, Eisenhower told Hoover that he wanted a force that 
was “(…) of reasonable size—enough to prevent brigandage.”641 At a National 
Security Council meeting on November 30th, concerns with the stability of the British 
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conservative government, the Middle East and NATO were openly expressed: Nixon 
declared himself scared of the prospect of a new government under Bevan and 
therefore saw it as necessary to prop up the Conservatives, Hoover noted that Lodge 
was thinking of a UN force in Syria, and Dulles saw the NATO meeting in mid-
December as “(…) most important one ever held.”642 The irritation with the Egyptian 
President also came to the fore to the extent that he was seen as engaging in ‘monkey-
business’ and a ‘monkey’ on the British back to avoid, a racialisation that linked well 
with the administration’s roots in the American south.643  
Speaking to the British House of Commons (and the White House) on December 
2nd, the British Foreign Secretary declared that their and the French forces would be 
withdrawn immediately, if he made the withdrawal a 14-day process and conditional 
on the making of an adequate UN force and the proceeding of the canal clearance and 
so with aid of British and French vessels in place. Content, neither the American 
Ambassador in London nor Eisenhower and Dulles problematized the plan, thus not 
only granting the British and French the ‘fig leaf’ requested by Macmillan, but also, 
as will be clear in the following, substantial influence on the UN force.644 It is unclear 
if, and if so to which extent and how, the Eisenhower administration and the UN 
Secretary-General and/or his Undersecretary, the American former OSS and State 
Department official Bunche, coordinated and agreed to expand the force. However, it 
is clear that Hammarskjold and Bunche asked the Advisory Committee to support an 
expansion from nearly 4.500 to around 6.000 soldiers two days after Lloyd stated that 
the withdrawal being dependent on the size of UNEF and the day after Eisenhower 
and Dulles agreed that this was a satisfactory plan. First, they discussed the logistics 
of build-up and the problems of getting the last units of the force to Port Said to let 
the British and French forces withdraw, thus emphasising a need for speed and 
nudging the idea of more troops. Then, they turned to the task of moving the force 
through the Sinai to let the Israelis withdraw, noting that the force would be 
significantly better equipped to handle its task with 3 extra battalions, thus a doubling 
of the non-technical units.645 After Hammarskjold, Bunche and the Legal Advisor to 
the Secretary-General—the Greek Constantin Stavropoulos who had worked with 
Bunche when he worked for the UN in Palestine—had (once again) ended Lall’s 
concerns, it was decided to support the Legal Council’s and military attaches’ work 
towards securing that Egyptian courts were to have no jurisdiction over the troops 
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“(…) as a matter of course” 646 as the Secretary-General noted. Thereby, the UN force 
would continue the practice of extra-territoriality of the expansion of the frontier of 
multinational imperialism. The subsequent meeting elaborated on the agreement. 
Hammarskjold started by saying that it dealt mostly with legal details “(…) which can 
be of no great interest to you.” 647 Stavropoulos then noted that Egypt had no 
objections, even if the still un-signed agreement, lent the UN more privileges than it 
had in the US via complete freedom of movement in the areas in which it operated on 
any means of transport, meaning that the force would be “(…) to work unhindered by 
any rule or regulation which, normally, would have to apply.”648 Washington 
remained content with the withdrawal plan despite a study by senior officials in the 
State Department with the help of the CIA two days later established that “(…) 
collusion and deception did exist [on the side of the British, French and Israeli 
governments] and that it was directed not only against Egypt but also the US 
Government”649 Already having contemplated a larger force, Washington was 
concerned mostly with stabilising its allies, their oil supply and NATO, as was evident 
in subsequent meetings with the French and British.650  
In Port Said, where the force kept building up within the original framework, 
relations between the ‘white’ UN soldiers with the British forces grew increasingly 
friendly as trucks, equipment, and food rations changed hands, positions were taken 
over, and soccer matches were arranged. While reports of this as well as of the UN 
soldiers’ turn in moral with the looting of furniture and other niceties from the villas 
and public buildings may well have reached Egyptian president,651 Nasser probably 
sensed a far larger pressure from both Hammarskjold who had already forced through 
an acceptance of a Canadian force during his mid-November visit that was now 
impossible to reverse and from the Eisenhower administration that via its diplomats 
in both Washington and New York as well as the American Ambassador in Cairo 
‘requested’ “a constructive attitude”.652 Last, but not least, Nasser had a growing 
interest in re-opening the canal due to a growing economic pressure, partly related to 
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missing income and partly related to frozen assets in the US and Great Britain, which 
had forced Nasser to both make requests for access to both its assets and American 
aid and argue that aid to the aggressor rather than those aggressed upon was both 
unfair and unwise in a regional context.653  
In any case, the Egyptian President instantly accepted both an enlargement of the 
UN force and an increase of the Canadian contingent when he met the Canadian UN 
Force Commander in Cairo, perhaps similar to the way the deposed King Farouk 
would have ceded to demands from the highest-ranking local British official.654 Aside 
the Canadians, Hammarskjold and Bunche also wanted to bring in an Indonesian 
contingent, perhaps to help Nasser to sell the increase of the force to the Egyptians. 
Nasser quickly accepted an Indonesian battalion, perhaps from seeing an advantage 
in having soldiers from another non-aligned and ‘brown’ nation that was additionally 
led by his other friend in international politics, the Indonesian President Sukarno. 
Having gained independence from a Western colonial power, Indonesia was by late 
1956 in a similar place as Egypt, struggling to avoid the conditional embrace of both 
Washington (which under both Roosevelt and Truman had sought to retain the 
colonial-era economic influence, had granted the first independent Indonesian 
government secret US military aid and had pressed for arrests until Eisenhower began 
losing interest) and Moscow that was seeking influence via an aid and trade agreement 
in late 1956.655 
The Egyptian President, however, for the third time refused a Pakistani contingent 
and had the Egyptian diplomats in New York when the discussion shifted there for a 
full month, until the idea was given up.656 Not only had the distance between Cairo 
and Islamabad grown beyond Islamabad joining the Baghdad Pact, the warming in 
Cairo and New Delhi’s relationship from the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the 
Pakistani government’s participation in the first Suez Canal User Association after the 
nationalisation of the canal. At this point, Nasser had also grown angry with the 
Pakistani government when it turned to the Baghdad Pact, and thus the West, after the 
invasion (even if Islamabad had openly criticised the invasion of Egypt and supported 
a peaceful solution to the ‘Suez Crisis’), and the attacks of the Pakistani Prime 
Minister Hussein Suhrawardy (who was facing massive criticism in Pakistan over 
price increases due to the closure of the canal).657  
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Finally, the Egyptian President only just agreed to a Brazilian contingent “(…) 
after a good deal of pressure (…)”658 from the UN Headquarters. According to Burns, 
the Egyptian hesitation towards Brazil had to do its voting pattern at the UN, which 
was apparently not closely aligned with that of Egypt.659 However, the hesitations of 
the Egyptian President may have been linked to Brazil’s connection to the West, 
having dispatched troops both to the Mediterranean theatre in the Second World War 
as part of the UN military alliance and to Korea as part of the UN coalition in the 
Korean War.660  
A few days after the Egyptian President had accepted the doubling of non-
technical troops, the heads of governments and diplomats of the NATO members met 
in the forum of the North Atlantic Council in Paris from the 11th to the 14th of 
December. Dulles found not only that there were “no serious fireworks” and “every 
evidence that ranks will be closed”,661 but also that several members, such as 
especially Norway and to a lesser extent also Denmark and the Netherlands, offered 
outspoken support,662 and Greece assured that Egypt was ambivalent as to the Soviet 
intentions.663 Nevertheless, he messaged Eisenhower that resentments endured.664 For 
example, the British Foreign Minister called UNEF for ‘a great step’, but also argued 
that Great Britain and France deserved praise for having created new opportunities for 
both NATO and the UN, and then attempted to put pressure on the US by calling for 
NATO, meaning Canada, Norway, Denmark and the US, to expand UNEF in size and 
duration.665 When Dulles met Eisenhower the next day, he therefore informed 
Eisenhower that he had struggled to keep the meeting from giving the appearance of 
NATO ‘teaming up’.666 He noted that he had dismissed a statement on concerting a 
policy on the Middle East due to its potential impact on world opinion.667 In the end, 
however, the final communique of the council most likely expressed what could be 
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agreed upon.668 On the one hand, the communique thus stated “(…) shock and 
revulsion” with the Soviet Union’s “(…) brutal suppression of the heroic Hungarian 
people (…)”.669 On the other, it merely “(…) emphasized in particular the need for 
rapid progress in clearing the Suez Canal in conformity with the resolution of the 
United Nations General Assembly (…)” and, moreover, “(…) the urgent need for 
initiating and pressing to a conclusion negotiations through the good offices of the 
United Nations with a view to restoring the Canal to full and free operation.”670  
Parallel with the diplomatic fence-mending in Paris, the more concrete process of 
ensuring the conditions for the re-opening of the canal continued with the 
‘international colonisation’ of Port Said. However, readings of memoirs and diary 
excerpts of some of the Danish and Canadian UN soldiers show that the transfer of 
Port Said was to become tenser as it became clear to the residents of the town that the 
British and French forces were leaving. As the number and rate of incidents went up, 
the British responded by intensifying their patrols and putting up barbed wire around 
the area of the docks they gradually withdrew to. However, they also began 
conducting area- and neighbourhood-wide raids with tank support. In light of the 
situation, Burns assigned the overall command of the UN forces in Port Said, which 
at that point more or less amount to a rather pro-Western or neutral ‘white’ force with 
approximately 2.000 Danish-Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Colombian soldiers, 
to the Danish commander of the DANOR battalion. Interestingly, the UN Commander 
sent the Colombians to Port Said rather than the already acclimatised and locally well-
liked Indian battalion, which was holding positions outside Port Said that it had taken 
over from the Danish-Norwegian battalion. As the British-French force gradually 
withdrew and the UN force took over their positions, the Danish commander also had 
UNEF form an external perimeter of several hundred meters around the barbed wired 
area that the ‘Allied forces’, as Burns called them, had set up. This zone, which 
shielded the withdrawing invasion force from reprisals of angry Egyptians, may have 
seemed as logic for the UN force, as the docks bordered the town’s ‘Arab quarter’. 
However, it may also be considered a step beyond joint patrols with the British and 
French forces that the Secretary-General specifically did not permit, as the buffer area 
shielded the invasion force from reprisals.671  
The UN force may well have been seen both as linked to the partially suspended 
Egyptian sovereignty and in part a re-actualisation of imperial forms of ‘whiteness’ 
and authority.672 While the first days after the NATO meeting saw exchanges between 
Egyptian paramilitaries and British forces that increasingly filled the nights of Port 
Said with the sounds of automatic weapons fire and exploding hand grenades, the UN 
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soldiers also felt how the withdrawal and the confrontations also changed their own 
situation. Worried about being caught in the middle in some parts of the canal town 
and their oversight of others, several of the companies of Danish-Norwegian battalion 
began training hand-to-hand combat as well as conducting shooting exercises on the 
edge of town. Minor situations also began to escalate towards incidents, perhaps an 
indicator of the legacy of the British influence on the Danish military culture from the 
aforementioned cooperation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Danish-Norwegian 
UN soldiers also increasingly resorted to warning shots. Additionally, the UN force 
also declared the ‘Arab’ part of town ‘out of bounds’. Whether related or not, the 
Danish UN soldiers who managed to get lost there were attacked by groups of young 
local angry men were only able to escape without shooting their way out through 
interventions of older local men, who perhaps knew what this type of attacks had 
previously led to. A few days before the British-French withdrawal, an entire Danish 
company was also deployed after a squad had been fired upon. In another ambush, a 
patrolling Norwegian squad had to ask a nearby British squad for help. Consequently, 
the UNEF also began to conduct house- and minor area-searches for weapons as well 
as propaganda, for led to minor incidents of sabotage in response.673 As the UN task 
force took over more areas of the town, the Danish commander realised that he needed 
more boots on the ground. Thus, he requested that Egyptian police units take over 
security and the dusk-to-dawn curfew in some neighbourhoods. Reflecting the 
continued partial suspension of Egyptian sovereignty by the UN force (alongside the 
British, French and Israeli forces), however, the Egyptian police units had to be vetted 
by the UN force to ensure that only police officers with their normal weapons and 
equipment were allowed into town to patrol. Additionally, UNEF held on to the sites 
connected to the delivery of electricity, gas, sewage and public health, and, perhaps 
even more tellingly, also established its own headquarters in the main building of the 
Suez Canal Company.674 Not surprisingly, the diaries and memoirs show that these 
young, ‘white’ and Western soldiers not only (like the British) felt more relaxed in 
Port Said’s colonial era neighbourhoods than in the ‘Arab quarter’, but that they (like 
the British) called the latter ‘the shantytown’. On and off, they also professed both 
‘professional’ respect for the forceful British (such as the removal of the 4.000 
villagers from the little fishing village of El Qutabi outside Port Said) and a parallel 
disdain for the Egyptian civilians, thus identifying themselves with the ‘white’ 
occupation soldiers much in the same way as the UN Commander who (even in his 
memories) called the British and French forces as ‘allied forces’.675 
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On the 22nd of December, the UN force escorted the ‘allied forces’ out as British 
jets soared above Port Said. Predictably, the British officers thanked the Canadian UN 
Commander, who had fought with the British in the Second World War, for the “(…) 
harmonious ways (…)”676 in which ‘cooperation’ had found place and also warmly 
praised the Danish Colonel in charge of the UN force in Port Said. Personifying the 
bigger picture, the Danish Colonel was connected not only to the faded Danish empire 
by way of relatives who had served in the Danish West Indies, but also the then still 
active British and French empires to which he had been socialised through relatives 
that had served in the British colony of Hong Kong; his time in the British-inspired 
paramilitary scout movement in his youth years; his teen interest in the British 
archaeology in Egypt; his time in the French Foreign Legion in Algeria and Morocco; 
and, not least, his service as a UN observer in Kashmir that introduced him to the 
lifestyle, the sense of superiority towards ‘Oriental’ peoples and the officers clubs of 
British colonial officers.677 
 
 
The Clearing of the Suez Canal: UNSCO and The Re-
establishment of the Western Frontier of Imperial Multilateralism  
 
Before his trip to Egypt in the middle of November to speak with the Egyptian 
President, the Secretary-General met the Advisory Committee to discuss not only the 
UN force, but also the clearance of the Suez Canal. As with the force, Hammarskjold 
wanted speed to be the main priority, emphasizing that the members should link their 
views and advice to “(…) the steps to be taken now as quickly as possible.”678 As he 
arrived in Cairo and the UN force started to arrive in Port Said at the northern end of 
the Suez Canal, several NATO members also began requesting US diplomats in their 
capitals to have the Eisenhower administration activate the London Oil emergency 
Advisory Committee.679 Amongst these were Denmark and Norway, which were not 
only NATO members providing troops for the UN force, but also representing some 
of the largest canal users. Especially Norway’s request was important, as it was both 
the largest user after the Great Britain and the largest transporter of oil to Great Britain 
by 1955. Indeed, at the time when Egypt nationalised the canal, nearly 80% of the 
Norwegian ships passing through were time chartered for British as well as American 
oil companies set for British ports.680 As Hammarskjold was flying back from Cairo 
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on the 18th of November, Macmillan, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer who 
was taking the reins in Whitehall, also expressed the partly genuine and partly 
overstated desperation of the British cabinet on the issue of the free operation of the 
canal to the American Ambassador in London.681  
Consequently, Hammarskjold and his canal clearance group of Wheeler, McCloy 
and Katzin set a high pace after his return from Egypt on the 18th of November. They 
were aware of Western concerns with the long term prospects of the operations of the 
canal, that the consumption (and thus transport) of Middle Eastern oil was expected 
to at least double over next decade and that major business papers in the US and 
London had debated the issue of expanding the Suez Canal as well as early designs 
for several weeks (and would continue to do so for months).682 That the British 
Foreign Secretary had begun to call on both the members of Commonwealth and the 
Advisory Committee to rally behind the British move to de-link the canal clearance 
and their withdrawal and then informed the US of doing so did probably not reduce 
the Secretary-General’s sense of urgency.683 Nevertheless, at the meeting with the 
Advisory Committee later on the 18th of November, the Secretary-General, however, 
disregarded Lall’s and thus India’s argument that it was the British and French that 
should pay for the clearance of the canal despite his aversion towards the British and 
French invasion.684 Despite India being what Nehru had called”(…) a principal user 
(…)”685 of the canal with approximately 60% of its trade going through the canal, 
New Delhi appears to have been concerned not only with clearing the canal, but also 
dealing with issues that India as a recently independent state could also come to face 
due to imbalances in the international system.686  
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Within a week, McCloy, Wheeler (and John Connor, his World Bank assistant) 
and Katzin had subsequently found Hammarskjold an American engineering company 
that could dispatch a team of engineers to the Suez Canal.687 The company, the Ralph 
M. Parsons Company, was predictably conducting business not only with the oil 
industry (in the form of Standard Oil and Shell) and other chemical industries, but 
also with the US military building air force bases and missile test sites and NATO 
governments through construction projects in their metropolitan territories.688 In other 
words, the company was a post-war version of the politically well-connected 
construction (and oil) corporations that had been involved in expanding the American 
imperial frontier in both Latin America and the Middle East before the Second World 
War.689 As he had promised the Eisenhower administration earlier, Hammarskjold 
also hired companies for a clearance fleet from the NATO members of the 
Netherlands and Denmark on November 26th.690 He also provided an interim 
permission, using here the aforementioned General Assembly’s permission for him to 
make hasty clearance arrangements, as the contract would need to be worked out by 
McCloy.691 At the same time London and Paris were assembling a clearance fleet of 
their own, Stavropoulos, the Legal Advisor to the Secretary-General, was thus 
dispatched to Cairo to explore the legal details of both the force and the canal 
clearance.   
After having discussed the UN force on the meeting of the Advisory Committee 
on the 4th of December, Hammarskjold opened the topic of the canal clearance by 
putting himself in charge of it, “(…) there is no question that all decisions on 
implementation are taken by the Secretary-General; that is to say, it is a pending 
United Nations operation.”692 The only point of discussion with Egypt was the 
freedom of use of equipment as Egypt was seeking to prevent the British and French 
vessels from being used, but once again the Secretary-General drove the point home, 
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“(…) we put it up the way we want.”693 The rest of the meeting appears to have been 
intended to be a walkthrough of the UN Suez Clearance Organization, at the time 
named UN Suez Canal Operation, by Katzin. He set out by stating that the canal was 
blocked by 51 obstructions, two of which were bridges and the rest ships partly in the 
Port Said area at the mouth of the canal and the rest further south. He then noted that 
the British-French salvage teams had surveyed most of the obstructions and that the 
“(…) first plan of operation is the same which the British-French salvage teams are 
following (…)”.694 This entailed that the UN fleet, which making was on its way from 
Denmark and the Netherlands, would both be the same size as the British-French fleet 
and clear the path outlined by the British to allow 65-70% of the ships to pass through 
before removing the obstructions from the canal. After stating that the UNSCO would 
follow the British-French plan and there was an agreed option of taking over six 
British and French vessels, Katzin more importantly noted that it would not set up its 
own administration team. Appearing to be interested in avoiding that the committee 
took an interest in the agreement Wheeler was to negotiate with Egypt, the Secretary-
General added that he thought it was “(…) not a thing the which this Committee is 
likely to wish to go into in any kind of detail. It is a matter of information.”695 Sensitive 
due to the making of the Panama Canal by the US by way of, the Colombian 
representative, Urrutia, however, asked Hammarskjold if Egypt had actually agreed 
to the British-French salvage operation. Hammarskjold was unclear in his response, 
making Urrutia repeat his question. As the Secretary-General admitted that they were 
working in Port Said and that the UN would take over only when it was ready, Katzin 
intervened, arguing that their work should not be dropped. After regaining his footing 
and a minor discussion with Lall, Hammarskjold ended the meeting stating, 
“Gentlemen, you will certainly be called again very soon. This was just for 
information purposes. We have no real questions to ask you. The next time I guess 
there will be questions.”696  
Two days after the meeting, the Canadian UN representative not surprisingly told 
his American counterpart that Canada was impressed with Hammarskjold and his 
ability to handle the situation.697 The Canadian enthusiasm can only have grown when 
Hammarskjold a few days later informed the Advisory Committee that the General 
Assembly did not need to be privy to the canal clearance agreement with Egypt.698 
With vessels at work near Port Said, the French likewise expressed content with 
Hammarskjold to the Eisenhower administration’s officials at the first day of the 
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NATO meeting in Paris.699 On the same day, the State Department ordered the 
Egyptian ambassador in Cairo to instruct Nasser that the US expected to Egypt to both 
“Offer full cooperation in urgent clearance of Canal” and “Offer full cooperation in 
renewal of negotiations on future Canal regime”.700 To make sure the message was 
received, the Secretary of State also conveyed the same meaning to Mahmud Fawzi, 
the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and the Egyptian Ambassador to the US in Washington 
on the last day of the NATO meeting.701 As the British-French fleet was clearing the 
first obstructions near Port Said and the NATO council was convened in Paris, 
Wheeler began surveying the canal with his American team of corporate surveyors 
and divers and the first UN-chartered vessels from not only the Netherlands and 
Denmark as originally planned, but also from Belgium and Western Germany, two 
other NATO members, began arriving to Port Said.702    
While this was taking place, however, complications arose (once again). First, the 
Egyptian government not surprisingly began protesting that part of the British salvage 
fleet was becoming part of the UN fleet when British and French forces were still 
occupying parts of Port Said (and UN troops from three NATO allies were either 
patrolling or growing in numbers). At the Advisory Committee meeting, the UN 
Secretary-General presented this and his botched attempt to persuade Egypt that the 
UN salvage teams would “(…) need some guidance (…)”703 when taking over some 
of the British-French vessels. He moved to state his hope for a result close to his 
‘pragmatist’ approach, “(…) for it would really be an absurdity if it were to interfere”, 
again placing Egyptian sovereignty below UN authority and the Western Bloc’s oil 
needs.704 Moreover, the Secretary-General was faced another challenge with the 
preliminary costs that would make it “(…) necessary to make extraordinary tiding-
over arrangements.”705 Two days later, another hurdle surfaced. McCloy had become 
aware of an agreement between the American Secretary of State and his British and 
French counterparts that the six British vessels the UN was incorporating were to 
retain their British crews, which according to the US Permanent Representative at the 
UN left Hammarskjold in a grim mood.706 Additionally, the shipping companies of 
the main canal using countries also began to contact ‘their’ foreign ministries to have 
them ask around in both Washington and New York, adding more pressure on both 
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the US and the UN to resolve the oil crisis not only via temporary alternative supply 
networks, but also opening the canal.707 Finally, it appeared that Egypt also withheld 
its permission for the UN to begin clearance operations until the Israeli government 
had withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula.708 
 As earlier, however, most matters were resolved. This reflected mainly how the 
Eisenhower administration had regained an interest in the UN to rebalance its 
approach to the situation after having turned to NATO as most strongly manifested in 
the agreement to let British crews stay on board the vessels that were to be 
incorporated into the UN fleet without consulting the UN Secretary-General. The 
American Secretary of State therefore had Lodge speak to Hammarskjold about 
helping each other rather than risk ‘crossing wires’ on the 24th of December.709 
Moreover, Cairo’s refusal to allow the beginning of the clearance operation appears 
to have been an Israeli construction to connect their withdrawal to the opening of the 
Suez Canal to Israeli vessels as far as Washington was able to learn.710 With Wheeler’s 
help, Egypt was also persuaded to accept the incorporation of the British-French crews 
into the UN fleet.711 Additionally, Washington took upon itself to assure the finances. 
Indeed, the Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey intensified the already close 
cooperation with McCloy.712 While the administration was ready to use the Special 
Fund available to the President for matters deemed important to US national security 
either as an advance or as aid, it wanted to bring on as many other nations as soon as 
possible. Washington also preferred the World Bank as the fiscal agent, as it was 
believed it could increase confidence in the fiscal aspects of the operation, enhance 
the operation’s international character (in comparison to the Suez Canal User 
Association), lead more effective negotiations, and offer a logical avenue for 
transferring the compensation to the shareholders in old canal company. The State 
Department also wanted London, Paris and Cairo to offer assurances on the clearance, 
offer cooperation with the Secretary-General, and seek a new overall agreement under 
UN auspices. The first step, the Undersecretary of State noted to the Secretary of State, 
was to have Hammarskjold write a letter to all parties and potential donors. He added 
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not only, “we expect to receive, informally and confidentially, a rough draft of the 
letter within the next few days”,713 but also that the Legal Advisers’ office was already 
working on a reply to the letter, indicative of what Washington expected from the 
relationship with Hammarskjold. While it is uncertain if he passed the letter by the 
administration first, he did send it the following day, the 25th of December. Several 
countries responded. For example, Ceylon, both a member of Commonwealth and the 
Advisory Committee, offered a contribution.714 However, the largest contributors 
were either members of NATO, ANZUS or Commonwealth and not least canal users, 
and in two cases either troop contributor or troop contributor and Advisory Committee 
member: Norway, Denmark, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia 
and the US.715 The finances were necessary to sort out as costs were running up for 
the hiring of vessels and crew (several of which were working overtime) for the UN 
fleet, insurance coverage, the American surveyors (from Parsons), engineers (from 
International General Electric Company), and auditors (from Howell & Company), 
not to mention the expenses the British ignobly reclaimed for their vessels in the UN 
fleet.716 In the end, these countries would pay 99.93% of the first loan to the UN to 
get the canal reopened while the rest would be covered via a 3% levy on Canal tolls 
over three  years.717  
As the UN started in the canal on the following day, the 26th of December, 
Hammarskjold approached Lodge, the American Permanent Representative at the 
UN, to share, according to Lodge, his “innermost thoughts on the long-range canal 
settlement, which he had not given to anybody”.718 On the one hand, he informally 
                                                          
713 Ibid. 
714 “Letter from UN Secretary-General to Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of 
Ceylon” 10 January 1957, Cables 2/3, Clearance, Suez Canal, Office of Special Political 
Affairs, S-0164-0001-0005, UNA   
715 “Letter from UN Secretary-General to Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of 
Germany” 10 January 1957, Cables 2/3, Clearance, Suez Canal, Office of Special Political 
Affairs, S-0164-0001-0005, UNA and “Letter from UN Secretary-General to Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Sweden10 January 1957, Cables 2/3, Clearance, Suez 
Canal, Office of Special Political Affairs, S-0164-0001-0005, UNA   
716 “Letter from Howell & company to the Office of the Secretariat” 15 December 1956, Howell 
and Company, United Nations Suez Canal Operation, UN Field Operation Service, S-0534-
0151, UNA, “Letter from Howell & company to the Office of the Secretariat” 14 January 1957, 
Howell and Company, United Nations Suez Canal Operation, UN Field Operations Service, S-
0534-0151, UNA, “Annex A to the Agreement relating to the clearance of the Suez Canal by 
and between the United Nations and L. Smit en Co.’s Internationale Sleepdienst and A/S Em. 
Z. Svitzers Bjergnings-Enterprise” 28 January 1957, United Nations Suez Canal Operation, 
Smit/Svitzer, UN Fields Operations Service, S-0534-0151, UNA, “Memorandum of agreement 
between United Nations and International Electric Company” 14 February 1957, Howell and 
Company, United Nations Suez Canal Operation, UN Field Operations Service, S-0534-0151, 
UNA, “Letter from British Delegation to the UN” 30 august 1957, Middle East, Dag 
Hammarskjold Original Papers 1956-1959, S-0370-0025-0010, UNA  
717 A/3719 
718 “Document 666 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–
December 31, 1956, Volume XVI - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” 666. 
184 
 
184 
 
requested that the US either pressure Egypt or offer aid as incentive for a long-term 
agreement once clearance operations were well on their way, and that he needed to 
learn the British-French ideas on arbitration on the other.719  
All at the same time, the UN fleet set in motion Wheeler’s plan to have the canal 
open by April. The engineers from the International General Electric Company and 
Parsons took care of the out-of-water work on telecommunications, workshops, and 
lighting systems in cooperation with Egyptians. While the UN fleet also had minor 
Egyptian help, it more importantly incorporated British and French vessels. This 
entailed not only that these vessels were operated by their own crews, but also that 
these were accorded the same immunities and privileges as the UN crews.720 Blurring 
the already muddy lines further, Burns also provided the British and French crews 
with 80 Swedish and Finnish soldiers, or rather fellow ‘white’ soldiers, dressed in 
civilian clothes only marked by their blue berets.721 Cairo accepted this, most probably 
due to the domestic pressure of a partially collapsed economy and growing 
unemployment (especially in the canal zone) and the pressure from Washington that 
had still not granted Egypt access to its frozen assets in the US and also halted its aid. 
Although Nasser did not link the clearance of the canal and Israeli withdrawal,722 he 
unofficially linked the settlement with Israel’s withdrawal to have Washington and 
New York put pressure on Tel Aviv. He therefore delayed the clearance with demands 
for shorter working hours for the Egyptian workers, causing frustration with the 
clearance companies managers and the crews on the private clearance vessels many 
of which were operating on piecework contracts.723 Washington and New York were 
also still under pressure due to the inability of the alternative oil supply network to 
provide more than 75% of Western Europe’s oil needs, SCUA’s lack of direct 
influence, and the rising freight rates.724 In return, the US put economic and political 
pressure on Egypt and offered assurances to its allies behind the curtain. Free to offer 
its assurances in public, the UN had every press release turn each bridge and sunk ship 
into epic obstacles that the Western world overcame; cast Wheeler as the saviour with 
                                                          
719 Ibid. 
720 A/3719 
721 E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 236. 
722 “Document 61 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 
1957, Volume XVII - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” n.d.; “Document 206 - 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII 
- Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” n.d. 
723 “Memo from Meeting in Danish Steamship Owners’ Association with attendance of CEO 
of Danish Clearance Company Svitzer” 15 February 1957, J. Ch. Aschgreen 1956 m. fl, 1956-
1958, Korrespondance fra Rederiforeningen vedr. Suezkanalen, DNBA 
724 “SCUA Report” 19 February 1957, J. Ch. Aschgreen 1956 m. fl, 1956-1958, 
Korrespondance fra Rederiforeningen vedr. Suezkanalen, DNBA  
185 
 
185 
 
a great authority;725 brought tales of a glorious day and night work ethic;726 and 
continuously spoke of a ‘satisfactory’ progress that was going ‘according to plan’.727 
As the UN fleet cleared the narrow path over January, a long term settlement also 
became an issue of growing concern. The US thus sought to pressure Egypt (as well 
as Great Britain and France) towards a settlement and have the Secretary-General 
follow its lead.728 Hammarskjold also had the Advisory Committee let the 
representatives of India and Norway, the two largest canal users in the committee and 
members of NATO on the one hand and the Commonwealth and non-aligned camp 
on the other, to work Egypt, Great Britain and France.729 Although canal was cleared 
opened in April, the issues of compensation, toll and UN loans took both spring and 
summer to be sorted out via the World Bank and a new Suez Canal Authority before 
the matter could be closed at the autumn session of the General Assembly, as the 
Egyptian government hunted the best outcome by seeking to negotiate from a position 
of strength.730 
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Altogether, several aspects of the UN force and the public/private hybrid 
partnership of UNSCO and the World Bank have been overlooked. First, it is 
necessary to recognise that the ‘Suez Crisis’ and the hybrid UN intervention was the 
most visible manifestation both of how the late 19th century form of imperialism was 
becoming increasingly untenable and ‘counter-productive’ and consequently how 
Western and linked thereto Commonwealth economic interests were increasingly best 
maintained through the frontier of imperial multilateralism. It is also crucial to 
recognise that intervention preserved the frontier of imperial multilateralism in 
extension of the path laid out in the late 19th century and the early 20th century by the 
frontier of European multinational imperialism in the Mediterranean. Additionally, 
the intervention demonstrates how the negotiated re-incorporation in practice resulted 
in a non-violent but nevertheless penetrating authority in the frontier zone that would 
continue beyond the existence of the UNSCO. Indeed, Wheeler returned to Egypt as 
a World Bank consultant two years later to discuss with the new Suez Canal Authority 
the older plans of widening the canal to service a growing number of ships that were 
also growing in size, resulting in an Egyptian World Bank loan.731 At the same time, 
the Eisenhower administration also came to establish what Cold War historian Roland 
Popp has called “‘a working relationship’ with Nasserite Arab nationalism”,732 just 
as Nasser also felt compelled to accept the building of a pipeline from Suez to the 
Mediterranean in 1967.733 Moreover, the precedent of the World Bank’s involvement 
in UN interventions both during and after the Cold War has been passed over in much 
the same way the links between UNSCO’s re-establishment of the Suez Canal and 
UNEF’s role therein. Most research on the interventions both during and after the 
twin-operation of UNSCO and UNEF has not involved a similar maritime component 
and focused, consequently, only on the Israeli-Egyptian state-level relations against 
the backdrop of the deployment of UNEF in the Gaza Strip. The next chapter will 
examine these, but in a way brings places the dynamics ‘on the ground’ to the fore.  
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Chapter 7: Re-establishing the Suez Oil 
Artery, Mission Creep in the Gaza Strip: 
Mission Creep and UN-Israeli Relations 
 
With the onset of the canal clearing and the re-deployment of the force east-wards 
across the Sinai, I turn from the making and the practice of the frontier zone in Egypt 
proper to that part of the frontier zone encompassing the Egyptian-Israeli border and 
the Armistice Demarcation Line between the Gaza Strip and Israel, or thus a frontier 
region in more literal sense. Thus, Israel and its importance to the Western frontier of 
imperial multilateralism gain primacy to Great Britain and France. 
Initially, I examine the deployment of the UN force into the Sinai Peninsula and 
eventually the Gaza Strip following the reluctant and protracted Israeli withdrawal 
from the Sinai Peninsula in the period from the middle of December 1956 to the end 
of February 1957 and lastly the Gaza Strip in early March 1957. Until mid-February, 
the UN leadership and the Eisenhower Administration were uncertain about what to 
do with the Gaza Strip once Israel withdrew. The decision to ultimately enter the Gaza 
Strip was connected to how, as mentioned above, Egypt linked the canal clearance 
with the Israeli withdrawal from both the Egyptian sovereign territory of the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, which Egypt administrated according to the 1949 
armistice. In other words, the UN leadership and the Eisenhower administration did 
not initially see the phase involving the Gaza Strip as the main aspect of the UN 
intervention. Rather, the UN involvement in the Gaza Strips followed as a condition 
after the initially securing the withdrawal of the British and French forces to ensure 
not only the clearance and re-opening of the Suez Canal and its continued operations, 
but also the salvaging of Western unity, here termed the frontier of imperial 
multilateralism.  
In this section, I link documents from the American foreign policy establishment 
from the online series of foreign policy related documents (FRUS) with unpublished 
cables and reports of the UN-employed military observers of the Egyptian-Israeli 
Military Armistice Commission (EIMAC) that was connected to the military observer 
organisation UNTSO (and thus already in the Gaza Strip when the ‘Suez Crisis’ broke 
out) as well as published memoirs of UN soldiers. Combined, these material allow for 
a new, and perhaps controlversial, reading of the entry of the UN force into the Gaza 
Strip. 
Subsequently, I examine the first week of the UN force in the Gaza Strip and how 
the inability of the UN to (fully) internationalise the area initially led to strain in the 
relationship with Israel, who was already critical of the UN. Although the Gaza Strip 
did not become a full-fledged UN governed territory, the UN was already engaged in 
the ad hoc governance of the area in the form of the relief, social and educational 
activities of the UN Relief and Works Agency. The deployment of the UN force in 
the Gaza Strip may accordingly be understood as another phase in the process of the 
simultaneously broadening of the frontier and deepening of imperial multilateralism 
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in the area that had already been part of the frontier multinational imperialism as 
Mandate Palestine under the British. Here, I link in the records of the EIMAC 
observers, various departments of the UN force itself as well as a few published 
documents from both the UN and Israel on the one hand, the memoirs of UN soldiers 
and the Israeli, Palestinian, British and broader Middle East historiographies on the 
other. 
The last two sections turn attention to the period from mid-March 1957 to June 
1967 (when the UN force was withdrawn). While UNEF was never stationed in Israel, 
the Israeli government (and in extension thereof the Israeli settlers) would come to 
find the UN force useful in much the same way as the Jewish settlers had benefitted 
from the British mandate regime and especially its security component before the 
establishment of Israel. In short, I show how UNEF came to serve as a de facto extra 
layer of Israeli border regulation on Egyptian-controlled territory when the Israeli 
border forces were draining funds from a society whose political elite had to deal with 
a growing middle class interested in welfare rather than warfare. In these two sections 
I also put to use EIMAC and UNEF documents as well as existing research literature 
on various aspects of Israeli society, military and defence policy.  
 
 
Redeploying through the Sinai Peninsula:  Expanding the Frontier 
Zone  
 
Although the early November resolutions passed by the General Assembly had 
demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces, Tel Aviv had kept them in 
the Gaza Strip. It was obvious to Tel Aviv that the Israeli occupation of the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Gaza Strip were considered less important than the clearance and 
re-opening of the Suez Canal in New York and Washington. While neither New York 
nor Washington were sure what to do with the Gaza Strip, the informal consultation 
of the American General Lucius Clay, the aforementioned overall military governor 
of occupied Germany, may well have pointed to reflections of internationalising the 
Gaza Strip (whereas there was no doubt about the Sinai Peninsula being a part of 
Egyptian sovereign territory). So too did the suggestion of UN officials with the 
Egyptian Israeli Armistice Commission in the Gaza Strip to their superiors on 
November 1st to turn the Gaza Strip into a trusteeship with no Egyptian presence until 
the General Assembly could settle its fate.734 On the other hand, the head of the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the Canadian General Burns (a few days 
from becoming the commander of the to-be-made UN force), was informed by 
Secretary-General’s American Executive Assistant Andrew Cordier that “Secretary-
General wishes you to be informed that if situation in Gaza should get out of hand he 
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has asked the United States to act as UN agent to come into the area to administer 
it.”735 As the Israeli forces began bombing Egyptian positions in the Gaza Strip, the 
UN officials also saw the US as the natural place to turn, having the help of a small 
force of US Marines evacuate most of their personal to the vessels of the Sixth Fleet 
that were still sailing amongst the British and French vessels.736 However, a clear 
course on the Gaza Strip did not materialise early on. It would be granted only granted 
minor attention until the UN force had taken over Port Said from the British-French 
forces on the 22nd of December and the UN fleet begun its work in the canal on the 
26th of December.  
In any case, the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip on the 2nd of November ended 
any speculations with a brutality that reflected Ben-Gurion and Dayan’s aggressive 
rhetoric, terrifying many of the Palestinians living in the area’s towns and the eight 
old British bases turned into refugee camps.737 The Israeli soldiers were also “(…) 
unwarrantly rough (…)”,738 noted the American Chairman of the EIMAC in the Gaza 
Strip, who gathered the reports from UNRWA personnel and EIMAC observers. He 
also added that “(…) a good number of people have been shot down in cold blood for 
no apparent reason.739 Moreover, many (…) “key UNRWA personnel are missing 
from the camps and are believed to have been executed by the Israelis.”740 In addition 
to violently demanding authority and preventing potential key potential Palestinian 
troublemakers from mobilising, the Israeli forces also installed a curfew and searched 
the bigger towns and the refugee camps for Egyptian and Palestinian Fedayeen, the 
paramilitary groups that had both fought in the Suez Canal guerrilla war against the 
British until 1954 and attacked Israeli settlements near the Gaza Strip since.741 As part 
thereof, Israeli military units massacred hundreds of Palestinians in the refugee camps, 
the largest massacres killing 275 people several of whom were women and children. 
Hundreds of Palestinians additionally also had to be treated in hospital.742 The attempt 
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of a UNRWA convoy to bring supplies to Gaza City was also dismissed.743 The Israeli 
soldiers also started to plunder. They “(…) robbed civilians, taking watches, rings, 
fountain pens etc. away from the Arabs either in their homes or on the streets. Every 
vehicle and every bicycle has been confiscated. Private workshops and machineshops 
have been stripped of all mechanical tools. Many mules and horses have been taken 
from the stores.”744 Israel did not re-instate the police force in Gaza until the end of 
the month, at which point it was incorporated into the Israeli Police that sent hundreds 
of officers and constables to take over the four police stations in the four main towns 
of the Gaza Strip.745  
However, the brutality and plundering may well have been steps to annex the Gaza 
Strip and perhaps a part of the Sinai. As the Palestinian historian Nur Masalha has 
shown, Ben-Gurion and the members of his secret committee of high-ranking labour, 
agriculture, settlement and foreign policy officials were disappointed that ‘only’ a few 
thousand Palestinians had sought to escape in contrast to 1948746 and that many 
Palestinians believed that the massacres, some of which took place weeks after the 
occupation, were attempts to scare more people to flee.747 Israeli historians have also 
shown that the Israeli Army’s Planning Department and the Israeli Prime Minister had 
wanted the strategic hills in the northern part of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula 
for some time.748 By 1956, these ideas converged with the Soviet termination of oil 
deliveries to Israel, the little known discovery of oil near the Gaza Strip (if indeed 
correct), and the knowledge that the Egyptian military was structured defensively and 
had not yet incorporated the Soviet arms from 1955.749  
Tel Aviv thus challenged Washington, New York, and the UN officials in the Gaza 
Strip. Indeed, the Israelis not only shut down the UN observers’ means of local 
communications and confined them to their quarters from the 4th of November. After 
having declared the Gaza Strip under a military governor on the 7th of November, they 
also seized the Gaza land registry, listed Palestinians owning land in both the Gaza 
Strip and Israel and sought to expel the UN observers to Jerusalem, Israel’s politicised 
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non-capital. When that failed due to the Secretary-General directly ordering the 
remaining military observers to stay, the Israeli forces returned the UN radios but 
turned to control the movement and thus knowledge of the remaining handful of 
international military observers forcing them to use Israeli vehicles with Israeli 
military drivers.750  
In Cairo, Nasser grew concerned with the reports of the Israeli atrocities his 
government was receiving and therefore asked Fawzi, his Foreign Minister, to speak 
to the UN to have the UN force move into the Gaza Strip, if to no immediate avail.751 
While it is uncertain if Nasser and Hammarskjold discussed the reports during the 
latter’s visit, it is certain that it, along with the information Hammarskjold was 
receiving from the military observers in the Gaza Strip, was not presented to the 
Advisory Committee. This suggests that Hammarskjold may well have found it 
important, but not immediately actionable or as important as the British-French 
invasion and canal closure. In Washington, on the day of Hammarskjold’s return and 
unaware of the Israeli strategic goals with obtaining the Gaza Strip, Eisenhower 
admitted that he failed to see why Israel wanted the area, especially as it had no 
sustainable water supply.752  
Knowing that Israel could not retain the Gaza Strip without US support, Abba 
Eban, the Israeli Ambassador to the UN and the US, sought but failed to both justify 
Israel’s attack and lure Washington to commit militarily to Israel.753 Golda Meir, the 
Israeli foreign minister, also sought to have Hammarskjold send a UN representative 
to the Gaza Strip so the annexation policies could be shown off as an improvement of 
social and political conditions while making Egypt appear to be turning the 
Palestinians into an unruly mob.754 After several Arab states brought up the rumours 
of the Israeli violence in the Gaza Strip at the General Assembly, Eban once again 
sought to gain US support for a non-Egyptian solution in the Gaza Strip, for the use 
of the UN force to safeguard the coming Israeli an oil pipeline from Eilat in the Gulf 
                                                          
750 “Cable from Acting Chief of UNTSO to UN General Secretary-General” 12 November 
1956, Israel Administration of GAZA, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-
0375-0069-0004, “Chairman EIMAC to Acting Chief of Staff UNTSO” 13 November 1956, 
Seizure of Gaza ‘Land Registry’ Records by the Israelis in Nov. 1956, UNCCP Related Matter, 
UNCCP, S-0378-0026-0005, UNA, “Cable from UN General Secretary-General Special 
Representative to Acting Chief of UNTSO” 27 November 1956, Israel Administration of 
GAZA, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0069-0004, UNA and 
“Summary of main events in Gaza Strip” undated, Israel Administration of GAZA, Gaza Strip, 
Area Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0069-0004, UNA 
751 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes, 220. 
752 “Document 577 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–
December 31, 1956, Volume XVI - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian.” 
753 “Document 591 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–
December 31, 1956, Volume XVI - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” n.d. 
754 “Letter from Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Special Representative to Secretary-
General” 21 November 1956, Israel Administration of GAZA, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political 
Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0069-0004, UNA 
192 
 
192 
 
of Aqaba, and for the security of Israel in light of the Soviet threat.755 While 
Eisenhower was not as interested in the votes of American Jews or sympathetic to 
Israel as Truman and thus dismissed the Israeli proposals, the initial idea of sanctions 
against Tel Aviv was also dropped, as they would have had to be enforced against 
London and Paris.756  
Nevertheless, the hesitation and focus on the Suez Canal of both the Eisenhower 
administration and the UN General-Secretary and his closest advisors gave Israel 
leeway to pursue its plans for the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. As Masalha has 
shown, the Israeli government had several ideas for the repatriation of Palestinian 
refugees from the Gaza Strip to Libya, the US and several Latin American 
countries.757 Even more indicative of its annexation plans were the Israeli military 
governor’s eagerness to make it ‘facts on the ground’ to make it harder for the UN to 
expel Israel. This involved the appointment of new local councils of agreeable 
notables, the initiation of the renovation of the old railway between Haifa and the 
Gaza Strip, the import of Gaza citrus fruits, and, the introduction of state-signifying 
markers as Israeli stamps, currency and licence plates. Until the visit of the Secretary-
General’s Special Representative on the 27th of November, the UN observers could 
do little more than inform either the Secretary-General, Cordier, or UNTSO’s Acting 
Chief of Staff of the vetting and missing people, excursions by Israeli mining and 
water company engineers into the Sinai Peninsula, and the interest of several Western 
companies in building of the Israeli pipeline.758 Upon his three day-visit, the Special 
Representative reported to the Secretary-General he noted there was “(…) evidence 
of a masterplan for the administration of the whole Gaza Area and economic as well 
as political union with the State of Israel”759 and that people therefore seemed 
reassured that the eyes of the international community were on the Gaza Strip. A week 
later, the (American) chairman of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Commission, learned 
of an Israeli plan to use the confiscated land ownership records to push people in the 
Gaza Strip with land in what had become Israel to sell these and migrate from the 
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Gaza Strip, thereby seeking to pre-empt land claims contesting not only the legitimacy 
of the Israeli annexation of the Gaza Strip but of the state of Israel itself. He also 
informed his (American) UNTSO superior that it was necessary that the troops arrive 
before the Israeli departure as “(…) all hell will break loose (…)”760 if plans “(…) 
called for the occupation of the Strip by UN troops (…)”.761  
Feeling the lack of support for the annexation plan from both Washington and 
New York, Tel Aviv eventually sanctioned a phased withdrawal of only 100 
kilometres a month by the beginning of December, thus using the Sinai Peninsula as 
a means to make time to ‘create facts on the ground’ in the Gaza Strip to retain it. 
Ben-Gurion thus ordered the Israeli commander, Moshe Dayan, to meet with Burns, 
the UN Commander, to settle the details for the phased withdrawal.762 However, while 
appearing to comply and also providing maps of the mine fields in the areas they were 
withdrawing from, the Israelis also destroyed all roads, the railway, and the telegraph 
line to buy time to create ‘facts on the ground’ in the Gaza Strip as well as to 
complicate the Egyptian return.763 Despite protests from the Secretary-General, the 
Israelis continued this practice along the three roads to the north, centre and south of 
the peninsula throughout the withdrawal. 
As the Scandinavian contingents whom Burns had come to favour were without 
vehicles to leave Port Said, he used the EIMAC military observers and the 
Yugoslavian reconnaissance unit that had just arrived by ship to follow the Israelis 
eastwards.764 Due to the relations between Nasser and Tito, Burns noted, the 
Yugoslavian UN unit enjoyed a warm welcome from the population of the town of 
El-Arish in the northern part of the Sinai.765 This, however, appear to be the last time 
the UN Force Commander used a contingent of India or Indonesia, Egypt’s 
international political allies, as the ‘spearhead’ or for taking positions of strategic 
importance. While it may well be connected to the ‘white’ UN contingents arriving as 
the first, the UN commander once again refrained from putting the contingents of 
Nasser’s political friends on the international scene in important or populated areas, 
using instead the ‘white’ units. Indeed, the Indian forces that had been deployed 
outside Port Said were sent to El Tor, a rather insignificant port town south of the Bay 
of Suez while the latest arrivals were kept in Abu Sueir.766  Whether connected to its 
only recent arrival to Egypt with American ‘globemasters’ or not,767 the battalion of 
                                                          
760 “Message from Chairman EIMAC to Acting Chairman UNTSO” 10 December 1956, 1956 
War, Israeli Occupation of the Gaza Strip 1/3, Office of Special Political Affairs, S-0164-0002-
0006, UNA 
761 Ibid. 
762 “Minutes of Meeting between UNEF Commander and IDF Commander” 16 December 
1956, Israel Administration of GAZA, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-
0375-0069-0004, UNA 
763 E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 243. 
764 Ibid., 240–42. 
765 Ibid., 244–45. 
766 Jensen, Kompagni Larsen, 66 & 73. 
767 “United States Airlift for the United Nations Emergency Force” undated, Brazil Folder, Field 
Operations Division, S-0530-0271, UNA 
194 
 
194 
 
Indonesia, the other ‘brown’ friend of Egypt in the force, was also deployed to a less 
significant location in the southeastern part of the Sinai.768 The UN force commander 
also kept the Brazilian battalion in the Suez Canal Area, near UNEF HQ,  although 
the battalion appear to have been in a similar situation with regards to vehicles as the 
Indonesians after arriving as part of the expansion that also included Indonesia (and 
Canada) partly on American ‘globemasters’ and partly on a Brazilian warship.769  
However, Finnish units were sent to serve as guards for the British clearance vessels 
in Port Said and towards Sharm El Sheik, at the entrance of the to the Israelis 
strategically important Straits of Tiran. Swedish units were deployed to El Qantara, 
another town part of the broader Suez Canal Area. He also kept the Canadian technical 
units and the still amassing Canadian reconnaissance unit, approximately 1.000 
troops, in the Suez Canal Area. After eventually being supplied with British and 
American trucks, the Danish-Norwegian unit was also ordered to trail the Israelis 
through an area that had seen heavy Egyptian-Israeli fighting. Several of the Danish 
soldiers already viewed the Egyptians with a distance if not occasional hostility close 
to that of the British soldiers they had met in Port Said: some of the Danes had even 
been estranged by leaving their posts due to a combination of having taken to its 
strategic importance and the bonding with the British units.770 According to published 
memoirs, the desert trek, however, took this further. Several indulged in necromantic 
practices with dead Egyptian soldiers once away from their commanders’ gaze on 
patrols, insulting in a very embodied way Egyptian sovereignty via the bodies of the 
soldiers. Some would kick the corpses. Others would pose for their friends’ camera: 
Playing cards across the chest of a corpse or laying in the sand holding a skull appear 
to have been amongst the more popular motifs. Several Danish soldiers also 
entertained themselves with detonating hand grenades found in Egyptian positions.771  
 
 
What of the Gaza Strip? Mission Creep as a Condition to re-open 
the Canal 
 
Far away from the ending of the temporary ‘international (re)-colonisation’ of Port 
Said (and the Sinai Peninsula), the Secretary-General and the American diplomats met 
and agreed that it would be unwise to push the General Assembly in New York 
towards a broader settlement on Israel and Palestine given the tension caused by the 
Israeli destruction in the Sinai Peninsula. However, they did agree that it was 
necessary to use the General Assembly to force Israel to leave the Gaza Strip even if 
                                                          
768 Jensen, Kompagni Larsen, 73. 
769 “United States Airlift for the United Nations Emergency Force” undated, Brazil Folder, Field 
Operations Division, S-0530-0271, UNA 
770 Kristiansen, Danske soldater i Gaza og Congo;, 22. 
771 Kjeldsen, Fredens soldater, 7–40; Jensen, Kompagni Larsen, 49–68. 
195 
 
195 
 
it remained unsettled if the UN were to administrate the area.772 As late December 
became early January and the UN force followed the Israeli forces across the Sinai 
Peninsula, Israeli diplomats again sought to garner support in both Washington and 
via the embassy in Tel Aviv for their ideas of letting Israeli security forces and police 
units stay in the Gaza Strip.773 However, neither Washington nor New York ceded 
much to Tel Aviv. For one, Egypt was linking the Israeli withdrawal to the clearance 
of the canal. Additionally, several members of the advisory committee had brought 
up the topic of their own interests relating to oil deliveries to Western Europe and 
Commonwealth trade.774 Another attempt to promote the Eilat-Haifa pipeline and a 
joint Israeli-UN administration and security apparatus in the Gaza Strip was thus 
made.775 Neither taking the Israeli bait nor enjoying the most likely outcome in the 
form of an Egyptian return but needing the canal open, Eisenhower began to wonder 
if the Gaza Strip should be turned into a UN protectorate in a phone conversation with 
his Secretary of State on the 12th of January.776 At this point in time, Hammarskjold 
appears to have been uncertain how to deal with the Gaza Strip, even if he had wanted 
to bring Clay on-board. Once in a stronger position after the UN force had reached 
the international frontier (as the still unsettled Egyptian-Israeli border was called) on 
the 21st of January, however, Hammarskjold mirrored Eisenhower’s idea and told US 
diplomats that the Israelis had nothing to do in the Gaza Strip, although he conceded 
that some UN units should deploy to the Gulf of Aqaba to safeguard Israeli passage, 
and that he wanted the UN force both in the Gaza Strip and in Israel in extension of 
the Truce Supervision Organization framework from 1949.777 At the next day’s 
Advisory Committee meeting, Hammarskjold also indirectly linked the 
administration of the Gaza Strip to the UN, stating “(…) that the armistice agreement 
provides for Egyptian administration and does not leave any leeway either for Israeli 
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administration or for United Nations administration without the consent of the 
controlling party”.778 In other words, while Egypt was to run the Gaza Strip according 
to the armistice, it could be run by the UN if Egypt consented. None of the committee 
members spoke against this or supported the Israeli goals, 779 indicating that the 
committee—or a majority strong enough to suggest that speaking against it was 
useless—found the notion of using the UN in an administrative capacity to ensure the 
re-opening of the canal and the protection of Commonwealth trade (as called for 3 
weeks earlier) uncontroversial. Even if the British and the French forces had been 
withdrawn weeks earlier and Israel thus stood alone, Hammarskjold was unable to 
pressure Israel further alone. Consequently, he warned the US that Egypt may delay 
the canal clearance unless every type of pressure was put on Israel, indirectly asking 
the Eisenhower administration to do so, as well as suggesting that some of the 
committee members should propose a resolution that the US could back.780 Standing 
before the General Assembly the next day, Hammarskjold therefore not only rejected 
the Israeli plan for the Gaza Strip, but also for the first time in public hinted that a UN 
administration of the Gaza Strip might be necessary by noting that any change in the 
armistice such as an UN administration would require an agreement with Egypt and 
that the UN force should be stationed on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line 
(ADL). After the GA meeting, he met with US diplomats as well as Pearson to work 
out the resolution details.781 Whilst speaking with the Eisenhower administration on 
how the two issues were in fact connected, the Secretary-General, in other words, both 
kept the canal clearance and the Gaza Strip separate in public and avoided the mention 
of turning the Gaza Strip into a trusteeship (as suggested by some of the American 
UN observers). Taking over the area in some UN administered form seemed inevitable 
if the canal were to open again and thus reopen the oil supply to Western Europe.  
While the UN force began to amass a few kilometres west of Rafah, one of the 
larger towns in the Gaza Strip, from the end of January, the UN military observers 
inside the Gaza Strip also began coordinating with the UN Relief and Works Agency 
under the American Henry Labouisse, who Hammarskjold had recruited from the 
American-led Economic Cooperation Administration and the Mutual Security 
Administration to take over the UNRWA in 1954, about which UNRWA sites needed 
UN guards.782 The remaining military observers, who were from New Zealand and 
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the US, also began analysing how UN could occupy the Gaza Strip as a trusteeship or 
something else. Tapping into the lesser violent parts of the European and American 
colonial and imperial military cultures and ways of monitoring and regulating people, 
they quickly and with eagerly offered (very) concrete thoughts on which sites were 
suitable for a UN HQ, contingent headquarters, camps and observation posts;783 how 
to garner the support of the local notables and other “(…) proper people (…)” as their 
backing would mean cooperation rather than conflict;784 how to “(…) control the 
population (…)” via outposts, traffic control points, patrols, observation posts and 
loudspeakers to relay UN messages;785 how to man, patrol and police the Armistice 
Demarcation Line (ADL) night and day;786 which buildings of the former British 
mandate power and buildings that had housed Australian and other British imperial 
forces during the First World War to use, and, not least, where to place certain 
contingents such as the Indian due to the “(…) Hindu Moslem traditional rivalry 
(…)”.787 They also sent lists of the Palestinians and Egyptians that had worked in the 
civilian Egyptian administration, effectively providing the UN with what can only be 
seen as both military and political intelligence.788  
All at the same time, hundreds of refugees began leaving the Gaza Strip for El 
Arish, not prevented from doing so by the Israelis that were presumably keen to see 
them leave. However, once the fleeing Palestinians realised that there was no water, 
rations and tents they turned back to the Gaza Strip. Not sure what to do or keen to 
avoid a (very) public human disaster (also) of their own making, the Israeli forces 
allowed them to re-enter the Gaza Strip. Passing closely by the soldiers of the Danish, 
Norwegian, Swedish and Colombian UN contingents to be searched for weapons, the 
Palestinians exposed to the UN soldiers to the misery of the refugee life.789 According 
to a Swedish officer, several of the soldiers in the Swedish units, who had met and 
come to respect Bedouins for their hard lives in their crossing of the Sinai, became 
sympathetic towards these people, if still unfamiliar with more details of both their 
                                                          
783 “Letter from UNEF Commander and Chief of Staff UNTSO to Acting Chairman EIMAC” 
30 January 1957, Israel Administration of GAZA January to March 1957, Gaza Strip, Area 
Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0069-0005, UNA 
784 “Memorandum from Chairman EIMAC to UNSG Executive Assistant (Cordier)” 31 January 
1957, Israel Administration of GAZA January to March 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political 
Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0069-0005, UNA  
785 “Letter from Acting Chairman EIMAC to UNEF Commander and Chief of Staff UNTSO” 
23 January 1957, Israel Administration of GAZA January to March 1957, Gaza Strip, Area 
Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0069-0005, UNA 
786 “Scheme to man, patrol and police the D/L in the Gaza Strip and the I/F between Egypt-
Israel and Egypt-Gaza” undated, Israel Administration of GAZA January to March 1957, Gaza 
Strip, Area Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0069-0005, UNA 
787 “Cable from Acting Chairman EIMAC to Acting Chief of Staff UNTSO”, 3 February 1957, 
Israel Administration of GAZA January to March 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political 
Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0069-0005, UNA 
788 “Letter from Acting Chairman EIMAC to UNEF Commander and Chief of Staff UNTSO” 
23 January 1957, Israel Administration of GAZA January to March 1957, Gaza Strip, Area 
Files, Political Affairs, EIMAC, S-0375-0069-0005, UNA 
789 E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 257–58. 
198 
 
198 
 
histories and those of the people in the Gaza Strip.790 Nevertheless, Swedish units 
patrolling near the International Frontier in the vicinity of Israeli units were fired upon 
by what was assumed to be the paramilitary Fedayeen units.791 Similarly, Danish 
soldiers managed to get into heated arguments with Palestinian students caught there, 
most probably on account of their still somewhat banal pro-Israeli/Orientalist views, 
mounting cynicism and the combination of the waiting time and the town’s 
atmosphere that was characterised by the lack of a villa neighbourhood and a broad 
non-Egyptian presence. In contrast but perhaps less surprising, they connected better 
with unarmed Egyptian soldiers and those from whom they bought services such as 
café-owners and market vendors. A Norwegian infantry company’s shooting night-
time shooting exercise near the town also led to a massive exodus of Egyptian that 
feared the Israeli army had come back.792  
In Washington (and Tel Aviv), the Eisenhower administration took up 
Hammarskjold on his request to lean on Ben-Gurion’s government. Although 
Washington eventually cancelled only the aid for the fiscal year of 1957, leaving 
ongoing projects, aid in transit, and Israeli economic assets in the US untouched (in 
contrast to the Egyptian assets), it let the Israeli government realise not only that it 
would only survive with US support (as the Soviet Union saw other countries as 
regional assets) and that its insistence on retaining some element of military or civilian 
control in the Gaza Strip was untenable.793 Over February, the Secretary-General and 
the Eisenhower administration continued to coordinate the Israeli withdrawal, 
exchanging informal memos and holding, by then ‘standard’, meetings involving only 
US diplomats, Hammarskjold, Bunche and Cordier at the UN building.794 By the 
middle of the month, Hammarskjold began to discuss openly his aim of 
internationalising the Gaza Strip with the American diplomats after having come to 
view it as necessary and turned it over with the Egyptian Foreign Minister who did 
not object as long as the UN administration kept “(…) an Egyptian face on it.”795 
Having deliberated with Henry Labouisse who had at least two years of experience 
with the Gaza Strip as the head of the UNRWA, Hammarskjold was settling for the 
idea of an Egyptian Military Governor alongside a UN High Commissioner, thus 
opting for a structure that tapped into British imperial configurations of sovereignty, 
space, and governance. Well aware that the issues at hand—such as financial and 
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administrative issues that included questions of credits, assets, sales of citrus fruits, 
education and health—were normally the realms of sovereign states, Hammarskjold 
did not want a full trusteeship, testimony to Hammarskjold’s ability to evade the 
pitfalls of international politics. He also informed Lodge that he wanted Lucius Clay 
to make the plans for the UN administration of Gaza, given his experience from 
governing occupied Germany. The post, much like that of McCloy, he argued that it 
was not to be a long term field job, but a short-term position with Secretariat 
assistance. This was due to, as Lodge telegrammed the Department of State, the fact 
that “(…) an American operation in field would not be feasible”.796 Telling of 
Hammarskjold’s equally acute skill of getting things moving with as little friction as 
possible by co-opting the Commonwealth (and former colonies), he wanted the Indian 
General Kodandera Thimayya to serve as High Commissioner. As Clay, Thimayya 
was also an emerging international heavyweight with roots in a Western imperial 
project. He had not only served with British Indian Army in Burma during the Second 
World War and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan afterwards, he 
had also handled ‘unruly’ Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war for the UN in 
Korea. As an ‘international celebrity’ and ‘soldier-statesman’, he was liked by the 
American, British and Indian foreign policy and military establishments as well as the 
medias and would thus represent a scoop for Hammarskjold, Nehru and Nasser.797 By 
the time Hammarskjold wanted him in the Gaza Strip, Thimayya had just left his 
command in the Indian Pune military region, where he dispensed with a small 
Pakistani incursion force without letting the conflict escalate to war, for a post in the 
east, where he also quickly managed to peacefully stand down a local rebellion that 
also had roots in the British Empire’s politics and had received arms from both 
Pakistan and several Communist parties in the region.798 He was thus well suited for 
a complex post-imperial conflict-strife area with multiple armed and frustrated 
factions. Keenly aware of the need to get the support of the Arab states as well, the 
Eisenhower administration was having both informal talks with Arab diplomats at the 
UN in New York and formal group meetings with Arab Ambassadors at the State 
Department in Washington.799 On the edge of the Gaza Strip, Burns also began to 
think of the administrative functions the UN was to take over. He was only informed 
that it would be a matter of some weeks necessary to negotiate a more permanent 
arrangement with Egypt.800      
Over the month of February, the Eisenhower administration kept the pressure on 
Israel, having the State Department legal experts do legal battle against their Israeli 
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counterparts. In the last week of February, Israel eventually softened its stand on in 
the Gaza Strip, although it refused to the let the UN force deploy on the Israeli side of 
the ADL, arguing that it had nothing to do on Israel sovereign soil. Both Washington 
and Hammarskjold had at this point accepted that it was necessary to safeguard 
Israel’s right to use both the Suez Canal, which Egypt had prevented on and off since 
1948, and the Gulf of Aqaba, and that the UN was needed to do so. However, they 
needed someone to put that, as well as the Israeli right to intervene if the UN 
arrangement were to break down, into a UN resolution. The French government fit 
the bill and did so when ‘asked’ by the Eisenhower administration. In doing so, France 
returned to the fold of the Western alliance.801 On the 1st of March, the US embassy 
in Tel Aviv received a phone call from the Israeli Foreign Ministry declaring that Ben-
Gurion had decided to withdraw and instructed Moshe Dayan, the Commander of the 
IDF, to meet the UN Commander who was waiting outside Gaza Strip with the UN 
force composed of 6.000 soldiers primarily from NATO and Commonwealth member 
states.802 On the 4th of March, Burns cabled Cordier, who, rather instantly it seems, 
cabled the US State Department that the Israeli forces and civilian administrators 
would be out of Gaza by the 4th in the afternoon.803  
    
 
Riots and Redeployment in the Frontier Zone: A Failed 
Internationalisation?  
 
The UN Force Commander had been unsure what exactly his response was to be if 
the Egyptians demanded that their administrative officials and police be allowed to 
return (as they had done in El Tor and El Arish again after the UN had let them back 
into Port Said). In contrast, both the Eisenhower Administration and the Secretary-
General with his higher echelon of mainly American UN officials had both 
acknowledged and accepted that it was necessary that the UN provided “(…) a UN 
administration in Gaza, not of Gaza (…)”804 in the form of a “(…) ‘marriage’ of 
UNEF and UNRWA (…)”805 within the Armistice framework so as to allow Egyptian 
consent. However, Burns felt under-informed. In the days prior to the notification by 
the Israeli forces, he tellingly not only requested the UNRWA to send experts on 
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judicial and police matters, public health, and finance,806 but also sought and failed to 
obtain American and British manuals on military government of occupied enemy 
territories from the end of the Second World War, a fact of which he did not find 
problematic and therefore noted in his memoirs.807 Making policy ‘on-the-go’ having 
focused on the Suez Canal rather than the Gaza Strip, Hammarskjold and the 
Eisenhower administration agreed that Israel had to accept the deployment of the UN 
force on the Israeli side the of ADL. This idea would become impossible to realise. 
Moreover, as the Israelis began to prepare their departure (despite having Israeli 
tourists visiting, presumably to link the land to Israel mentally)808 the Palestinians 
began to provoke and in a few cases attack the Israeli forces with homemade bombs, 
hand grenades, and small arms in public places, to which the Israeli forces responded 
with more than 200 arrests just before the withdrawal.809 However, much to the 
frustration of Hammarskjold and the Eisenhower administration, Israel also caused 
trouble in the sphere of finances. Tel Aviv was not only contesting Burns’ instructions 
to exchange Israeli pounds for Egyptian ones, but also refusing to hand over the 
money the Israeli forces had seized in the Arab Bank of Gaza, in other words, a large 
part of the holdings of the Palestinian locals and refugees.810 Complicating matters for 
the UN force Commander further, they came to disagree on how long the UN was to 
stay in the Gaza Strip. The Secretary-General foresaw only a two-month operation in 
the Gaza Strip due to the lack of Israeli willingness to let forces deploy to the Israeli 
side of the ADL whereas the Eisenhower administration favoured a longer-term UN 
presence.811 Southwest of Rafah on the edge of the Gaza Strip, Burns also added to 
the confusion of what was to happen politically. Having been told to expect a few 
weeks, he spoke merely of an un-defined ‘period’ when he requested a meeting with 
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the UNRWA leadership in Beirut to discuss further how to deal with the envisaged 
responsibility of the civil administration of the Gaza Strip.812 Whether or not due to 
the input of his military observers that had fed him both political and military 
intelligence on the Gaza Strip since the end of January, Burns was more certain of 
what to do in the military sphere. While he does not offer any things in his memoirs, 
those of a Danish soldier do in noting how the UN force was to occupy the Gaza Strip. 
Once again, the battalions of Yugoslavia and India, the political friends of Egypt, were 
to operate in unpopulated areas along the International Frontier or small villages such 
as Deir El Ballah. Again being placed somewhere in the middle, the Brazilian and 
Columbian battalions were to take more important areas around the medium-sized 
town of Khan Yunis. Finally, the battalion of the two Scandinavian NATO-members, 
some of whom at this point had come to adopt the Orientalist view of the ‘Arabs’ as 
primitive, lazy and untrustworthy (as admitted by one of the soldiers writing a 
memoir), took the most important and populated areas around Gaza City to the north 
while the Canadian technical units remained in the also relatively large town of Rafah 
to the South along with the Swedish Battalion, once again promoting the ambiguity 
of a ‘white’ colour line.813 
Regardless of the lack of complete agreement (and accordingly a single overall 
plan), it became time for UNEF to take over the control of the Gaza Strip. It had been 
agreed that this was to take place on the evening and night between the 6th and 7th of 
March under the Israeli curfew to avoid conflicts. Consequently, the UN observers 
could report how the Israelis extended their tank patrols in Gaza City just as the US 
Sixth Fleet moved closer to the beaches, most probably in case US support of UNEF 
began entering the Gaza Strip a few hours before midnight with a massive presence 
of journalists was needed.814 Having no maps of the Gaza Strip let alone a larger plan 
beyond moving into the Gaza Strip, the Danish commander of the joint Danish-
Norwegian battalion, who once again had been put at the front with his ‘white’ 
battalion, felt his force was literally scrambling in the dark when the initial Israeli 
police officers left them on their own to search for the buildings Burns considered 
necessary to control the Gaza Strip such as those of the UNRWA, the city halls, the 
Gaza train station, the police stations and the telegraph station. Moreover, the Israeli 
forces were not very helpful until Dayan showed up in person, presumably to avoid 
further loss of goodwill in Washington and New York. By the morning of the 7th of 
March, the Israeli forces had withdrawn and the UN forces had begun to move towards 
Sharm El Sheik and into all the towns of the Gaza Strip (and thus expand the frontier 
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zone), using only what little knowledge the Israeli forces had passed on during the 
night-time deployment.815  
As the UN force moved into the different parts of the Gaza Strip, the UN soldiers 
were forced to process another Middle Eastern location both different and similar 
from the others they had seen. Some noticed the small villages and others the villa 
neighbourhoods in the larger towns, others the refugee camps. However, some of the 
Danish soldiers were puzzled with the anger they had previously met from 
Palestinians students from the Gaza Strip in El Arish as the aid provided by the 
UNRWA granted the Palestinian refugees with what the Danes saw as decent housing, 
better clothes and free schooling. Rather than finding sympathy for the Palestinian 
refugees, they appear to initially have taken a hostile view. This sense of confusion 
was not helped insofar as a few Palestinians fired some shots and threw some hand 
grenades at some UNRWA depot buildings to see if they would be able to get 
materials and foodstuffs for themselves.816 More important for the relations between 
the people of the Gaza Strip, whether refugees or original residents, and the UN Force, 
however, the UN units distributed an Arab translation of a proclamation from Burns 
that had been approved from UN HQ in New York. Firm and unforthcoming, it 
declared to the Palestinians that not only that “(…) maintaining quiet (…)” and the 
“(…) responsibility for civil affairs in the Gaza Strip (…)” was the mandate of the 
UN force, but also that they should “(…) remain quiet (…)”, “(…) remain law-
abiding and orderly (…)”, and “(…) not carry arms or explosives (…)”.817 
Additionally, the declaration also ordered the Palestinians to refer their needs to their 
camp leaders, mayors, and village elders, the Mukhtars, rather than the UN. Perhaps 
telling of the views in the US, the military takeover, argued Hamilton Fish Armstrong, 
the Washington-insider and editor of the American Foreign Affairs, who was to be 
found amongst the internationals waiting at the edge of the Gaza Strip, was “(…) 
admirably executed (…)”.818  
However, the UN’s attempt to simultaneously fully internationalise the Gaza Strip 
would prove impossible. Unsurprisingly, the lack of a plan of how to more specifically 
take over the responsibility of civil affairs in the Gaza Strip (besides having Israel 
withdraw) would mark the first few days. With Ralph Bunche scheduled to arrive to 
discuss the further process with the Egyptian government, the UN force had arrived 
with only a minor ‘entourage’ of UNRWA experts and UN technical assistance 
experts, the latter from US sponsored projects in Egypt and no formal guidelines to 
go by.819 The UN force was accordingly from the outset insufficiently equipped for a 
civilian administration and thus forced to install a number of military governors in the 
different towns. These governors were ordered to ‘normalise’ the situation in part by 
promoting the formation of new councils with other political representatives than 
those endorsed by the Israeli occupation regime and sharing authority for security with 
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the police.820 As part of this process, the UN Force Commander made the police 
station in Gaza City the headquarters of the UN force. Tellingly, the police station 
was heavily fortified, strategically located and mostly self-contained and had small 
windows and gun slits, as it had been built as one of the 60 forts the British mandate 
regime had built all over Palestine following the Palestinian Revolt from 1936 to 
1939.821 The prisoners in the prison attached to the police station rioted the same night, 
as the UN had failed to initiate the scheduled release of approximately 300 of the 
nearly 350 prisoners as these were believed to be political prisoners from the Israeli 
occupation. The UNEF reacted the only way it knew how to. Having been designated 
to several locations in Gaza City including the police station/prison by the UN 
Commander, the Danish soldiers took centre-stage once again. On the first day the 
UN ruled the Gaza Strip, used warning shots, tear gas and batons. The prisoners most 
probably thought that the UN soldiers had merely picked up where the Israeli soldiers 
left and that they were to remain locked up, given that the combined police station and 
prison had been the strongest symbol of both the British presence in the area from 
1920 to 1948 and the Israeli presence from November 1956 to March 1957.822  
The UN force fared little better outside the prison/police station/UNEF HQ. As 
the Danish Military Governor recalls, the work of the new councils instantly came to 
a halt, allegedly since at least one Mayor had taken to Egypt for instructions. Due to 
the words of his informants, who may have exaggerated to ensure payment, the UNEF 
governor dismissed any other explanation than Egyptian influence.823 The Canadian 
UN Force Commander, his Swedish Chief of Staff and the Danish Battalion 
Commander, another Swedish UN officer and the American foreign policy pundit 
Armstrong all, whether true or not, suggest that Egypt sent in subversive agents with 
the sole aim of countering the return of the Gaza Strip to Egyptian control.824 
Predictably, the advisor to the Egyptian President, Muhammad Heikal, made no 
mention of Egyptian influence.825 Regardless of Egyptian influence or not, people 
gathered to demonstrate the morning after the prison riot. However, rather than 
amassing in front of the former British police station/priso, people gathered in front 
of one of the other Danish quarters, a former Palestinian school. Accordingly, the 
soldiers removed most of the furniture from the classrooms to make a barricade in the 
courtyard. By midday, the soldiers of the infantry company holding the school felt 
that the crowd soon counted more than a thousand people. The demonstration, 
however, passed without only a few minor shootings in joy and one incident of a 
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Danish soldier nearly being robbed of his rifle. Expecting the worst, the Danish 
infantry companies nevertheless fortified their sites with sandbag positions and barbed 
wire and, perhaps more indicatively of how they viewed the situation and their own 
role, placed heavy machineguns on the roof of the school and adopted a posture of 
combat readiness, meaning that all soldiers walked around with all personal weapons, 
all of their ammunition as well as additional tear gas grenades. When one of these 
locations was fired upon both during the night and the following day, the 8th of March, 
the Danish military governor of Gaza City consequently outlawed weapons held 
without permit, again drawing attention to the Danish-Norwegian battalion. During 
the day, another demonstration took place. While it didn’t escalate into violent 
encounters, the day would see tension escalate. At the demonstration, several young 
Palestinians taunted the (also mostly young) Danish soldiers by pressing their chests 
into the rifle barrels of the Danes. Additionally, Yugoslavian soldiers cheered the 
Egyptian-Yugoslavian leaders with the demonstrators, which prompted the UN Force 
Commander to redeploy the unit to El Arish, effectively keeping predominantly pro-
Western ‘white’ units to control the strategic and heavily populated areas of the Gaza 
Strip. In the evening, paramilitaries also fired upon the Coptic neighbourhood in Gaza 
City, most probably a response to actual or imagined collaboration with the Israelis. 
As an even stronger signal to the UN, the villa of UN Force Commander was also 
fired upon. Neither group of shooters were apprehended, leaving the UN force with 
little actual evidence.826 While Egypt may well have had political operatives or 
Fedayeen units acting on orders, it seems far more likely that the Egyptian presence 
at this point was aimed at monitoring the situation. Instigating incidents that could 
have caused a broader Palestinian revolt against the joint UNEF and UNRWA rule of 
the Gaza Strip would most probably have resulted in a second Israeli occupation by 
the forces that at least the Danish soldiers heard rumours of being amassed (or rather 
not dispersed).827 At this point, Egypt was not ready for another war with Israel. Not 
surprisingly, the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee came to agree that 
the operation best not discussed in the General Assembly as it was “(…) on thin ice 
(…)”828 as Hammarskjold put it, since UNEF could be seen as having started to 
operate beyond what had been authorised. 
The next morning, the Swedish Chief of Staff banned both demonstrations in any 
form and all larger meetings.829 This, however did not reduce tension. If the memoirs 
of a Danish soldiers is anything to go by, the situation grew more futile. A 
demonstration that the Danish Military Governor approved as an exemption soon 
escalated out of control. Consequently, the Danish units were ordered to put on 
helmets, use tear gas grenades, and fire warning shots, before finally attaching 
bayonets. After a Palestinian was hit by (and eventually died from) a ricocheting 
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warning shot, others began to throw stones and the Danes arresting people, using their 
boots, elbows, rifle barrels and even rifle butts. Even the UN company officers had 
their pistols drawn. Eventually, the Danish Company Commander had a platoon 
advance in a line, combining bayonets thrusts and waves of warning shots over the 
crowd. At this point, even the soldiers on kitchen duty and off duty joined the ranks 
in helmets and kitchen clothes or underwear. A steel-helmeted Norwegian platoon 
also joined in while a Brazilian battalion was also called on. As the riot was put down, 
UN guards were placed all over the area to show that the UN remained in control.830 
Whether or not a form of path dependency from the British and Israeli eras clashing 
with the Egyptian attempt of re-asserting its influence, the opening of a relationship 
between a new regime-in the-making and its new host population was not ideal. Once 
again, the Gaza Strip inhabitants, original residents and refugees alike—whom had all 
already been severely tested by the three months of Israeli occupation with massacres, 
camp screenings and mass arrests—experienced what appeared to be another mainly 
‘white’ power take over where the Israelis had left and begin to regulate how they 
could act and organise themselves publicly. The reactions of the local population and 
Egypt were as predictable as they were defining of the situation.  
Realising that a Palestinian revolt in the Gaza Strip could potentially cause another 
war with Israel at this point, the Egyptian president had little choice but to send back 
an Egyptian Administrative Governor and disregard Bunche who, upon arriving in the 
afternoon on the day of the riot, insisted the UN keep control. Bunche accepted.831 As 
the Governor had an administrative role with undefined duties, Hammarskjold saw 
Egypt leaving a margin for negotiation with the UN. Yet, as Hammarskjold 
recognised, the UN could not challenge the Armistice Agreement, as Egypt was 
entitled to administrate the area as it saw fit.832 However, he maintained that the force 
had and was still within the limits of international law.833 Nasser did, however, agree 
to Bunche’s demands that neither Fedayeen nor Egyptian military units would operate 
in Gaza Strip before the Egyptian Governor-General arrived on the 14th of March, 
marking after only a week of UN rule the end to any UN interim rule and all Israeli 
hopes for a ‘non-Egyptian’ solution.834  
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Becoming a Frontier-Regime: ‘Connecting Dots across Time and 
Space at the ADL 
 
In its first week in the Gaza Strip, UNEF had failed to convince both the Egyptian 
government and the Palestinians that it would act as ‘welcome visitors rather than 
rulers’ as banners had read the first day in the Gaza Strip.835 By the time the Egyptian 
Governor arrived, the local media in the Gaza Strip was, not surprisingly, reporting 
that the UN’s abuse of power had led Nasser to demand that the force be withdrawn, 
whether this was so or not. Residents also paraded with that message at the Governor’s 
arrival until he told the crowd that the UN force was to be considered a friendly force 
in full cooperation with the Egyptian administration. Additionally, the Yugoslavian 
battalion refused to serve in the Gaza Strip without the Egyptian government renewing 
its permission. In agreement with UN HQ in New York, the UN Force Commander 
accordingly sent the unit back to El Arish.836 From un-specified sources, Burns also 
learnt that the Egyptian President may not have agreed to the part of the agreement 
with the UN that laid out the UN’s functions in the Gaza Strip were to be exclusive in 
the first instance and that this had not reached the Secretary-General.837 This may well 
have been the case and thus supportive of the claims of these memoirs of UNEF 
officers and soldiers that the first demonstrations had felt rigged and been well 
supplied with Egyptian flags and posters of Nasser. However, it should also be clear 
that the Gaza Strip Palestinians, at least in part, marked their discontent with the 
actions of UNEF that probably appeared to them as similar to the British mandate 
regime and partly also the Israeli regime. Had the majority of the Palestinians wanted 
a UN administration, which Burns claims at least a little minority wanted,838 Egypt 
would also have faced a revolt at some point. The Palestinians, especially the refugees, 
had been exposed to a genocide that had led to expulsion from their villages, an 8-year 
long state of dislocation, widespread trauma combined with overcrowding and 
poverty, and the humiliation of depending on external support systems for survival 
and education. While many were not yet organised in ways that could support a 
sustained political campaign or revolt, the potential was there. Despite being mostly 
poor dependents individually, the combined mass of the approximately 300.000 
Palestinians of the Gaza Strip was a political force in its own right to be reckoned with.  
With the Suez Canal clearance at stake, the Secretary-General had to go to Egypt. 
Before he left for Cairo to meet with the Egyptian President, he therefore held a 
meeting with the Advisory Committee. For once disagreeing with the Canadian 
representative at the meeting—which the Brazilian member called a “(…) special 
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session of disagreements (…)”839—Hammarskjold explained that he was keen to get 
the force to the ADL, away from the task of internal security. To the amazement of 
the Committee (and not hitherto noted in any research), the Secretary-General 
nevertheless also made it clear that he saw the UN entitled to take enforcement action 
through the Security Council and all means available in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter 
such as placing additional military forces in the Gaza Strip, if Egypt continued to 
sanction raids and incursions into Israel. He, however, also recognised they had yet to 
deal with issues such as the question of whether UNEF would be able to use force in 
a military or police capacity and how UNEF was to deal with the security of the 
UNRWA staff, which the head of the UNRWA, the American Labouisse, had noted 
UNEF should be concerned with.840    
In the Gaza Strip, the UN Commander took to reorganising the force in the days 
following the Egyptian Governors’ arrival. He had already sent the Yugoslavian 
battalion back to Egypt to have them patrol the still not yet fully settled Egyptian-
Israeli border, the International Frontier, instead of the Swedish battalion. He also 
redeployed the Danish infantry companies from downtown Gaza City to the edges of 
the city and Beit Hanun further to the north, probably realising that not doing so would 
overstay their welcome and potentially lead to new riots. As the Egyptian controlled 
police began to take over the maintenance of order and three quarters of the force had 
been designated for guarding ‘vulnerable points’ (such as police stations, water 
pumping installations and power stations) within the Gaza Strip, additional forces 
were also redeployed to the edge of the Gaza Strip.841  
Here, two things are worth noting. First, Burns still managed to ensure support 
from both New York and Cairo to bring in the Canadian reconnaissance squadron 
(whose deployment he had previously negotiated only with Canadian diplomatic 
personnel in Cairo). This was no small feat considering what had already happened in 
the Gaza Strip.842 Second, the return of the Egyptian governor and Egyptian-controlled 
police and the redeployment of the force did not fundamentally change the primary 
task of policing the Armistice Demarcation Line. There had been a focus on the UN 
running the Gaza Strip for an interim phase earlier: what changed was merely a 
cancelation of the interim UN administration and an earlier turn to cooperation with 
the Egyptian-controlled police than imagined. In late January, for example, Burns’ 
ADL policing plans had revolved around four infantry battalion areas near the towns 
of Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah and Deir El Ballah.843 In February (and thus still before 
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UNEF entered the Gaza Strip), his plans had been elaborated by a proposal from two 
EIMAC military observers from New Zealand and the US. They suggested several 
methods that, when combined, would reduce crossings between the Gaza Strip and 
Israel. First was a proposal of a series of permanent or semi-permanent barbed-wired 
watch towers with living accommodations and underground defensive positions along 
the ADL. Then followed a call for the ADL to be marked by a full-length fence, fences 
in trouble-areas, a full-length bull-dosed trench, or a series of dispersed concrete 
markers. Additionally, the scheme suggested a 100-yard zone on both sides of the 
ADL that no Palestinian, Egyptian or Israeli units or individuals would have the right 
to access. A road should also cut through this zone to allow the UNEF to conduct 
motorised, mounted and foot patrols (with automatic weapons and dogs) both day and 
night. Finally, the force was suggested to have an aerial reconnaissance component.844 
Already upon receiving the scheme, Burns appears to have seen it as a ‘maximum’ 
regime. He declined to adopt the proposal in full, finding that not all, but “(…) some 
of Colonel Brown’s suggestions may be quite useful.”845. As Burns noted in his 
memoirs (in 1962), his concerns had mostly revolved around credibility, or the right 
to fire rather than only challenge.”846 Accordingly, he settled for rotating units between 
battalion camps not in but near Gaza City, Khan Yunis, Rafah and Deir El Bellah and 
smaller company and platoon-sized operational camps near the ADL. Not sure how to 
balance concretely credibility and the rules of engagement on the ADL, however, he 
informed Hammarskjold of his concerns when the latter came to Egypt. 
Hammarskjold (and Burns) subsequently met Nasser and his foreign policy 
officials.847 According to the proposal Burns had received from the UN military 
observers, the entire General Armistice Agreement would have had to be renegotiated 
had they come to a written agreement making fundamental jurisdictional changes in 
the Gaza Strip (or in Israel).848 Once Burns had rejected an Egyptian idea for joint 
patrols between the Egyptian-controlled police and UNEF, a verbal agreement on 
‘cooperation’ was therefore reached. Reflecting the Gaza Strip’s suspended 
sovereignty, the arrangement allowed UNEF to control a zone between the Gaza Strip 
and Israel on the Gaza side of the ADL of 100 meters during the day and 500 meters 
during the night in which it would be allowed to defend itself against hostile action by 
firing, if necessary, and to take into custody people to promptly turn them over to the 
local police. For their part, the Egyptian authorities were to prevent people from 
entering the zone and Israel, reinstate penalties for crossing into the latter, and have 
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the police cooperate closely with UNEF. Although no formal publication would take 
place, both parties would inform the Gaza population.849  
However, the agreement between the Secretary-General and the Egyptian 
government not only dictated how the Egyptian-controlled police, the UN force and 
the UNRWA were to order and regulate the space of the Gaza Strip and the mobilities 
of the people in it. Unknowingly and unintentionally, it strengthened the link between 
UNEF, its functions and setup (and thus also the UN) and those of the British mandate 
(and thereby also the British Empire) beyond the existing ties. The UNEF concept—
which by then had come to consist of nearly 6.000-man strong force with light infantry 
units, armoured reconnaissance units, light aircraft and the EIMAC observers mostly 
living separately from the society it was to take part in regulating—also closely 
resembled that which recent research shows the British Colonial Office and Mandate 
regime were headed towards by the late 1940s: A growing militarisation in terms of 
the origin and training of the force, the use of aircraft and armoured vehicles, larger 
units with increasingly younger men, the growing separation from society and the 
challenge of building up knowledge. Upon taking over Palestine, the British mandate 
disbanded the municipal police and gendarmerie manned mostly by Palestinians, 
instead installing a force of British soldiers who had fought both in the First World 
War and the Irish war for independence. Over the 1920s, this force was turned into the 
(more) regular Palestine Police Force with Jewish settlers and Palestinians and—
reflecting British thinking on imperial policing—support from two squadrons of 
armoured cars and an Airforce squadron of aircraft. However, the Palestinian revolt in 
1929 led to a temporary enlargement of the 2.000-man force with approx. 20.000 
soldiers, some of which stayed on as police reserves after the revolt. The Palestinian 
revolt from 1936 to 1939 further militarised both Palestine and the force. Palestine 
became a military geography with the aforementioned series of police forts while the 
force began to recruit soldiers, dress them in khaki and give them military weapons, 
equipment, vehicles, and tasks as manning roadblocks, searching for weapons and 
making arrests. During the Second World War, the force became an army-equipped 
mobile strike force. The post-war Jewish settler terrorism forced about a concept of a 
larger force with improved intelligence-gathering capacities and engaged in police-
military cooperation, which was spread to other rebelling British colonies.850 Thus, 
when UNEF was formed 8 years after the dismemberment of the Gaza Strip from the 
rest of Palestine (that the new Jewish settler colonial state of Israel for the most part 
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took over), the concept—of a cooperative, militarily trained and equipped force of 
young men living separately from society split in stationary and mobile strike forces 
in self-contained bases—was clearly not a novel new UN formula, but rather a tried 
and tested British imperial method. The main difference was that it was now the UN 
and the Egyptian government that had to ‘rule’ the Palestinians.  
As is broadly accepted amongst imperial historians, imperial formations, whether 
American or British and otherwise, depend(ed) on systems of both destruction and 
knowledge.851 A frontier-regime linked to the British model of imperial policing, the 
UN force was obviously no different in that it also needed to engage in gaining, 
building, storing and using knowledge. Although the UN force failed to have such a 
system in place in March, the proposal the UN military observers with the EIMAC 
had sent the Force Commander in late January 1957 emphasized the need to build a 
system that were to combine maps, aircraft, the EIMAC military observers, the patrol 
regime at the ADL and as part thereof the chain of observation towers. 
As for maps, Burns had had the military advisor to the UN Secretary-General, the 
Finnish General Martola, and the military observers in the Gaza Strip search not only 
the UK, the former mandate power, but also its colony of Cyprus, Israel and the US 
for at least 50 (strategic/operational level) for maps scaled 1:100.000 and at least 100 
(tactical level) maps scaled 1:25.000 from late January.852 In Mid-February, UNEF 
staff picked up 150 map sets with 1.800 sheets at the British Army Headquarters in 
Nicosia in Cyprus with a UNEF aircraft, thus tapping directly into the knowledge base 
of British Empire to build its own.853 Indeed, the British smaller-scale maps had their 
origins in the Palestinian revolt in the 1930s.854 Indeed, as argued by the historian of 
imperial knowledge systems James Hevia, military maps emerged to serve both as 
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strategic information displays and as tactical support for the imperial regulatory and 
disciplinary regimes as a result of the evolving imperial knowledge system’s union of 
science, management and information storage over the 19th century.855 Although the 
maps in extension thereof were tools intended to assist the UN force in taking over the 
Gaza Strip initially and then build an ADL regime, the UN force never got the maps 
to the people that needed them in time for the take-over of the Gaza Strip, leaving the 
leading Danish-Norwegian battalion ‘blind’ and forced to rely on inadequate Israeli 
information. If anything, the lack of maps made clear that UNEF was in desperate 
need of its own knowledge system.  
Initially used to transport Burns between Egypt and the Gaza Strip to meet Israeli 
military officials to coordinate the takeover of the Gaza-Strip and supplies (as well as 
maps), the light (Canadian) aircraft of the UN force were later used to supplement the 
Canadian battalion that Burns tasked with patrolling the International Frontier 
between Egypt and Israel and later also the Yugoslavian battalion following its refusal 
to serve in the Gaza Strip not long after the riots. As were the cases with the structure 
and composition of the force and the maps, the use of reconnaissance aircraft in the 
Middle East had, as mentioned briefly above, also evolved out of the need to police 
nomad populations to curb their capacities to defy authority in both the British and 
French mandates.856 
The military observers of the Egyptian-Israeli Military Armistice Commission had 
since 1948 been part of the General Armistice Agreement (with equivalents along the 
other Israeli borders). Still, the integration of the 8 Western and ‘white’ EIMAC 
military observers that had been in the Gaza Strip during the Israeli occupation and 
the new team after Burns had suggested the Secretary-General to do so upon UNEF 
entering the Gaza Strip, can also be seen as a parallel to the Mandate regime’s 
investigative branch, the Criminal Investigation Department (that Egypt kept active in 
both Egypt and the Gaza Strip). Indeed, these observers would serve as UNEF’s 
investigators of incident in the no-movement zone, writing up incidents reports that 
would gradually become a repository of knowledge for the force, providing micro-
insights into the dynamics of the Gaza Strip.857  
As for the last element of the UNEF knowledge system, the patrol and observation 
tower regime with 72 observation posts on the 59-kilometre-long ADL and the aerial 
and motorised patrol regime on the 200-kilometre-long IF was in place by early April. 
Interestingly, this dimension of the UNEF knowledge system resembled not only the 
British mandate regime in its wish to gather information to generate intelligence, but 
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also a more intense version of the Jewish pre-Israeli colonial settlements in that 
observation towers as means to monitor and dominate surrounding territory had been 
hallmarks of these (and partly so after 1948). Compared to the thinly dispersed and 
only just connected pre-Israeli settlements, the UN towers, albeit smaller than 
settlements, surrounded the entire Gaza Strip, leaving in theory no part of the ADL 
unwatched with an average distance of 300-500 meters between them and overlapping 
lines of sight.858 In extension of argument that the redeployment to the ADL from mid-
March made little to no difference, Burns made only minor changes to the contingents’ 
(area of) responsibilities in the establishment phase. Parts of the Brazilian and Swedish 
battalions, for example, switched places, letting the Brazilians take over a part of the 
ADL and the no-movement zone and the Swedes take over as guards for the UNEF 
depot in Rafah and the UN HQ, the residence of the civilian female UNEF staff, and 
the Commander’s villa in Gaza City. However, the Swedes were also to guard the 
UNRWA hospital in Rafah and several UNRWA stores all over the Gaza Strip in a 
capacity as ‘aid to civil power’ using the same system (and phrase) the British mandate 
had used to provide guards and/or help maintain order.859  
Once in place, the units of the real-time UN monitoring and regulatory system 
began reporting the incidents on their day and night patrols or near their observation 
posts in the form of coded signals or report codes via the UNEF field telephone 
network, most probably generating more information than the EIMAC observers and 
the civilian UNEF administration even if they would often fail to catch and altogether 
miss people crossing the ADL (leaving footprints).860 As will be clear in both the 
following section (and chapter), however, the UNEF regime was not only similar to—
and troubled like—the British Mandate regime, it would also (unintentionally) come 
to favour the Israel state as the British Mandate had (intentionally) favoured the Jewish 
colonial settlements. 
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The Relationships between UNEF and Israel, the IDF and the 
Israeli Settlers, 1957-1967 
 
Mirroring the simultaneous resentment of the British and need for them to expand the 
colonial settlements during the Mandate era and provide military training,861 many 
Israelis disliked the UN from 1948 despite the fact that Israel in part owed its 
establishment to the UN and had benefitted from the General Armistice Agreement. 
Until 1956, this feeling stemmed not only from the fact that the UN didn’t condemn 
the attack on Israel in 1948 and the sense that the Military Armistice Commissions 
violated Israeli sovereignty. It was also rooted in the growing tension between the 
Secretary-General-General since 1952, Dag Hammarskjold, and the Israeli Prime 
Minister, David Ben-Gurion, due to the founding of what was probably a disguised 
military settlement in the demilitarised zone in the Sinai and the inability of the 
Security Council to intervene on Israel’s behalf in relation to the use of the Suez Canal; 
the Fedayeen attacks; and the deadly exchanges between Israeli and Egyptian forces 
in the mid-1950s. From early November 1956, the UN and the Eisenhower 
administration also put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and the Gaza 
Strip.862 Many had also seen the redeployments to ADL after the march-riots in Gaza 
City as UNEF’s defeat. Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that the Israelis did not 
treasure the UN soldiers at first. Indeed, they were disappointed with UNEF from mid-
March, as many of the Gaza Strip Palestinians were able to return to their former 
villages, visit family and friends, reclaim or steal equipment and so on in Israel.863  
However, it appears that the hostility was less intense in the part of the Gaza Strip 
patrolled by the Danish and Norwegian units, as the Danish and Norwegian soldiers 
gained sympathy for the Israelis and vice versa already from mid- March. A Danish 
officer noted in his published diary how their skills in English or German and 
forthcoming manner led to greetings and soon chatting. It probably also helped that 
the Israeli units sported female soldiers. By late March, the UN Force Commander 
found soldiers from the Danish-Norwegian battalion playing soccer with Israeli 
soldiers near the ADL, a breach of UNEF regulations. Nevertheless, the interactions 
continued, if not intensified with regular friendly conversations and exchanges of 
coffee, much to the concern of UNEF HQ, as Egypt could require the hard fought for 
Danish contingent changed for fraternisation.864 The ties between the soldiers, 
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however, went beyond shared languages and military experience. There were also ties 
through the expansion and modernisation of Israeli agriculture, which the Israeli 
adaption of tractors in the longer history of the use of colonial experts, DDT and 
swamp-draining were the most visible signifier of at the ADL. This link was probably 
most obvious to the Danish soldiers, as they came from a country with a large 
agricultural sector also being modernised.865 However, the Danish and Norwegian 
soldiers also came from countries in which Israel stood as a ‘beacon of democracy’, 
and whose governments had supported Israel politically at the UN, labour unions had 
developed close ties, and not least, former Second World War resistance members had 
sent their weapons to the new state in 1948.866 In any case, the ties between the 
‘DANOR’ soldiers and the Israeli soldiers and settlers strengthened. One of the Danish 
units went from greets, occasional soccer games and frequent chats and coffees to 
accepting invitations to visit a nearby kibbutz and receiving tips from the Israeli 
soldiers on the ways Palestinians crossed the ADL, thus expanding the spectrum of 
fraternisation.867 
Despite this warming in relations between the DANOR units and the Israelis, the 
Israeli government complained to the UN that Palestinians were still entering Israel, 
or ‘infiltrating’ as it was termed in Israel. Upon receiving the Israeli complaint and 
still clearing the Suez Canal, the UN suggested both the Israelis and the Egyptians to 
construct “(…) an effective obstacle of barbed wire and possibly mines along the ADL 
(…),868 as the EIMAC observers had suggested to Burns. The Egyptians offered a 
tepid response, as the Egyptian administration would feel the heat from the 
Palestinians. The Israelis liked the idea until it was realised a barbed wire fence would 
have to be placed on both sides of the ADL, something the Israeli government had 
flatly rejected earlier. The Israeli refusal thus gave the Egyptians some breathing 
space, but at the same time also left the ADL problem unsolved.869 This led to incidents 
that challenged not least the Danish soldiers’ naivety. In early April, some Danish 
soldiers witnessed two soldiers from an Israeli border unit take their jeep across the 
ADL ditch and shoot to scare the Palestinian shepherds that were attending their flocks 
on the Gaza Strip side. The disrespect the Israelis showed the Danish UNEF soldiers 
temporarily weakened their relationship. A week later, another Israeli border unit 
wounded a Palestinian trying to cross the ADL in front of the Danish soldiers.870   
Nonetheless, the Israeli soldiers and settlers near the ADL as well as the 
government came to appreciate the UN force as its abilities increased. A few days after 
                                                          
865 Jensen, Kompagni Larsen, 99; Sandra M Sufian, Healing the Land and the Nation: Malaria 
and the Zionist Project in Palestine, 1920-1947 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
866 Arthur Arnheim and Dov Levitan, Politik, diplomati og den hjælpende hånd: Danmark og 
oprettelsen af staten Israel (Kbh.: Museum Tusculanum, 2011); Hilde Henriksen Waage, “How 
Norway Became One of Israel’s Best Friends,” Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 2 (2000): 
189–211. 
867 Jensen, Kompagni Larsen, 99–100. 
868 E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 276. 
869 Ibid. 
870 Kjeldsen, Fredens soldater, 70–72. 
216 
 
216 
 
the cooling in relations, Danish soldiers aided by an Indian observation post detained 
a Palestinian stealing irrigation pipes from an Israeli settlement.871 Soon after, an 
Egyptian journal also displayed pictures of Danish soldiers meeting with Israeli 
soldiers for coffee, music and dancing inside the Gaza Strip, a stamp of approval of 
sorts. If the officer’s diary didn’t exaggerate, most Danish soldiers on the first Danish 
contingent also went to visit a kibbutz before they were exchanged over April, as an 
emerging ethos belittled those who didn’t.872 Since 1948, Israeli units had faced 
Palestinians using Egyptian and Israeli anti-vehicle and anti-tank mines as asymmetric 
retaliation rather than direct confrontation. Seeing Brazilians attacked this way, could 
therefore have suggested the Israelis that the Brazilians—also soldiers at the centre of 
another racialised post-imperial modernisation and state-building project—were to be 
appreciated: Clearly, they were not friends of the Palestinians. 873 Two weeks later, 
another Brazilian unit prevented a small group of Bedouin from bringing weapons into 
the Gaza Strip, probably improving their standing with the Israelis.874 In mid-April 
and early May, two Indonesian soldiers killed two Palestinians, perhaps letting the 
Israelis see the Indonesian units as useful, despite being Muslims.875 In mid-May, 
Colombian units also caught a Palestinian fleeing from an Israeli unit and a group of 
armed Palestinians crossing the ADL.876 In mid-June, two Danish patrols (from the 
new contingent) joined the Indonesian battalion in killing another unarmed 
Palestinian, which prompted an Israeli unit to hand over fresh strawberries to the 
specific Danish unit in approval. Three days later, another Danish unit not only caught 
another Palestinian, but also killed two others. Another Israeli unit appeared and noted 
to the Danes that the new turn in the Danish ADL regime was most welcome.877  
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By mid-June, these incidents were no longer isolated. Rather, they constituted a 
pattern. In much the same way some of the ‘white’ UNEF soldiers had identified with 
the British in El-Arish, many UN rank and file, NCO’s and officers from most if not 
all contingents to the IEMAC observers to the Force Commander himself, and thus 
UNEF at a broader level, not only saw the Palestinians as disorderly after the March 
1957-riots against the backdrop of the British discourses from the 1920s and 1930s. 
Many UNEF members in daily conversations, diaries, incident reports, and eventually 
memoirs also adopted the Israeli classification of Palestinians in- and outside Israel as 
‘Arabs’ and also those crossing into Israel as ‘Infiltrators’.878 Clearly, this was not just 
an issue of distancing the Palestinians by labelling them differently from the way they 
self-identified. In essence, these phrases echoed the pre-Israeli and Israeli Zionist 
settler colonial narratives. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe has shown these interwoven 
narratives as framing the Palestinians as alien bodies in the wrong places within the 
context of the Zionist plans to ‘heal the land’ by clearing out the ‘Arabs’; unruly pests 
resisting the Zionist plans; and as ‘infiltrators’ once they began to return to their former 
homes and villages no longer in Palestine, but the Zionist state settler colonial state of 
Israel.879  The Holocaust may also partly have led to a pro-Israeli current in the Nordic 
and Canadian contingents, but probably less so in, for example, the Indian contingent 
whose government could not reconcile with the Jewish dependency on the British 
Empire as well as the treatment of the Palestinians since the Mandate.880 Whether the 
Holocaust was a factor or not, the underlying narratives had clearly gained 
significance by mid-June insofar discourse translated into practice all along the ADL. 
Although the killings of Palestinians led to the enforcement of the Egyptian clause in 
the verbal agreement with the UN Secretary-General and the UN Commander that UN 
units should only fire when threatened, EIMAC investigators would be called out for 
incidents in which UN soldiers had fired whether threatened or not.881  
This practice, moreover, also manifested itself in the treatment of Israelis. Were 
Israelis to enter to no-movement zone, UNEF were to hand them over to the Egyptian-
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controlled police as they were to hand over Palestinians. Yet, the first Israeli held by 
UNEF in April was kept in a Danish camp for three weeks, until he escaped.882 In early 
June, Indonesian soldiers also entered Israel to help an Israeli squad that had hit a 
mine.883 A few weeks later, Danish and Norwegian soldiers unintentionally let either 
an Israeli soldier or settler, judging by the military-style approach and boot prints left 
in the sand, pass the ADL near a village with the result that a Palestinian boy was 
nearly killed by the hand grenade the Israeli ‘infiltrator’ threw into his room.884 More 
broadly, the influence of UNEF can perhaps be gaged by how Israel’s number of 
registered confrontations between Israeli border units and ‘infiltrators’— mostly 
Palestinians returning to their former homes in other words—had dropped by nearly 
16% from 5.713 to 4.801 a year after UNEF had established itself at the ADL.885 While 
the drop took place on all Israeli borders rather than only along the ADL that separated 
Israel and the Gaza Strip on the one hand, and Egypt, as noted, had promised to control 
the Fedayeen on the other, it seems sound to link the drop, at least in part, to the UN 
in the form of both the gradually more ‘efficient’ UNEF and UNRWA that was 
shifting from repatriation to improving camp conditions, providing schooling and 
channelling energy into inward-oriented political debates (rather than outward-
oriented Fedayeen activity) under Labouisse, the American Hammarskjold, as 
mentioned before, had handpicked.886 
The compliments from Israeli units in the early phase of UNEF’s establishment at 
the ADL may well have been instances of local initiative. Indeed, Ben-Gurion’s 
retaliation raids in the early and mid-1950s had resulted in a military culture that not 
only encouraged ‘self-authorisation’ for action and disobedience in all unit across 
sizes and across all ranks after these skirmishes, but also during the war of 1956.887 
This military culture was additionally reinforced by the extreme links scholars have 
shown between state, society and individual partly forged in the Mandate and partly 
after 1948. Israeli children grew up in a militarised society on constant military 
alertness and were indoctrinated by Zionist parents, teachers, games, children’s books 
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and media to put the state before themselves, to think Palestinians as primitive and 
criminal, to dream of conscription and see war as a rite of passage, and to join the 
youth pioneer movement building paramilitary and migrant camps near the borders.888 
Against the combination of militarisation from childhood, the similar tasks of keeping 
the ‘unruly’ Palestinians under control, and increasing personal relations, some Israeli 
soldiers and settlers may well have seen the UN soldiers in some sort of mirror image. 
However, other considerations make it likely that the UN ‘efficiency’ increased 
and that Ben-Gurion’s government was aware thereof. As Israeli scholar Eitan Barak 
has noted, Israel initially saw UNEF as “(…) a factor which would prevent military 
attacks, especially surprise ones.”889 Additionally, the first kibbutz visit by UNEF 
soldiers in March 1957 was, if one of the participating Danish soldier’s information 
was correct, cleared with the local Israel military authority.890 Again, this could be a 
local initiative. If the drop on confrontations were link to an increasingly ‘efficient’ 
UN regime (and the changing course of UNRWA), the UN gave Ben-Gurion what 
appears to be an internationally paid extra layer of border security after, as Israeli 
historian Guy Laron has shown, the Israeli middle class had been demanding better 
conditions at the expense of the standards in the migrant settlements near the borders 
and military spending for some time and the annexation of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai 
failed.891 In what can hardly be seen as a coincidence given the Israeli military’s 
censorship of the media, the Danish killings in June 1957 were mentioned in not one 
but several notices in the influential newspaper, the Jerusalem Post. One of the Danish 
camps even began to receive the newspaper when they caught (or killed) Palestinians 
on the ADL.892 Other contingents may have had similar experiences. Considering also 
the importance assigned to the un-armed and thinly manned armistice commissions 
from 1948 onwards, it appears that Ben-Gurion’s cabinet, as a minimum, followed 
UNEF closely, if not letting the local Israeli units interact with the force. The Israeli 
scholar Eitan Barak partially confirms this noting that Egypt launched a formal 
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complaint against UNEF for fraternising with Israeli units in 1958 and the apparent 
Israeli success of getting intelligence from a high-ranking UNEF in 1960.893  
As his predecessors in the Mandate had used the British, Ben-Gurion also sought 
to use the UN involvement when possible. The conflict between Israel, Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia about Israeli ships passing through the Straits of Tiran from 1951 was 
one such matter after 1956. Although Nasser promised Israeli ships de facto passage 
when Hammarskjold went in Cairo in mid-March 1957 (to discuss the Gaza Strip), he 
had Burns deploy an infantry company to the area, fearing another war between Israel 
and Egypt. Israel first let a Danish ship sail to Eilat with commercial goods and then 
an American vessel to transport Iranian crude to Eilat, which meant both using the 
Suez Canal and potentially provoking the US navy patrol in the area into action if 
Egypt, or Saudi Arabia, were to engage the tanker. Despite Saudi and Egyptian sabre-
rattling, Israel gained de facto passage rights that lasted a decade on basis of the UN-
facilitated understanding and the involvement of the UN, Hammarskjold and UNEF’s 
Sharm-el-Sheik contingent several times.894  
Israel also benefitted from UN involvement without knowing. As a response to 
Egypt and Syria’s formation of the United Arab Republic, Israel initiated military 
manoeuvrings in the Negev Desert in late 1958. Egypt reacted by sending forces from 
El-Arish to the IF without notifying UNEF. Once UNEF encountered these, the (then 
Indian) Chief of Staff was sent to argue that UNEF was responsible for patrolling the 
IF with its aircraft and (Yugoslavian and Canadian) reconnaissance units. Egypt ceded 
an exclusive patrol zone 5 kilometres wide by day and 2 kilometres by night. A few 
months later, in early 1959, the UN once again intervened to Israel’s benefits. Since 
the formation of the UAR in 1958, the Israeli air force had increased its aerial patrols 
as deterrence, reconnaissance, and perhaps also intimidation of the Palestinians in the 
Gaza Strip, something the UNEF could do little about. Sensibly, Egypt deployed 
fighter jets to El-Arish. Fearing that UNEF would be caught in an arms race on both 
sides of the ADL/IF, Hammarskjold spoke to Nasser.895 Yet, estimates from the 
Danish-Norwegian battalion alone still put 477 of the 1.157 sightings of Israeli 
fighters, or around 41%, as illegally entering Egypt and the Gaza Strip between April 
1959 and April 1961.896 Over February 1960, Israeli forces also engaged UAR forces 
in the Syrian part. Logically, the UAR sent about 50.000 soldiers and about 500 tanks 
and tank destroyers towards the Egyptian-Israeli IF. Caught by surprise, Israel sought 
Hammarskjold’s help. He declined, having already restrained Cairo—a government 
he, as noted earlier, strongly disliked—from reasonable defensive measures with 
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Soviet equipment after it had been not only attacked by Israel, France and Great 
Britain recently, but also denied weapons and loans by the West since the 1952-coup. 
That Israel had attempted to manipulate him into thwarting the Egyptian World Bank 
negotiations for a loan to expand the Suez Canal by Israel in 1959 only ensured that 
he spoke to the US, Great Britain and Egypt but not Israel to avert the crisis.897  
Until the war in 1967 (we now know as the Six Day War) broke out, the years from 
1961 appear to have brought no other crises on the Armistice Demarcation Line or the 
International Frontier significant enough to require the involvement of either the UN 
General Secretary in New York (and the US) or UNEF. Certainly, the UN took part in 
keeping the ‘unruly’ Palestinians inside the Gaza Strip and was ready to keep things 
from heating up on the IF. However, it appears to have been a question of the Egyptian 
and Israeli energies turning inwards in the name of modernisation and partly away 
from their borders to the broader region of the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian 
Gulf, most discernibly in the proxy-war Yemen, and to a smaller degree various 
central and north-eastern African states (and in Israel’s case also Iran, Syria after the 
collapse of the UAR in 1961, and the emerging European trade bloc). The energies of 
both governments were simply not tied to the Palestinians and each other (locally), as 
much as the problems and openings the Soviet Union and the US created via their 
military, political and economic aid that reflected their own regional designs. Moscow 
sought Egyptian (and later also Syrian) maintenance and supply areas in the short term 
and base rights in the long term to increase its Mediterranean power projection 
capabilities. On its part, Washington sought to keep the Soviet Union out of the region, 
maintain its grip on the regional oil supplying states, and finally ensure that both the 
British ally and the regional defence pact remained stable.898 
Most literature has, as shown, argued that UNEF was either the first (and 
successful) peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN, or, in the case of a few 
scholars from or residing in Israel, a failure to protect Israeli interests. Going beyond 
these—from the viewpoint of imperial and global history—cursory glances or deeply 
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embedded perspectives, I have in this chapter instead reviewed the UN intervention 
with a sensitivity to the deeper history of the region as well as the international system. 
In short, I argue that UNEF can be seen as a frontier zone of Western imperial 
multilateralism on basis of what can be summed up as three separate processes with 
their own dynamics that from late 1956 began to increasingly overlap. First, the 
broader process of Washington and Moscow vying for regional hegemony to either 
safeguard the Western European oil supply or to gain access to the Mediterranean 
furthered the UN down the path of mainly looking after Western interests it been on 
since 1942. Second, the UN got caught up into the highly volatile Israeli-Egyptian 
state of affairs between war and the absence of war, which tied the interests of both 
local actors to the those of the US and the USSR and thus also the UN. Thirdly, and 
an aspect that the following chapter will examine in further detail, the practice ‘on the 
ground’ of the UN intervention turned it into an ad hoc hybrid post-1945 extension of 
the British Mandate. This was not only a consequence of the expanding area of 
operations and jurisdiction from the Canal Area via the Sinai to the Gaza Strip, the 
ADL and IF. Practice also reflected deeper structural legacies from especially British 
configurations of imperial sovereignty, governance, and space. If unintentionally, the 
joint UN-regime of UNEF and UNRWA linked to the British Mandate regime and its 
technologies of power, being rooted in sovereignties in flux; an externally controlled 
social regime; the re-actualisation of certain ideas of gender and race; turning to the 
tested concept of a militarized police force of young men recruited from other parts of 
the frontier of imperial multilateralism whose struggle for control and authority shaped 
of shifting sensations of security and insecurity, in part linked to the military cultures 
of the contributing countries’ militaries, colonial militaries or intra-Western military 
cooperation.   
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Chapter 8: Postcoloniality? The UN and 
The Militarisation of Life in The Frontier 
Zone of Imperial Multilateralism, 1957-
1967 
 
Suggesting that both the structuralising dynamics and the everyday practice of the 
frontier of imperial multilateralism are best understood from ‘within’, I examine here 
the UN regime’s links to everyday life in the Gaza Strip, both in its own right from 
March 1957 to June 1967 and against the backdrop of the British configurations of 
imperial sovereignty, governance, and space. In other words, I explore and historicise 
how the UN tied into what the political geographers Richelle Bernazolli and Colin 
Flint see as the ‘everydayness’ of the practice of military power in specific places.899 
Inseparable from this, I also explore how young and old and male and female 
Palestinians—refugees and ‘natives’ alike—and Bedouin that traditionally moved 
between the Sinai and the Negev deserts sought to negotiate the practice of UNEF and 
its structural legacies in its regime of control and authority and ideas of gender and 
race in the spaces and practices of their everyday lives. To explore these mostly 
unmapped realities with more weight on the ‘negotiatedness’ of the UN presence ‘on 
the ground’ and the actors involved than in existing research900 (and the previous 
chapter in that it focused on the force itself and its relations to Israel), I examine three 
different spheres of life linking my theoretical framework of the frontier zone of 
imperial multilateralism, the Gaza Strip population and the UN contingents: 1) Land, 
2) (In)Security and 3) Labour and economic relations. Rather than seeing gender, race 
and age as only intersecting technologies of power and social categories, I see them 
as integral parts to everyday practice ‘on the ground’ more visible on certain occasions 
and places than others.901  
                                                          
899 Richelle Bernazzolli and Colin Flint, “Power, Place, and Militarism: Toward a Comparative 
Geographic Analysis of Militarization,” Geography Compass 3, no. 1 (2009): 493–411. 
900 Aside the military historian Michael Carroll (who offers a glorified national peacekeeping 
narrative on basis of interviews with Canadian soldiers), the anthropologist Ilana Feldman is 
the only scholar to have taken a marginal interest in the practices of UNEF. Despite also 
working on the Mandate era elsewhere, she fails, however, to historicise the UN intervention. 
Moreover, separating the UN intervention from the UNRWA regime, she sees the UN force 
only marginally involved in Gaza Strip everyday life; an interpretation (that despite being 
shared by Jean-Pierre Filiu, a historian of the Gaza Strip whom I also use), I cannot, as will be 
shown, agree with. Feldman, “Ad Hoc Humanity.” 
901 For more on race and gender, see also Briggs, Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and 
U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico; Green, Black Yanks in the Pacific; Kramer, The Blood of 
Government; Levine, Prostitution, Race & Politics – Policing Venereal Disease in the British 
Empire; Philippa Levine, Gender and Empire (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004); Price, Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific; Stoler, Carnal 
Knowledge and Imperial Power. 
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This approach (and structure of the chapter), however, is also related to how it is 
currently not possible to gain a full overview of all incidents in the ADL area that 
either led to detention or in some cases also death, and thus their seriousness, 
frequency and, not least, significance in relation to the emerging militant nationalism 
(as viewed from the Force). Additionally, the communication between the UN 
Secretary-General and his deputies and the Force Commander on the one hand and 
UNEF records produced after serious encounters between UN soldiers and residents 
of the Gaza Strip on the other, remain classified. In other words, an important part of 
the material from both the upper layer ‘on the ground’ and the UN HQ in New York 
is currently not available either. Nevertheless, the set of records that I do have access 
to is still a broad set of sources. The majority of the records of the Egyptian-Israeli 
Military Armistice Commission (EIMAC) and UNEF that remain in the UN archive 
are not only available, they also allow for the different types of relations and conflicts 
the UN regime entailed to be explored since the reports do not record mere random 
incidents but investigations when the regime and its practices caused harm, were 
challenged or failed to work. The material is thus in many ways generous enough to 
build a qualified and broad insight into everyday life and the negotiation of the regime 
of the UN force. For example, I consult unpublished and unused incident reports, 
statistics and cables of EIMAC observers who were added to UNEF; mostly hitherto 
unused internal communication, accident reports, labour documents and 
administrative materials from the UNEF Chief Administrative Officer, the Legal 
Advisor, and the Force Commander to mention just some; and the already consulted 
published memoirs of members of the UN force. Independently, these records provide 
glimpses of Gaza Strip everyday life. Combined, they allow for a critical appraisal of 
the UN regime from 1957 to 1967 when unpacked by way of contextual literature on 
the Mandate regime; Palestinian nationalism; Israel; the imperial struggle for regional 
hegemony in Cold War Middle East; and the troop contributing states.  
 
 
As Before (I)? Land Ownership and Usage as a Prism to 
understand the Negotiation of the UN Regime in the Gaza Strip 
 
In this section, I use land ownership and land usage as a prism to understand what the 
UN regime meant ‘on the ground’ and consequently how the different population 
groups of the Gaza Strip sought to negotiate its practices and impact(s) on their lives.  
As noted in the previous chapter, the Egyptian President and the UN Secretary-
General bypassed the existing Armistice framework, making instead a verbal 
agreement on the area of operations, functions and authority of the UN force in 
addition to the Status of Forces Agreement from February, which covered other 
aspects not only but mostly related to Egypt. As part of the verbal agreement UNEF 
was, as mentioned, to operate a 100-meter-wide zone of no-man’s-land on the Gaza 
Strip side of the ADL, which expanded to a 500-meter zone by night. Without making 
an announcement of officially dabbling into land management both ‘inside’ the Gaza 
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Strip and on the ADL, the UN effectively not only continued its own meddling with 
regard to land use and ownership in Palestine, it also connected to a deeper history of 
externalising land management. This was not due to a covert conspiracy, but a 
consequence of the legal and financial aspects not having been settled in the verbal 
ADL arrangement and the UN´s longer involvement in the unmaking of Palestine and 
its own history and roots in the American and British imperial projects.  
As the cultivation season came to its peak (some months UNEF had arrived), many 
Palestinians grew frustrated with UN units both near the ADL and inside the Gaza 
Strip obstructing access to their land and crops. If failing to come to personal 
arrangements with the UN units, they shrewdly began making legal claims to the 
Egyptian Governor-General. Most claimants were probably peasants with little land. 
Not only had many Palestinians peasants lost land as a consequence of Jewish and 
Palestinian elite purchases, British agricultural and economic policies, and the 
traditional division of land amongst sons in Mandate Palestine,902 nearly 4.000 people 
in the Gaza Strip had also lost some or all of their land when the Jewish settlers 
established the state of Israel in 1948.903 Most involved in agriculture in the Gaza Strip 
were thus small-scale peasants or land tenants. The expulsion of some 200.000 
Palestinians from the villages and towns north-east of the Southern District that 
became the Gaza Strip only increased the pressure on the land. Unsurprisingly, 
opportunists and friends of the regime also made claims, adding to the pressure on the 
Egyptian regime, which had already made the Gaza Strip tax-free and supported citrus 
plantation start-ups. As claims began mounting, the much beleaguered Egyptian 
Governor-General had the liaison officers to UNEF present these to the UN force. By 
mid-summer, the UNEF worried about the “(…) considerable number of claims of 
landowners in the area (…)”904 that “(…) varied in nature and covered demands for 
the payment by UNEF of arbitrary rentals for the use of land, not based on any actual 
loss suffered by the owner; assertions that parcels of uncultivable land in use by 
UNEF would have been tilled if the Force was not there; or claims for loss of crops 
or alleged damage to planted fields.”905 Knowing that the elite of the Gaza Strip had 
grown close to the Egyptians (if not closer than it had been to the British)—on account 
of the severance from Palestine and dependence on its goodwill and allowance for 
middle-class Egyptians to purchase imported luxury goods—it seems fair to assume 
that at least some of the first claims may well have been friendly services to political 
allies, trials to see if compensation would be paid either sparingly or the opposite or 
both. The Under-Secretary, Ralph Bunche, also thought so, noting to the UNEF Force 
Commander that there was “(…) an apparent tendency on the part of Egyptian Liaison 
                                                          
902 Issa Khalaf, “The Effect of Socioeconomic Change on Arab Societal Collapse in Mandate 
Palestine,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 29, no. 1 (1997): 93–112. 
903 Jean-Pierre Filiu and John King, Gaza: A History (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 106. 
904 Message “Claims against UNEF for use of land” from Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche to 
UNEF Force Commander E. L. M. Burns, 23 October 1957, Land Claims, Claims outside 
Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal 
Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA 
905 Ibid. 
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officers to act as something more than intermediaries with UNEF and rather the 
advocates of local claimants (…)”.906 He continued that “(…) it has been the 
experience of UNEF that these officers have put forward even the most exaggerated 
claims at their face value, and often for high payments, to the point either of 
encouraging the submission of claims or of entering them on their own initiative 
without a request from the claimant.”907 Rather than facing unrelenting Palestinian 
claims ad hoc, UNEF HQ and the UN HQ in New York held back not on all but on 
most of the claims for compensation in order to seek a broader negotiated policy with 
the Egyptians. This unsurprisingly led the number of claims to rise. By October, some 
40-50 claims were pending with no policy in sight.908  
Naturally, the Egyptians were keen to let the UN pay to score points with the 
Palestinians while the UN was keen to keep costs low. Although the Under-Secretary 
informed the Force Commander that he accepted compensation for damages caused 
by UNEF beyond the few arrangements already made in the most obvious cases of 
damage in non-operational areas, he made some reservations. First, he argued that 
private law could not be used against military use. Secondly, he also contended that 
the land occupied by UNEF—which amounted to that of the large maintenance area 
near Rafah (due to the concentration of ex-British facilities and skilled labourers 
trained by the British and its proximity to its supply point in El-Arish Airstrip), six or 
seven battalion headquarters, 13 company headquarters, 27 platoon headquarters, 
approximately 70 observations posts and the roads and tracks linking platoon camps 
and observation posts as well as the bulldozed ADL—constituted a minimalist 
approach to military land use.909 In doing so, however, he ignored that the Gaza Strip 
was overpopulated in relation to its size (5-8 kilometres wide and a little more than 
40 kilometres long) as well as unable to sustain itself, which meant that even a 
                                                          
906 Message “Claims against UNEF for use of land” from Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche to 
UNEF Force Commander E. L. M. Burns, 23 October 1957, Land Claims, Claims outside 
Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal 
Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA. 
907 Ibid. 
908 Letter on “Claims re. Land adjacent to ADL” from UN Legal Adviser (New York) to Legal 
Officer at Egyptian Liaison Headquarters, 26 June, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, 
Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, 
Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA, Message “Land for Erections of 
Radio Pilots” from UNEF Accommodation Officer to UNEF Legal Adviser, 8 August 197, 
Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges 
and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-
0004, UNA and Letter on Land Claims from UNEF Force Commander E. L. M. Burns to 
Brigadier-General Amin Hilmy at Egyptian Liaison Staff Headquarters, 17 September 1957, 
Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges 
and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-
0004, UNA  
909 Message “Claims against UNEF for use of land” from Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche to 
UNEF Force Commander E. L. M. Burns, 23 October 1957, Land Claims, Claims outside 
Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal 
Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA. 
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minimalist approach took away land (at night time the 500 meter ADL zone alone 
amounted to 10% of the width of the Gaza Strip).910 Thirdly, he also (rightly) argued 
that most of the land UNEF used in one capacity or another had been uncultivable 
before the arrival of UNEF. Finally, he noted that UNEF´s land use remained within 
the Status of Forces Agreement entered with Egypt that—as the possessor of the rights 
of the sovereign State—had previously held the ADL itself. Writing the Force 
Commander six months after the arrival of the force, it was nevertheless clear that the 
Under-Secretary, despite his unwillingness to let the Egyptians take him hostage, did 
not hold the reins of the situation. Showing that political matters were decided in New 
York, he let the Force Commander know that the Legal Advisor was instructed not 
only to search for people “(…) both sufficiently neutral and sufficiently competent in 
administrative procedures (…)”,911 but also to negotiate with the Egyptians about the 
making of a neutral “(…) joint indemnification procedure (…)”912 that was to involve 
both Egyptian and UN representatives, balance between Egyptian practices of and UN 
ideas and offer joint compensation with a larger Egyptian share.913  
However, this was easier said than done. In the Gaza Strip, peasants (and others 
interested in what else was possible) continued to pressure the Egyptians to get 
compensation, leaving the Egyptians unable to budge much. For its part, the UN made 
little internal progress despite the Secretary-General becoming part of the process 
(once again);914 despite several clarifying aide-memoires were exchanged between 
UNEF, UN and the Egyptians;915 and despite the Force Commander recommending 
                                                          
910 Following surveys in 1951, UNRWA estimated that as much as a third of the Gaza Strip was 
uncultivable, being sand dunes. John B. Blandford and United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “Report of the Director of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to the United Nations General 
Assembly” (New York: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East, September 1951). Among those recognising that the Gaza Strip was unsustainable 
was also UNRWA. A former UNRWA economic advisor also made this point public, see James 
Baster, “Economic Problems in the Gaza Strip,” The Middle East Journal 9, no. 3 (1955): 323–
27. 
911 Message “Claims against UNEF for use of land” from Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche to 
UNEF Force Commander E. L. M. Burns, 23 October 1957, Land Claims, Claims outside 
Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal 
Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA. 
912 Ibid. 
913 As for the share of compensation, the UN Under-Secretary made reference to NATO´s status 
of forces agreement, which suggested the sending state pay 25% and the receiving state 75%. 
914 “Claims against UNEF for use of Land” from Constantin Stavropoulos, UN Legal Counsel, 
to Dag Hammarskjold, UN General-Secretary, 8 November 1957, Land Claims, Claims outside 
Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal 
Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA. 
915 Letter on Land Claims from Brigadier-General Amin Hilmy at Egyptian Liaison Staff 
Headquarters to UNEF Force Commander E. L. M. Burns, 17 November 1957, Land Claims, 
Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities 
of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA and 
Letter on Land Claims from UNEF Force Commander E. L. M. Burns to Brigadier-General 
Amin Hilmy at Egyptian Liaison Staff Headquarters, 18 November 1957, Land Claims, Claims 
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the Legal Counsel to the Secretary-General that it would be wise to make some small 
measures of payments to “(…) consolidate the appeal which the presence of UNEF 
could have for the local population (…)”,916 most probably aware that at least some 
and increasingly a growing number of the claims were from struggling Palestinian 
peasants that had suffered damage to their trees, lost access to vital land or seen crops 
destroyed by UN vehicles.917 By December 1957, the UN Legal Adviser and the 
Egyptian Liaison Officer were still navigating the issues of how the Egyptian 
obligation to provide land for operational uses linked to whether or not to compensate 
the owners against the backdrop of established Egyptian practices (of doing so or not) 
and UNEF seeing compensation as an mostly Egyptian matter and vice versa.918  
By mid-May 1958, however, Egypt and the UN appear to have found both a joint 
procedure grounded in the Status of Forces Agreement and assessors that they could 
agree upon. If only some of the claims of peasants owning land that the UN used for 
`comfort` and `convenience` (i.e. football fields and shooting ranges) had been 
handled (as they did avoided the Egypt obligation to provide land), Palestinians with 
claims related to operational use would soon have their complaints considered.919 In 
early June, 17 of them received an offer for settlement from UNEF by way of the 
Egyptian Liaison staff, making note of having considered the assessments made by 
the agricultural expert of the Egyptian administration.920 Soon after, more Palestinians 
began filing claims for compensation about destroyed buildings and walls, crops such 
as barley destroyed by vehicles, and damaged or wholly destroyed trees (olive, lemon, 
almond and eucalyptus), date palms, cactus hedges and vines with the Egyptians in a 
steady stream.921 Aside a minor spat between the Egyptian regime and UNEF about 
                                                          
outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of 
UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA 
916 “Claims against UNEF for use of Land” from Constantin Stavropoulos, UN Legal Counsel, 
to Dag Hammarskjold, UN General-Secretary, 8 November 1957, Land Claims, Claims outside 
Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal 
Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA 
917 Internal UNEF “Special Report”, undated May 1957, Land Claims, Claims outside 
Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal 
Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA. 
918 “Letter” regarding Land use and compensation from UNEF Legal Adviser to Egyptian 
Liaison Officer, 11 December 1957, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, 
Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator 
Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA  
919 Letter “Claims for land” from UNEF Legal and Political Adviser to UNEF Chief 
Administrative Officer, 15 May 1958, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, 
Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief 
Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA 
920 “Letter” regarding Land use and compensation from UNEF Legal Adviser to Egyptian 
Liaison Officer, 9 June 1958, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, 
Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator 
Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA 
921 “Letter” regarding compensation from UNEF Legal Adviser to Egyptian Liaison Officer, 20 
June 1958, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, 
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what constituted ´operational´ needs (and who could make the decisions) and the 
occasional case that had two Palestinians claim ownership and compensation for the 
same land (made possible by Israel taking part of the land registry in 1956), claims 
were soon dealt with at a rate of 15 cases per week, a pace telling of the importance 
UNEF granted the Palestinians’ feelings towards the force.922 It is uncertain how often 
UNEF requested reimbursement from Egypt (although it reserved the right to do so), 
but UNEF and the Egyptians settled 117 cases (of which 93 related to damage from 
operational use such as storage areas, parking lots, transport and patrol roads etc.). 
While this left 80 claims unsettled on the one hand, it also provided some average 
amounts to go by as standards on the other.923 Additionally, the fact that the land area 
in the compensation clams had been reduced by nearly 70% after being jointly 
surveyed pleased the Legal and Political Adviser who informed the Force Commander 
and Chief Administrative Officer that “(…) the joint machinery for the surveying of 
land claims works smoothly”.924 Aside some minor hitches,  such as UNEF shifting to 
direct payments for the majority of the settlements in the spring of 1960 (which the 
                                                          
Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-
1773-0000-0004, UNA and “Letter” regarding compensation from UNEF Legal Adviser to 
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Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief 
Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA 
922 “Letter” regarding operational claims from UNEF Legal Adviser to Egyptian Liaison 
Officer, 7 July 1958, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and 
Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s 
Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA, “Letter” on Land Claims from UNEF Force Commander E. L. 
M. Burns to Brigadier-General Amin Hilmy at Egyptian Liaison Staff Headquarters, 7 July 
1958, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, 
Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-
1773-0000-0004, UNA, “Letter” on Land Claims from Brigadier-General Amin Hilmy at 
Egyptian Liaison Staff Headquarters to UNEF Force Commander E. L. M. Burns, 5 August 
1958, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, 
Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-
1773-0000-0004, UNA, “Letter” on Land Claims from UNEF Force Commander E. L. M. 
Burns to Brigadier-General Amin Hilmy at Egyptian Liaison Staff Headquarters, 7 August 
1958, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, 
Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-
1773-0000-0004, UNA and “Letter” regarding operational claims from UNEF Legal Adviser 
to Egyptian Liaison Officer, 23 September 1958, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, 
Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, 
Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA 
923 Memo “Average cost of Land Claims” to UNEF Force Commander and Chief 
Administrative Officer, 29 September 1958, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, 
Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief 
Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA 
924 Letter “Land Claims” from UNEF Legal and Political Adviser to UNEF Force Commander 
and Chief Administrative Officer, 8 October 1958, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, 
Contracts, Leases, Insurance and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, 
Chief Administrator Officer’s Files, S-1773-0000-0004, UNA 
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Egyptian administration was not pleased with perhaps considering it a means to gain 
goodwill),925 the joint system for managing and compensating the claims found 
worthy had found its footing.   
However, that is not to say that the claims, or rather the problems causing them, 
went away. By 1963, more than 350 Palestinians—most of whom appear to have been 
illiterate peasants with small pieces of land (making their mark with a finger dipped 
in ink) rather than owners of multiple properties or large-scale landowners—had made 
claims for compensations against UNEF roads on their lands (some of which were 
kept in operation for 7 years), the destruction of crops, trees and property by UNEF 
and the loss of access to land due to UNEF operations. While the UNEF records do 
not shed light neither on how many peasants and landowners remained in the Gaza 
Strip, nor the total number of claims filed (and compensations made), it seems fair to 
assume that the claimants probably made up only a minor part of the peasant 
population. Nevertheless, their claims not only stood as very clear counter-arguments 
to the moderate claim of the UN Under-Secretary, they also caused UNEF some 
worries over the years. Not only was the joint claims system set up. UNEF also 
appears to have recognised that most claimants on whose land the force operated were 
probably for the most part struggling peasants and that careless behaviour would be 
counterproductive and thus to be avoided. Emphasising the need for maintaining good 
relations with the local population, the Egyptian Governor-General’s administration 
and the Egyptian government in Cairo, orders to avoid damages on land, crops, hedges 
and property were accordingly given recurrently by both contingent officers and the 
Force Commander until the withdrawal of the force in 1967.926 As noted, however, 
                                                          
925 Letter “Payment of Land Claims” from UNEF Legal Adviser to UNEF Chief Finance Officer 
Officer, 23 May 1960, Land Claims, Claims outside Contracts, Contracts, Leases, Insurance 
and Claims, Privileges and Immunities of UNEF, Legal Affairs, Chief Administrator Officer’s 
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926 “Letter” regarding operational claims from UNEF Legal Adviser to Egyptian Liaison 
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the UN force also connected to Palestine´s deeper history of externalisation due to its 
entanglement with the intersecting American and British imperial projects and the 
unmaking of Palestine.  
When the League of Nations sanctioned the British takeover following the First 
World War, Palestinian peasants had not only faced uneven Ottoman policies, which 
had empowered and enlarged the urban landowning class and established oppressive 
tax systems and land-tenure systems to gain local support.927 They had also had to put 
up with the hardships of war: large-scale forced labour, deforestation, seizure of food 
and livestock as well as military units being quartered in villages. Yet, the British 
would offer little respite. Instead, they implemented a racialised regime manned it 
with colonial administrators, experts and security forces with the aim of providing 
strategic imperial linkage and integrating the mandate into the imperial and global 
economies. This entailed the monetization of the agrarian economy (and push towards 
landlords and large-scale landowners); the entrance to world market and subsequent 
commodification of land, labour and time; increased competition; and mechanization 
(which favoured the more organized Jewish settlers that also increased in numbers). 
Unsurprisingly, the Palestinian rioted, but gained only some tariff protection. The 
depression further intensified competition with the Jewish colonial settlers, 
Palestinian communal disharmony and made the landless rural population dependent 
on wage labour (with lower wages than their Jewish counterparts who especially after 
1933 were also allowed to immigrate in ever larger numbers). Altogether, these 
factors led to a Palestinian revolt that brought about both the enlargement and 
militarisation of the British security forces as well as turned Palestine into a militarised 
geography. The following years were even more marked by the British economic and 
agricultural policies, which had reduced the resilience of the Palestinian rural 
communities to poor harvests, droughts, cattle diseases, plagues of locusts and mice, 
and launched citrus fruits as the main export product in direct competition with Spain 
and South Africa. Neither the ensuing overcrowded and over-used lands and increase 
in unskilled wage labour, nor Palestinian-Jewish relations improved with the Second 
World War. By 1945, around 10% of the Palestinian population had to make do with 
unskilled wage labour, urban slum was spreading, and the Jewish settlers and the 
Palestinian elite were buying up land at a growing pace while peasant families, 
following traditions of heritage, divided their lands into smaller plots for their sons, 
leaving a growing number of peasants with less than sustainable lands. At the same 
time, the Jewish colonial settlers staged their insurgency against the British Mandate 
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administration with the aim of setting up a Jewish state, forcing the British to deploy 
almost 100.000 troops.928  
Enter the UN, which—on British request—took it upon itself to deal with the 
collapsing British Mandate. At that point, London had already thought about the 
partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an ‘Arab’ state for more than a decade, 
knowing well that the division of land was a major if not the largest issue.929 Echoing 
the British, the UN Special Committee On Palestine, established by a special General 
Assembly session in May 1947, recommended partition and thus the making of two 
states by the end of August 1947 against the backdrop of: the Palestinian lack of 
organisation and rejection of anything but a state of their own; the Jewish territorially 
aspiring web of armed state-like institutions; the British lack of recommendations; the 
US and Soviet silences due to institutional disagreement on policy or strategy;930 and 
finally the Jordanian King’s wish to annex the West Bank.931 According to historian 
Elad Ben-Dror, the secretariat staff (including Ralph Bunche and Constantin 
Stavropoulos) that were to service the UN’s Palestine Commission—the UN 
organisation that was to act as a provisional government while partitioning 
Palestine—thus left the idea of an Arab state and instead focused only on making a 
Jewish state.932 Unquestionably, the UN thus had a share of responsibility in the 
unmaking of Palestine, finalised with the Jewish settlers’ establishment of Israel in 
the Middle Eastern war in 1948. In extension thereof, the unmaking of Palestine linked 
directly to the making of the Gaza Strip hybrid geography, in which the UN came to 
provide initially relief and later social welfare via UNRWA.933 In doing so, the UN 
took on state-like responsibilities along Egypt. As UNRWA recognised that “(…) 
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about one-third of the area consists of sand dunes and is entirely unproductive (…)934 
and the population density of the Gaza Strip high, it started both an afforestation 
project to turn refugees into ‘self-supporting farmers’ and an agricultural training 
centre with American cattle. The centre was to serve as a model for others, but the 
Israelis closed it in November 1956.935  
Once the Israel withdrew, UNRWA was able to restore its developmentalist 
operations in the agricultural (and educational) sphere. More importantly, however, 
the UN force arrived to the Gaza Strip as part of the process of reopening the Suez 
Canal. Not only was this goal achieved. Incidentally, the UN (force) also both created 
a military geography of its own in the form of observations posts, camps ranging from 
platoon to battalion size, military roads, maintenance areas, communication sites, 
storage facilities, officers’ villas as well as beach and sports clubs that in no small way 
resembled the military geography of the British Mandate (forces) on the one hand and 
enlarged its own role in the management of land in the Gaza Strip in a way that built 
on and in part continued the overall British militarised geography in the post-Mandate 
Gaza Strip on the other. While this continuation of the militarisation (of land, space 
and everyday life) and state of permanent but unstable exception brought tension, it is 
by no means enough to explore the practice of UNEF only through the prism of land: 
The practice of the UN force also needs to be examined through the eyes of the 
Palestinians and Bedouin who may have seen the security arrangements of UNEF 
generating as much insecurity as security.  
 
 
As Before (II)? Security and Insecurity as a Prism to understand 
the Negotiation of the UN Regime in the Gaza Strip 
 
In this section, I examine how the practice of UNEF was negotiated through the prism 
of security and insecurity not only because scholars on imperial and colonial 
expansion and the Mandate regimes centre security.936 Scholarship on contemporary 
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interventions also link security and insecurity. Notably, military sociologist Paul 
Higate and gender and developmental scholar Marsha Henry contend that “(…) 
peacekeeping is about space, how it is seen, the way it is reconfigured by 
peacekeeping going about their security work, and crucially, the impact these spatial-
security practices have (…).”937 In the context of peacekeeping, the spatial practice 
of security, according to Higate and Henry, “shapes how space is experienced, and to 
the extent to which it is considered secure or insecure.”938 Within the Gaza Strip, the 
(in)security prism therefore covers not only military aspects, but also various 
everyday life encounters: 1) the ADL regime; 2) UNEF traffic in the Gaza Strip and 
off duty encounters in the Gaza Strip and 3) Israeli crossings into the Gaza Strip. 
Shortly after the UN force arrived in March 1957, it began to provide grounds for 
the Gaza Strip ‘natives’, refugees and Bedouin to view it with less relief than when it 
had replaced the Israeli forces. UNEF units not only met the Gaza City demonstrations 
and riots with armed soldiers, warning shots and clubs (as showed in chapter 7) and 
continued the militarisation of the land, putting further pressure on the remaining 
peasants (as touched upon previously in this chapter). The different UNEF units on 
the ADL would also—more or less right after setting up their more than 70 
observation posts and camps there in late March 1957—generate tension (sometimes 
of a fleeting character and occasionally leading to premeditated attempted murder) in 
their encounters and relations with people living near the ADL on account of their 
racialised, gendered and often rigid ways of monitoring and regulating their assigned 
sectors. Spatialised intersecting moments of diachronic and synchronic factors, these 
various encounters reflected the tasks of the UNEF units in the respective areas in 
which they served, their experiences following their redeployment from El- Arish and 
the deeper logics, norms and practices of their national military cultures on the one 
hand, and the precarity of everyday life for the Gaza strip population and their 
experiences from the Mandate era on the other.  
 Although the UNEF reports on ADL incidents and the correspondence between 
the Force Commander and the UN General-Secretary and Under-Secretary on these 
remain inaccessible, the EIMAC records suggest that the first six to ten months in the 
decade UNEF operated on the ADL were particularly agitated. Most incidents were 
minor and did not lead to violence: In early April, for example, Danish soldiers 
detained two peasants by on suspicion of stealing grass in Israel, perhaps on account 
of the aforementioned racialised pro-Israeli views dominating the joint Danish-
Norwegian battalion that cast Palestinians (and Egyptians) as primitive in contrast to 
Israelis that were seen as fellow and ‘civilised’ people, being ‘white’, using tractors 
and speaking both English and German.939 However, fewer but more serious incidents 
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led to both killings of Palestinians and attacks on UNEF units. Also in early April, a 
Brazilian unit was attacked with redeployed Egyptian or Israeli mines, a Palestinian 
and Bedouin asymmetric tactic used against both British and Israeli forces.940 Here it 
is worth noting that the Brazilian army had grown out of the Portuguese colonial army 
and been used to both populate and colonise strategically the ‘primitive’ Amazon 
interior and regulate the mobilities of the free poor. Despite reforms, it remained 
governed by ideas of violent ‘white’ masculine honour and engaged in frontier 
violence in the 1950s.941 In another April incident perhaps re-actualising the 
patronising and distrustful nature of the Dutch colonial military and state that both the 
Indonesian military and state had partially inherited, an Indonesian soldier shot and 
wounded a Palestinian male refugee standing in a crowd of nearly 60 people near the 
Indonesian camp, perceiving the group as threatening.942 Three weeks later several 
Palestinian men seeking day labour were beaten with rifle butts and one killed by 
Indonesian soldiers after a guard mistakenly let the group enter the camp alongside a 
truck.943 On the following day, the UN Commander requested the Military Advisor to 
the Secretary-General that the Colombian battalion—which was placed on the ADL 
off Khan Younis that housed both a camp of more than 25.000 refugees and a camp 
of 31.000 Bedouin—be issued machine guns and mortars, which all other ADL 
contingents already had.944 However, both on the very day the US (the Colombian 
arms supplier) rejected the request for heavy weapons and some days later, Danish 
units killed two Palestinians.945 A week and several detentions later, the UN 
Commander issued an order on how to act should civil disorder erupt, echoing the 
British ‘Aid to Civil Power’ function. He charted seemingly sound principles of acting 
correct, not using physical coercion, and not resorting to punitive actions. Yet, he also 
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ordered armoured vehicles be used sparingly to avoid losing their ‘moral effect’ on 
the locals and that “As a rule, the dispersal of rioters and the taking into custody of 
the ring-leaders are sufficient to restore order,”946 revealing that he was ready to take 
over internal security and thereby breach the verbal agreement with Nasser, the Status 
of Forces Agreement, and the 1949 Armistice Agreement. While no riot or revolt 
broke out, a Danish unit was fired upon two weeks later.947 From late May to late July, 
several Bedouin also attacked UN units all along the ADL with guns (leaving one 
Bedouin dead) and mines (leaving two Palestinian farmers dead).948 In July, 
Palestinian villagers from the Finnish sector also first fired upon two Finnish units 
and later attacked an outpost after two drunk Finnish soldiers had rummaged their 
village for women for sex,949 an insult as the Palestinian female body had emerged as 
the symbol of the nation in the Mandate era.950 Indonesian and Colombian units were 
also attacked with guns and mines in their sectors.951 In mid-July, a Palestinian 
teenager was shot and wounded by a Brazilian soldier in the Brazilian sector. 
Emphasizing the soldier’s rough behaviour, an eleven-year-old Palestinian boy who 
had witnessed the shooting of his friend told the EIMAC observer with all the anger 
he could muster that he “(…) will take the police to these people.”952 In August, more 
than 25 rounds were fired upon a Danish unit with an automatic weapon using the 
ammunition of the Egyptian-controlled but Palestinian-manned police militia’s 
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automatic weapon, suggesting that members of the unit—which the Governor-
General had ordered to cooperate with UNEF—now also took part in attacks on 
UNEF.953 As autumn became winter, UNEF still faced additional attacks as the 
reduced availability of vegetables and fruits raised the stakes of crossing.954 Against 
this backdrop, it seems to fair to suggest that the Gaza Strip residents may have seen 
UNEF as engendering both fleeting sensations and longer experiences of ‘insecurity’.  
However, the year of 1958 appears to have brought less tension. Despite noting 
more than 30 cases of UNEF detaining men, women and children from January to 
June 1958, the EIMAC reports make mention of ‘only’ 4 attacks on UNEF—one 
involving a young Palestinian woman who wounded a Colombian soldier with a knife 
after he confronted her near the ADL, thus perhaps reacting to what see saw as an 
aggression—and no killings of Palestinians and Bedouin between early January and 
May.955 A battalion report from the Danish-Norwegian, however, notes 8 separate 
incidents from April to October in which its units were targeted with gun fire, 
challenging at least somewhat the number of only four incidents overall.956 As 
mentioned before, the UNEF records concerning ADL incidents may also show a 
different picture even if protocol was to dispatch the EIMAC observers to the 
incidents, as they had been the attacks and killings from April 1957 to December 1957, 
some of which were corroborated by a few memoirs.957 However, the EIMAC reports 
do not stand alone in noting a change. Using statistics from the Israeli security and 
military forces on ‘infiltrations’, Alina Korn, an Israeli sociologist focusing on 
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political crime and legal sociology, also notes that the number of Palestinians crossing 
into Israel dropped noticeably throughout 1957 and 1958 compared to the previous 
years.958 A range of different influences linked to both Egypt and the UN relieved 
tension.  
Foremost, the Egyptian government contributed, even if it was more concerned 
with avoiding a war with Israel than helping the Palestinians. First, the Egyptian 
President secured a working relationship with the US from 1958, selling itself as a 
stabilising force of Arab nationalism,959 to put, as Salim Yaqub, historian of Egypt-
Israeli relations, noted, “(…) the Arab-Israeli issue ‘in the icebox’, insulated alike 
from war and diplomacy.”960 Subsequently, Cairo allowed the Gaza Strip’s political 
elite to establish a ‘Legislative Council’ in 1958 after rejecting their suggestion of 
joining the United Arab Republic, a joint Egyptian-Syrian republic under Egyptian 
dominance. Soon after, Cairo also let the last of the two Palestinian battalion of 
frontier guards—which had been created in the early 1950s to guide Palestinian 
militancy away from Israel (even if that failed and was part of the Israeli motivations 
for the invasion in late 1956) return. This doubling of Palestinian security forces was 
a weighty concession, as it increased the visibility of Palestinian involvement in 
policing, and thus governing, the Gaza Strip, not least because it was to be followed 
of the formation of Fatah, a militant nationalist organisation.961 Moreover, Cairo also 
set up a scheme that allowed (especially the nationalist or leftist) teachers and 
unskilled workers to travel to the Gulf States. Egyptian loans and Egyptian access to 
the markets of especially Yugoslavia (that had troops in the Gaza Strip) and 
Czechoslovakia also facilitated a growing number of citrus plantations, offering some 
income opportunities (by the mid-1960s, nearly half of the Gaza Strip's workforce had 
found work on these plantations). Nevertheless, the Palestinians workers went 
underpaid as unions were illegal and the readily available supply of labour kept wages 
low just as the thirty richest Gazan families who owned the plantations expanded their 
lands ten-fold (to a third of the Gaza Strip’s fertile land by the mid-1960s) at the 
peasants’ expense.962 Egypt, rather than the UN, thus continued the British line of 
simultaneous economic inclusion and exclusion. 
As noted, the UN force also contributed to a less edgy atmosphere. For example, 
the abovementioned joint compensation procedure may have been of influence. That 
UNEF detonated several personnel and anti-armour mines in unmarked minefields on 
the edge of the Gaza strip, released the agricultural centre to let it reopen, and held 
information sessions on the population of the Gaza Strip and Islam for at least some 
contingents may also have eased relations.963 Additionally, UNEF’s shift from 
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ignoring to reinforcing its no-fraternisation policy following the creation of United 
Arab Republic may also have reduced irritation by preventing ‘political eyesores’.964 
Additionally, the (pre-arranged) departure of the Indonesian and the Finnish 
contingents, which had been involved in hostilities, may also have been a factor. Visits 
to the refugee camps may also have reduced the distance between ‘locals’ and UN 
soldiers: By 1966, UN soldiers made contributions for a house for a 71-year old 
Palestinian widower and medical treatment for a young Palestinian girl as well as 
arranging Christmas parties for Palestinian children (ignoring the religious 
dimension).965  
However, this is not to say that everything completely changed, far from it. Albeit 
much less frequently compared to the first year UNEF was operational, the UN units 
were still shot at until it was withdrawn. In September 1958, for example, a member 
of the Palestinian paramilitary police/national guard that had just been allowed to 
redeploy from Egypt, sought to kill a Colombian soldier with his machinegun.966 In 
another attack on UNEF with an even clearer message, a Swedish company-size camp 
was fired upon in November 1959.967 This may have been linked to how a Swedish 
unit earlier had put several cacti-fruits under the shirt of some teenagers that had been 
rough to a younger boy mending his family’s sheep, an act that had result in the village 
in which the teenagers lived to throw rocks at Swedish units when they passed 
through.968 In the 1960s, attacks appear to have been much less common (or less 
reported on and investigated), but still occurring, in some cases with arms and in 
others with pickaxes or other tools turned into weapons as situations went out of 
hand.969  
Aside keeping the UN visible, the mere presence of the ADL regime probably also 
fed frustrations, leading attacks to continue albeit at a smaller scale. For example, the 
Danish-Norwegian battalion alone conducted 4.180 patrols from October 1960 to 
April 1961, equating roughly one patrol pr. hour. This may not sound like much as a 
24-hour average, but most patrols were night-time additions to the daytime operation 
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of the battalion’s more than 20 observation posts.970 Factoring in the patrols and the 
other 50 observations posts of the entire UN force, UNEF, in fact, took part in making 
the Gaza Strip a highly monitored and regulated militarised geography. Although 
detentions also appear to have become less frequent, they did not change in character. 
Brazilian, Columbian and Scandinavian soldiers continued to detain Palestinians and 
Bedouin for picking grass near the ADL. In some cases, teenage girls and younger 
women were also deemed so vital’ to the ADL regime that they had to be pursued for 
more than a kilometre. In many cases, they had not even crossed the ADL, let alone 
been closer than the 100 meters allowed in daytime.971 ‘White’ UN soldiers, Canadian 
(or Scandinavian for that matter), also kept causing incidents on account of what could 
be seen as racist provocations and displays of authority, occasionally leading to 
violent responses.972  
That life changed little for the majority of the population of the Gaza Strip was 
probably another factor contributing to incidents. Thousands may have found work in 
plantations or left for the Gulf States, but most refugees continued to face 
unemployment and squalid conditions in either Gaza City and Khan Younis, the two 
largest towns, or the 8 refugee camps, each holding between 8.000 and 35.000 people. 
Regardless of gender and dwelling, all had an insufficient dietary intake, little space 
for their families, no privacy, nowhere to go, and no prospect of realising their UN-
backed rights to return home and compensation.973 As most refugees had been 
amongst those most dispossessed by the Mandate policies, UNRWA’s aid was hardly 
a match for the pressure on family networks due to the loss of the markets and 
resources of Palestine; the rising rents due to the lack of housing; the wage drop due 
to the abundance of unskilled labour; the contracted economy; and the lack of soil to 
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grow food.974 In a particularly depressing case, a 20-year old Palestinian woman 
married to a poor and unemployed 50-year old man against her will sought to kill 
herself by way of either Israeli units or UNEF by crossing into Israel. When 
interrogated after being transferred to a Brazilian unit by an Israeli unit, she explained: 
“I crossed the ADL because I am angry with this life and wanted to be killed.”975 When 
asked if she wanted to return to Gaza, she repeated: “I don’t want this life, and want 
to be killed.” Unquestionably, this incident elucidates the intersections between the 
miserable situation of women (young women in particular) in the Gaza Strip; the lives 
of Palestinian refugees; the lack of a horizon offering change; and the militarisation 
of life on both sides of the ADL. 
Despite its considerable monitory and regulatory extent, UNEF’s ADL regime was 
‘porous’. The force not only failed to prevent Palestinians from crossing into Israel. 
In several cases, it also failed to prevent Israeli settlers and soldiers from crossing the 
ADL, giving cause for fear, frustrations, anger and hate. This had been a problem 
already before 1958. For example, a Bedouin boy (and his father’s 80 sheep that he 
depended on for his livelihood) had been kidnapped near the ADL on the Gaza Strip 
side by Israeli soldiers who also shot at a young Bedouin girl when taking him. In 
another illuminating case, a Palestinian boy from a village near the ADL on the Gaza 
Strip side only just survived a hand grenade exploding in his room that the EIMAC 
observer suspected an Israeli settler from the nearby and ill-reputed settlement for 
throwing.976 After 1958, however, the UN force kept failing at preventing Israeli 
attacks and kidnappings both inside the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert of Egypt. 
Entering Egypt proper, for example, an Israeli unit killed a Bedouin woman and child 
as well as wounded another woman on February 1959.977 In September 1959, Israeli 
forces also killed several Bedouin in Israel and expelled nearly 350 others to Egypt, 
depriving them of their property and tents to finally kill a Bedouin on Egyptian 
territory to ensure that no one returned.978 On their own, these incidents may be seen 
as separate. Seen together (and with others), however, they may well be taken as a 
continuation of the systemic Israeli violence and dispossession of more than 6.000 
Bedouin, ongoing since 1948 and part of the militarised Jewish settler state’s legacy 
from the British Mandate regime.979 Instances of Israeli military units handing over 
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captured or killed Palestinian farmers with assurances that they had been captured or 
killed in Israel also continued and remained equally impossible to challenge, UNEF 
having no jurisdiction in Israel.980 Israeli units also continued to detain children 
picking grass for their families’ livestock; doing their homework away from the 
overcrowded refugee camps; or playing near the ADL. In some instances, Israeli units 
also crossed the ADL to abduct Bedouin and Palestinian children,981 which in some 
cases may have been cause for Palestinian boys to set Israeli fields on fire.982 Not only 
linked to the UNEF’s inability to prevent these types of Israeli attacks, the detentions 
and incursions (beyond Israeli territory in particular) probably also reflected how the 
reduced funds for the border forces—a consequence of the growing pressure from the 
Israeli middle-class that wanted services rather than threats983—had the Israeli forces 
to turn, once again, to aggressive measures to deter Palestinians from returning to their 
former villages now in Israel.  
Additionally, Israel also began to enforce a more aggressive aerial patrol regime. 
Certainly, French-made Israeli jets had occasionally crossed the Egyptian-Israeli 
International Frontier as well as the ADL before 1958. Right after the UN force had 
moved into the Gaza Strip, for example, Israeli fighter jets made overflights.984 After 
the formation of the United Arab Republic (and the reduced border forces), however, 
Israel not only initiated more flights at low altitude, but also sent more of its jetfighters 
over non-Israeli territory. On May 19th 1958, for example, 21 Israeli fighter jets flew 
over the Gaza Strip.985 Subsequently, the Danish-Norwegian unit also reported 219 
overflights from April to October 1958 of its area alone.986 Although Israel seems to 
have scaled down after the end of the UAR in 1961, the Danish-Norwegian unit 
nevertheless kept noting on average 1 and 2 daily overflights of ‘their’ area alone.987 
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The EIMAC records also suggest that overflights also occasionally occurred at 
altitudes as low as 50-200 meters, most likely an intimidation tactic along the lines of 
the Israeli ground incursions into the Gaza Strip.988 Moreover, Israeli naval units 
detained Palestinian fishing crews just as larger Israeli fishing vessels entered the 
Gaza ‘territorial’ waters, reminding the Palestinians that they were not only hemmed 
in, but also that the UN was unable to alter that situation.989  
When seen within a broader sphere security going beyond only encounters at the 
ADL, UNEF traffic also proved a continuous problem in the relations with the 
population of the Gaza Strip. For perhaps half of the Mandate era, the British security 
forces had rarely numbered more than 2.000 all over Palestine.990 From 1957 to 1967, 
the UN deployed UNEF that varied in size from 6.000 in 1957 to approximately 3.500 
in 1967 in the small territory of the Gaza Strip alone. Once in place in Egypt, the force 
began amassing a high number of British and American vehicles. Not surprisingly, 
accidents amassed quickly. Already after six months, the UN units had caused 77 
traffic accidents, some of which were fatal.991 In some cases compensations were 
made in accordance to British Mandate law that Egypt kept in place and Sharia law in 
others, thus balancing claims and fears of feuds with accommodating the Muslim 
population when it came to compensation, ‘blood money’, in family matters.992 
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Indeed, the UN took traffic accidents serious. By February 1958, accidents were raised 
as a topic at the weekly conference of the commanders of the different UN 
contingents. Especially speed and drunk driving were noted as problems.993 In April 
1960, the UNEF Commander further expressed the need to drastically reduce the 
number of traffic accidents against the backdrop of 23 UNEF-related in March.994 By 
September 1960, the number of accidents had nevertheless risen to 449, thus 
averaging 10 accidents a month, typically involving young UNEF truck drivers either 
driving too fast or paying little attention to traffic combined with children running 
across the street or, less frequently, drunk military and civilian UN staff returning 
from staff villa parties.995 Although the number of accidents vaned—most probably 
reflecting the gradual reduction of the force—the Under-Secretary-General for 
Special Political Affairs in New York, Ralph Bunche, personally kept tabs on the 
situation.996 However, the UN force also caused tension in the relations with the 
population of the Gaza Strip by way of their off-duty encounters. 
Another way the UN soldiers had UNEF associated with insecurity was through 
off-duty encounters. Visiting cultural and historical sites (linked to the Western 
understanding of the ‘Orient’ and ’Middle East’) and the market of Gaza City in most 
cases probably fall outside this category.  However, the involvement of UN soldiers 
in public drunkenness, street fights, use of private brothels, black market trade, and 
narcotics trafficking in Gaza City, Rafah and Khan Younis as well as UN beach 
locations does not. Already in June, one of the officers’ villas of the Brazilian 
contingent, which was located on the beach front, had grown to be so problematic that 
the Egyptian Chief of the Palestine Police, which had become the Egyptian-controlled 
but Palestinian-manned paramilitary militia, wanted to seize the villa.997 From July 
1957, the UN force and the Egyptian regime were also forced to cooperate on the 
involvement of Brazilian, Canadian, Columbian and Indian UN soldiers in smuggling 
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and distributing narcotics.998 In August 1957, the Egyptian liaison staff, under 
pressure from the Governor-general, also informed UNEF that UN soldiers took part 
in promoting theft and robbery by frequenting ‘houses of ill repute’ in Gaza City that 
were not regulated (as brothels since no formal ‘Red Light District’ existed).999 Most 
common, however, were drunkenness and altercations. Perhaps not to lose the favour 
of the ‘business classes’—that included owners of bars, casinos, restaurants as well as 
taxis—on account of soldiers causing trouble and to create off-duty venting options 
away from the local population, UNEF approved the establishments of contingent bars 
with Palestinian barmen (if these mostly worked in the officers’ clubs), and the 
purchase of alcohol in bulk (1.800 bottles of rum at a time).1000 Not surprisingly, 
however, UN soldiers still caused trouble in the Gaza Strip throughout the operational 
period. While the UNEF Military Police records, which to a large extent are the central 
records for which to search for off-duty incidents, are still inaccessible, both internal 
records from the Danish-Norwegian Battalion and UNEF records that were sent to the 
Danish UN Department in the Danish Ministry of Defence are both accessible and 
illuminate the Danish soldiers’ off-duty behaviour. For example, it appears to have 
been common to combine souvenir shopping with lunches mostly consisting of a lot 
of beer, wine and liquor in the British era and beach neighbourhoods in Gaza City: a 
combination that occasionally ended in disturbances, altercations, fights, or stabbings. 
Taxi drivers, and bypassing women, merchants and young men typically appear to 
have been dragged into the brawling, which in some cases led to the repatriation of 
the UN soldiers.1001   
Altogether, it seems fair to say that the shift towards less violent relations between 
UNEF and the Palestinians and Bedouin from 1958 did not reflect a fundamental 
change in the ADL regime and the types of encounters. Rather, the cooperation 
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between Egypt and the Gaza elite (against the backdrop of the tacit agreement between 
Cairo and Washington) appear to have been what released tension from the Gaza Strip 
and thus what made the shift possible. Indeed, what may have appeared as a regime 
of ‘security’ when seen from the headquarters of UNEF may well have appeared as 
both fleeting moments of and enduring senses of ‘insecurity’ when seen from the 
fields near the ADL, the villages on the outskirts of the Gaza Strip, the areas around 
the UN camps and ‘watering holes’ and beach camps. Broadly, the dynamics of UNEF 
not only indirectly linked to the British structural support of the Jewish settlers in the 
Mandate period,1002 the pattern may well also have appeared at least partly familiar to 
Palestinians old enough to remember the British era.  
 
 
As Before (III)? Labour and Economic Relations as a Prism to 
understand the Negotiation of the UN Regime 
 
As shown in both the previous chapter and the previous sections of this chapter, the 
UN force did not entertain uncomplicated relations with the Gaza Strip population. 
However, as the Gaza Strip had become and remained a geography of precarity (to 
say the least), and as precarity links to risk, uncertainty, vulnerability and security, the 
UN force quickly came to be attractive as a means of income for people that found 
employment or as a means of gaining direct and indirect revenue due to the patronage 
of the UN soldiers and the impact of the UN force on the economic webs the Gaza 
Strip was part of. This was linked to how prices, and thus the cost of living, instantly 
began increasing with the arrival of the UN force. Indeed, five weeks after its arrival 
in the Gaza Strip, the Chairman of the EIMAC informed his superior in Jerusalem, 
the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, that “The cost of living in Gaza continues to rise as 
more UNEF funds are spent in the area. Many locals are complaining that there is no 
rent or price control as formerly.1003 Yet, some also stood to gain from these changes.  
Within weeks of UNEF arriving, the established families, merchants, 
managers/owners of plantations, restaurants, hotels and companies (built on the skills 
of craftsmen turned unskilled labour) as well as bankers would begin to profit from 
the presence of the UN force.1004 Indeed, as the EIMAC chairman noted, “(…) the 
business classes are feeling the beneficial effect of the increased spending (…).1005 
Logically, the ‘business classes’ made up only a small minority in an area as small as 
the Gaza Strip—5-8 kilometres wide and a little more than 40 kilometres long—that 
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had also seen the influx of more than 200.000 people carrying few possessions with 
them. As scholars of the Mandate have shown, this segment owed its rise to 
prominence to the British modernisation policies that had aimed to only gradually 
modernise the agricultural economy of Palestine to avoid the rise of nationalism (as 
had been the cases in both Egypt and India) on the one hand, and integrate Palestine 
into the economies of the region and of the British empire on the other. Decided in the 
Colonial Office and in Jerusalem, the British policies not only created a growing gap 
between the towns and villages (that saw their autonomy fade), but also enlarged what 
the EIMAC chairman called ‘the business classes’, as Palestine gradually saw the 
effects of the commodification of land, labour and materials.1006 While these changes 
were slower to manifest themselves in the southern Gaza District (which Mandate 
officials considered a backwater), the Mandate policies nevertheless strengthened the 
‘businesses classes’ of the Gaza Strip. Building directly on the organisation and 
practices of the Mandate administration and that of the British in Egypt, the Egyptians, 
Nathan Shachar, historian of the Gaza Strip, argues, “(…) sometimes in tandem with 
old rich Gazan families, really functioned as a superior caste, controlling and taxing 
every economic initiative, from prostitution—the cheap brothels of Gaza were well 
known in Cairo and drew many visitors—to valuable and beneficial projects.”1007 The 
merchants who had gained permission to import luxury goods from Lebanon that 
thousands of visiting Egyptians could purchase at low costs to let the Egyptian regime 
gain foreign currency,1008 most probably also benefitted from UNEF, which already 
from June 1957 began keeping Israeli naval vessels from boarding Palestinian fishing 
boats and boats importing Lebanese luxury goods, as the ADL continued into the 
waters of the Gaza Strip.1009 Although many UN soldiers probably spent part of their 
salaries on nightclubs and brothels in both Beirut and Cairo once leave trips were 
initiated in April 1957,1010 many also offered the hotels (some of which were built, 
owned and run by wealthy Egyptians), restaurants, bars and taxi companies of the 
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larger towns of Gaza City and Khan Younis their patronage over the years.1011 Already 
in late April, the UN officer observed (as noted above), the attitude of the ‘business 
classes’ towards the UN force was “(…) increasingly favourable and friendly 
(…).”1012 Most of the ‘business classes’ that benefited from the presence of UNEF 
were men much in the same way that the Palestinians who had worked for the British 
had been and the Mandate labour market had generally been male-dominated.  
Those who found work for UNEF were also not surprisingly predominantly men. 
This was not only on account of the types of physical labour people were needed for, 
but also a consequence of the Mandate policy and the Jewish/Israeli expulsion of 
approximately 200.000 people to what was left of the Southern District of Palestine. 
Indeed, the hardships of the First World War and the emergence of a widely engaged 
women’s movement (if mostly active in to the north) over the late 1920s and early 
1930s both required and enabled many women in the Southern District of Palestine to 
work as textile factory workers and fruit pickers as well as nurses and teachers (after 
taking gendering and depoliticising training in some of the (few) schools and centres 
for girls and women established by the British), their paths often functions of their 
family backgrounds. However, the making of the poverty-stricken Gaza Strip in 1948 
rolled back most achievements and ensured that men would come to dominate the 
Gaza Strip labour market. While some women were able to return to nursing and 
others found low-paid work in what remained of the textile and citrus industries, the 
majority of women had no places to seek work. Only when the Egyptian regime in 
1957 made the Gaza Strip tax-free to promote (any) economic activity did more 
women find work in the rising number of citrus fruit plantations.1013 Reproducing the 
British policy of teaching women gendering and depoliticising subjects such as 
nursing, hygiene, home management skills and sewing, UNRWA soon shifted from 
only relief to training and education, including women’s centres and schools for girls 
and boys.1014 By 1957, this had allowed some women to work as teachers in the girl’s 
schools for refugees and some hundreds of refugee mothers and young women to 
make  blankets and table linen for other UNRWA refugee camps and embroidered 
skirts for visitors in UNRWA non-commercial training centres.1015 Once in the Gaza 
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Strip, the UN force began hiring Palestinian workers. Yet, six months later no more 
than a handful of women, all with Greek names worked in low admin positions.1016 
From the labour-related material available, which amounts to numerous files and 
hundreds of documents, it appears that UNEF only began to think about hiring 
Palestinian women once UNRWA began informing UNEF that they had female 
commercial course graduates. When women could begin to take the course is unclear, 
but in 1966 they could still only learn typing in Arabic and English and shorthand 
while their male counterparts would also be trained in book-keeping and ‘related 
subjects’,1017 thereby leaving UNEF (and UNRWA) with similar policies as the 
Mandate and a character resembling a scaled down version of the Gaza Strip that left 
Palestinian women with few options.  
As had also been the case in the Mandate era and the Egyptian period from 1948 
to 1956, some skilled and educated Palestinian men found full- or part-time 
employment with the power that be: some with the Egyptian administration that 
placed several Palestinians in senior positions previously held by Egyptians and some 
with the UN force even if the April 1957 riots had left it unpopular. According to the 
Chairman of the EIMAC, especially “(…) the middle and lower classes and 
particularly those in governmental departments and on fixed salaries (…)1018 were 
affected by the rising costs of living the spending of UNEF caused. If the typical Greek 
and Armenian names on the lists of locally recruited staff are anything to go by, the 
UN force nevertheless hired mostly non-Arabic male expats as administrative 
assistants, secretaries, and engineers while it hired some Palestinians in lower 
functions as mechanics, phone operators, typists and procurement, logistics, and 
finance clerks, thereby in some instances recruiting people who had previously 
worked for the British in either Egypt or Palestine, especially Rafah where the UN 
maintenance area was coincidentally placed.1019 In contrast to the British soldiers and 
policemen that were expected to have at least a basic command of Arabic soon after 
arriving to Palestine to enter the security forces,1020 each UN contingent operating on 
the ADL also received one or more Arabic-English interpreters. Being Palestinians, 
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they were expected to have agendas of their own. Hence, UNEF hired only those 
UNRWA or EIMAC recommended or UNRWA lent to UNEF, suggesting a careful 
vetting process.1021 Possibly repeating another British (and Egyptian) practice, the UN 
units began to use their interpreters as informers: a tactic that UNEF HQ quickly 
criticised as unfitting.1022 However, some contingents were indifferent. The Brazilian 
battalion, for example, would use their soldiers with Lebanese heritage while the 
Indonesian battalion would use its laundry workers if in need.1023 Custodians of the 
British legal system along with the Egyptian Military Governor-General by way of 
running the Gaza Strip in cooperation, both UNEF and UNRWA also contracted 
Palestinians trained in legal matters by the British for occasional legal counsel on 
issues related to land and labour and perhaps most frequently compensation following 
labour or traffic incidents.1024  
As had been the case under the Mandate,1025 the larger part of the Palestinians in 
employment with UNEF, however, were manual labourers, many of whom had 
worked for the British. There was plenty of labour available not only due to the Israeli 
expulsion of Palestinians into what became the Gaza Strip. The Mandate policies had 
also gradually undermined the fabric of Palestine’s agrarian social economy to the 
extent that calculations from five villages extrapolated to the entire Mandate had 
almost half the rural population live with less land than what was required for 
subsistence needs and thousands of landless peasants had been forced into wage 
labour. Not surprisingly, they came to make up of the bulk of the refugees.1026 Equally 
unsurprising perhaps, UNEF was still recruiting amongst people that had worked for 
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the British in 1965.1027 After the UN force had terminated its operations in Egypt 
(aside operating a supply route out of El-Arish by plane, observing the Straits of Tiran 
and patrolling the International Frontier between Israel and Egypt), the Egyptian 
government, no doubt by way of a request from the reinstated Egyptian governor, 
requested that the Egyptians that had been hired as cooks, barbers, batmen (civilian 
security staff for villas, messes and non-military areas), and other labourers be laid 
off in favour of Palestinians.1028 The UN force did so, and by September 1958 this 
mostly male labour force counted 1.025 Palestinian employees, predominantly ‘blue 
collar’ workers as waiters, kitchen boys, sign writers, gardeners, drivers and 
construction day labour working in and between the UNEF camps and officer 
villas.1029 Although this number was a lot higher than the 87 traineeships as plumbers, 
carpenters, electricians etc. UNRWA offered, it was not very high in comparison 
neither with the roughly 7.000 jobs UNWRA offered refugees and Gaza Strip 
‘natives’ as teachers, textile workers and camp workers,1030 nor with the Gaza Strip 
refugee population above 15 years of age, which UNRWA—in what can be seen as a 
continuation of the British Mandate population monitoring regime—counted to 
117.270 in mid-1957.1031 A particularly gruelling case at that moment stressed the lack 
of work and the subsequent importance of gaining any work a few months after the 
UN force had arrived. Frantically seeking work, a group of several Palestinian men 
pressed at the gates of the Indonesian camp and were mistakenly let in alongside a 
truck. In response, and perhaps in an instance of re-actualised colonial military 
culture, several Palestinians were beaten with rifle butts and one killed by Indonesian 
soldiers.1032 While many labour-related files have been disposed of as part of UNEF’s 
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appraisal process and subsequently also the UN Archive in New York, the records 
available suggest that such labour related violence did not occur again. However, this 
is not to say that UNEF workers had no problems. Indeed, neither the UNEF part-time 
nor the full-time manual labourers had any external outlets for their frustrations. Egypt 
had outlawed unions (and political parties) in comparison to the British that had both 
allowed unions and even promoted them during the Second World War.1033 Instead, 
the local UNEF employees—some of whom may have had experience with the union 
for unskilled labour (Palestine Arab Workers Society) or that for skilled labour 
(Federation of Arab Trade Unions) that also operated in the Southern District of 
Palestine1034—sought to make do on their own. Many sought to negotiate with their 
superiors to get help with rations, lodging and transport to make ends meet, to the 
extent the staff of the Chief Administrative Officer’s office grew concerned by the 
degree to which it had become necessary to help not international employees with 
these things (as was UN custom much like the British), but locally recruited 
employees.1035 The Gaza Strip was not an easy place to live in with an unemployment 
rate at nearly 90% in 1959.1036 By 1960, a clearer set of rules had come into 
existence.1037 However, a new set of disciplinary measures against employees in 1961 
suggested that little changed for those Palestinian manual workers who struggled to 
sustain their families with a part-time income and refugee rations whilst given no 
leave, no sick leave and only first aid in case of work-related accidents.1038 Not 
surprisingly, thefts of bread, tea and petrol—that could either be used or sold in 
smaller quantities or bulk by workers—continued.1039 Moreover, requests for fulltime 
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work and promotions and formal complaints over foremen and supervisors, conduct, 
shifts, dismissals and racial discrimination became regular,1040 as they had been under 
the Mandate.1041  Others sought to cope by requesting salary reductions to be able to 
keep the UNRWA rations, yet another testimony to the Gaza Strip hardships.1042 
Arguably, the frustrations of the UNEF workers, as they expressed and dealt with 
them on their own, were thus both as restricted as those of the broader population of 
the Gaza Strip and very particularised expressions of these as gradually expressed 
over the late 1950s and early 1960s with the formation of the militant nationalist 
organisation Fatah in 1959, the Egyptian proclamation of a constitution for the Gaza 
Strip in 1962 and the Palestinian Liberation Army in 1964.1043 Whether the result of 
the Palestinian workers’ negotiations or one or more decisions on the part of UNEF, 
the UN force gradually reduced the share of part-time workers from around half of its 
labour force in 1958 (544 of the 1.025 employees) to around a third in 1965 (582 of 
1.481 Palestinian employees), as the force was gradually reduced from 6.615 in 1957 
to 3.984 in 1966 due to other interventions launched into Congo, West Irian and 
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Cyprus and UNEF correspondingly raised the number of Palestinian (male) 
workers.1044 
While some factors and conditions were linked entirely to or decided by Israel 
and/or Egypt, UNEF all in all in various forms built on, connected to and replicated 
some of the logics and practices of the British Mandate in the sphere of labour and 
economic relations whilst at the same time being part of a new assemblage of authority 
in the Gaza Strip.1045  
As both the previous and this chapter should have made clear, the joint rule of the 
Gaza Strip by the UN and Egypt effectively turned it into a territory consisting both 
of what military geographer Rachel Woodward sees as geographies of military 
activities, which she defined as “(…) the patterning of material entities and social 
relations across space shaped by the production and reproduction of military 
capabilities”,1046 on the one hand, and geographies of militarism, which she defined 
as “(…) the shaping of civilian space and social relations by military objectives, 
rationales, and structures, either as part of the deliberate extension of military 
influence into civilian spheres of life and the prioritisation of military institutions, or 
as a product of these processes (…)“, on the other.1047 That everyday life otherwise 
gradually appeared less unstable and incidents appeared as ‘peaks’ linked to this new 
assemblage of authority—in which Egyptian-controlled police and the Egyptian 
intelligence service patrolled and monitored the urban areas and political 
groupings,1048 and the UN force patrolled and regulated the space near the ADL—
rather than new affectionate relations or a new agreeable stability, again also in the 
context of the previous British Mandate regime. Yet, the establishment of this joint 
regime affected people of different social standing and age, and the places in which 
they lived, differently, resulting in different interactions and tactics for these.   
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Summary of Part 2: Negotiating Life and 
Authority in a Frontier Zone of Imperial 
Multilateralism 
 
In the first part of the analysis, I argued that the UN intervention in the form of both 
the Suez Clearance Organization and the United Nations Emergency Force 
represented not only one possible instrument that the Eisenhower Administration 
realised by way of the UN and a willing UN leadership against the backdrop of fearing 
for the survival of the British Empire and NATO as the quintessential expression of 
and means to secure the alliance between the Western imperial and colonial powers, 
medium and smaller states. It was also, I argued, in different ways not as much a break 
with the past, and thus something ‘new’, as it was (a non-destined yet still) path-
dependent expression of the global imperial system as it was evolving. If anything, 
the gendered and racialised top-down dynamics pointed as much ‘backwards’ to the 
different imperial systems and inter-imperial projects as they did ‘forward’.  
In the second part of the analysis, I turned to interrogate how matters ‘on the 
ground’ in what became the UN ‘mission area’ of north-eastern Egypt and the Gaza 
Strip, or what I theorised as a ‘frontier zone of imperial multilateralism’, appeared 
within that context.  
‘Connecting the dots’ of the web of the UN force from its conception to its arrival, 
showed how the context of the operation also spilled over into its composition. 
Initially, NATO-members and Commonwealth-members, several of which had 
economic and strategic interests in the functioning of the Suez Canal, provided the 
bulk of the units. When expanded, it saw the addition of units from states that had 
previously either supported the US in the Korean War militarily or received US arms 
and funding. Not insignificantly, it also emerged that had been assembled to a large 
extent by way of the American Airforce via NATO bases in Portugal and Italy as well 
as bases in either Turkey or Iran, which although not a member of NATO was a 
member of CENTO, the Middle Eastern military alliance that Egypt and Syria had not 
become part of. Additionally, the UN force acquired a great deal of the supplies and 
vehicles from initially the British invasion force and later the US. Parallel to the build-
up of the force, Western companies also began the clearance operation of the Suez 
Canal, initially even including French and British vessels. At this point, everything 
still very much pointed to the immediate context of the Suez Crisis against the 
backdrop of a regime of international organisations under the UN umbrella attending 
Western interests in subtler ways than hitherto. 
Analysing the deployment of the UN force to the Suez Canal Area where it was to 
escort out the British and French invasion forces and offer them what they themselves 
had called a ‘fig leaf’, it emerged that the force may well have prevented incidents, 
wider skirmishes and hostilities or a return to downright fighting with the civilian 
Egyptian population in the area near Port Said and Suez and the returning Egyptian 
security and military forces. However, it also appears that at least the Scandinavian 
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and Canadian units sympathised and identified with the invasion forces more than 
they did the Egyptians. It may have been for that reason that the UN Commander 
frequently deployed these as the vanguard units and the Latin American units when 
he needed more units. However, given the warm relations between the Canadian 
commander of the UN force and the higher echelons of the invading forces, some of 
whom he may even have known personally, and the different contingents’ ties with 
and mimicking of the British and multiple shoot-outs with Egyptians, it appeared as 
likely that the systemic predisposition ‘backwards’ often also translated into similar 
dynamics ‘on the ground, when filtered through the military cultures of the various 
units and their concrete situations. Further research on the Indian and Yugoslavian 
units may well, however, point in the opposite direction in their cases.  
When examining the redeployment of the UN force into the Gaza Strip to take 
over control from the Israeli occupation force, it again appeared to be the case that it 
continued along a similar path. First was the handling of the riot in Gaza City, the ban 
on demonstrations and public gatherings soon after, and the subsequent failure of the 
UN to realise the emerging joint-US-UN plan of internationalising further the Gaza 
Strip in cooperation with Egypt, which forced the UN to have the force maintain an 
operational area along the ADL rather than also maintain internal security. The first 
months of establishing the frontier regime also suggested an orientation to something 
familiar with shootings, retaliatory assaults and detentions. Moreover, the relationship 
between the UN and Israel and the relations between the UN force and Israeli military 
units and settlers also began to appear similar to the relationship between the British 
Mandate and the British security forces on the one hand and the Jewish settler colonial 
communities on the other. 
Interrogating the relations between the UN force and the different population 
segments of the Gaza Strip also pointed towards both problematic issues and practices 
in many ways similar to those of the British Mandate. With regard to military land 
usage, the pressure from Palestinian peasants on the Egyptian administration 
eventually got to the UN, which lead to the formation of a compensatory scheme. The 
broader prism of insecurity captured not only what the UN units and soldiers did and 
did not do on the ADL in terms of detentions, ambushes and letting Israeli units and 
settlers into the Gaza Strip, but also how the force engendered insecurity on account 
of traffic accidents, drunk soldiers getting into and so on. Finally, it emerged that the 
presence of the UN force not only quickly led to rising price levels in the Gaza Strip 
to the detriment of the bulk of the residents who were both unemployed or refugees 
(or both) and poor, but also in the long run supported the Egyptian policy of aiding an 
economic Palestinian elite to maintain control, thus again, if unintentionally, building 
on and replicating in some ways the policies of the British Mandate. 
Altogether, the issue of continuity from inter-imperial cooperation and the first 
phases of imperial multilateralism in policy and, practice appears to become even 
more pronounced when the analytical focus is shifted to how matters unfold ‘on the 
ground’. If anything, it would seem evident that policymakers, UN staffers’ and 
researchers’ characterisation of the first UN intervention of ‘classis’ and ‘successful’ 
need to be reconsidered.   
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
The previous chapters have covered a lot of ground and sought to make many 
connections. To be able to provide any measured reflections of my endeavour, I must 
return to my point of departure. Accordingly, this chapter first recaps the challenges 
of the research field as I see them and my aims and research questions. Then, I move 
on to present my findings. I do so in the ‘reverse’ order, initially focusing on matters 
‘on the ground’ (or the second part of the analysis and the frontier zone of Egypt and 
the Gaza Strip), before adjusting the lens to the overall system (or the first part of the 
analysis and the frontier system). Accordingly, I reflect on how my findings contribute 
to the research field on international interventions before, finally reflecting on 
excavating the archives as a means to ‘keep the door open’ for subsequent research. 
 
 
The Challenges of the Research Context, the Aims and the 
Research Questions   
 
As noted in both the introduction and the methodological chapter, the early research 
on the UN interventions and their state-building components was largely published in 
Western journals and monographs from Western publishing houses by Western 
scholars rooted in Western academic institutions or think-tanks close to the Western 
centres of power. Since the end of the Cold War and the advent of especially feminist 
and post-structuralist (and only marginally postcolonial) scholarship within the 
research field, the publishing channels, the disciplines and the scholars themselves 
have thankfully come a long way. Indeed, an upward number of scholars representing 
an ever-growing range of disciplines, approaches and aims have called attention to 
how the international interventions and state-building project result in systems of 
governance that cannot be held accountable, externalise the local administrations, 
create dependence and often also lead to gendered insecurity in everyday life. It is, 
thus, safe to say that the claim of Brian Urquhart—a former British military officer 
and UN Under-Secretary-General involved in several Cold War interventions—that a 
UN intervention was “(…) like a family friend who has moved into the household 
stricken by disaster (…)”1049 no longer stands unopposed. However, seeing how the 
scholarly critique linked to the Western hegemony after the Cold War and the 
associated neoliberal turn in the international system, a group of scholars—whom I 
clustered together as the ‘imperial segment’—began to characterise the structural 
logics, the ways of organising and the practices of the interventions as imperial in 
nature. In different ways, this cluster of scholars began to add a diachronic (or 
historical) dimension to the overall critique: a task that is still ongoing. 
                                                          
1049 B. Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, New York, 1987, 248. 
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 As a historian attempting to link imperial and colonial history, international 
history and Cold War history, I suggested that the overall research field, in all its 
synchronic contemporaneity, and the ‘imperial segment’ subsequently faced three 
overall challenges. The first challenge, as I saw it, linked to the legacies of the rather 
intimate links between most academic disciplines involved in ‘peacekeeping’ research 
and the imperial as well as the colonial projects from the late 19th century onwards, 
and how, consequently, the histories of the ‘mission areas’ and their residents and the 
deeper history of our international system still are overlooked. Instead, I suggested, 
these histories need to be seen as fundamental to the workings of our international 
system, much in the same way that the histories of colonies and their residents have 
become integral to the histories of imperialism. A second challenge, I argued, was not 
only how to engage the mainstream against this backdrop, but also to both seek and 
expand the common ground whilst promoting what Markowich and Shinn called 
‘disciplinary elasticity’.1050 Considering the links between the situation within the 
research field and ‘mission areas’ on the one hand and the two first challenges on the 
other, I finally saw the third challenge as the need to historicise the international 
system, the troop contributing states and the ‘mission areas’ and to do in a way that 
speaks to the common ground rather than the disciplinary differences of the research 
field. Altogether, I contended that these three challenges pointed towards the need for 
a counter-narrative, or, even better, a new narrative that could provide a platform for 
historicising the interventions and the overall system of governance they reflect in 
way that would offer forward social relevance. Consequently, I saw taking the first 
step towards creating this narrative as the best way to handle these challenges. My 
first aim, thus, was to promote interdisciplinary dialogue on the links between the 
imperial, the inter-imperial and the international. The means with which to do so, my 
second aim was accordingly two-fold: to introduce a new analytical-theoretical 
framework and to provide an analysis based on it. To realise these aims, the theoretical 
framework was accordingly not only to be rooted in the discussion amongst imperial 
historians, but was also to wed systemic and everyday perspectives (or insist on a 
global-local orientation if you will).  
On the basis of this framework, I thus set out to examine 1) how the post-1945 
regime of international organisations under the umbrella of the United Nations 
emerged from inter-imperial cooperation and the systemic significance thereof; 2) 
and, in this context, the forms of civilian and military regimes of regulation and 
governance the interventions of the United Nations, intentionally and unintentionally, 
transferred to—and engendered—‘on the ground’ in the ‘mission areas’; and 3) 
accordingly within this context, how different population groups ‘on the ground’ in 
the ‘mission areas’ related to and/or resisted these forms of civilian and military 
regimes.  
Linked to the interventions of the UN more broadly, these questions were too large 
to answer in a single dissertation. Instead, I chose to focus on the themes in the 
questions but through the ‘looking glass’ of the first UN intervention that came to be 
                                                          
1050 Marcovich and Shinn, “Where Is Disciplinarity Going?” 
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labelled a ‘peacekeeping’ operation. This intervention, which took place first in Egypt 
and subsequently in the Gaza Strip and lasted from 1956 to 1967, was relevant not 
only because it set a precedent for later interventions with regard to policy making, 
doctrine, and organisation. Despite being a site for much research since 1957, the 
intervention also offered, I suggested, a much understudied oil and shipping 
dimension in the context of a militarised region at the forefront of the imperial Cold 
War conflict. The intervention, in other words, appeared, I suggested, a good, if not 
the best, place to start the unravelling of the established peacekeeping narrative and 
start a new counter-narrative rooted in imperial historiography.    
 
 
My Findings: On The ‘Frontier Zone of Imperial Multilateralism’ 
(Part 2) 
 
Within the setting of the first ‘peacekeeping’ operation of the United Nations, the 
second part of the analysis examined the civilian and military regimes of regulation 
and governance of the UN in the ‘mission area’ and how different population groups 
living in the ‘mission area’ related to and/or resisted these.  
Concretely, I linked research on British Mandate Palestine and the Middle East in 
the Cold War, with published materials from the US and UN soldiers, and records 
from the UN force itself and its corps of EIMAC observers against the backdrop of 
my space-, network- and people-centred theoretical framework. This method allowed 
a fundamentally different understanding of the UN intervention to appear, unlocking 
hitherto overlooked dynamics, practices, and conflicts (between the UN force and the 
Gaza Strip residents, the UN and Egypt and Egypt and the Gaza Strip residents) that 
should be familiar to the scholars of both the British Mandate and the current 
interventions. Indeed, it appeared that the UN failed to build a joint UN-Egyptian 
administrative regime, which would have created a situation much more familiar to 
most scholars of today’s ‘mission areas’. That this not so minor detail of a botched 
administration fell under the radar, and thus out of the narrative, enabled the 
intervention to instead be presented as a narrow and impartial ‘buffer’ operation, 
something I suggest it was clearly not alone on account of the failure to build rapport 
with the Gaza Strip residents in the first weeks.  
However, as I showed, the tensions, conflicts and insecurities the first weeks of 
the UN presence engendered did not end as most UNEF units were relocated to 
operate only on the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) due to direct Egyptian and 
indirect Palestinian pressure. Rather, this negotiated process was also relatively 
violent with months of incidents claiming the lives of several Palestinians, Bedouin 
and UN soldiers. While it appeared the relations stabilised gradually, at least in the 
sense of fewer examples of ‘negotiations by rifle and mines’ and killings taking place, 
the formal security apparatus of the UN continued to frequently create atmospheres 
of insecurity. On and near the ADL, insecurity came primarily in the form of the 
omnipresent surveillance and regulatory regime on the ADL; the endless thereof 
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derived wrongful detentions of not only but especially Palestinian and Bedouin 
children and women; the repeated failures to prevent Israeli soldiers and settlers from 
occasionally carrying out attacks with impunity; and the inability to challenge both 
the frequent low-altitude overflights of Israeli fighter jets and the Israeli naval and 
fishing vessels that challenged Palestinian fishing boats in the territorial waters of the 
Gaza Strip. Inside the Gaza Strip, the UN force (also) created atmospheres and 
situations of insecurity near their bases (which only in the case of platoon camps were 
placed near the ADL); in relation to labour conflicts or overly aggressive reactions to 
theft; endless traffic incidents that regularly killed small children on account of drunk 
driving, speeding and the congestion of the Gaza Strip and the refugee camps in 
particular which left the children with few places to play; and in the towns when UN 
soldiers, often drunk, engaged in arguments or occasionally fights with restaurant 
owners, taxi drivers, and bypassing Palestinians, men and women alike.  
The insecurity, it became evident, also extended into the economic sphere, as the 
loose regime the UN and Egypt established piecemeal with regard to both labour and 
economic dimension tended to the interests of the minor Palestinian merchant and 
landed elite as well as the Egyptians who had joined in with building new orange 
plantations, hotels and so on, whilst the unemployment rate for Palestinians, refugees 
and Gaza residents alike, skyrocketed. Eventually, the overall pressure on the 
Egyptian administration and the emerging threat of militant Palestinian environments 
in the larger towns and refugee camps led to the facilitation of the labour migration of 
tens of thousands of young Palestinians, mainly disenfranchised or politically aware 
men, to the Gulf States. The few thousand Palestinians that worked for the UN force 
or its ‘development’ sibling, UNRWA, also appear not to have done so out of 
affectionate feelings for the UN, but as a means to handle the insecurity of everyday 
life that went beyond the daily struggle on the insufficient UN food rations. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly given the Egyptian prohibition of labour unions, the records also show 
numerous attempts of UN-employed Palestinians to complain, gain benefits, increase 
their salaries and so on, on an individual basis.  
It also materialised that the UN force caused land problems for numerous 
Palestinian peasant. Many peasants had lost land (but not all as was the case for many 
of the people congested in the refugee camps) with the creation of the Israeli settler 
colonial state in 1948, and thus needed to put every last piece of land to use. Again, 
pressure led the Egyptian administration and subsequently the UN to act, here in the 
form of a system of compensation for land being used for military purposes. Despite 
being compensated or in a few cases granted permission to use the land near the ADL, 
members of the peasant families, whether male or female and young and old, were 
frequently detained, thus tying the land issue to the problems and insecurities created 
by the ADL regime.  
However, the intervention not only appears similar to current interventions in that 
it was an externalising system of governance (organising its matters with the UN 
higher echelons and the troop contributing and funding states via New York on the 
one hand and Egypt and its Gaza Strip administration on the other); offered the 
Palestinians in the ‘mission area’ very little with regard to formal mechanisms of 
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influence and accountability (the land compensation scheme perhaps being the 
exception); and turned the area of the Gaza Strip into a militarised geography (with 
the Israelis on the ‘outside’ and the Egyptian intelligence service and Palestinian-
manned but Egyptian controlled police unit on the ‘inside’). In doing so, UNEF also 
very much continued in the path laid out of by the British Mandate. More than 
anything, it militarised everyday life and its spaces as had the British from the late 
1920s onwards only in a much reduced and thus overcrowded area. Just as the British 
had favoured the Jewish settler communities and used the Egyptian monarchy to their 
own ends, the UN similarly favoured the state of Israel, which it had had a rather large 
role in making, at the expense of the Palestinians, and negotiated its aims in the Gaza 
Strip with the military regime in Cairo. The joint UN-Egyptian regime, if more ad hoc 
and ‘loose’ than initially anticipated following the realisation that it was necessary to 
enter the Gaza Strip to reopen and stabilise the Suez Canal to secure Western 
European oil supplies, also reinforced a process of socio-economic and political 
disenfranchisement and externalisation that also connected to the British Mandate. 
Often, and this needs further attention and unpacking by future research, it also 
seemed that many of the interactions between UN units and Gaza Strip residents 
(whether Palestinians or Bedouin) as well as Israelis took place in racialised spaces 
that tied national military cultures into the deeper fusion of imperial identities and into 
the sense of global ‘whiteness’, which by both inter-imperial cooperation and projects 
the UN itself carried forward well until the mid-1960s (and perhaps beyond).  
In the process of relocating from Egypt, the Scandinavian and Canadian 
contingents of the UN force seemed not only to tie into the idea of a global 
‘whiteness’, but also to relate sympathetically to both the British and Israelis (more 
than the French) units and their goals, which subsequently formed their practices. 
However, the underlying global power structure of the UN and its markers of identity, 
here theorised as the frontier of imperial multilateralism, were made visible already 
in the examination of the build-up of the force. ‘Connecting the dots’ of the 
geopolitical infrastructure of the intervention, it became clear that most of the states 
that provided contingents for the UN force and logistical sites were, to various 
degrees, linked to the either the British or the American imperial frontiers. 
 
       
My Findings:  On the ‘Frontier of Imperial Multilateralism’ (Part 1) 
 
Turning to the broader picture of how the post-1945 regime of international 
organisations under the umbrella of the United Nations emerged from inter-imperial 
cooperation and the systemic significance thereof (in what can perhaps be called the 
‘frontier region’), entails a bit of a shift in scale, emphasising the systemic aspects 
more than the matters ‘on the ground’.  
Concretely, I linked research—on the British, American, and Soviet Union’s early 
Cold War Middle East policies relating to trade, energy, naval strategy and geopolitics 
and research on Israeli and Egyptian foreign policy and strategy—with published 
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materials not only but especially from the American online series of records from the 
State Department (FRUS) as well as unpublished records from the Danish Steamship 
Owners Association (which was close to the use of the Suez Canal and the 
negotiations up to the joint British, French and Israeli invasion as Denmark was 
amongst the ten most regular canal users) against the backdrop of my theoretical 
framework. Earlier works on the intervention have discussed the part of the context 
of the UN intervention that relates to the joint British, French and Israeli invasion of 
both Egypt and the Gaza Strip (against the backdrop of the Egyptian, American and 
British conflict about financing the Aswan Dam). However, the combination of the 
theoretical framework on the one hand, and the FRUS-series, the shipping records and 
the diverse research literature on the other, allowed a deeper—and both fundamentally 
different and bleaker—understanding of the UN intervention to materialise. 
Although officials from the UK, Canada and the highest echelon of the UN 
Secretariat had held talks on internationalising the Suez Canal with a military force 
and American think-tanks had made similar suggestions to the American 
administration in the early 1950s, the intervention was not a planned means for the 
West to re-secure direct control of the Suez Canal after the British had to withdraw 
their last forces from the canal area in 1954 (or prevent another war between Israel 
and Egypt). As for the immediate context of the intervention, it is necessary, I argue, 
to think beyond the crisis (the invasion of Egypt and the Gaza Strip, which to some 
extent was supported in Western Europe as way to gain a larger space for Western 
Europe to manoeuvre globally) by also including the oil dimension (which Cold War 
economic historians has researched but no peacekeeping scholars considered). Seen 
against this backdrop, the US engagement and close partnership with the UN 
Secretary-General—in criticising the invasion and the Soviet threats, supporting the 
intervention at the UN General Assembly and in the corridors and finally assisting 
with finances, logistics and arms—connected directly to two problems with 
potentially global ramifications. Firstly, the intervention, I argued, was a joint 
response between the Eisenhower Administration and the highest UN echelon to the 
urgent need to reopen and stabilise the Suez Canal to secure Western European oil 
supplies. Secondly, the intervention also linked to the Eisenhower Administration’s 
wish to avoid no less than what it feared to be the implosion of the British Empire (on 
account of its deteriorating economic situation) that would not only have regional 
repercussions with regard to a military presence to secure the oil supply of Western 
Europe, but also affect both NATO’s credibility and capability and the already 
globalised Cold War in which the US relied on the British and French. Consequently, 
the Eisenhower Administration not only supported the intervention as directly as it 
could, it also launched two oil supplement schemes and the economic aid to the British 
by way of the international financial organisations.  
However, both the Suez Crisis and the UN intervention, I found, had several 
deeper layers other than ‘only’ the oil supply problem from late 1956 and the 
increasing hostility between Cairo, London and Washington from 1954 onwards. 
Firstly, the period from 1950 to 1955 saw Anglo-American influence wane and thus 
their imperial frontiers weaken, as neither fully realised the extent to which the pro-
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Western post-Mandate regional regimes depended on autonomy to remain stable 
domestically. In other words, I argue that the Anglo-American alliance made volatile 
rather than stabilise the region over the 1950s, giving thus the Soviet Union several 
openings to seek naval, maritime and commercial influence in the medium term so as 
to build rapport with strategically opportune regional regimes in the longer run.  
Secondly, I argued that the intervention also reflected the shifting regional frontier 
dynamics, as the wartime and early Cold War Anglo-American cooperation in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East—in the form of the regional dimension of the 
United Nations military alliance, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration and the Middle East Supply Center—reflected the American 
expansion into the Mediterranean and the Middle East both in cooperation with and 
at the expense of both the weakening British Empire British as well as the still 
embryonic post-Mandate states and in hostile competition with the Soviet Union.  
Thirdly, I found that these organisations—and also the UN (both as a military 
alliance and organisation) and eventually the UN intervention in extension thereof —
also very much built on the inter-imperial cooperation after the First World War and 
the regional expressions thereof. As the formal instrument promoting inter-imperial 
cooperation (or ‘multinational imperialism’), the League of Nations had begun to shift 
the international modus operandi further away from direct and violent imperial 
occupation towards internationally sanctioned systems of imperial governance in the 
form of the Mandates: A shift that coincided with the American ascendency to a 
position of global influence in the global imperial system as its relative strength versus 
the other imperial systems and colonial powers increased with First World War and 
the promotion of American belief that endless direct interventions and occupations 
would not yield stable influence but unending resistance and instability (after a decade 
of interventions and occupations in Latin and Central America). However, riots and 
revolts, especially in the post-Ottoman Middle East, on the one hand, and the still 
dominant agendas and repertoires of power of the larger imperial-systems and colonial 
powers on the, other eventually led to the militarisation of the Mandates, the alienation 
of Japan and Germany (and in part the Soviet Union) and the collapse of the League.  
Finally, I argued that the UN intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip, the UN 
security organisation and alliance, and the emerging competitive and cooperative 
inter-imperial blocs of the inter-war also linked to the regional expressions of the pre-
First World War phase of multinational imperialism in two ways. Not only had 
European inter-imperial cooperation since the 1850s revolved around the exclusion or 
at least reduction of Russian imperial influence in the region as the Ottoman Empire 
increasingly struggled to control its imperial territories and spheres of influence, to 
build a stronger and modern state apparatus and economy, and to control its various 
populations. The numerous inter-imperial interventions against the Ottoman Empire 
(that saw the British and French growing influence and takeovers of Cyprus and 
Lebanon, the ‘internationalisation of Crete’, and the making of Albania) on the one 
hand and the form of racialising and system-supportive agreements on inter-imperial 
trade, communications, law, hygiene, and mobilities on the other also provided a 
deeper legacy to draw upon.  
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What do my Research Findings contribute to the Research Field 
on International Interventions? 
 
Unquestionably, the lens of my theoretical framework and my findings altogether 
paint a picture of the first UN intervention that is both fundamentally different and 
much, much bleaker than existing research. Indeed, it is quite a step to rearticulate the 
intervention from the ‘classic’ buffer (and successful) operation to a ‘frontier zone of 
imperial multilateralism’ that in many ways built on, continued and replicated the 
logics and the practices of the British Mandate and thus also held similar influences 
locally (in the ‘partnership with Egypt). That is not, however, to say that more research 
could not yield new insights. Obviously, one’s scholarly background and theoretical 
framework help decide where one look, what one looks after and what eventually 
recognises more specifically. Beyond these factors of differentiation, more region-
specific research and records from the UN force and the higher echelons (that are still 
classified from top secret to strictly confidential), the Israel border units, the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry, the Egyptian Governor-General’s administration as well as the 
military archives of all the troop contributing states could all potentially be very useful 
in adding further or changing the fundamental perspective. Altogether, however, the 
combination of records, published materials and research literature on the British 
Mandate, the American, British and Soviet Cold War Middle East-policies, 
Palestinian nationalism and militancy and Israeli nationalism and militarism presented 
here, to the best of my knowledge, represents the hitherto the largest collection of 
sources connected to the realities of everyday life ‘on the ground’ and literature 
connected to the dynamics of the ‘mission area’.  
If this work thus stands up to the scrutiny of colleagues, the first United Nations 
‘peacekeeping’ operation, as it came to labelled, should be recognised as anything but 
such in that had both diachronic and synchronic dimensions tying it directly to deeper 
modes of imperial cooperation. It must, however, also be recognised that 
UNEF/UNSCO was not only an expression of ‘merely’ a coming together of the 
regimes and practices of especially but not only the British and American imperial 
systems and their systems of governance. As is hopefully painstaking clear, it was 
also the expression of a system that, if tied both to the British and American British 
imperial frontiers, expanded in its own right. Here conceptualised as a frontier, it was 
system that expanded in both breadth—by way of its growing membership, how it 
organised international space and relations in a self-referential manner, its 
organisational bureaucracy steeped in Western ways and its gradually emerging 
military web of bases, ports and supply systems—and in depth (in this case) on 
account of ever-intensifying links with the frontier zone in the form of the political-
geographical palimpsests of the various overlapping regimes of governance in the 
former British Mandate by way of the intervention and the linkups to the broader 
system of the United Nations.  
That is no, however, to say that the process of expansion (of the frontier) and 
incorporation (of the frontier zone) the joint UNEF/UNSCO intervention thus 
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expressed should be seen as having been only imposed on the ‘mission area’ without 
a process of negotiation, externalising, militarising in nature, and disenfranchising. As 
scholars of imperial and colonial history have reminded us for some time now to be 
the case within the imperial state-systems, the colonial powers and colonial state 
powers all around the world (and also peacekeeping researcher concerned with current 
interventions), I contend the opposite. All actors, whether individuals, families, 
communities, organisations or states, sought to—and with various degrees of 
success—negotiated their own interests within the broader framework of the 
expanding frontier on basis of what they could muster of resources and alliances, in 
turn often making the spaces—such as roads, check points, observation posts, nearby 
villages and other sites of contact—of the frontier zone fluid and negotiated, if most 
probably often contested and informed by race- and gender-dynamics.  
It is here emphasis should be placed: The system(s) of governance the first UN 
intervention in Egypt and the Gaza Strip was shaped by and shaped and brought to the 
‘mission area’ were certainly globally structuralising processes, but they were not 
unchangeable or linear. Rather, they were the results of human choices in extension 
of previous human choices, and thus human practices that can be—and to some extent 
were—challenged and subsequently transformed ‘on the ground’, and, thus, 
expressions of something that we can understand and problematise.  
 Against this backdrop, the analysis of UNEF/UNSCO and theoretical manoeuvres 
have hopefully both pointed towards ways in which to analyse other UN interventions 
that allows such work to be both historically informed—and thus gender-, race-, and 
class-sensitive—and grounded in the dynamics of their own synchronic/contemporary 
contexts on the one hand, and emphasised the urgent need to do so on the other.  
More research along these lines will hopefully also demonstrate the relevance, if 
not timeliness, of not only engaging in the promotion of ‘disciplinary elasticity’ and 
firmly placing research within the context of interdisciplinary dialogue on the imperial 
in the international, but also to historicise both the interventions and our international 
system and our own research fields, methodologies and strategies, given the intimate 
links between most social sciences and the imperial, inter-imperial and international 
systems of governance from the late 19th century onwards. No scholar operates in a 
vacuum.   
 
 
Some Thoughts on Myth-busting and Levelling the Playing Field 
Between Otherwise Loud Old ‘white’ Men, Noisy Soldiers, Audible 
Brown Men, and Inaudible Brown Children and Women 
 
While research on current interventions will not likely get access to internal and still 
active records, and perhaps—depending on the dangers affiliated with field work—
engage in field work, I will here briefly engage in some further reflections on what 
challenges, opportunities and resources the holdings of the UN archive offer on basis 
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on my experiences. As it is, many scholars leave little with which to engage. Similarly, 
many archivists reject the that they hold power over social, public and political 
memories, just as many historians and historically interested scholars of international 
relations see archives as merely physical repositories.1051 It has been, and is, thus a 
case of what the archive scholars Joan M. Schwartz and Terry Cook call ‘the blind 
leading the blind’. In other words, “(…) scholars using archives without realizing the 
heavy layers of intervention and meaning coded into the records by their creators and 
by archivists long before any box is opened in the research room, and archivists 
treating their archives without much sensitivity to the larger footprints they 
themselves are leaving on the archival record.”1052  
However, as said by anthropologist and colonial historian Laura Ann Stoler, 
information systems and archival production go far beyond merely generating orders, 
weekly reports to superiors, summaries of reports and so on via circuits of 
communication such as shipping lines, courier services, and telegraphs.1053 Rather, 
“The archive was the supreme technology of the late 19th century imperial state 
(…).”1054 Similarly, I learnt that UNEF depended on its ability to gather, organise and 
distribute information from its observation towers and day and night patrols to the 
battalion camps that sent them to UNEF HQ that then send them New York that sent 
orders the other way. The records and archival practices of the UN and UNEF, in other 
words, were as integral to the regime in the ‘mission area’ as the imperial and colonial 
practices of gathering and storing information were to the degree of success of 
implementing imperial and colonial policies. It is thus necessary to understand firstly, 
the chain of how something becomes a record in relation to the visible and invisible 
exercise of the regimes in the ‘mission areas’ and is then subsequently handled by the 
records management before it ends up in the archival system; secondly, how these 
chains from each ‘mission area’ are part of the overall system of governance on a 
global scale; and thirdly, what this means for archive-based research. 
Regarding the production of records, historian of Haiti Michel-Rolph Trouillot 
notes, “Silences are inherent in history because any single event enters history with 
some of its constituting parts missing. Something is always left out while something 
else is recorded.”1055 He continues, “In other words, the very mechanisms that make 
any historical recording possible also ensure that historical facts are not created 
equal. They reflect differential control of the means of historical production at the 
                                                          
1051 Terry Cook, “The Archive(s) Is a Foreign Country: Historians, Archivists, and the Changing 
Archival Landscape,” The Canadian Historical Review 90, no. 3 (2009): 514; Joan M. Schwarts 
and Terry Cook, “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory,” Archival 
Science 2, no. 1 (2002): 2. 
1052 Joan M. Schwarts and Terry Cook, “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern 
Memory,” 6. 
1053 Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” Archival Science 2, no. 
1 (2002): 98. 
1054 Ibid., 87; See also James Hevia, The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge 
and Empire-Building in Asia, 2012. 
1055 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston, 
Mass.: Beacon Press, 1995), 49. 
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very first engraving that transforms an event into fact.”1056 In the case of the 
production of UNEF records, it often happened—given the UN(EF) records derived 
from the exercise of its regime—that the records made invisible/inaudible Palestinians 
and Bedouin and that details would be reduced in significance, such as when, for 
example, the blast of a hand grenade next to a Palestinian boy in his bedroom was 
translated literally as ‘noise’,1057 or they became protagonists only when engaging in 
‘infiltration’ into Israel or ‘barbaric’ feuds etc.1058  
From 1960, the UNEF central registry, which was set up in May 1957,1059 began 
sending continuously its sensitive records both to and by way of the United Nations 
Field Service, in much the same way the colonial registries continuously—and 
especially at decolonisation—sent many, if not most, of the sensitive records to 
London.1060 Given my findings, it is perhaps less startling that the records 
management and archival system of UNEF, resembled in part that of the British 
Empire, which had gradually introduced a records keeping system revolving around 
a central registry that collected documents in series, which each contained case files, 
correspondents files and subject files.1061  
Regarding using the archive, the reflections of imperial historian Antoinette 
Burton—another leading voice in the charge against positivist archival thinking— are 
useful. She notes how “Historians who visit the Oriental and India Office Collections 
for the first time are often surprised by how powerfully the archival space itself evokes 
the Raj.”1062 When visiting the UN archive I found it hard to ignore how the archive, 
                                                          
1056 Ibid. 
1057 “EIMAC Investigation of UNEF Report” from UN Military Observer to Chairman EIMAC 
27 June 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957 – June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, 
Political, EIMAC, UN Archives (P114-0256) 
1058 “EIMAC Investigation of UNEF Report” from UN Military Observer to Chairman EIMAC 
15 May 1957, Complaints and Investigations April 1957 – June 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, 
Political, EIMAC, UN Archives (P114-355) and 1058 “EIMAC Investigation of UNEF Report” 
from UN Military Observer to Chairman EIMAC 19 December 1957, Complaints and 
Investigations July 1957 – December 1957, Gaza Strip, Area Files, Political, EIMAC, UN 
Archives (P114-397)  
1059 “Establishment of UNEF Registry” from Chief of Personnel to Chief Administrative 
Officer 30 May 1957, Reorganization of Central Registry 1960-1964, UNEF, S-0530-0011-
0007 (P-124-0480) and “Memorandum: Staffing, UNEF Registry” by Chief of Registry 28 June 
1957, Reorganization of Central Registry 1960-1964, UNEF, S-0530-0011-0007, UN Archives 
(P124-0483)  
1060 http://search.archives.un.org/united-nations-field-operations-service (25/05/2016) and 
Mandy Banton, “Destroy? ‘Migrate’? Conceal? British Strategies for the Disposal of Sensitive 
Records of Colonial Administrations at Independence,” Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 40, no. 2 (2012): 321–35. 
1061 Timothy John Lovering, “British Colonial Administrations’ Registry Systems: A 
Comparative Study of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,” Archival Science 10, no. 1 (2010): 
1–23; Zohar Aloufi, “The Legacy: British Mandate Record Management System in Israel,” 
Archival Science 7, no. 3 (2007): 207–11. 
1062 Antoinette Burton, Empire in Question: Reading, Writing, and Teaching British 
Imperialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 94. 
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as a mirror of imperial and colonial archives and colonial registries, not least 
employed mainly ‘white’ Australian, British, Italian, French and American nationals 
as archivists and consultants and ‘coloured’ or ‘black’ Jamaicans, Sri Lankans and 
Senegalese as service and maintenance staff. It was thus a very clear reminder to me 
that the heart of relations between the archive and the institution that created it, 
revolves around the power to label, in this case ‘peacekeeping’. Similarly, I could not 
help but note that the archive was not only almost located as far away from ‘mission 
areas’ as was the British archive from the colonies of the British Empire. It was also 
difficult to dismiss what the archive’s hold of hundreds of kilometres of documents, 
classified as Top secret, Secret and Classified, means for the histories of the ‘mission 
areas’, effectively making peoples’ own history unreachable for them and their 
descendants. For example, the significance of UNEF archive for Gaza Strip history 
cannot be overstated. One could perhaps, therefore, go as far as wonder—with regard 
to the importance of the records for Palestinian cultural memory— if the UN archival 
practice should not be seen as harmful as the systematic Israeli policy of hiding and 
scattering of the Palestinian written legacy? The records are not only beyond the reach 
of most Palestinian historians, but also ‘ordinary’ Palestinians. The circumstances are 
exacerbated by the fact that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency has made 
most of the Palestinian post-1948 written legacy in form of birth and death certificates 
and its own service records from health, education, relief and social services since 
1948 and kept it in in Vienna until 1970 and Amman thereafter.1063  
Altogether, this means that the UN archive is an active site as all other archives in 
which, as Schwartz and Cook contend, “(…) social power is negotiated, contested, 
confirmed.”1064 Thus, as Burton argues, “The more deliberately we acknowledge the 
impact of our archival experiences on our research and our teaching, the better we 
are able to historicize the British Empire, its strategies of containment, its disciplinary 
mechanisms, and its visible and invisible forms of rule.”1065 The same argument can 
be forwarded for research on the UN interventions. This will allow us to, step by step, 
first contest and later harness the power of the records on the interventions in the 
archive of the UN. As Schwartz and Cook again contend, “When power is denied, 
overlooked, or unchallenged, it is misleading at best and dangerous at worst. Power 
recognised becomes power that can be questioned, made accountable, and opened to 
transparent dialogue and enriched understanding.”1066   
                                                          
1063 Aloufi, “The Legacy”; Nur Masalha, The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, 
Narrating the Subaltern, Reclaiming Memory (London; New York: Zed Books, 2012); Maher 
Nasser, “Palestine Refugee Records Project” (Stocktaking II Conference on Palestinian 
Refugee Research, Ottawa, 2003); Salim Tamari and Elia Zureik, “The UNRWA Archives on 
Palestinian Refugees - A Feasability Study for Policy and Applied Research - Phase 1” 
(Jerusalem: The Institute of Palestine Studies, 1996). 
1064 Joan M. Schwarts and Terry Cook, “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern 
Memory,” 1. 
1065 Antoinette M. Burton, After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation 
(Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2003), 104. 
1066 Joan M. Schwarts and Terry Cook, “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern 
Memory,” 2. 
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Archives  
 
Rederiforeningen (formerly the Danish National Business Archives, now the Danish 
National Archives in Viborg) 
EIMAC 
UNEF Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force  
UNEF Office of the Force Commander 
UNEF Chief of Staff  
UNEF Chief Administrative Officer 
UNEF Assistant Administrative Officer  
UNEF Liaison Officer Tel Aviv 
UNEF Leave Centre, Beirut 
UNEF Leave Centre, Cairo 
UNEF Legal and Political Advisor  
UNEF Personnel Administration 
UNEF Public Relations 
UN Field Operations Service 
UN Office of Special Political Affairs 
UN Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs  
  
270 
 
270 
 
  
271 
 
271 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abernethy, David B. The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas 
Empires, 1415-1980. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 
Abou-El-Fadl, Reem. “Neutralism Made Positive: Egyptian Anti-Colonialism on the 
Road to Bandung.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 2 
(2015): 219–40. 
Abulafia, David, and Nora Berend, eds. Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. 
Adebajo, Adekeye. UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan 
Conflicts. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011. 
Akami, Tomoko. “Beyond Empires’ Science: Inter-Imperial Pacific Science 
Networks in the 1920s.” In Networking the International System: Global 
Histories of International Organizations, 97–132. Cham, Heidelberg, New 
York, Dordrecht, London: Springer, 2014. 
al-Husseini, Jalal. “UNRWA and the Palestinian Nation-Building Process.” Journal 
of Palestine Studies 29, no. 2 (2000): 51–64. 
Alconini, Sonia. “The Southeastern Inka Frontier against the Chiriguanos: Structure 
and Dynamics of the Inka Imperial Borderlands.” Latin American 
Antiquity 15, no. 4 (2004): 389–418. 
Aloufi, Zohar. “The Legacy: British Mandate Record Management System in 
Israel.” Archival Science 7, no. 3 (2007): 207–11. 
Al-Qaq, Richard Kareem. Managing World Order: United Nations Peace Operations 
and the Security Agenda. London; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 
2009. 
Amirie, Abbas. “The United Nations Intervention in the Congo Crisis, 1960-1961: 
With Special Emphasis on the Political Role of the Late Secretary-General, 
Dag Hammarskjold.” 1967. 
Anghie, Antony. Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law. 
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Aning, Kwesi, Kwesi, and Samuel Atuobi. “Responsibility to Protect in Africa: An 
Analysis of the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture.” Global 
Responsibility to Protect 1, no. 1 (2009): 90–113. 
Ankersmit, Frank. “Manifesto for An Analytical Political History.” In Manifestos 
for History, edited by Keith Jenkins, Sue Morgan, and Alan Munslow, 176–
96. London: Routledge, 2007. 
Anwar, Deqi Fortuna. “The Cold War and Its Impact on Indonesia: Domestic 
Politics and Foreign Policy.” In Southeast Asia and the Cold War, 133–50. 
Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2012. 
Applebaum-Sikorska, Anna, and Penguin. Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern 
Europe 1944-1956. London: Penguin Books, 2013. 
272 
 
272 
 
Arens, Esther Helena. “Multilateral Institution-Building and National Interest: Dutch 
Development Policy in the 1960s.” Contemporary European History 12, no. 
4 (2003): 457–72. 
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish. “The U. N. Experience in Gaza.” Foreign Affairs 35, no. 
4 (1957): 600–619. 
Arnheim, Arthur, and Dov Levitan. Politik, diplomati og den hjælpende hånd: 
Danmark og oprettelsen af staten Israel. Kbh.: Museum Tusculanum, 2011. 
Ashworth, Lucian M. A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the 
Modern State to Academic International Relations, 2014. 
———. “Feminism, War and the Prospects for Peace: Helena Swanwick (1864-
1939) and the Lost Feminists of Inter-War International Relations.” 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 13, no. 1 (2011): 25–43. 
———. “Interdisciplinarity and International Relations.” European Political Science 
8, no. 1 (2009): 16–25. 
Aunesluoma, Juhana. “A Nordic Country with East European Problems: British 
Views on Post-War Finland, 1944-1948.” Scandinavian Journal of History 
37, no. 2 (2012): 230–45. 
Aust, Martin. “Writing the Empire: Russia and the Soviet Union in Twentieth-
Century Historiography.” European Review of History 10, no. 2 (2003): 
375–91. 
Aytekin, E. Attila. “Tax Revolts During the Tanzimat Period (1839–1876) and 
Before the Young Turk Revolution (1904–1908): Popular Protest and State 
Formation in the Late Ottoman Empire.” Journal of Policy History 25, no. 3 
(2013): 308–333. 
Bacevich, Andrew J. The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security 
Policy since World War II. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 
Banton, Mandy. “Destroy? ‘Migrate’? Conceal? British Strategies for the Disposal 
of Sensitive Records of Colonial Administrations at Independence.” Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40, no. 2 (2012): 321–35. 
Barak, Eitan. “Between Reality and Secrecy: Israel’s Freedom of Navigation 
through the Straits of Tiran, 1956-1967).” The Middle East Journal 61, no. 
4 (2007): 657-. 
———. “Caught in the Middle: The United Nations Emergency Force, Israel and 
the 1960 ‘Rotem Crisis.’” Diplomacy and Statecraft 17, no. 2 (2006): 393–
414. 
———. “On the Power of Tacit Understandings--Israel, Egypt and Freedom of 
Passage through the Suez Canal, 1957-1960.” The Middle East Journal 58, 
no. 3 (2004): 444–68. 
———. “The Freedom That Never Was: Israel’s Freedom of Overflight over the 
Straits of Tiran Prior to the Six Day War.” Journal of Contemporary 
History 43, no. 1 (2008): 75–91. 
Baranowski, Shelley. Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from 
Bismarck to Hitler. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011. 
273 
 
273 
 
Barkawi, Tarak. “Peoples, Homelands, and Wars? Ethnicity, the Military, and Battle 
among British Imperial Forces in the War against Japan.” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 46, no. 1 (2004): 134–63. 
Barkawi, Tarak, and Mark Laffey. “Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and 
International Relations.” Millennium 31, no. 1 (2002): 109–27. 
Barkey, Karen. Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Barlas, Dilek. “Friends of Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey, 
1923-36.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 36, no. 2 (2004): 
231–52. 
Barnes, Robert. “Branding an Aggressor: The Commonwealth, the United Nations 
and Chinese Intervention in the Korean War, November 1950–January 
1951.” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 2 (2010): 231–53. 
———. The US, the UN and the Korean War: Communism in the Far East and the 
American Struggle for Hegemony in the Cold War. London, New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 2014. 
Baroud, Ramzy. My Father Was a Freedom Fighter:  Gaza’s Untold Story. London, 
New York: Pluto Press, 2010. 
Bartal, Shaul. The Fedayeen Emerge: The Palestine-Israel Conflict, 1949-1956. 
Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2011. 
Baster, James. “Economic Problems in the Gaza Strip.” The Middle East Journal 9, 
no. 3 (1955): 323–27. 
Bastian, Jeannette Allis. “Reading Colonial Records Through an Archival Lens: The 
Provenance of Place, Space and Creation.” Archival Science 6, no. 3 
(2007): 267–84. 
Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. The Globalization of World Politics: 
An Introduction to International Relations. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. 
Beattie, Peter M. The Tribute of Blood: Army, Honor, Race, and Nation in Brazil, 
1864-1945. Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2001. 
Beck, Peter J. “Britain and the Suez Crisis: The Abadan Dimension.” In Reassessing 
Suez 1956: New Perspectives and Its Aftermath, edited by Simon C Smith, 
53–65. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. 
Behera, Navnita C. “Re-Imagining IR in India.” International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 341–68. 
Békés, Csaba. “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality.” 
Cold War History 6, no. 4 (2006): 477–500. 
Belich, James. Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the 
Anglo-World, 1783-1939. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009. 
Ben-Dror, Elad. “How the United Nations Intended to Implement the Partition Plan: 
The Handbook Drawn up by the Secretariat for the Members of the United 
Nations Palestine Commission.” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 6 (2007): 
997–1008. 
274 
 
274 
 
———. “The Success of the Zionist Strategy Vis-À-Vis UNSCOP.” Israel Affairs 
20, no. 1 (2014): 19–39. 
Ben-Eliezer, Uri. “State Versus Civil Society? A Non-Binary Model of Domination 
Through the Example of Israel.” Journal of Historical Sociology 11, no. 3 
(1998): 370–96. 
Bennett, Brett M, and Joseph Morgan Hodge. Science and Empire: Knowledge and 
Networks of Science across the British Empire, 1800-1970. Houndmills, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
Bennett, Ethan R. “Frontier.” Encyclopedia of Politics of the American West. Los 
Angeles: Sage Reference & CQ Press, 2013. 
Berdal, Mats R. The United States, Norway and the Cold War, 1954-60. New York, 
N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press in association with St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, 
1997. 
Berger, Mark T. “Old State and New Empire in Indonesia: Debating the Rise and 
Decline of Suharto’s New Order.” Third World Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1997): 
321–61. 
Bernazzolli, Richelle, and Colin Flint. “Power, Place, and Militarism: Toward a 
Comparative Geographic Analysis of Militarization.” Geography Compass 
3, no. 1 (2009): 493–411. 
Bills, Martha, and D.C.) Center for Strategic and International Studies. Options for 
U.S. Military Support to the United Nations. Washington: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1992. 
Bishop, Peter V. “Canada’s Policy on the Financing of U.N. Peace-Keeping 
Operations.” International Journal 20, no. 4 (1965): 463–83. 
Blandford, John B., and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East. “Report of the Director of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to the 
United Nations General Assembly.” New York: United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, September 1951. 
Bligh, Alexander. “The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), 1956–67: Past 
Experience, Current Lessons.” Middle Eastern Studies 50, no. 5 (2014): 
796–809. 
Bloomfield, Lincoln P. “China, the United States, and the United Nations.” 
International Organization 20, no. 4 (1966): 653–76. 
Bobal, R. Thomas. “‘A Puppet, Even Though He Probably Doesn’t Know So’: 
Racial Identity and the Eisenhower Administration’s Encounter with Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and the Arab Nationalist Movement.” The International 
History Review 35, no. 5 (2013): 943–74. 
Boden, Ragna. “Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia.” Journal of Cold 
War Studies 10, no. 3 (2008): 110–28. 
Borhi, László. Hungary in the Cold War, 1945-1956 between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 
2004. 
275 
 
275 
 
Borring Olesen, Thorsten, Carsten Due-Nielsen, Ole Feldbaek, Nikolaj Petersen, and 
Poul Villaume. Dansk udenrigspolitiks historie 5, 5,. København: 
Danmarks Nationalleksikon, 2005. 
Borstelmann, Thomas. The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations 
in the Global Arena. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
Borutta, Manuel, and Sakis Borutta. “A Colonial Sea: The Mediterranean, 1798–
1956.” European Review of History 19, no. 1 (2012): 1–13. 
Borzutzky, Silvia, and David Berger. “Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don’t: 
The Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan Dam.” The Middle East 
Journal 64, no. 1 (2010): 84–102. 
Bossuat, Gerard. “French Development Aid and Co-Operation under de Gaulle.” 
Contemporary European History 12, no. 4 (2003): 431–56. 
Boughton, James M. “IMF Working Paper: Northwest of the Suez: Crisis and the 
IMF.” International Monetary Fund, 2000. 
Bourantonis, Dimitris, and Konstantinos Magliveras. “Anglo-American Differences 
over the UN during the Cold War: The Uniting for Peace Resolution.” 
Contemporary British History 16, no. 2 (2002): 59–76. 
Bourdaghs, M. “The Disease of Nationalism, the Empire of Hygiene.” Positions 6, 
no. 3 (1998): 637–73. 
Bowker, Robert. “Playing Second Fiddle in a Dysfunctional Orchestra: Australia, 
Britain and the Suez Canal 1950–56.” Global Change, Peace & Security 25, 
no. 3 (2013): 325–37. 
Bowman, Edward H., and James E. Bowman. “The Logistics Problems of a UN 
Military Force.” International Organization 17, no. 2 (1963): 355–76. 
Bowman, Edward H., and James E. Fanning. “The Logistics Problems of a UN 
Military Force.” International Organization 17, no. 2 (1963): 355. 
Boyd, James M. United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations a Military and Political 
Appraisal. New York: Praeger, 1972. 
Brands, Hal. Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2010. 
Bridge, J. W. “The Legal Status of British Troops Forming Part of the United 
Nations Force in Cyprus.” The Modern Law Review 34, no. 2 (1971): 121–
34. 
Briggs, Laura. Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in 
Puerto Rico. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 
Brückenhaus, Daniel. “The Origins of Trans-Imperial Policing: British-French 
Government Cooperation in the Surveillance of Anti-Colonialists in 
Europe, 1905-25.” In Imperial Cooperation and Transfer, 1870-1930, 171–
96. New York; London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015. 
Buanes, Arild, and Svein Jentoft. “Building Bridges: Institutional Perspectives on 
Interdisciplinarity.” Futures 41, no. 7 (2009): 446–54. 
Burbank, Jane, and Frederick Cooper. Empires in World History: Power and the 
Politics of Difference. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
276 
 
276 
 
———. Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010. 
Burkman, Thomas W. Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008. 
Burnett, Christina Duffy. “‘They Say I Am Not an American ...’: The Noncitizen 
National and the Law of American Empire.” Virginia Journal of 
International Law 48, no. 4 (2008): 659–718. 
Burns, Arthur Lee, and Nina Heathcote. Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces, from Suez 
to the Congo. New York: Published for the Center of International Studies, 
Princeton University by Praeger, 1963. 
Burns, E. L. M. “The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping.” 
International Journal 23, no. 1 (1967): 1–17. 
Burton, Antoinette. Empire in Question: Reading, Writing, and Teaching British 
Imperialism. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011. 
Burton, Antoinette M. After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the 
Nation. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2003. 
Calandri, Elena. “Italy’s Foreign Assistance Policy, 1959-1969.” Contemporary 
European History 12, no. 4 (2003): 509–25. 
Canuel, Hugues. “French Aspirations and Anglo-Saxon Suspicions: France, Signals 
Intelligence and the UKUSA Agreement at the Dawn of the Cold War.” 
The Journal of Intelligence History 12, no. 1 (2013): 76–92. 
Carroll, Michael. “Canada and the Financing of the United Nations Emergency 
Force, 1957-1963.” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 13, no. 
1 (2002): 217–34. 
Carroll, Michael K. Pearson’s Peacekeepers Canada and the United Nations 
Emergency Force, 1956-67. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009. 
Chandler, David. Empire in Denial : The Politics of State-Building. London, Ann 
Arbor: Pluto Press, 2006. 
Chapman, Dudley H. “International Law: The United Nations Emergency Force: 
Legal Status.” Michigan Law Review 57, no. 1 (1958): 56–81. 
Chapman, John. “The Secret Dimensions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1900-
1905.” In The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922, 82–98. Abingdon; 
New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Charbonneau, Bruno. “Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New 
Interventionism in Africa.” Modern & Contemporary France 16, no. 3 
(2008): 279–95. 
Charbonneau, Bruno. France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2008. 
Charbonneau, Bruno. “Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South.” 
International Peacekeeping - London 21, no. 4 (2014): 539–40. 
———. “The Imperial Legacy of International Peacebuilding: The Case of 
Francophone Africa.” Review of International Studies 40, no. 3 (2014): 
607–30. 
277 
 
277 
 
Charbonneau, Bruno, and Wayne S. Cox. “Global Order, US Hegemony and 
Military Integration: The Canadian-American Defense Relationship.” 
International Political Sociology 2, no. 4 (2008): 305–21. 
Chazan Meir. “A Fighting Press: Reflections of Israel’s War of Independence in 
Children’s Newspapers.” Journal of Israeli Politics, Society and Culture 24, 
no. 1 (2005). 
Cohen, Maxwell. “The Demise of UNEF.” International Journal 23, no. 1 (1967): 
18–51. 
———. “The United Nations Emergency Force: A Preliminary View.” International 
Journal 12, no. 2 (1957): 109–27. 
Cohen, Michael J. “From ‘Cold’ to ‘Hot’ War: Allied Strategic and Military 
Interests in the Middle East after the Second World War.” Middle Eastern 
Studies 43, no. 5 (2007): 725–48. 
Cohen, Stuart A., and Robert O. Freedman. “Light and Shadows in the US-Israeli 
Military Ties, 1948-2010.” In Israel and the United States: Six Decades of 
US-Israeli Relations, 143–64. Boulder: Westview Press, 2012. 
Cohen Hattab, Kobi. “The Attraction of Palestine: Tourism in the Years 1850-
1948.” Journal of Historical Geography 27, no. 2 (2001): 166-. 
Cole, Babalola. “The United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: The Actions and 
Policies of the African Nations in the Congo.” 1967. 
Coleman, Bradley Lynn. “The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950-1954.” The Journal 
of Military History 69, no. 4 (2005): 1137–77. 
Collingham, E. M. Imperial Bodies: The Physical Experience of the Raj, C. 1800-
1947. Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press ; Blackwell Publishers, 2001. 
Comay, Michael. “UN Peacekeeping: The Israeli Experience.” In Peacekeeping: 
Appraisals and Proposals, 93–117. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983. 
Combs, James Joseph. “France and United Nations Peacekeeping.” International 
Organization 21, no. 2 (1967): 306–25. 
Connelly, Matthew James. Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World 
Population. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008. 
Conniff, M. L. “The Canal Builders: Making America’s Empire at the Panama 
Canal.” Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas 7, no. 2 
(2010): 97–98. 
Conrad, Sebastian. “Rethinking German Colonialism in a Global Age.” Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 41, no. 4 (2013): 543–66. 
Cook, Terry. “The Archive(s) Is a Foreign Country: Historians, Archivists, and the 
Changing Archival Landscape.” The Canadian Historical Review 90, no. 3 
(2009): 497-. 
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005. 
Cooper, Frederick, and Ann Laura Stoler. Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in 
a Bourgeois World. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 
278 
 
278 
 
Coronil, Fernando. “After Empire: Reflections on Imperialism from the Américas.” 
In Imperial Formations, 241–71. Santa Fe, Oxford: School for Advanced 
Research Press & James Currey, 2007. 
Cossali, Paul, and Clive Robson. Stateless in Gaza. London: Zed Books, 1986. 
Cottyn, Hanne. “Renegotiating Communal Autonomy. Communal Land Rights and 
Liberal Land Reform on the Bolivian Altiplano. Carangas, 1860-1930.” 
University of Ghent, 2014. 
Cox, Wayne, and Kim Nossal. “The ‘crimson’ World: The Anglo-Core, the Post-
Imperial Non-Core, and the Hegemony of American IR.” In International 
Relations Scholarship around the World, 287–307. London: Routledge, 
2009. 
Cox, Wayne S., and Kim Richard Nossal. “The ‘Crimson World’: The Anglo Core, 
the Postimperial Non-Core and the Hegemony of American IR.” In 
International Relations Scholarship around the World, 287–307. London: 
Routledge, 2009. 
Creswell, Michael. “Between the Bear and the Phoenix: The United States and the 
European Defense Community, 1950-54.” Security Studies 11, no. 4 
(2002): 89–124. 
Cunliffe, Philip. Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South. 
London: Hurst, 2013. 
———. “Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between Peacekeeping and 
Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today.” International Peacekeeping 
19, no. 4 (2012): 426–42. 
Dai, Yingcong. The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009. 
DANOR BN  XIX. Minnebok. Byens Bogtrykkeri, 1966. 
DANOR BN IV. “DANOR BN IV - April-October 1958.” DANOR BN, United 
Nations Emergency Force, 1958. 
DANOR BN IX. “DANOR BN IX - October 1960-April 1961.” DANOR BN, 
United Nations Emergency Force, 1961. 
DANOR BN VI. “DANOR BN VI - April 1959-October 1959.” DANOR BN, 
United Nations Emergency Force, 1959. 
DANOR BN VII. “DANOR BN VII - October 1959-April 1960.” DANOR BN, 
United Nations Emergency Force, 1960. 
DANOR BN VIII. “DANOR BN VIII - April-October 1960.” DANOR BN, United 
Nations Emergency Force, 1960. 
DANOR BN X. “DANOR BN X - April-October 1961.” DANOR BN, United 
Nations Emergency Force, 1961. 
DANOR BN XII. “DANOR BN XII - April-October 1962.” DANOR BN, United 
Nations Emergency Force, 1962. 
DANOR BN XV. “DANOR BN XV - October 1963-April 1964.” DANOR BN, 
United Nations Emergency Force, 1964. 
DANOR BN XVII. “DANOR BN XVII.” DANOR BN, United Nations Emergency 
Force, 1965. 
279 
 
279 
 
DANOR BN XX. “DANOR BN XX - April-October 1966.” DANOR BN, United 
Nations Emergency Force, 1966. 
DANOR BN XXI. “DANOR BN XXI - October 1966-April 1967.” DANOR BN, 
United Nations Emergency Force, 1967. 
Darby, Philip. “Rolling Back the Frontiers of Empire: Practising the Postcolonial.” 
International Peacekeeping 16, no. 5 (2009): 699–716. 
Darwin, John. After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empires, 1400-2000. 
London: Penguin Books, 2008. 
———. “An Undeclared Empire: The British in the Middle East, 1918–39.” Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27, no. 2 (1999): 159–76. 
Daugherty, William J. “Truman’s Iranian Policy, 1945-1953: The Soviet Calculus.” 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 4 
(2002): 580–93. 
De Vito, Christian Guisepp. “Micro-Spatial History: Towards a New Global 
History.” Leiden, 2014. 
Deguilhem, Randi. “Turning Syrians into Frenchmen: The Cultural Politics of a 
French Non-Governmental Organization in Mandate Syria (1920-67)--the 
French Secular Mission Schools.” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 
13, no. 4 (2002): 449–60. 
Dietl, Ralph. “Suez 1956: A European Intervention?” Journal of Contemporary 
History 43, no. 2 (2008): 259–78. 
———. “The WEU: A Europe of the Seven, 1954–1969.” Journal of Transatlantic 
Studies 7, no. 4 (2009): 431–52. 
Dimier, Véronique. The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy: 
Recycling Empire, 2014. 
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. Military Intelligence in Cyprus From the Great War to 
Middle East Crises. London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2010. 
———. “The Value to CENTO of UK Bases on Cyprus.” Middle Eastern Studies 
45, no. 4 (2009): 611–24. 
Dombroski, Kenneth R. Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International 
Regime. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Duara, Prasenjit. “The Cold War as a Historical Period: An Interpretive Essay.” 
Journal of Global History 6, no. 3 (2011): 457–80. 
———. “The Imperialism of ‘Free Nations’: Japan, Manchuko and the History of 
the Present.” In Imperial Formations, 211–40. Santa Fe, Oxford: School for 
Advanced Research Press & James Currey, 2007. 
Duffield, Mark. “Development, Territories, and People: Consolidating the External 
Sovereign Frontier.” Alternatives 32, no. 2 (2007): 225–46. 
Duffield, Mark, and Vernon Hewitt. “Introduction.” In Empire, Development and 
Colonialism: The Past in the Present, 1–15. Woodbridge, Rochester: James 
Currey, 2013. 
Duffield, Mark, and Vernon M. Hewitt, eds. Empire, Development & Colonialism: 
The Past in the Present. Woodbridge, Rochester: James Currey, 2013. 
280 
 
280 
 
Duffield, Mark R. Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World 
of Peoples. Cambridge: Polity, 2007. 
E. L. M. Burns. Between Arab and Israeli. New York: George Harrap and Co., 1962. 
Ear, Sophal. “The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia.” Asian 
Journal of Political Science 15, no. 1 (2007): 68–96. 
Echenberg, Myron. “‘Morts Pour La France’; The African Soldier in France during 
the Second World War.” Journal of African History 26, no. 4 (1985): 363–
80. 
Eckert, Carter J. Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins 
of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2014. 
Edelstein, David M. “Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past.(Book 
Review).” Political Science Quarterly 120, no. 4 (2005): 679-. 
Edwards, Paul. Unusual Footnotes to the Korean War. Osprey Publishing, 2013. 
Edwards, Paul M. United Nations Participants in the Korean War: The Contributions 
of 45 Member Countries. Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2013. 
Eide, Ingrid. “Some Factors Affecting Local Acceptance of a UN Force – A Pilot 
Project Report from Gaza.” International Problems 1, no. 2 (1966). 
———. “Some Factors Affecting Local Acceptance of a UN Force – A Pilot Project 
Report from Gaza.” In Peace, War and Defence – Essays in Peace 
Research, edited by Johan Galtung, 240–63. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 
1976. 
El Hussini, Mohrez Mahmoud. Soviet-Egyptian Relations, 1945-85. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1987. 
El Mallakh, Ragaei, and Carl McGuire. “The Economics of the Suez Canal under 
UAR Management.” The Middle East Journal 14, no. 2 (1960): 125–40. 
Elaraby, Nabil E. “UN Peacekeeping: The Egyptian Experience.” In Peacekeeping: 
Appraisals and Proposals, 65–92. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983. 
El-Eini, Roza I.M. “Government Fiscal Policy in Mandatory Palestine in the 1930s.” 
Middle Eastern Studies 33, no. 3 (1997): 570–96. 
El-Eini, Roza I.M. “Trade Agreements and the Continuation of Tariff Protection 
Policy in Mandate Palestine in the 1930s.” Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 1 
(1998): 164–91. 
Elkordy, Abdul-Hafez M. “The United Nations Peace-Keeping Functions in the 
Arab World,” 1967. 
Engholm, Carl. Fremmedlegionær og dansk oberst: Carl Engholms erindringer i krig 
og fred 1913-1979. Lyngby: Dansk historisk håndbogsforlag, 1996. 
Ergut, F. “Policing the Poor in the Late Ottoman Empire.” Middle Eastern Studies 
38, no. 2 (2002): 149–64. 
Erman, Sam. “Meanings of Citizenship in the U.S. Empire: Puerto Rico, Isabel 
Gonzalez, and the Supreme Court, 1898 to 1905.” Journal of American 
Ethnic History 27, no. 4 (2008): 5–33. 
281 
 
281 
 
Feldman, Ilana. “Ad Hoc Humanity: UN Peacekeeping and the Limits of 
International Community in Gaza.” American Anthropologist 112, no. 3 
(2010): 416–29. 
———. “Home as a Refrain: Remembering and Living Displacement in Gaza.” 
History and Memory 18, no. 2 (2000): 10–47. 
———. “Observing the Everyday.” Interventions 9, no. 3 (2011): 414–33. 
———. “The Challenge of Categories: UNRWA and the Definition of a ‘Palestine 
Refugee.’” Journal of Refugee Studies 25, no. 3 (2012): 387–406. 
Ferguson, Niall. Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire. New York: Penguin 
Press, 2004. 
Ferris, Jesse. “Guns for Cotton? Aid, Trade, and the Soviet Quest for Base Rights in 
Egypt, 1964–1966.” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 2 (2011): 4–38. 
———. “Soviet Support for Egypt’s Intervention in Yemen, 1962-1963.” Journal of 
Cold War Studies 10, no. 4 (2008): 5–36. 
Ferris, John. “Armaments and Allies: The Anglo-Japanese Strategic Relationship, 
1911-1921.” In The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922, 249–63. 
Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Fieldhouse, David Kenneth. Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958. 
Oxford university press, 2006. 
Filiu, Jean-Pierre, and John King. Gaza: A History. London: Hurst & Company, 
2014. 
Fitzgerald, Edward Peter. “Business Diplomacy: Walter Teagle, Jersey Standard, 
and the Anglo-French Pipeline Conflict in the Middle East, 1930-1931.” 
Business History Review 67, no. 2 (1993): 207–45. 
Fitzsimons, Matthew A. “The Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy.” The Review 
of Politics 19, no. 4 (1957): 419–45. 
Fleischmann, Ellen L. “The Emergence of the Palestinian Women’s Movement”, 
1929-1939.” Journal of Palestine Studies 29 (2000): 16–32. 
Frank, Alison. “The Children of the Desert and the Laws of the Sea: Austria, Great 
Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean Slave Trade in the 
Nineteenth Century.” The American Historical Review 117, no. 2 (2012): 
410–44. 
Friedman, Hal M. Creating an American Lake United States Imperialism and 
Strategic Security in the Pacific Basin, 1945-1947. Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 2001. 
Galpern, Steven G. Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and 
Postwar Imperialism, 1944-1971. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
Galtung, Johan, and Helge Hveem. “Participants in Peacekeeping Forces.” In Peace, 
War and Defence – Essays in Peace Research, 264–81. Copenhagen: 
Christian Ejlers, 1976. 
Ganser, Daniele. NATO’s Top Secret Stay-behind Armies and Terrorism in Western 
Europe. New York: Frank Cass, 2005. 
282 
 
282 
 
Garfield, S. “Tapping Masculinity: Labor Recruitment to the Brazilian Amazon 
during World War II.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 86, no. 2 
(2006): 275–308. 
Garfield, Seth. “Beholding the Miracle: Xavante Indians and Economic 
‘Development’ Under Brazilian Military Rule.” The Americas 57, no. 4 
(2001): 551–80. 
———. In Search of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States, and the Nature of a 
Region, 2013. 
———. “The Environment of Wartime Migration: Labor Transfers from the 
Brazilian Northeast to the Amazon During World War II.” Journal of 
Social History 43, no. 4 (2010): 989–1019. 
———. “The Roots of a Plant That Today Is Brazil: Indians and the Nation-State 
under the Brazilian Estado Novo.” Journal of Latin American Studies 29, 
no. 3 (1997): 747–68. 
———. “Where the Earth Touches the Sky: The Xavante Indians’ Struggle for Land 
in Brazil, 1951-1979.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 80, no. 3 
(2000): 537–63. 
Gat, Moshe. “Anatomy of Decline: Anglo-Soviet Competition in the Middle East, 
1956–67.” Israel Affairs 19, no. 4 (2013): 603–22. 
Gazit, Mordechai. “The 1956 Sinai Campaign: David Ben‐Gurion’s Policy on Gaza, 
the Armistice Agreement and French Mediation.” Israel Affairs 6, no. 3–4 
(2000): 43–67. 
Geyer, Michael, and Charles Bright. “World History in a Global Age.” American 
Historical Review 100, no. 4 (1995): 1034–60. 
Geyikdağı, V. Necla. Foreign Investment in the Ottoman Empire International Trade 
and Relations 1854-1914. London; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 
2011. 
Ghali, Mona. “United Nations Emergency Force I.” In The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, 104–30. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. 
Ghosh, Durba. “Another Set of Imperial Turns?” The American Historical Review 
117, no. 3 (2012): 772–93. 
Gibbs, David N. The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, 
Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991. 
———. “The United Nations, International Peacekeeping and the Question of 
Impartiality: Revisiting the Congo Operation of 1960.” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 38, no. 3 (2000): 359–82. 
Gluska, Ami. The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, 
Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963-1967. London: Routledge,an 
imprint of taylor & francis books ltd, 2007. 
Gnehm, Edward W. “ANZUS: The Alliance through American Eyes.” Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 2 (2001): 161–65. 
283 
 
283 
 
Go, Julian. “Chains of Empire, Projects of State: Political Education and U.S. 
Colonial Rule in Puerto Rico and the Philippines.” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 42, no. 2 (2000): 333–62. 
———. Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Goh, Daniel. “Postcolonial Disorientations: Colonial Ethnography and the Vectors 
of the Philippine Nation in the Imperial Frontier.” Postcolonial Studies 11, 
no. 3 (2008): 259–76. 
Golani, Moṭti. Israel in Search of a War: The Sinai Campaign, 1955-1956. Brighton; 
Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 1998. 
Goodrich, Leland M., and Gabriella Rosner. “The United Nations Emergency 
Force.” International Organization 11, no. 3 (1957): 413–30. 
Goodwin, Geoffrey L. “The Political Role of The United Nations: Some British 
Views.” International Organization 15, no. 4 (1961): 581–602. 
Gorman, Daniel. “Britain, India, and the United Nations: Colonialism and the 
Development of International Governance, 1945–1960.” Journal of Global 
History 9, no. 3 (2014): 471–90. 
———. “Empire, Internationalism and the Campaign against the Traffic in Women 
and Children in the 1920s.” Twentieth Century British History 19, no. 2 
(2008): 186–216. 
———. Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging. Manchester, 
New York: Manchester University Press and Palgrave, 2006. 
———. “Liberal Internationalism, The League of Nations Union, and the Mandates 
System.” Canadian Journal of History 40, no. 3 (2005): 449-. 
———. The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s, 2012. 
Gouda, Frances, and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg. American Visions of the Netherlands 
East Indies/Indonesia US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 
1920-1949. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002. 
Grandin, Greg. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise 
of the New Imperialism. New York: Holt Paperback, 2010. 
Green, Michael Cullen. Black Yanks in the Pacific: Race in the Making of American 
Military Empire after World War II. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2010. 
Greenberg, Ela. Preparing the Mothers of Tomorrow Education and Islam in 
Mandate Palestine. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010. 
Gregory, Derek. The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq. Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 
Grove, Eric. “Who to Fight in 1956, Egypt or Israel? Operation Musketeer versus 
Operation Cordage.” In Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives and Its 
Aftermath, 79–86. Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2008. 
Guettel, Jens-Uwe. German Expansionism, Imperial Liberalism and the United 
States, 1776-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
284 
 
284 
 
Hadhri, Mohieddine. “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward North Africa During the Cold 
War: From Eisenhower to Kennedy (1953–1963).” The Journal of the 
Middle East and Africa 5, no. 2 (2014): 95–110. 
Haim Grossman. “War as Child’s Play: Patriotic Games in the British Mandate and 
Israel.” Israel Studies 9, no. 1 (2004): 1–30. 
Hall, H. Duncan. Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations. London; New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971. 
Hall, Hessel Duncan. Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations. London; New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971. 
Hanhimäki, Jussi. “Self-Restraint as Containment: United States’ Economic Policy, 
Finland, and the Soviet Union, 1945–1953.” The International History 
Review 17, no. 2 (1995): 287–305. 
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000. 
Hashmi, Sohail H. “‘Zero Plus Zero Plus Zero’: Pakistan, the Baghdad Pact, and the 
Suez Crisis.” The International History Review 33, no. 3 (2011): 525–44. 
Hee Kyung, Suh. “Atrocities before and during the Korean War.” Critical Asian 
Studies 42, no. 4 (2010): 553–88. 
Heffernan, Michael. “Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: The Royal 
Geographical Society and the First World War.” Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers 21, no. 3 (1996): 504–33. 
Heikal, Mohamed. Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes. Guernsey: 
Transworld Publishers, 1988. 
Helmreich, Jonathan E. “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Belgian Congo in the 1950s.” 
The Historian 58, no. 2 (1996): 315–28. 
Hevia, James. The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-
Building in Asia, 2012. 
Hewitt, Vernon. “Empire, International Development & the Concept of Good 
Government.” In Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the 
Present, 30–44. Woodbridge, Rochester: James Currey, 2013. 
Higate, Paul, and Marsha. Henry. Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and 
Performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia. London; New York: Zed Books, 
2009. 
“History/Timeline.” Accessed October 14, 2015. http://www.parsons.com/about-
parsons/Pages/history-timeline.aspx. 
Hobson, J. M., and George Lawson. “What Is History in International Relations?” 
Millennium 37, no. 2 (2008): 415–35. 
Hocknell, Peter. “Contested Development: A Retrospective of the UN Development 
Programme in Cyprus.” In The Work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting 
Peace and Development, 157–92. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave, 2001. 
Hodge, Joseph Morgan. Triumph of the Expert Agrarian Doctrines of Development 
and the Legacies of British Colonialism. Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2007. 
285 
 
285 
 
Hoffman, Bruce. “The Palestine Police Force and the Challenges of Gathering 
Counterterrorism Intelligence, 1939–1947.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, 
no. 4 (2013): 609–47. 
Holmila, Antero. “The Holocaust and the Birth of Israel in British, Swedish and 
Finnish Press Discourse, 1947–1948.” European Review of History 16, no. 
2 (2009): 183–200. 
Holt, Andrew. “‘No More Hoares to Paris’: British Foreign Policymaking and the 
Abyssinian Crisis, 1935.” Review of International Studies 37, no. 3 (2011): 
1383–1401. 
Hom, Stephanie Malia. “Empires of Tourism: Travel and Rhetoric in Italian 
Colonial Libya and Albania, 1911–1943.” Journal of Tourism History 4, 
no. 3 (2012): 281–300. 
Houbert, Jean. “Russia in the Geopolitics of Settler Colonization and 
Decolonization.” Round Table 86, no. 344 (1997): 549–61. 
Howe, Stephen. “British Worlds, Settler Worlds, World Systems, and Killing 
Fields.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40, no. 4 (2012): 
691–725. 
Huber, Valeska. Channelling Mobilities: Migration and Globalisation in the Suez 
Canal Region and Beyond, 1869-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013. 
———. “Colonial Seas: The ‘International’ Colonisation of Port Said and the Suez 
Canal and Beyond, 1869-1914.” European Review of History: Revue 
Européenne D’histoire 19, no. 1 (2012): 141–61. 
———. “Connecting Colonial Seas: The ‘International Colonisation’ of Port Said 
and the Suez Canal During and After the First World War.” European 
Review of History 19, no. 1 (2012): 141–61. 
Hughes, Geraint. “Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South.” 
Round Table 103, no. 3 (2014): 353–56. 
Hughes, Matthew. “A British ‘Foreign Legion’? The British Police in Mandate 
Palestine.” Middle Eastern Studies 49, no. 5 (2013): 696–711. 
———. “Terror in Galilee: British-Jewish Collaboration and the Special Night 
Squads in Palestine during the Arab Revolt, 1938–39.” Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 43, no. 4 (2015): 590–610. 
Hulbert, Jeff. “Right-Wing Propaganda or Reporting History?: The Newsreels and 
the Suez Crisis of 1956.” Film History 14, no. 3/4 (2002): 261–81. 
Hurewitz, J. C. “The UN and Disimperialism in the Middle East.” International 
Organization 19, no. 3 (1965): 749–63. 
Husseini, Hassan. “A ‘MIDDLE POWER’ IN ACTION: CANADA AND THE 
PARTITION OF PALESTINE.” Arab Studies Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2008): 
41–55. 
Huxley, Margo. “Geographies of Governmentality.” In Space, Knowledge and 
Power: Foucault and Geography, edited by Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart 
Elden, 185–204. Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2007. 
286 
 
286 
 
Iandolo, Alessandro. “Imbalance of Power: The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 
1960–1961.” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 2 (2014): 32–55. 
———. “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Soviet Model of Development’ in West Africa, 
1957–64.” Cold War History 12, no. 4 (2012): 683–704. 
Ignatieff, Michael. Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan. London: Vintage, 2003. 
Ilana Feldman. Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority and the Work of Rule, 
1917-1967. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008. 
———. “The Quaker Way: Ethical Labor and Humanitarian Relief.” American 
Anthropologist 34, no. 4 (2007): 689–705. 
Ilan Pappe. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
———. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oxford: OneWorld Publications 
Limited, 2006. 
International Who’s Who 1966-67. London: Europa Publications, 1966. 
Issawi, Charles. An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa. 
London: Routledge, 2010. 
Jackson, Robert H, and Georg Sørensen. Introduction to International Relations: 
Theories and Approaches, 2013. 
James, Alan. The Politics of Peace-Keeping. New York: Published for the Institute 
for Strategic Studies by Praeger, 1969. 
Jarboe, Andrew Tait, and Richard Standish Fogarty, eds. Empires in World War I: 
Shifting Frontiers and Imperial Dynamics in a Global Conflict. London; 
New York: I.B. Tauris; Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
Jayasuriya, Laksiri, David Walker, and Jan Gothard. Legacies of White Australia: 
Race, Culture, and Nation. Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 
2003. 
Jensen, Ole. Kompagni Larsen: Vordingborg - Ægypten Tur-Retur November 1956 - 
Maj 1957. Lyngby: private publication, 2005. 
Jersild, Austin. “The Soviet State as Imperial Scavenger: ‘Catch Up and Surpass’ in 
the Transnational Socialist Bloc, 1950–1960.” The American Historical 
Review 116, no. 1 (2011): 109–32. 
Joan M. Schwarts, and Terry Cook. “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of 
Modern Memory.” Archival Science 2, no. 1 (2002): 1–19. 
Johnson, Edward. “A Permanent UN Force: British Thinking after Suez.” Review of 
International Studies 17, no. 3 (1991): 251–66. 
———. “The Diplomats’ Diplomat: Sier Pierson Dixon, Ambassador to the United 
Nations.” In Whitehall and the Suez Crisis, edited by Saul Kelly and 
Anthony Gorst, 178–98. London; Portland: Frank Cass, 2000. 
———. “‘The Umpire on Whom the Sun Never Sets’: Dag Hammarskjold’s 
Political Role and the British at Suez.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 8, no. 1 
(1997): 249–78. 
Johnson, Robert. “Command of the Army, Charles Gwynn and Imperial 
Policing:The British Doctrinal Approach to Internal Security in Palestine, 
287 
 
287 
 
1919–29.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43, no. 4 
(2015): 570–89. 
Jones, Clive. Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries 
and Mandarins : Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action. 
Eastbourne; Portland, Or.: Sussex Academic Press, 2010. 
Jones, Clive, Tore T Petersen, and Clive Jones. Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies, 
2013. 
Jordheim, Helge, and Iver B. Neumann. “Empire, Imperialism and Conceptual 
History.” Journal of International Relations and Development 14, no. 2 
(2011): 153–85. 
Kabalo, Paula. “Dialogues with Young People David Ben-Gurion’s Youth 
Campaigns, 1939–1954.” Israel Affairs 14, no. 2 (2008): 218–36. 
Kagarlitsky, Boris. Empire of the Periphery: Russia and the World System. London; 
Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2008. 
Kahng, Gyoo‐hyoung. “Zionism, Israel, and the Soviet Union: A Study in the Rise 
and Fall of Brief Soviet‐Israeli Friendship from 1945 to 1955.” Global 
Economic Review 27, no. 4 (1998): 95–107. 
Karbo, Tony. “Peace-Building in Africa.” In Peace and Conflict in Africa, 113–32. 
London ; New York: Zed Books, 2008. 
Karetny, Eli, and Thomas G. Weiss. “UNRRA’s Operational Genious and 
Institutional Design.” In Wartime Origins and the Future of the United 
Nations, edited by Dan Plesch and Thomas G. Weiss, 99–120. London; 
New York: Routledge, 2015. 
Kassimeris, Christos. “United States Intervention in Post-War Greek Elections: 
From Civil War to Dictatorship.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 20, no. 4 
(2009): 679–96. 
Kavalski, Emilian. Encounters with World Affairs: An Introduction to International 
Relations, 2015. 
Kent, John. America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo. 
London, New York: Routledge, 2010. 
Ker-Lindsay, James. “The Origins of the UN Presence in Cyprus.” In The Work of 
the UN in Cyprus: Promoting Peace and Development, 50–73. Basingstoke, 
New York: Palgrave, 2001. 
Khalaf, Issa. “The Effect of Socioeconomic Change on Arab Societal Collapse in 
Mandate Palestine.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 29, no. 1 
(1997): 93–112. 
Khalid, Adeeb. “The Soviet Union as an Imperial Formation: A View from Central 
Asia.” In Imperial Formations, 113–40. Santa Fe; Oxford: School for 
Advanced Research Press & James Currey, 2007. 
Khan, Yasmin. “Sex in an Imperial War Zone: Transnational Encounters in Second 
World War India.” History Workshop Journal 73, no. 1 (2012): 240–58. 
Khanduri, Chandra B, and Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research. Thimayya: 
An Amazing Life. New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2006. 
288 
 
288 
 
Khodarkovsky, Michael. Russia’s Steppe Frontier : The Making of a Colonial 
Empire, 1500-1800 : Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East 
European Studies. Indiana University Press, 2002. 
Kim, Jean J. “Experimental Encounters: Filipino and Hawaiian Bodies in the U.S. 
Imperial Invention of Odontoclasia, 1928–1946.” American Quarterly 62, 
no. 3 (2010): 523–46. 
Kim, Taewoo. “Limted War, Limited Targets.” Critical Asian Studies 44, no. 3 
(2012): 467–92. 
Kinloch-Pichat, Stephen. A UN “Legion”: Between Utopia and Reality. London; 
New York: Frank Cass, 2004. 
Kjeldsen, Niels. Fredens soldater. Copenhagen: Hjemmevaernsfonden, 1958. 
Kjersti G. Berg. “UNRWA and the Politics of Relief.” In Interpreting Welfare and 
Relief in the Middle East, edited by Nefissa Naguib and Inger Marie 
Okkerhaug. Leiden: Brill, 2008. 
Klepak, Hal. “Power Multiplied or Power Restrained? The United States and 
Multilateral Institutions in the Americas.” In US Hegemony and 
International Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions, 
edited by Rosemany Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, 
240–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay. “Soviet Oil Politics and the Suez Canal.” The World Today 
31, no. 10 (October 1, 1975): 397–405. 
Knight, John. “Securing Zion? Policing in British Palestine, 1917–39.” European 
Review of History 18, no. 4 (2011): 523–43. 
Kolko, Gabriel. The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 
1943-1945. New York: Pantheon Books, 1990. 
Korn, Alina. “From Refugees to Infiltrators: Constructing Political Crime in Israel in 
the 1950s.” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 31, no. 1 (2003): 
1–22. 
Kramer, Paul A. “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between 
the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910.” The Journal of 
American History 88, no. 4 (2002): 1315–53. 
———. “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the 
World.” The American Historical Review 116, no. 5 (2011): 1348–91. 
———. “Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine-
American War as Race War*.” Diplomatic History 30, no. 2 (2006): 169–
210. 
———. The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, & the 
Philippines. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. 
Krige, John. American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in 
Europe. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006. 
———. “The Peaceful Atom as Political Weapon: Euratom and American Foreign 
Policy in the Late 1950s.” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 38, no. 
1 (2008): 5–44. 
289 
 
289 
 
Kristiansen, Preben. Danske soldater i Gaza og Congo; [København: Forlaget 
Fremad, 1962. 
Kroizer, Gad. “From Dowbiggin to Tegart: Revolutionary Change in the Colonial 
Police in Palestine during the 1930s.” The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 32, no. 4 (2004): 115–33. 
Kumaraswamy, P. R. India’s Israel Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010. 
Kunz, Diane B. The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991. 
———. The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1991. 
Kushner, Tony. “‘Without Intending Any of the Most Undesirable Features of a 
Colour Bar’: Race Science, Europeanness and the British Armed Forces 
during the Twentieth Century.” Patterns of Prejudice 46, no. 3–4 (2012): 
339–74. 
Kuss, Susanne. “Co-Operation between German and French Troops During the 
Boxer War in China, 1900/1: The Punitive Expedition to Baoding.” In 
Imperial Cooperation and Transfer, 1870-1930, 197–218. New York; 
London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015. 
Kuzmarov, Jeremy. Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation Building 
in the American Century. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
2012. 
Kyle, Keith. Suez. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991. 
———. Suez Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East. London; New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2011. 
Labouisse, Henry, and UNRWA. “Annual Report of the Director of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.” 
New York; Beirut: UNRWA and UN General Assembly, June 30, 1957. 
———. “Special Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.” New York; Beirut: 
UNRWA and UN General Assembly, June 30, 1954. 
———. “Special Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.” New York; Beirut: 
UNRWA and UN General Assembly, December 15, 1956. 
Lal, N. “India and the Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, 1967.” 
International Studies 13, no. 2 (1974): 309–23. 
Lal, Nand. From Collective Security to Peace-Keeping: A Study of India’s 
Contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67. Calcutta: 
Minerva Associates, 1975. 
Laron, Guy. “‘Logic Dictates That They May Attack When They Feel They Can 
Win:’ the 1955 Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal, the Egyptian Army, and Israeli 
Intelligence.” The Middle East Journal 63, no. 1 (2009): 69–84. 
———. “Playing with Fire: The Soviet-Syrian-Israeli Triangle, 1965-1967.” Cold 
War History 10, no. 2 (2010): 163–84. 
290 
 
290 
 
———. “The Domestic Sources of Israel’s Decision to Launch the 1956 Sinai 
Campaign.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 2 (2015): 
200–218. 
Lau, Albert. “Introduction: South East Asia and the Cold War.” In Southeast Asia 
and the Cold War, 1–13. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2012. 
Lawrence, Mark Atwood. “Explaining the Rise to Global Power: U.S. Policy toward 
Asia and Africa since 1941.” In America in the World: The Historiography 
of American Foreign Relations since 1941, edited by Frank Costigliola and 
Michael J. Hogan, 236–59. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Lawson, George. “The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations.” 
European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 2 (2012): 203–26. 
Lee, Na Young. “The Construction of Military Prostitution in South Korea during 
the U.S. Military Rule, 1945-1948.” Feminist Studies 33, no. 3 (2007): 
453–81. 
Lee, Steven. “The United States, the United Nations, and the Second Occupation of 
Korea, 1950-1951.” Japan Focus 8, no. 50 (2010). 
Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. “The United States and Egypt: Confrontation and 
Accommodation in Northeast Africa, 1956–60.” Middle Eastern Studies 29, 
no. 2 (1993): 321–38. 
Lesch, David W. “When the Relationship Went Sour: Syria and the Eisenhower 
Administration.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 28, no. 1 (1998): 92–107. 
Levey, Zach. “French-Israeli Relations, 1950-1956: The Strategic Dimension.” In 
Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives and Its Aftermath, 87–106. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. 
Levin, Noam, Ruth Kark, and Emir Galilee. “Maps and the Settlement of Southern 
Palestine, 1799–1948: An historical/GIS Analysis.” Journal of Historical 
Geography 36 (2010): 1–18. 
Levine, Philippa. Gender and Empire. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004. 
———. Prostitution, Race & Politics – Policing Venereal Disease in the British 
Empire. New York: Routledge, 2003. 
Lieven, Dominic. “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities.” 
Journal of Contemporary History 30, no. 4 (October 1, 1995): 607–36. 
Lindner, Ulrike. “New Forms of Knowledge Exchange between Imperial Powers: 
The Development of Institut Colonial International (ICI) Since the End of 
the Nineteenth Century.” In Imperial Cooperation and Transfer, 1870-1930, 
57–78. New York; London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015. 
Lippman, Thomas W. “The View from 1947: The CIA and the Partition of 
Palestine.” The Middle East Journal 61, no. 1 (2007): 17-. 
Little, Douglas. “Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-
1958.” The Middle East Journal 44, no. 1 (1990): 51–75. 
Lobell, Steven E. “Second Face of Security Strategies: Anglo-German and Anglo-
Japanese Trade Concessions During the 1930s.” Security Studies 17, no. 3 
(2008): 438–67. 
291 
 
291 
 
Lohr, Eric. Russian Citizenship : From Empire to Soviet Union. Harvard University 
Press, 2012. 
Louis, William Roger, and Roger Owen. Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its 
Consequences. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University 
Press, 1989. 
Love, Eric Tyrone Lowery. Race over Empire Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-
1900. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 
Lovering, Timothy John. “British Colonial Administrations’ Registry Systems: A 
Comparative Study of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.” Archival 
Science 10, no. 1 (2010): 1–23. 
Lowe, Peter. “The Round Table, the Dominions, and the Anglo‐Japanese Alliance, 
1911–1922.” Round Table 86, no. 341 (1997): 81–93. 
———. “Waging Limited Conflict: The Impact of the Korean War on Anglo-
American Relations, 1950-1953.” In War and Cold War in American 
Foreign Policy, 1942-62, edited by Dale Carter and Robin Clifton, 133–55. 
Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. 
Luard, Evan. A History of the United Nations. The Years of Western Domination, 
1945-1955. London: Macmillan, 1982. 
———. The Age of Decolonization, 1955-1965. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989. 
Lucas, Scott. The Lion’s Last Roar: Britain and the Suez Crisis. Manchester, UK; 
New York: Manchester University Press, 1996. 
Lucas, Scott, and Morey. “The Hidden ‘alliance’: The CIA and MI6 before and after 
Suez.” Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (2000): 95–120. 
Lucas, W. Scott. Divided We Stand: Britain, the US, and the Suez Crisis. London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1991. 
Lunt, James D. Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century. London: 
Macdonald Futura, 1981. 
Lutz, Catherine. The Bases of Empire the Global Struggle against U.S. Military 
Posts. London: Pluto Press, 2009. 
Lyons, Gene M. “American Policy and The United Nation’s Program For Korean 
Reconstruction.” International Organization 12, no. 2 (1958): 180–92. 
Macekura, Stephen. “The Point Four Program and U.S. International Development 
Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 128, no. 1 (2013): 127–60. 
MacQueen, Norrie. Peacekeeping and The International System. Milton Park, New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
———. The United Nations since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War. Essex, 
U.K.; New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999. 
Maloney, Sean M. Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-
1970. St. Catharines: Vanwell Pub., 2002. 
Manela, R. Gerwarth, and Manela. “The Great War as a Global War: Imperial 
Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911-1923.” Diplomatic 
History 38, no. 4 (2014): 786–800. 
Marcovich, Anne, and Terry Shinn. “Where Is Disciplinarity Going? Meeting on the 
Borderland.” Social Science Information 50, no. 3–4 (2011): 582–606. 
292 
 
292 
 
Mariager, Rasmus. “‘British Leadership Is Experienced, Cool-Headed and 
Predictable’: Anglo-Danish Relations and the United States from the End 
of the Second World War to the Cold War.” Scandinavian Journal of 
History 37, no. 2 (2012): 246–60. 
———. I tillid og varm sympati: Dansk-britiske forbindelser og USA under den 
tidlige kolde krig. Copenhagen: Musculanums forlag : Købehavns 
universitet, 2006. 
Marsh, Steve. “Continuity and Change: Reinterpreting the Policies of the Truman 
and Eisenhower Administrations toward Iran, 1950-1954.” Journal of Cold 
War Studies 7, no. 3 (2005): 79–123. 
———. “The United States, Iran and Operation ‘Ajax’: Inverting Interpretative 
Orthodoxy.” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2003): 1–38. 
Marten, Kimberly Zisk. Enforcing the Peace: Learning from The Imperial Past. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 
Masalha, Nur. “The 1956–57 Occupation of the Gaza Strip: Israeli Proposals to 
Resettle the Palestinian Refugees.” British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 23, no. 1 (1996): 55–68. 
———. The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, Narrating the Subaltern, 
Reclaiming Memory. London; New York: Zed Books, 2012. 
Massey, Doreen. For Space. London; Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005. 
———. Space, Place and Gender. London: Polity Press, 1994. 
Matray, James I. “Korea’s War at 60: A Survey of the Literature.” Cold War History 
11, no. 1 (2011): 99–129. 
Maurer, Noel, and Carlos Yu. “What T. R. Took: The Economic Impact of the 
Panama Canal, 1903–1937.” The Journal of Economic History 68, no. 3 
(2008): 686–721. 
Mawby, Spencer. “Britain’s Last Imperial Frontier: The Aden Protectorates, 1952–
59.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 29, no. 2 (2001): 75–
100. 
Mays, Terry M. Africa’s First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981-
1982. Westport: Praeger, 2002. 
Mazower, Mark. “An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the 
Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century.” International Affairs 82, no. 3 
(2006): 553–66. 
———. Governing the World: The Rise and Fall of an Idea. London: Allen Lane, 
2012. 
———. No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 
McAlister, Melani. Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the 
Middle East since 1945. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. 
McGregor, P. M. J. “The History of No 2 Squadron, SAAF, in the Korean War.” 
Military History Journal 4, no. 3 (1978): 1–11. 
McPherson, Alan. “World War I and US Empire in the Americas.” In Empires in 
World War I: Shifting Frontiers and Imperial Dynamics in a Global 
293 
 
293 
 
Conflict, edited by Andrew Tait Jarboe and Richard Stan Fogarty, 328–50. 
London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014. 
Mearsheimer, John J, and Stephen M Walt. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign 
Policy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007. 
Mehos, Donna, and Suzanne Moon. “The Uses of Portability: Circulating Expers in 
the Technopolitics of the Cold War and Decolonization.” In Entangled 
Geographies, edited by Gabrielle Hecht, 43–74. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
2011. 
Mehta, Coleman. “The CIA Confronts the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948–1951.” Journal of 
Cold War Studies 13, no. 1 (2011): 101–45. 
Merridale, Catherine. Ivan’s War: The Red Army 1939-1945. London: Faber and 
Faber, 2005. 
Miles, Steven B. “Imperial Discourse, Regional Elite, and Local Landscape on the 
South China Frontier, 1577-1722.” Journal of Early Modern History 12, no. 
2 (2008): 99–136. 
Miller, Clark A. “‘An Effective Instrument of Peace’: Scientific Cooperation as an 
Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1938-1950.” In Global Power 
Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs, edited by 
John Krige and Kai-Henrik Barth, 133–60. Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2006. 
Mills, Nigel, ed. Presenting the Romans: Interpreting the Frontiers of the Roman 
Empire World Heritage Site. Heritage Matters. Woodbridge: The Boydell 
Press, 2013. 
Mills, William C. “The Chamberlain-Grandi Conversations of July–August 1937 
and the Appeasement of Italy.” The International History Review 19, no. 3 
(1997): 594–619. 
Milošević, Nemanja. “Yugoslavia, USA and NATO in the 1950s.” In How Far Is 
NATO from the Western Balkans?, edited by Miroslav Hadžić, Sonja 
Stojanović, and Filip Ejdus, 64–80. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security 
Policy, 2007. 
Miskel, James F. “US Post-War Naval Strategies in the Mediterranean Region.” In 
Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future, 
edited by John B. Hattendorf, 147–63. Abingdon; New York: Frank Cass, 
2005. 
Mohan, J. “Parliamentary Opinions on the Suez Crisis in Australia and New 
Zealand.” International Studies 2, no. 1 (1960): 60–79. 
Mohan, Jitendra. “India, Pakistan, Suez and The Commonwealth.” International 
Journal 15, no. 3 (July 1, 1960): 185–99. 
———. “South Africa and the Suez Crisis.” International Journal 16, no. 4 (1961): 
327–57. 
Mommsen, Wolfgang J. “Preface.” In Imperialism and After: Continuities and 
Discontinuities, IX–XII. London; Boston; Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986. 
294 
 
294 
 
Mommsen, Wolfgang J., and Jürgen Osterhammel. Imperialism and After: 
Continuities and Discontinuities. London, Boston: German Historical 
Institute & Allen & Unwin, 1986. 
Monakov, Mikhail. “The Soviet Naval Presence in the Mediterranean at the Time of 
the Six Day War.” In The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War, 
144–71. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford University 
Press, 2008. 
Moon, Seungsook. “Regulating Desire, Managing the Empire: U.S. Military 
Prostitution in South Korea, 1945-1970.” In Over There:  Living with the 
U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present, edited by Maria 
Höhn and Seungsook Moon, 39–77. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010. 
Mordechai Bar-On. The Gates of Gaza: Israel’s Road to Suez and Back. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 
Morewood, Steve. “Prelude to the Suez Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British 
Dominance over the Suez Canal, 1869-1956.” In Reassessing Suez 1956: 
New Perspectives and Its Aftermath, 13–34. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. 
Morgan, William Michael. Pacific Gibraltar U.S.-Japanese Rivalry over the 
Annexation of Hawaiʻi, 1885-1898. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 
2011. 
Morrissey, John. “The Imperial Present: Geography, Imperialism and Its Continued 
Effects.” In The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Cultural Geography, 
edited by Noala C. Johnson, Richard H. Schein, and Jamie Winders, 494–
507. Somerset: John Wiley & Sons, 2013. 
Mudiam, Prithvi Ram. India and the Middle East. London: British Academic Press, 
1994. 
Nachmani, Amikam. “Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49.” 
Journal of Contemporary History 25, no. 4 (1990): 489–522. 
Nagata, Naomi. “International Control of Epidemic Diseases from a Historical and 
Cultural Perspective,” 73–90. Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, 
London: Springer, 2014. 
Naidu, Mumulla Venkat Rao. “United Nations Force: Legal Theory and Political 
Practice,” 1967. 
Nand Lal. From Collective Security to Peace-Keeping: A Study of India’s 
Contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67. Calcutta: 
Minerva Associates, 1975. 
Nasser, Maher. “Palestine Refugee Records Project.” Ottawa, 2003. 
Nathanson, Roby, and Ron Mandelbaum. “Aid and Trade: Economic Relations 
between the United States and Israel, 1948-2010.” In Israel and the United 
States Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations, edited by Robert O. Freedman, 
124–42. Boulder: Westview Press, 2012. 
National Defense Research Institute (U.S.), ed. Overseas Basing of U.S. Military 
Forces : An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits. Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013. 
295 
 
295 
 
“NATO Mini. Comm. Paris 11th-14th December 1956,” n.d. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c561214a.htm. 
Neff, Donald. Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East. 
New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1981. 
Neilson, Keith. “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and British Strategic Foreign Policy, 
1902-1914.” In The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922, 48–63. 
Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Nicholas, Herbert. “UN Peace Forces and the Changing Globe: The Lessons of Suez 
and Congo.” International Organization 17, no. 2 (1963): 320–37. 
Nichols, David A. Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis : Suez and the 
Brink of War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011. 
Nicosia, Francis. “Arab Nationalism and National Socialist Germany, 1933–1939: 
Ideological and Strategic Incompatibility.” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 12, no. 3 (1980): 351–72. 
Nilsson, Mikael. “Aligning the Non-Aligned: A Re-Interpretation of Why and How 
Sweden Was Granted Access to US Military Materiel in the Early Cold 
War, 1948–1952.” Scandinavian Journal of History 35, no. 3 (2010): 290–
309. 
———. “American Propaganda, Swedish Labor, and the Swedish Press in the Cold 
War: The United States Information Agency (USIA) and Co-Production of 
U.S. Hegemony in Sweden during the 1950s and 1960s.” The International 
History Review 34, no. 2 (June 1, 2012): 315–45. 
Nordholt, Henk Schulte. “Indonesia in the 1950s: Nation, Modernity, and the Post-
Colonial State.” Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde 167, no. 4 
(2011): 386-. 
Noreng, Øystein. Crude Power Politics and the Oil Market. London: I.B. Tauris, 
2006. 
Norris, Jacob. “Repression and Rebellion: Britain’s Response to the Arab Revolt in 
Palestine of 1936–39.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36, 
no. 1 (2008): 25–45. 
Nöthling, F.J. “A Dilemma of Conflicting Interests: South Africa, Suez and Egypt, 
1947–1956.” Kleio 35, no. 1 (2003): 41–61. 
Nugent, David. “Knowledge and Empire: The Social Sciences and United States 
Imperial Expansion.” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 17, 
no. 1 (2010): 2–44. 
Nur Masalha. Land without a People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians, 1949-
1956. London: Faber and Faber, 1997. 
O’Brien, Patricia. “Remaking Australia’s Colonial Culture?: White Australia and Its 
Papuan Frontier 1901–1940.” Australian Historical Studies 40, no. 1 
(2009): 96–112. 
O’Brien, Phillips Payson. “Britain and the End of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.” In 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922, 264–84. Abingdon; New York: 
Routledge, 2009. 
296 
 
296 
 
———. “The Titan Refreshed: Imperial Overstretch and the British Navy before the 
First World War.” Past & Present, no. 172 (2001): 146–69. 
Oldenziel, Ruth. “Islands: The United States as a Networked Empire,” 13–42. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011. 
O’Reilly, Marc J. “Following Ike? Explaining Canadian‐US Co‐operation during the 
1956 Suez Crisis.” The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 
35, no. 3 (1997): 75–107. 
Oren, Amiram, Oren Barak, and Assaf Shapira. “‘How the Mouse Got His Roar’: 
the Shift to an ‘Offensive-Defensive’ Military Strategy in Israel in 1953 
and Its Implications.” The International History Review 35, no. 2 (2013): 
356–76. 
Oren, Michael B. “Ambivalent Adversaries: David Ben-Gurion and Israel vs. the 
United Nations and Dag Hammarskjold, 1956-57.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 27, no. 1 (1992): 89–127. 
Ouellet, Eric. “Multinational Counterinsurgency: The Western Intervention in the 
Boxer Rebellion 1900–1901.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 20, no. 3–4 
(2009): 507–27. 
Özbek, Nadir. “‘Beggars’ and ‘Vagrants’ in Ottoman State Policy and Public 
Discourse, 1876–1914.” Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 5 (2009): 783–801. 
———. “Policing the Countryside: Gendarmes of the Late 19th Century Ottoman 
Empire (1876-1908).” International Journal of Middle East Studies 40, no. 
1 (2008): 47–67. 
Padelford, Norman J. “Financing Peacekeeping: Politics and Crisis.” International 
Organization 19, no. 3 (1965): 444–62. 
Painter, David. “The Marshall Plan and Oil.” Cold War History 9, no. 2 (2009): 
159–75. 
Painter, David S. “The Marshall Plan and Oil.” Cold War History 9, no. 2 (2009): 
159–75. 
Pappé, Ilan. The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge. London; New 
York: Verso, 2014. 
Parmar, Inderjeet. “American Hegemony, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rise 
of Academic International Relations in the United States.” In The Invention 
of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, 
and the 1954 Conference on Theory, edited by Nicholas Guilhot, 182–209. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 
Pedersen, Susan. “Back to the League of Nations.” The American Historical Review 
112, no. 4 (2007): 1091–1117. 
———. “Metaphors of the Schoolroom: Women Working the Mandates System of 
the League of Nations.” History Workshop Journal 66, no. 1 (2008): 188–
207. 
———. “The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument.” Geschichte Und 
Gesellschaft 32, no. 4 (2006): 560–82. 
Pelt, Mogens. Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations 1949-
1974. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2006. 
297 
 
297 
 
Perdue, Peter C. “Empire and Nation in Comparative Perspective: Frontier 
Administration in Eighteenth-Century China.” Journal of Early Modern 
History 5, no. 4 (2001): 282–304. 
Petersen, Nikolaj. “SAC at Thule: Greenland in the U.S. Polar Strategy.” Journal of 
Cold War Studies 13, no. 2 (2011): 90–115. 
Petersen, Tore Tingvold. “Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The Struggle 
for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952-1957.” The International History Review 14, 
no. 1 (1992): 71–91. 
Pettyjohn, Stacie L. U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783-2011, 2012. 
Pierre Bourdieu. “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic 
Field.” In State/Culture – State-Formation after the Cultural Turn, edited by 
George Steinmetz, 53–75. London: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
Pietsch, Tamson. Empire of Scholars: Universities, Networks and the British 
Academic World, 1850-1939. Manchester, New York, Vancouver: 
Manchester University Press, Palgrave Macmillan and UBC Press, 2013. 
Plesch, Daniel. America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and 
a Forged Peace. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011. 
Podeh, Elie. “The Drift towards Neutrality: Egyptian Foreign Policy during the 
Early Nasserist Era, 1952–55.” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 1 (January 
1996): 159–78. 
Poiger, Uta G. “Imperialism and Empire in Twentieth-Century Germany.” History 
and Memory 17, no. 1 (2005): 117–43. 
Popp, Roland. “Accommodating to a Working Relationship: Arab Nationalism and 
US Cold War Policies in the Middle East, 1958-60.” Cold War History 10, 
no. 3 (2010): 397–427. 
Porat, Dan A. “Between Nation and Land in Zionist Teaching of Jewish History, 
1920-1954.” Journal of Israeli Politics, Society and Culture 27, no. 2 
(2008): 253–68. 
Pouligny, Béatrice. Peace Operations Seen from below: UN Missions and Local 
People. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2006. 
Power, Jane. “‘Real Unions’: Arab Organised Labor in British Palestine.” Arab 
Studies Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1998): 13–28. 
Preston, Diana. The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China’s War on 
Foreigners That Shook the World in the Summer of 1900. New York: 
Walker, 2000. 
Price, John. Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific. Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2011. 
———. “The ‘Cat’s Paw’: Canada and the United Nations Temporary Commission 
on Korea.” The Canadian Historical Review 85, no. 2 (June 1, 2004): 297–
321. 
Raben, Remco. “A New Dutch Imperial History?: Perambulations in a Prospective 
Field.” BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review 128, no. 1 (2013): 5–30. 
298 
 
298 
 
Rajak, Svetozar. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: 
Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953-57. Milton Park, 
Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011. 
Razack, Sherene. Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, 
Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism. Toronto; Buffalo: University of 
Toronto Press, 2004. 
Razack, Sherene. Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affairs, 
Peacekeeping and New Imperialism. Toronto: Universy of Toronto Press, 
2004. 
“Rehabilitation and Development of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheres in South 
Korea.” Food and Agriculture Organization, 1954. 
Renton, James. “Changing Languagesof Empire and the Orient: Britain and the 
Invention of the Middle East, 1917–1918.” Historical Journal 50, no. 3 
(2007): 645–67. 
Rhodes, Benjamin D. “Reassessing ‘Uncle Shylock’: The United States and the 
French War Debt, 1917-1929.” The Journal of American History 55, no. 4 
(1969): 787–803. 
Riga, Liliana. The Bolsheviks and the Russian Empire, 2012. 
Rikhye, Indar Jit. The Future of Peacekeeping. New York: International Peace 
Academy, 1989. 
———. The Theory & Practice of Peacekeeping. New York: Published for the 
International Peace Academy by St. Martin’s Press, 1984. 
Rikhye, Indar Jit, Michael Harbottle, and Bjørn Egge. The Thin Blue Line: 
International Peacekeeping and Its Future. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974. 
Roberts, Adam. “Evan Luard as a Writer on International Affairs.” Review of 
International Studies 18, no. 1 (1992): 63–73. 
Roberts, Mary Louise. “The Price of Discretion: Prostitution, Venereal Disease, and 
the American Military in France, 1944–1946.” The American Historical 
Review 115, no. 4 (2010): 1002–30. 
———. What Soldiers Do: Sex and the American GI in World War II France, 2014. 
Rock, David. “War and Postwar Intersections:  Latin America and the United 
States.” In Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions, 15–
40. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. 
Rodao, F. “Japan and the Axis, 1937-8: Recognition of the Franco Regime and 
Manchukuo.” Journal of Contemporary History 44, no. 3 (2009): 431–47. 
Rogan, Eugene L. The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East, 
2015. 
Rohde, Joy. Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research 
During the Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013. 
———. “Gray Matters: Social Scientists, Military Patronage, and Democracy in the 
Cold War.(Essay).” The Journal of American History 96, no. 1 (2009): 99–
122. 
299 
 
299 
 
Rose, S. O. “Race, Empire and British Wartime National Identity, 1939-45.” 
Historical Research 74, no. 184 (2001): 220-. 
Rosenfeld. “From Emergency Relief Assistance to Human Development and Back: 
UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees, 1950-2009.” Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 28, no. 2–3 (2009): 286–317. 
Roslyng-Jensen, Palle. “Til Kamp Mod Arabisk Nationalisme.” In Nye Fronter I 
Den Kolde Krig. Gyldendal, 2010. 
Rosner, Gabriella. The United Nations Emergency Force. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1963. 
Rotbard, Sharon. “Wall and Tower (Homa Umigdal): The Mold of Israeli 
Architecture.” In A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli 
Architecture, edited by Rafi Segal and Eyal Weisman, 38–57. Tel Aviv-
Jaffa; New York: Baberl; Verso, 2003. 
Rubinstein, Robert. “Peacekeeping and the Return of Imperial Policing.” 
International Peacekeeping 17, no. 4 (2010): 457–70. 
Rubinstein, Robert A. Peacekeeping under Fire: Culture and Intervention. Boulder: 
Paradigm Publishers, 2008. 
Ruzicic-Kessler, Karlo. “Italy and Yugoslavia: From Distrust to Friendship in Cold 
War Europe.” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 19, no. 5 (2014): 641–64. 
Ryan, W. Michael. “The Influence of the Imperial Frontier on British Doctrines of 
Mechanized Warfare.” Albion 15, no. 2 (1983): 123–42. 
Sackley, Nicole. “The Village as Cold War Site: Experts, Development, and the 
History of Rural Reconstruction.” Journal of Global History 6, no. 3 
(2011): 481–504. 
Salim Yaqub. “No War, No Peace: Egypt and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1952-1973.” 
Zeitgescichte 31, no. 2 (2004): 64–87. 
Saltford, John. The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 
1962-1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal. London; New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
Samura, Michelle, and Brooke Neely. “Social Geographies of Race: Connecting 
Race and Space.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 34, no. 11 (2011): 1933–52. 
Sandars, Christopher T. America’s Overseas Garrisons, 2000. 
———. America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Sayigh, Yazid. Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National 
Movement, 1949-1993. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford 
University Press, 1997. 
Sayward, Amy L. The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and 
Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the 
World, 1945-1965. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006. 
Schick, Irvin Cemil. “Print Capitalism and Women’s Sexual Agency in the Late 
Ottoman Empire.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East 31, no. 1 (2011): 196–216. 
300 
 
300 
 
Schlesinger, Stephen. “Cryptoanalysis for Peacetime: Codebreaking and the Birth 
and the Structure of the United Nations.” Cryptologia 19, no. 3 (1995): 
217–35. 
Schmidl, Erwin A. “The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth 
Century.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 10, no. 2 (1999): 4–20. 
———. “The International Operation in Albania, 1913–14.” International 
Peacekeeping 6, no. 3 (1999): 1–10. 
Schraeder, Peter J. “Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S.-French Competition 
in Francophone Africa.” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 3 (2000): 
395–419. 
Sessions, Gene A. “The Multilateralization of the Monroe Doctrine: The Rio Treaty, 
1947.” World Affairs 136, no. 3 (1973): 259–74. 
Sever, Ayşegül. “A Reluctant Partner of the US over the Suez? Turkey and the Suez 
Crisis.” In Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives and Its Aftermath, 
123–32. Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2008. 
Seydi, Süleyman. “Making a Cold War in the Near East: Turkey and the Origins of 
the Cold War, 1945–1947.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 17, no. 1 (2006): 
113–41. 
Shabaneh, Ghassan. “Education and Identity: The Role of UNRWA’s Education 
Programmes in the Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism.” Journal of 
Refugee Studies 25, no. 4 (2012): 491–513. 
Shachar, Nathan. The Gaza Strip: Its History and Politics. Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2010. 
Shannon, Kelly R. “Truman and the Middle East.” In Companion to Harry Truman, 
edited by Daniel S. Margolies, 362–88. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
2002. 
Sharp, Walter R. “The United Nations System in Egypt: A Country Survey of Field 
Operations.” International Organization 10, no. 2 (1956): 235–60. 
Shaw, Tony. Eden, Suez, and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during 
the Suez Crisis. London; New York; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 
I.B. Tauris ; In the U.S.A. and Canada distributed by St. Martin’s, 1996. 
Sim, David. A Union Forever the Irish Question and U.S. Foreign Relations in the 
Victorian Age. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013. 
Sinanoglou, Penny. “British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929–1938.” 
Historical Journal 52, no. 1 (2009): 131–52. 
Sinclair, Georgina. At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial 
Endgame, 1945-80. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006. 
———. “‘Get into a Crack Force and Earn £20 a Month and All Found…’: The 
Influence of the Palestine Police upon Colonial Policing 1922–1948.” 
European Review of History 13, no. 1 (2009): 49–65. 
Sirrs, Owen L. A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the 
Mukhabarat, 1909-2009. Milton Park, New York: Routledge, 2010. 
301 
 
301 
 
Sköld, Nils. I fredens tjänst: Sveriges medverkan i Förenta nationernas 
fredsbevarande styrka i Mellanöstern 1956-67. [Stockholm]: Almqvist & 
Wiksell International, 1990. 
Sluglett, Peter. “An Improvement on Colonialism? The ‘A’ Mandates and Their 
Legacy in the Middle East.” International Affairs 90, no. 2 (2014): 413–27. 
Smallman, Shawn C. “Military Terror and Silence in Brazil, 1910–1945.” Canadian 
Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 24, no. 1 (1999): 5–27. 
———. “The Professionalization of Military Terror in Brazil, 1945-1964.” Luso-
Brazilian Review 37, no. 1 (2000): 117–28. 
Smith, Neil. American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to 
Globalization. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. 
Smith, Simon C. Reassessing Suez 1956 New Perspectives on the Crisis and Its 
Aftermath. Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2008. 
Soytürk, Mehmet. “Modern State and Security: The Gendarmerie System in France, 
Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.” History Studies 4, no. 2 
(2012). 
Sprye, Graham. “Canada, the United Nations Emergency Force, and the 
Commonwealth.” International Affairs 33, no. 3 (1957): 289–300. 
Steans, Jill, Lloyd Pettiford, and Thomas Diez. Introduction to International 
Relations: Perspectives and Themes. Harlow, England; New York: 
Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005. 
Steinmetz, George, ed. Sociology & Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a 
Discipline. Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2013. 
Stewart, Andrew. Empire Lost Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War. 
London: Continuum, 2008. 
Stoler, Ann Laura. Along the Archival Grain – Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial 
Common Sense. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 
———. Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial 
Rule. 2nd Revised edition edition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2010. 
———. “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance.” Archival Science 2, no. 1 
(2002): 87–109. 
———. Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995. 
Stoler, Ann Laura, and Cooper Cooper Frederick. “Between Metropole and Colony: 
Rethinking a Research Agenda,” 1–43. Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: 
University of California Press, 1995. 
Stoler, Mark A. Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand 
Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2000. 
Strang, G. Bruce. “‘The Worst of All Worlds:’ Oil Sanctions and Italy’s Invasion of 
Abyssinia, 1935–1936.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 19, no. 2 (2008): 210–
35. 
302 
 
302 
 
Stromberg Childers, Kristen. “The Second World War as a Watershed in the French 
Caribbean.” Atlantic Studies 9, no. 4 (2012): 409–30. 
Sufian, Sandra M. Healing the Land and the Nation: Malaria and the Zionist Project 
in Palestine, 1920-1947. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
Swedenburg, Ted. Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the 
Palestinian National Past. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas press, 2003. 
Syriatou, Athena. “National, Imperial, Colonial and the Political: British Imperial 
Histories and Their Descendants.” Historein 12 (2013): 38–67. 
———. “National, Imperial, Colonial and the Political: British Imperial Histories 
and Their Descendants.” HISTOREIN 12 (2013): 38. 
Takeyh, Ray. The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine the US, Britain, and Nasser’s 
Egypt, 1953-57. New York: St. Martin’s Press, in association with St. 
Antony’s College, Oxford, 2000. 
Tal, David. “Symbol Not Substance? Israel’s Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles, 
1960–1962.” The International History Review 22, no. 2 (2000): 304–17. 
Tamari, Salim, and Elia Zureik. “The UNRWA Archives on Palestinian Refugees - 
A Feasability Study for Policy and Applied Research - Phase 1.” Jerusalem: 
The Institute of Palestine Studies, 1996. 
Tandon, Yashpal. “UNEF, the Secretary-General, and International Diplomacy in 
the Third Arab-Israeli War.” International Organization 22, no. 2 (1968): 
529–56. 
Tavares, Antonio C. “The Japanese Colonial State and the Dissolution of the Late 
Imperial Frontier Economy in Taiwan, 1886-1909.” The Journal of Asian 
Studies 64, no. 2 (2005): 361–85. 
Teitler, Gerke. “The Mixed Company: Fighting Power and Ethnic Relations in the 
Dutch Colonial Army 1890-1920.” In Colonial Armies in South East Asia, 
edited by Tobias Rettig and Karl Hack, 154–68. Abingdon; New York: 
Routledge, 2009. 
The Rockefeller Foundation. “The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1956.” 
New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1956. 
Thomas, Martin. Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder 
after 1914. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. 
———. “France’s North African Crisis, 1945-1955: Cold War and Colonial 
Imperatives.” History 92, no. 306 (2007): 207–34. 
Thoral, M. -C. “Colonial Medical Encounters in the Nineteenth Century: The French 
Campaigns in Egypt, Saint Domingue and Algeria.” Social History of 
Medicine 25, no. 3 (2012): 608–24. 
Thornhill, Michael T. “Eden, Churchill and the Battle of the Canal Zone, 1951-
1954.” In Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives and Its Aftermath, 35–
51. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. 
Thorpe, Rosemary. “The Latin American Economies in the 1940s.” In Latin 
America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions, 41–58. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994. 
303 
 
303 
 
Tickner, J. Ann. “Retelling IR’s Foundational Stories: Some Feminist and 
Postcolonial Perspectives.” Global Change, Peace & Security 23, no. 1 
(2011): 5–13. 
Tignor, Robert L. “In the Grip of Politics: The Ford Motor Company of Egypt, 
1945-1960.” The Middle East Journal 44, no. 3 (1990): 383–98. 
Tilchin, William N. “The United States and the Boer War.” In International Impact 
of the Boer War, 107–20. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 
Tilley, Helen, and Robert J Gordon. Ordering Africa: Anthropology, European 
Imperialism and the Politics of Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2007. 
Tomlinson, Jim. “The Commonwealth, the Balance of Payments and the Politics of 
International Poverty: British Aid Policy, 1958-1971.” Contemporary 
European History 12, no. 4 (2003): 413–29. 
Tooze, J. Adam. The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order 
1916-1931. London, New York: Allen Lane, 2014. 
Toprani, Anand. “Germany’s Answer to Standard Oil: The Continental Oil 
Company and Nazi Grand Strategy, 1940–1942.” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 37, no. 6–7 (2014): 949–73. 
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. 
Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1995. 
Tshibambe, Germain Ngoie, Grace Maina, and Erik Melander. “Analysing the Peace 
Process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo : From War to the 
Uncertain Peace.” In Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa, 161–
91. Capetown: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2016. 
Turner, Barry. Suez, 1956: The First Oil War. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2006. 
Turner, Jackson Frederick, and John Mack Faragher. Rereading Frederick Jackson 
Turner: “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” and Other 
Essays. New Haven (Conn.); London: Yale univ. press, 1998. 
Turoma, Sanna, and Maxim Waldstein. Empire De/centered: New Spatial Histories 
of Russia and the Soviet Union. Farnham; Burlington: Ashgate, 2013. 
Tuttle, and Tuttle. “Forerunners of Frederick Jackson Turner: Nineteenth-Century 
British Conservatives and the Frontier Thesis.” Agricultural History 41, no. 
3 (1967): 219–27. 
Tyrrell, Ian. “American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History.” The 
American Historical Review 96, no. 4 (1991): 1031–55. 
Umetsu, Hiroyuki. “The Birth of ANZUS: America’s Attempt to Create a Defense 
Linkage between Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.” International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4, no. 1 (2004): 171–96. 
Uri Ben-Elizer. “A Nation-in-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel’s First 
Years.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 37, no. 2 (1995): 264–
85. 
Urquhart, Brian. A Life in Peace and War. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 
———. Ralph Bunche: An American Life. New-York; London: W.W. Norton, 
1993. 
304 
 
304 
 
Urquhart, Brian E. “United Nations Peace Forces and the Changing United Nations: 
An Institutional Perspective.” International Organization 17, no. 2 (1963): 
338–54. 
van Der Veur, Paul. “The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique.” International 
Organization 18, no. 1 (1964): 53–73. 
Vardi, Gil-li. “‘Pounding Their Feet’: Israeli Military Culture as Reflected in Early 
IDF Combat History.” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 2 (2008): 295–
324. 
Vego, Milan. “Soviet and Russian Strategy in the Mediterranean Since 1945.” In 
Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future, 
edited by John B. Hattendorf, 164–92. Abingdon; New York: Frank Cass, 
2005. 
Venkataramani, M. S. “Oil and Us Foreign Policy During the Suez Crisis 1956-7.” 
International Studies 2, no. 2 (1960): 105–52. 
Villaume, Poul. Allieret med forbehold: Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig : en 
studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949-1961. København: Eirene, 1995. 
Waage, Hilde Henriksen. “How Norway Became One of Israel’s Best Friends.” 
Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 2 (2000): 189–211. 
———. “Norway and a Major International Crisis: Suez ‐ the Very Difficult Case.” 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 9, no. 3 (1998): 211–41. 
Waever, Ole. “The Sociology of a Not so International Discipline: American and 
European Developments in International Relations.” International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 687–727. 
Watson, Brent Byron. Far Eastern Tour the Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953. 
Montreal; Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002. 
Weis, Anthony John. The Global Food Economy: The Battle for the Future of 
Farming. London; New York; Halifax; Winnipeg: Zed Books ; Fernwood, 
2007. 
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the 
Making of Our Times. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. 
Wilmington, Martin W. “The Middle East Supply Center: A Reappraisal.” The 
Middle East Journal 6 (1952): 144–66. 
———. The Middle East Supply Centre. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1971. 
Wilson, Kathleen. “Old Imperialisms and New Imperial Histories: Rethinking the 
History of the Present.” Radical History Review, no. 95 (2006): 211–34. 
Wilson, Keith. “The Boer War in the Context of Britain’s Imperial Problems.” In 
International Impact of the Boer War, edited by Keith Wilson, 158–67. 
New York: Palgrave, 2001. 
Wiseman, Henry. Peacekeeping, Appraisals and Proposals. New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1983. 
Wolf, Eric R. Europe and the People without History. Edited by Thomas Hylland 
Eriksen. Berkeley, Calif.; London: University of California Press, 2010. 
305 
 
305 
 
Woodwards, Rachel. “From Military Geography to Militarism’s Geographies: 
Disciplinary Engagements with the Geographies of Militarism and Military 
Activities.” Progress in Human Geography 29, no. 6 (2005): 718–40. 
Yael Darr. “Nation Building and War Narratives for Children: War and Militarism 
in Hebrew 1940’s and 1950’s Children’s Literature.” Paedagogica Historica 
48, no. 4 (2012): 601–13. 
Yaqub, Salim. Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the 
Middle East. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 
Yasigh, Sayid. Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National 
Movement, 1949-1993. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
Yeşilbursa, B. “The American Concept of the ‘Northern Tier’ Defence Project and 
the Signing of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 1953-54.” Middle Eastern 
Studies 37, no. 3 (2001): 59–110. 
Zaman, Rashed Uz, and Biswas, Niloy Ranjan. “Bangladesh’s Participation in UN 
Peacekeeping Missions and Challenges for Civil–Military Relations: A 
Case for Concordance Theory.” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 3 
(2014): 324–44. 
Zanotti, Laura. Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, 
and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era. University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011. 
Zeidan, Abdel-Latif M. The United Nations emergency force: 1956-1967. Stockh.: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976. 
Zureik, Elia. “Constructing Palestine through Surveillance Practices.” British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 28, no. 2 (2001): 205–27. 
 
 
M
A
R
TIN
 O
TTO
VAY JØ
R
G
EN
SEN
R
EVISITIN
G
 TH
E FIR
ST U
N
ITED
 N
ATIO
N
S PEA
C
EK
EEPIN
G
 IN
TER
VEN
TIO
N
 IN
 EG
YPT 
A
N
D
 TH
E G
A
ZA STR
IP, 1956-1967: A C
A
SE O
F IM
PER
IA
L M
U
LTILATER
A
LISM
?
ISSN (online): 2246-1256
ISBN (online): 978-87-7112-713-3
